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Integrated Reporting (IR) has emerged as a new corporate reporting approach to 
communicating to stakeholders about organisational value creation. IR is expected to 
produce better corporate reporting for stakeholders and promote greater transparency and 
accountability in the capital market. IR is not currently mandatory for Chinese companies. 
However, in view of the serious environmental pollution and social problems facing 
China and given that IR has the potential to contribute to societal and environmental well-
being, IR is expected to gain momentum. Although only one Chinese (mainland) 
company has published integrated reports, a number of Chinese companies have traces of 
IR in their corporate reports (i.e., annual reports, sustainability reports, and corporate 
social responsibility reports). IR is important for China but there is currently no Chinese 
specific IR framework that comprehensively considers factors that are context-specific to 
China. Thus, the overall research objective of this thesis is to develop an IR framework 
for China and apply the framework to evaluate IR disclosure practices of Chinese listed 
companies.  
 
There has been a proliferation of CSR, sustainability, and intellectual capital studies; 
however, IR-related studies in the Chinese context are scarce. IR studies have not 
designed a context-specific IR framework that comprehensively considers the contextual 
factors inherent in the jurisdictions they investigate. Moreover, very few studies adopt a 
combination of a weighted IR disclosure index and a scoring system that are specifically 
designed for a specific jurisdictional context to examine IR disclosure practices. In 
particular, the scoring systems of previous studies lack consideration of the connectivity 
between financial and non-financial information, and the connectivity between 
quantitative and qualitative information. Another gap in the extant IR literature is that 
although many studies have used stakeholder consultation to collect participants’ views 
on the implementation of IR, those studies lack the participation of a broad range of 
stakeholder groups. 
 
This study provides an interpretation of the IR disclosure practices of Chinese companies 
using a framework of key theoretical underpinnings of stakeholder, agency, signalling, 




The research methodology adopted in this study is a mixed methods approach. The choice 
of the research methodology is appropriate for the interpretive and statistical analysis 
approach as well as influenced by the author’s worldview, training, and experience. After 
two rounds of questionnaire surveys, a weighted IR disclosure index consisting of 68 
items is developed in consultation with 51 Chinese stakeholders. The weighted index 
takes into consideration China’s idiosyncratic cultural, economic, political, legal, 
international, social, and environmental factors. The weighted IR disclosure index and a 
scoring system are then applied as instruments for content analysis to the top 100 Chinese 
listed companies’ corporate reports for the years 2014-2018. The collected data are 
quantified and analysed to gauge the extent and quality of IR disclosures. Following the 
evaluation of IR disclosure practices, the study also conducts a number of hypothesis tests 
to examine the determinants of IR disclosure practices and the effect of IR disclosure 
practices on agency costs. Lastly, the third round of questionnaire survey is conducted to 
gain the opinions of 51 Chinese stakeholders on the barriers to the adoption of IR and 
their recommendations for IR implementation in China. These surveys, evaluations and 
tests form the basis for recommendations for a framework of best IR practices in China. 
 
The results indicate that the IR disclosure practices of Chinese companies have been 
improving over the period 2014-2018. The extent of IR disclosures by Chinese listed 
companies is satisfactory, but the quality of IR disclosures still has significant room for 
improvement. Furthermore, there are a number of IR disclosure items that show a gap 
between the stakeholders’ expectations and the actual IR disclosure practices. This study 
indicates that there are differences in IR disclosure practices between A-share firms and 
dual A-and H-share firms, between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs, and 
between firms in China and firms in other countries. This study also finds that there are 
anomalies in the conciseness and readability of corporate reports of Chinese listed 
companies. The findings indicate that many Chinese companies have already initiated the 
adoption of an IR approach for presenting disclosures in their corporate reports. However, 
IR disclosure practices (the extent and quality of IR disclosures) by some Chinese 
companies are at a low level. It is also found that pressures from customers, employees, 
and communities drive IR disclosure practices. Financial leverage, independent directors, 
CEO duality, and profitability also impact the IR disclosure practices of Chinese firms. 
Moreover, both the extent of IR disclosures and the quality of IR disclosures negatively 
affect agency costs. Additionally, the analysis of stakeholder perceptions reveals that 
eleven factors are barriers or challenges to implementing IR in China. Further, successful 
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implementation of IR practices in China requires the support of the government as well 
as initiatives on education, organisations, technology, assurance, and activities. 
 
Several theoretical and practical implications are evident in the study. The findings 
indicate that there are three incentives motivating Chinese companies to adopt an IR 
approach: (1) to mitigate information asymmetry between the organisation and all 
stakeholders; (2) to signal superior quality, legitimacy and conformity to all stakeholders; 
and (3) to discharge accountability to all stakeholders. In this study, the findings regarding 
IR practices in China intensify socio-political theories (stakeholder theory, legitimacy 
theory, institutional theory). However, the findings both support and detract from 
economics-based theories (agency theory and signalling theory). The study also reveals 
that IR practices tend to be policy-driven and culturally-embedded in China. The study 
suggests that “integration” in IR means the integration of five dimensions: time (past-
present-future); qualitative and quantitative information; financial and non-financial 
information; positive and negative information; and internal and external stakeholders. 
Specific policies and regulations for mandating IR can be designed with stakeholders’ 
participation, such as for certain sectors, for SOEs as well as non-SOEs, and for A- and 
H-share firms. The sustainability report and the annual report could be incorporated 
together; the pages should be shortened, and convoluted language and jargon should be 
avoided. 
 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, the current study is the first to extensively 
investigate IR practices in China. Specifically, the current study is the first to provide a 
holistic contextual analysis of IR practices in the Chinese context by comprehensively 
considering a number of aspects. This thesis also contributes to the methodology of 
evaluating IR disclosure practices in a unique way that comprises a combination of a list 
of IR disclosure items (an unweighted IR disclosure index), a weighting system and a 
scoring system that are specifically designed for the Chinese context. Furthermore, both 
the extent and the quality of IR disclosures are used respectively to examine the 
relationship between a set of factors and IR disclosure practices by Chinese firms. 
Analysing the relationship between potential impact factors and IR disclosure practices 
provides insights on factors that influence IR disclosure practices. This study also 
provides direct evidence of the positive effect of IR disclosure practices on mitigating 




There are seven critical reflections in this thesis. Firstly, IR practices in China are 
complex and multifaceted, requiring comprehensive attention to many aspects. Using the 
mixed methods approach in this study is appropriate and is important to the multi-
objective of the thesis. Secondly, there are three considerations for choosing appropriate 
theories for IR studies: suiting the nature of IR, interconnecting, and being adaptive to the 
context. Thirdly, a contextual approach, which can reflect contextual features, is 
important to the contextual nature of IR. Fourthly, the ultimate purpose of IR is to tell the 
story of organisational value creation for all stakeholders well and effectively. Fifthly, the 
decision by the top management to adopt IR or to change IR disclosure practices depends 
on external pressures from stakeholders, external incentives, and internal incentives. 
Sixthly, Chinese contextual factors have been changing and their impacts on IR disclosure 
practices are dynamic. Further, tensions may exist between contextual factors, resulting 
in an effect on IR practices. Lastly, as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, IR is in transition 
towards a new format. 
 
Several lessons were learnt by the author in undertaking this study. Firstly, including all 
the possible disclosure items in an IR disclosure index is unrealistic. Secondly, the 
difficulty of content analysis limits the production of studies relating to IR disclosure 
practices. Thirdly, when doing survey studies, some cultural attributes in China may 
impede a researcher to successfully approach stakeholders who have no previous 
association with the researcher. Lastly, the IR framework for China established in this 
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1 CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the thesis and highlights the key aspects that form 
the structure of the thesis. The objective of this thesis is to develop an IR framework and 
apply the framework to evaluate the IR disclosure practices of Chinese listed companies. 
An interrelated objective of this thesis is to test the determinants of IR disclosure practices 
of Chinese listed companies and the effect of IR disclosure practices on agency costs. 
Based on the findings of the evaluation, testing, and surveys, recommendations for the 
implementation of IR practices in China are proposed. 
 
The rest of this chapter is structured in the following manner. Section 1.2 presents the 
origin and global developments of IR practices. Section 1.3 describes the Chinese setting 
for IR practices. Section 1.4 presents a review on relevant theories underlying IR practices. 
Section 1.5 provides a literature review of the extant studies on IR practices. Section 1.6 
describes the research objectives and questions. Section 1.7 and section 1.8 introduce the 
research methodology and methods, respectively. The scope and limitations of this thesis 
are stated in section 1.9. The structure of the thesis is provided in section 1.10. Section 
1.11 concludes the chapter. 
 
1.2 The origin and global developments of IR practices 
The origin of IR practices can be traced to developments in early corporate reporting 
practices such as Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting (CSRR) and Sustainability 
Reporting (SR). IR incorporates a number of features (e.g., intellectual capital, corporate 
social responsibility, and strategy) of early corporate reporting practices and is becoming 
more relevant in the current era because it shows some clear advantages over early 
corporate reporting practices (see Eccles & Krzus, 2010; García-Sánchez et al., 2013; 
Steenkamp, 2018). IR also overcomes some limitations of early corporate reporting 
practices (see Adams, 2015; Gleeson-White, 2014). The early corporate reporting 
practices often provide cluttered, duplicated, incomplete, and disconnected information; 
therefore more and more scholars (such as Burgman & Roos, 2007; Cordazzo, 2005; 
Hutton, 2004; Kolk & Pinske, 2010; Pedrini, 2007) call for the provision of inter-
connected information in an integrated manner. IR is regarded as the most significant 
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reporting innovation for companies since the introduction of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) practices (Kee et al., 2014). 
 
Developments in corporate reporting practices and related regulations worldwide are 
heading towards the adoption of IR practices (EY, 2014; Howitt, 2016). South Africa was 
the first country to explicitly mandate (on an apply or explain basis) companies listed in 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange to publish integrated reports and to follow its local IR 
framework, the King III Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (known as 
King III) (Cheng et al., 2014). The UK and some countries in the European Union, 
especially Germany and France, also moved towards mandating IR. For example, the 
amendment of the Fourth and Seventh Accounting Directives in European Union, the 
Companies Act 2006 of UK, German Accounting Standard No.15, and Grenelle II of 
France can be seen as the implementation of IR (EY, 2014; Howitt, 2016). However, IR 
is still on a voluntary adoption basis in most countries, as for example in Malaysia, 
Singapore, India, Turkey and Japan, where the voluntary adoption of IR has been backed 
by their governments. 
 
A significant global IR development is the establishment of the International Integrated 
Reporting Council (IIRC). The International Integrated Reporting Framework (IIRF) 
prescribed by IIRC is regarded as a significant achievement (Eccles & Krzus, 2014). The 
framework consists of two fundamental concepts (value creation; capital), seven guiding 
principles (strategic focus and future orientation; connectivity of information; stakeholder 
relationships; materiality; conciseness; reliability and completeness; and consistency and 
comparability), and seven substantive content elements (business model; risks and 
opportunities; strategy and resource allocation; performance; outlook; organisational 
overview and external macro-environment; and governance). Currently, the framework 
is the most commonly used international guideline by scholars and practitioners of IR 
research and adoption. 
 
In this present study, IR is a corporate reporting that provides interconnected material 
financial and non-financial information, including but not limited to strategy, governance, 
risk, performance and prospects, to stakeholders, demonstrating to them about an 
organisation’s past, present and future, and how the organisation creates and sustains 




1.3 The Chinese Setting 
Since 2009, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) 
have required certain listed companies to disclose information on the environment, social 
responsibility, and corporate governance. This mandate has resulted in the majority of 
Chinese listed companies publishing stand-alone CSR reports and other non-financial 
reports as a part of their annual reports. Although these reports are not integrated reports, 
Chinese listed companies have accumulated some experiences in compiling non-financial 
reports (Yang et al., 2012). IR is now gaining momentum in China. The IR Example 
database website of IIRC indicates that there is only one company, China General Nuclear 
(CGN) Power, releasing integrated reports in mainland China. There are five Hong Kong-
based firms included in the IR Example database website: China Light & Power (CLP) 
Group, The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), Link Real Estate 
Investment Trust (Link REIT), Pacific Basin Shipping Limited, and Swire Pacific 
Limited (Russell, 2017). In addition, a Hongkong company called The Hongkong and 
Shanghai Hotels claimed that its annual report was prepared in accordance with IIRF1. 
Chinese government agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the 
academic community are also showing increasing interest in IR practices (see CBCSD, 
2015; Li, 2013; Yang et al., 2012). However, there is no IR framework to support the 
trend in China; therefore, it is important to develop an IR framework to provide guidelines 
for Chinese companies. This thesis is aims to contribute towards the development of IR 
in China.   
 
Heterogeneity in contextual factors in different countries causes corporate reporting to 
differ from country to country (Matemane & Wentzel, 2019). For instance, comparative 
studies have shown that culture affects variations in CSR reporting practices between 
countries (Vitolla et al., 2019b). Visser (2008) and Shareef et al. (2014) believe 
jurisdiction-specific factors are important considerations for developing a non-financial 
reporting framework in different countries. It is also important to consider factors that are 
context-specific to China when developing a Chinese-specific IR framework. Hence, the 
IR framework developed in this thesis considers these Chinese context-specific factors. 
 
 
1 Please see 2017 annual report of The Hongkong and Shanghai Hotels (https://www.hshgroup.com/-
/media/Files/HSH/Financial-Reports/2017/EW00045-2017-Annual-Report.ashx) and 2018 annual report 




1.4 Theoretical framework 
Scholars have drawn from diverse, and often complementary, theoretical perspectives, 
including stakeholder theory, agency theory, signalling theory, legitimacy theory, and 
institutional theory to explain IR practices.  
 
Stakeholder theory is concerned with the relationships of an organisation with a variety 
of stakeholders in society. In this theory, stakeholders are crucial to the survival of 
companies and have expectations about an organisation’s behaviours and the 
corresponding effects of those behaviours (Deegan, 2002; Gray et al., 1996). To meet 
stakeholders’ expectations, the primary aim of IR is to enhance accountability for 
stakeholders via integrated reports (Steenkamp, 2018). 
 
Agency theory postulates that the provision of better disclosures to the market may reduce 
information asymmetries between managers and investors (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
IR can thus be seen as a monitoring mechanism that allows investors to supervise 
managers’ behaviours and assess whether managers’ actions meet investors’ interests, 
leading to lower information asymmetry between investors and managers and lower 
agency costs (De Villiers & Hsiao, 2017; Fasan & Mio, 2017; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
 
Signalling theory is used to depict the behaviour when two parties have access to 
asymmetric information and is concerned with reducing the asymmetry between these 
two parties (Spence, 2002). This theory contends that information disclosure can be seen 
as signalling the superior quality of a company (Spence, 1973). A high-quality company 
signals its advantages to the market using information disclosure to distinguish itself from 
low-quality companies (Frías-Aceituno et al., 2014). IR is regarded as one of the most 
effective and strategic ways to send positive signals to its users (Inchausti, 1997; Qu et 
al., 2015; Silvestri et al., 2017).  
 
In voluntary corporate reporting studies, legitimacy theory is one of the most cited 
theories (Tilling, 2004). This theory is based on the notion of a social contract between 
the organisation and society (Deegan et al., 2002). Organisational legitimacy is seen as a 
‘resource’ upon which an organisation can be dependent for its survival (Deegan, 2006, 
p.162). According to legitimacy theory, by communicating organisational legitimisation 
efforts, IR principally serves to gain, maintain and repair organisational legitimacy (Chu 




In IR studies, institutional theory is a frequently used framework to explain the response 
to institutional pressure in the process of IR adoption (Frías-Aceituno et al., 2013a; Jensen 
& Berg, 2012; Wild & Van Staden, 2013). Three types of institutional isomorphism, 
coercive, mimetic, and normative exert pressures on organisations to adopt IR (Farooq & 
Maroun, 2017; Vaz et al., 2016). Organisations adopt IR to meet institutional expectations 
(De Villiers & Hsiao, 2017; Fuhrmann, 2019).  
 
By integrating the above five theories, a theoretical framework is established. Based on 
the theoretical framework, there are three drivers for companies to improve their IR 
disclosure practices: to mitigate information asymmetry between the organisation and all 
stakeholders; to signal superior quality, legitimacy, and conformity to all stakeholders; 
and to discharge accountability to all stakeholders. Direct and indirect costs are the main 
factors that lead to poor IR disclosure practices. 
 
1.5 Literature review  
The primary areas of focus in previous IR studies are IR disclosures, evaluation of IR 
disclosure practices, and hypothesis testing in relation to the determinants and effects of 
IR practices, including the adoption of IR and IR disclosure practices. In order to identify 
IR disclosures, many extant studies use existing corporate reporting frameworks. For 
instance, some previous studies (e.g., Pavlopoulos et al., 2017; Sofian & Dumitru, 2017; 
Stent & Dowler, 2015) adopt disclosure items prescribed by existing IR frameworks (i.e., 
IIRF (IIRC, 2013); King III Report (IoDSA, 2009); King IV Report (IoDSA, 2016)), 
while other studies (e.g., Turturea, 2015; Van Zyl, 2013) apply disclosure items 
prescribed by sustainability reporting frameworks (such as GRI G3 guidelines; GRI G4 
guidelines). In order to gauge IR disclosure practices, some studies use the ASSET 4 
database (Arguelles et al., 2015; Mervelskemper & Streit, 2017), Bloomberg ESG scores 
(Bernardi & Stark, 2018), and IR awards and recognitions (Barth et al., 2017; Martinez, 
2015), while other studies used a disclosure index (Lee & Yeo, 2016; Zhou et al., 2017).  
 
Some studies (Frías-Aceituno et al., 2013b; Jensen & Berg, 2012; Lai et al., 2017) analyse 
the determinants (e.g., firm-level characteristics and country-level characteristics) of IR 
practices; other studies (Barth et al., 2017; Lee & Yeo, 2016; Zhou et al., 2017) 





However, previous IR studies have several limitations. First, studies on IR in the Chinese 
context are scarce. The nature of the scarcity can be explained by the fact that IR is not 
currently a mandatory requirement for Chinese companies. Second, studies seldom 
developed their jurisdiction-specific IR frameworks by considering country-specific 
factors from local stakeholder perspectives. Thirdly, few studies adopted the weighted 
disclosure index and a scoring system with quality criteria to examine IR disclosure 
practices so far. In particular, the scoring systems of previous studies lack consideration 
of the connectivity between financial information and non-financial information, and the 
connectivity between quantitative information and qualitative information. Lastly, 
although many studies use stakeholder consultation to collect participants’ views on the 
implementation of IR, those studies lack the participation of a broad range of stakeholder 
groups.  
 
1.6 Research objectives and research questions  
The overall research objective of this thesis is to develop an IR framework for China and 
apply the framework to evaluate IR disclosure practices2 of Chinese listed companies. 
This research objective comprises the following sub-objectives: 
⚫ Design a Chinese IR disclosure index that includes a list of IR disclosure items 
and a weighting system.  
⚫ Assess IR disclosure practices of Chinese listed companies using a scoring system 
and the above IR disclosure index.   
⚫ Develop and test several hypotheses with respect to the determinants of IR 
disclosure practices and the effect of IR disclosure practices on agency costs. 
⚫ Make recommendations for the implementation of IR practices in China. 
 
On the basis of the above research objectives, the principal research questions of this 
thesis are as follows: 
⚫ What should be a Chinese IR framework?  
⚫ How do the Chinese listed companies perform with regard to their IR disclosure 
practices? 
⚫ What are the firm determinants of IR disclosure practices of Chinese listed 
 





⚫ What is the association between IR disclosure practices and agency costs? 
⚫ What factors need to be considered in implementing IR practices in China? 
 
1.7 Research methodology 
Two main research paradigms commonly recognised by scholars are positivism and 
interpretivism (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). Collis and Hussey (2014. p. 13) define 
positivism as “a paradigm that originated in the natural sciences. It rests on the assumption 
that social reality is singular and objective and is not affected by the act of investigating 
it” while interpretivism is defined as “a paradigm…rests on the assumption that social 
reality is in our minds and is subjective and multiple. Therefore, social reality is affected 
by the act of investigating it. The research involves an inductive process with a view to 
providing the interpretive understanding of social phenomena within a particular context” 
(Collis & Hussey, 2014. p. 44). Positivism emphasises quantitative methodology while 
interpretivism emphasises qualitative methodology (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998).   
 
Positivism and interpretivism are often viewed as opposites and incompatible with each 
other (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). Pragmatism, as the third paradigm, is concerned with 
the compatibility between positivism and interpretivism (Collis & Hussey, 2014; 
Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). Pragmatism contends that mixed methods methodology 
can be the third methodology in addition to qualitative methodology and quantitative 
methodology (Hall & Howard, 2008). Mixed methods is a research methodology that 
combines elements of both qualitative and quantitative methods to collect, analyse, and 
interpret both quantitative and qualitative data (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2009; Johnson et 
al., 2007). This thesis applies mixed methods in order to achieve its multiple objectives. 
Both quantitative and qualitative data are collected, processed, analysed and interpreted.  
 
1.8 Research methods 
According to Collis and Hussey (2014, p.59), a research method is “a technique for 
collecting and/or analysing data”. Initially, a preliminary IR disclosure index is identified 
based on a review of extant literature and consideration of some factors unique to China. 
The IR disclosure index is sent to 51 participants to validate the relevance of the items 
for Chinese companies. The criteria for stakeholder selection are that the selected 
stakeholder must be a Chinese (mainland) resident and familiar with corporate reports. 
The constitution of the stakeholders’ panel is determined with reference to IIRF, GRI G4 
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guidelines, the King IV Report, and some of the literature relating to stakeholders’ 
classification. These 51 Chinese participants are from eight stakeholder groups: eight 
scholars in accounting; two editors in financial media; seven financial managers; eight 
financial analysts in banks; six auditors; five officials in government agencies in charge 
of supervising Chinese companies; six industry analysts in consultant companies; and 
nine financial analysts in investment companies. After adjusting some IR disclosure items, 
the final IR disclosure index is established. A 5-point Likert-like scale is then used for 
assigning a weighting to each IR disclosure item by every participant. Last, the average 
weighting for each IR disclosure item is calculated and a weighted IR disclosure index is 
constructed. In order to assess IR disclosure practices, a scoring system (a 5-point scale 
from 0 to 4) containing qualitative criteria is established. The qualitative criteria are 
derived from IIRF, GRI standards, and China’s Accounting Standard for Business 
Enterprises—Basic Standard, and the extant literature.  
 
Secondly, 100 listed A-share companies are chosen according to market capitalisation. 
The corporate reports of the sample companies for the years 2014 to 2018 are retrieved 
from the companies’ websites. Two coders3 conduct a pilot test of content analysis, using 
the constructed weighted IR disclosure index and the scoring system. Ten corporate 
reports from the sample companies are selected on a random basis and coded using 
sentences as the unit of coding, and each disclosure item is assigned a score according to 
the scoring system established previously. After verifying the reliability of the coding 
process, formal content analysis is conducted using the constructed weighted IR 
disclosure index and the scoring system. The results of the content analysis are quantified 
and analysed from various angles4.  
 
Thirdly, a series of hypotheses as to the determinants of IR disclosure practices and the 
effect of IR disclosure practices on agency costs are developed based on a number of 
previous studies as well as relevant theories. Data are collected from both the results of 
the content analysis for five years of corporate reports of 100 sample companies and 
accounting databases. The hypotheses are tested using statistical techniques (e.g., 
correlation tests and OLS regression analysis). Findings are interpreted using the 
constructed theoretical framework. 
 
3 The author and another Chinese PhD candidate in Accounting at the University of Waikato.   





Lastly, two open-ended questions are sent to the Chinese stakeholders to consult about 
the implementation of IR practices in China. Formal recommendations are then proposed 
by combining the feedback from the Chinese stakeholders, the extant literature, and 
previous evaluation and testing. 
 
1.9 Scope and limitations 
This research focuses on the IR disclosure practices of 100 top A-share listed companies 
according to market capitalisation in the Chinese mainland over the 5 years from 2014 to 
2018. In this study, IR disclosure practices refer to the level of alignment between the 
corporate reports of Chinese firms and the Chinese-specific IR framework that is 
established in this study.   
 
The study is subject to the following limitations. Firstly, this study focuses on large 
companies without the involvement of small and medium-sized companies, which may 
be not sufficient to represent the overall IR disclosure practices in China. Secondly, this 
research is restricted to the context of IR disclosure practices in China. As a result, the 
generality of its findings is limited by the features of a specific context. Thirdly, 
subjectivity is inevitably involved in this research, despite the researcher’s best attempts 
to avoid the production of biased findings. Lastly, questionnaire surveys (three rounds) 
depend solely on the views of Chinese stakeholders; no foreign stakeholders participate 
in this study (see Chapters 6 and 10). 
 
1.10 The structure of the thesis 
The thesis is composed of eleven chapters as follows: 
Chapter one: Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the research, including the origin and global 
developments of IR practices, the Chinese setting, theoretical framework, research 
objectives and questions, research methodology and methods, scope and limitations.  
Chapter two: Theoretical framework 
This chapter offers a theoretical framework that adapts to the Chinese context and 
integrates five mainstream IR theories: stakeholder theory, agency theory, signalling 
theory, legitimacy theory, and institutional theory. This integrated theoretical framework 
is used to explain the nature of IR and its practices in China.  
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Chapter three: Research context 
This chapter provides a setting for the thesis. The chapter analyses the impact of external 
macro-environmental factors on IR disclosure items. This chapter provides the criteria for 
the selection of IR disclosure items, considering the cultural, economic, political, legal, 
international, social, and environmental factors of China. 
Chapter four: Literature review 
This chapter conducts an extensive review of the extant academic literature on IR. The 
purpose of the literature review is to describe the IR frameworks and approaches used in 
previous studies to assess IR disclosure practices in different countries, to identify gaps 
in the extant literature, and to construct a preliminary list of IR disclosure items that are 
used as a basis for constructing a formal list of IR disclosure items. The most relevant 
literature is that which harnesses the IR framework to conduct empirical investigations, 
especially evaluating IR disclosure practices.  
Chapter five: Research methodology and method 
The chapter first discusses the methodological assumptions that guide the study, then 
continues by introducing the philosophical background of the author and explaining how 
it influences the choice of methodology for this study. Lastly, the chapter outlines and 
justifies the research methods. 
Chapter six: Development of the IR disclosure index 
This chapter describes the process for the construction of the Chinese IR disclosure index, 
as one of the components of Chinese IR framework, which is then employed for content 
analysis of corporate reports of the sample companies. The Chinese IR disclosure index 
consists of two elements: a list of IR disclosure items and a weighting system.  
Chapter seven: IR disclosure practices by Chinese companies 
This chapter reports on the results with respect to the IR disclosure practices of Chinese 
listed companies in terms of items, themes, companies, trend, listing status, and 
ownership. The results are interpreted using the previously developed theoretical 
framework.  
Chapter eight: Hypothesis development 
This chapter develops seventeen hypotheses regarding IR disclosure practices based on 
the extant literature and theory. The hypothesis development provides the basis for 
hypothesis testing, which is conducted in chapter nine. 
Chapter nine: Hypothesis testing 
In this chapter, hypothesis testing examines the determinants of IR disclosure practices, 
and the associations between IR disclosure practices and agency costs using both 
11 
 
univariate and multiple regression analysis. The results are interpreted using the 
previously developed theoretical framework. 
Chapter ten: Chinese stakeholders’ perspectives on IR practices 
This chapter focuses on examining the perceptions of Chinese stakeholders with regard 
to the barriers to the adoption of IR and recommendations for IR implementation. This 
feedback provides the basis for making recommendations about IR practices that are 
applicable to the Chinese context. 
Chapter eleven: Conclusion 
This chapter reviews the thesis and discusses the theoretical implications, practical 
implications, contributions, reflections, lessons learnt, and future research directions.  
 
1.11 Summary 
This chapter provides an overview of the study. Academic studies on IR in the Chinese 
context are scarce and lack depth and breadth. The primary motivation for the current 
study is to bridge the gap in the literature in the area of IR and promote IR practices in 
China. China’s top 100 A-share listed companies, according to market capitalisation, are 
chosen as the sample. This study develops a Chinese IR framework, which has not 
previously been done, and extends earlier studies by focusing on IR disclosure practices 
in the Chinese context. The study uses literature analysis, stakeholder surveys, content 
analysis, and statistical analysis to collect data and analyse data using mixed quantitative 
and qualitative methods. As one of the forerunners of studies on IR in the Chinese context, 
this study offers a significant platform for further research and is beneficial for both 
scholars and practitioners. Overall, the study extends our theoretical, empirical, normative 




2 CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
According to Gray et al. (2009), “Theory is, at its simplest, a conception of the 
relationship between things. It refers to a mental state or framework and, as a result, 
determines, inter alia, how we look at things, how we perceive things, what things we see 
as being joined to other things and what we see as ‘good’ and what we see as ‘bad’” (p. 
6). A theoretical framework is a structure that can hold, support, introduce and describe 
a theory that explains why the research problem under study exists (Abend, 2008). In 
extant IR studies, although there have been various theories (e.g., agency theory, 
signalling theory, legitimacy theory, institutional theory and stakeholder theory) applied 
as theoretical frameworks to interpret IR practices, it is believed that there is no single 
theory that can solely interpret IR practices as the field is too complex (Gray et al., 1995a; 
Omran & El-Galfy, 2014). Using multiple theories can allow deeper insights into IR 
practices and provide a fuller understanding (Deegan et al., 2000). In addition, the theories 
are not competing but complementary to each other (Gray et al., 1995b).  
 
In this study, multiple theories are used as a basis to guide the methodological approach, 
make sense of the analysis, and provide reflections on the findings. This chapter presents 
a theoretical framework consisting of five theories often used to explain IR practices: 
stakeholder theory, agency theory, signalling theory, legitimacy theory, and institutional 
theory. The chapter is organised in eight sections. Sections 2.2 to 2.6 review the 
stakeholder theory, agency theory, signalling theory, legitimacy theory, and institutional 
theory, respectively. The assumptions underpinning the theories are identified, and the 
implications of these theories for the current IR study are explained. Section 2.7 explains 
the nexus between these theories and summarises the similarities and differences. On this 
basis, an integrated theoretical framework is suggested, and its relevance for the study is 
explained. Section 2.8 summarises the chapter. 
 
2.2 Stakeholder theory 
2.2.1 Overview of stakeholder theory  
There are two theoretical positions, shareholder theory and stakeholder theory, which 
have been recognised as ‘two polar opposites’ in the management literature (Alam, 2018). 
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Shareholder theory focuses on shareholder primacy (Friedman, 1970). This perspective, 
according to economic theories, argues that shareholder primacy will result in a better 
resources allocation and will benefit everyone in the society (Quinn & Jones, 1995; 
Tantalo & Priem, 2016). However, this perspective is criticised as narrow and restrictive 
because it focuses only on shareholders and ignores or mistreats other stakeholders (Gray 
et al., 1988).  
 
From the perspective of shareholder theory, shareholders are viewed as the owners, who 
can decide how to manage their capitals and properties because contracts prescribe their 
rights with respect to capitals and properties; managers are thus viewed as the agents of 
shareholders (Asher et al., 2005; Freeman, 2001). However, from the perspective of 
stakeholder theory, rights with respect to properties and capitals are socially constructed 
and are not ultimate rights (Asher et al., 2005; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Etzioni, 1998). 
In terms of business objectives, from the perspective of shareholder theory, Friedman 
(1962, 1970) suggests that a company should have only one objective—maximising the 
profits for shareholders. From the perspective of stakeholder theory, the business 
objectives can be extended to include stakeholder objectives (Clarkson, 1995; Freeman 
et al., 2004; Mitchell et al., 1997). Stakeholder theory emphasises that an organisation 
needs to meet the objectives of its various stakeholders, rather than only the objectives of 
shareholders as in shareholder theory because “stakeholder theory highlights 
organisational accountability beyond simple economic or financial performance” 
(Guthrie et al., 2006, p. 256). 
 
Stakeholder definition, identification, and prioritisation 
The term ‘stakeholder’ was first proposed in an internal memorandum at the Stanford 
Research Institute in 1963 (Freeman, 1984). Since then, there have been numerous 
definitions of the stakeholder. Initially, the shareholder was considered the sole 
stakeholder (Friedman, 1962). However, Freeman (1984) expands the definition of 
stakeholder by providing a classical definition, from a strategic management point of 
view, to include any group that is likely to affect or be affected by organisational activities. 







Table 2.1 Definitions of stakeholders 
Researcher Definitions of Stakeholder 
Freeman (1984) A stakeholder is any group or individual 
who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organisation’s 
objectives. 
Nutt and Backoff (1993) Stakeholders are all the parties who will be 
affected by or will affect the 
organisation’s strategy. 
Bryson (1995) A stakeholder is any group or organisation 
that can put a claim on the organisation’s 
attention, resource, or output, or is 
affected by that output. 
Jensen (2001) Stakeholders include all individuals or 
groups who can substantially affect, or be 
affected by, the welfare of the firm. 
Johnson and Scholes (2002) Stakeholders are seen as those individuals 
and groups who depend on the 
organisation to achieve their own goals 
and on whom, in some cases, the 
organisation depends. 
 
Many scholars have attempted to identify and differentiate stakeholder groups. For 
example, potential categories have included external and internal stakeholders (Carroll, 
1989; Pearce, 1982); strategic and moral stakeholders (Goodpaster, 1991); supportive, 
marginal, non-supportive, and mixed blessing stakeholders (Savage et al., 1991); and 
single issue and multiple issues stakeholders (Wood, 1994). Clarkson (1995) believes that 
stakeholders can be divided into two categories, namely primary and secondary 
stakeholders. Primary stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, customers, 
suppliers, lenders, government, and communities, are considered to have priorities 
because they are critical for the organisation’s survival. The secondary stakeholders 
comprising environmentalists and media, do not rely on the organisation and are not 
considered to be vital for the organisation’s survival. Mitchell et al. (1997) endow the 
stakeholder identification and salience with three stakeholder attributes: power, 
legitimacy, and urgency. Based on these three relationship attributes, they categorise 
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stakeholders into eight groups from the lowest to the highest priority (non-stakeholder, 
dormant, discretionary, demanding, dominant, dangerous, dependent, and definitive 
stakeholders). Friedman and Miles (2002) classify stakeholder groups into four types: 
whose with explicit/implicit recognised contracts and compatible interests (e.g., 
shareholders, top management, partners); those with explicit/implicit recognised 
contracts and incompatible interests (e.g., government, customers, lenders, suppliers and 
other creditors); those with unrecognised implicit contracts and compatible interests (e.g., 
the general public, trade associations); and those with no contracts and incompatible 
interests (e.g., aggrieved or criminal members of the public). 
 
The branches of stakeholder theory 
There are many perspectives on stakeholder theory. Donaldson and Preston (1995) frame 
stakeholder theory into three different versions: descriptive, normative, and instrumental. 
Berman et al. (1999) separate stakeholder theory into two distinct stakeholder 
management models: strategic stakeholder management (an instrumental approach) and 
intrinsic stakeholder commitment (a normative approach). Among these perspectives, 
two major branches of stakeholder theory are prominent in the literature: the ethical 
(moral or normative) branch, and the managerial (positive) branch (Belal, 2008; Belal & 
Owen, 2007; Deegan, 2009; Gray et al., 1996; Gray et al., 2009; Guthrie et al., 2006).  
 
The ethical branch proposes that all stakeholders have the same right to be considered 
and treated fairly, regardless of what the stakeholder’s power5 is (Deegan, 2009). Stoney 
and Winstanley (2001) emphasise “the moral role of organisations and their enormous 
social effects on people’s lives” (p.608). Thus, the ethical perspective relates directly to 
Gray et al.’s (1996) accountability model of stakeholder theory. According to Gray et al. 
(2009, p. 25), “the organisation owes an accountability to all its stakeholders” rather than 
only focusing on powerful stakeholders who provide critical resources to the organisation 
(Deegan & Unerman, 2006). However, when the interests of stakeholder groups conflict, 
it is a challenge for managers to treat all stakeholders fairly (Fernando & Lawrence, 2014). 
Nevertheless, Hasnas (1998) points out that an organisation must manage stakeholders’ 
conflicting interests “to attain the optimal balance among them” (p. 32). The managerial 
branch, unlike the ethical one, is a “management centred” perspective, centred mainly on 
 
5 It is believed that stakeholders can control the resources of organisations directly or indirectly (Deegan et 
al., 2000). Stakeholder’s power is determined by the level of control stakeholders have over the resources, 




managing the relationship between an organisation and its critical stakeholders. The 
identification of critical stakeholders is based on “the extent to which the organisation 
believes the interplay with each group needs to be managed in order to further the interests 
of the organisation” (Gray et al., 1996, p. 45). From this perspective, an organisation 
ought to be accountable to powerful stakeholders who control the critical resources of the 
organisation, rather than all stakeholders as in the ethical perspective (Fernando & 
Lawrence, 2014). The more critical the stakeholders’ resources to the organisation, the 
greater is the accountability of the organisation to meet the expectations of those 
stakeholders (Deegan, 2009).  
 
Stakeholder accountability  
It is expected that organisations are accountable for their activities (Alam, 2018). Jones 
(1977) claims that accountability implies an obligation to explain to somebody else, who 
has the authority to evaluate the account and allocate compliments or criticism. Stewart 
(1984) establishes a ladder of accountability, comprising five types of accountability: 
accountability for probity and legality; process accountability; performance 
accountability; programme accountability; and policy accountability. In addition, 
Laughlin (1990) proposes the concepts of contractual accountability and communal 
accountability. According to Gray et al. (1996), accountability is “the duty to provide an 
account (by no means necessarily a financial account) or reckoning of those actions for 
which one is held responsible” (p. 38). In order to explain the possible reasons for 
stakeholder accountability, Werhane and Freeman (1997) identify three types of analysis: 
interest-based; rights-based, and duty-based. Compared with interest-based and rights-
based accountability, duty-based accountability is the widest and looks at organisational 
responsibilities to stakeholders. Based on the above definitions, Christensen and 
Ebrahims (2006) conceptualise accountability as “being answerable to stakeholders for 
the actions of the organisation” (p. 196). The notion of accountability may be derived 
from the ethical (normative) perspective of stakeholder theory, in which stakeholders 
have a right to information about how an organisation affects them (Deegan, 2009).  
 
Stakeholder involvement 
According to Waddock (2002), there are three levels of stakeholder involvement: 
stakeholder mapping (first level), in which the company maps its stakeholders to 
distinguish between primary and secondary; stakeholder management (second level), in 
which the company attempts to manage stakeholder expectations and balance different 
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positions; and stakeholder engagement (third level), in which the company engages its 
stakeholders in decision-making processes, shares information, has dialogues and 
establishes a mutual responsibility model (Manetti, 2011; Rinaldi, 2013). It is believed 
that high-level accountability towards stakeholders can be fulfilled if an organisation is 
inclined to stakeholder engagement (Freeman, 1984; Silvestri et al., 2017). 
 
2.2.2 Implications of stakeholder theory for IR 
According to the definition provided by IIRC (2013), stakeholders are “those groups or 
individuals that can reasonably be expected to be significantly affected by an 
organisation’s business activities, outputs or outcomes, or whose actions can reasonably 
be expected to significantly affect the ability of the organisation to create value over time” 
(p.33). IIRC (2013) advocates that “an integrated report benefits all stakeholders 
interested in an organisation’s ability to create value over time, including employees, 
customers, suppliers, business partners, local communities, legislators, regulators and 
policy-makers” (p.4). Value creation by embracing all stakeholders fits in ideally with the 
nature of IR (Haller & Van Staden, 2014). Likewise, Conway (2019) also argues that “the 
rationale behind IR is underpinned by stakeholder theory” (p.607). Songini and Pistoni 
(2015) believe that IR can satisfy the information needs of the overall stakeholders’ 
categories. Similarly, Eccles et al. (2010) also see IR as a channel of communication for 
all stakeholders.  
 
Steenkamp (2018) believes that the purpose of IR is to enhance accountability for 
stakeholders via integrated reports. Silvestri et al. (2017) classify accountability into two 
categories: strong accountability and weak accountability. From the strong accountability 
perspective, IR is used as a strong accountability tool by companies to be answerable 
towards their stakeholders; from the weak accountability perspective, IR is regarded as a 
reputational tool. Quarchioni et al. (2020) claim that IR is not only a stakeholder 
accountability tool but a stakeholder managerial tool. 
 
Kılıç and Kuzey (2018b) believe that according to stakeholder theory, gender-diverse 
boards can better recognise the needs of stakeholders, which can enhance a company’s 
ability to manage the needs of different groups of stakeholders. Moreover, a higher 
practice of forward-looking disclosures in an integrated report represents a higher ability 
of a company to manage the needs of different stakeholder groups. Therefore, board 
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gender diversity has a positive relationship with the practice of forward-looking 
disclosures in an integrated report. García-Sánchez et al. (2013) explore whether the 
culture of a country affects the adoption of IR. They find that firms from countries with 
stronger collectivist and feminist values are more likely to adopt IR. García-Sánchez et 
al. (2013) interpret these results using stakeholder theory and suggest that collectivist and 
feminist values highlight public welfare, leading firms to adopt IR to enhance the 
decision-making ability of stakeholders.  
 
Similarly, Vitolla et al. (2019b) examine how national culture impacts IR quality based 
on a sample of 135 international companies from 28 countries. The results show that firms 
operating in countries with cultural systems with less power distance, more uncertainty 
avoidance, less individualism, less masculinity, and less indulgence tend to show higher 
IR quality. The interpretations of the results are based on the ethical-moral (normative) 
and strategic-managerial (instrumental) approaches of stakeholder theory, respectively. 
Vitolla et al. (2019b) believe a cultural system defines whether a country is stakeholder‐
oriented or shareholder‐oriented. From the ethical‐moral (normative) approach 
perspective, low power distance, high collectivism, high feminism, high restraint and high 
uncertainty avoidance lead to a stakeholder‐oriented national culture, shaping a context 
that encourages firms to report financial and non-financial information in an integrated 
way. From the strategic‐managerial (instrumental) approach perspective, the above 
national culture elements define the context in which the stakeholders act. In order to 
strategically manage the information needs of stakeholders, a high IR quality is required. 
Vitolla et al. (2019c) develop hypotheses regarding the relationship between five kinds 
of stakeholders’ pressure and IR quality based on stakeholder theory. The results indicate 
that pressure from customers, environmental protection organisations, employees, 
shareholders, and governments leads to IR quality. They believe that stakeholder pressure 
determines IR quality because a higher IR quality represents a proactive response by 
companies to stakeholders’ expectations. 
 
In addition, according to Ambler and Wilson (1995), stakeholder theory is criticised 
because it may lead to inefficiency and suboptimality generally because of conflicts 
among stakeholders. Similarly, Jensen (2001) believes “whereas value maximisation 
provides corporate managers with a single objective, stakeholder theory directs corporate 
managers to serve many masters. And, to paraphrase the old adage, when there are many 
masters, all end up being short-changed. Without the clarity of mission provided by a 
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single-valued objective function, companies embracing stakeholder theory will 
experience managerial confusion, conflict, inefficiency, and perhaps even competitive 
failure” (p. 9). However, Conway (2019) points out that this criticism of stakeholder 
theory is not a problem for IR because IR clarifies the aim of a company by clearly 
disclosing the company’s objectives and strategy; thus, decisions are made closely 
surrounding the aim and trade-offs between stakeholder interests are “necessary and 
acceptable” (p. 611).  
 
2.3 Agency theory 
2.3.1 Overview of agency theory 
Agency theory is mainly concerned with the agency problem that arises from the 
separation of ownership and managerial control (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), which 
translates to the separation of risk sharing, decision making and control in companies 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983).  
 
Principal-agent relationship 
Agency theory is founded on the principal-agent relationship (also referred to as the 
agency relationship), which is defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as “a contract 
under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making 
authority to the agent” (p.308). According to Lambert (2001), the principal is seen as the 
party who provides capital, endures primary risks and conducts incentives, while the 
agent is viewed as the party who makes decisions and performs a service on behalf of the 
principal, and endures secondary risks. In a corporate context, agents mainly correspond 
to managers, whereas principals primarily correspond to investors (Shehata, 2014).  
 
Agency problem 
Two key assumptions underlie a principal-agent relationship: (1) economic rationality 
(the principal and the agent are interest maximisers); and (2) self-interest (the interests of 
the principal and the agent are not always aligned) (Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2011). Based on these assumptions, agency 
theory infers that there are conflicts (known as “agency conflict”) inherent in principal-
agent relationships, although there is a fiduciary relationship between agents and 
principals and it is expected that agents act in the interests of the principals (Bhaumik & 
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Gregoriou, 2010; De Villiers & Hsiao, 2017). When the agent does not act in the best 
interests of the principal, an agency problem emerges, because individualistic and 
opportunistic interests held by principals and agents impact the efficiency of the principal-
agent relationship (Subramaniam, 2018). This type of agency problem is called a 
“principal-agent problem” (Panda & Leepsa, 2017).  
 
Information asymmetry 
According to agency theory, information asymmetry results from managers who have an 
information advantage over investors (De Villiers & Hsiao, 2017). Specifically, it reflects 
an information gap that arises from managers possessing private or asymmetric 
information regarding the true situation of a company (De Villiers & Hsiao, 2017). 
Information asymmetry may exacerbate agency problems (Scott, 1997). Specifically, 
information asymmetry may lead to moral hazards (also referred to as hidden costs) and 
adverse selection (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1986; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
 
Agency costs 
Agency costs are the summation of the monitoring cost, bonding cost, and the residual 
loss arising from loopholes in agency relationships (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Several 
strategies, including incentive-focused and monitoring strategies, may mitigate agency 
problems. Incentive-focused strategy aims to provide incentives that induce agent 
behaviours congruent with the principal’s interests. For instance, employment contracts 
may be chosen by the investors to provide incentives for aligning the managers’ interest 
with that of the investors. Accordingly, the cost related to incentive-focused strategies is 
called a bonding cost (e.g., bonuses and stock options). The second type of strategy for 
reducing opportunistic behaviour is the monitoring strategy, which aims to monitor 
managers’ behaviour. It includes external or internal audits (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986), 
the composition of the board of directors (Fama & Jensen, 1983), and performance 
evaluation systems (Kaplan & Atkinson, 1989). Accordingly, the costs related to 
monitoring strategies are called monitoring costs (e.g., mandatory audit costs). 
Monitoring costs are paid by investors, whereas bonding costs are paid by managers 
(Shehata, 2014). Residual loss occurs when managers do not aim to maximise the 
investors’ interest (Morris, 1987).  
 
2.3.2 Implications of Agency theory for IR  
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Agency theory postulates that IR can be seen as one of the mechanisms to monitor a 
company’s performance by providing high extent and quality of disclosures to investors 
(De Villiers & Hsiao, 2017; Fasan & Mio, 2017; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Thus, IR 
reduces information asymmetry between investors and managers, allowing investors to 
monitor managers’ behaviours and to assess whether managers’ actions meet investors’ 
interests (De Villiers & Hsiao, 2017; Fasan & Mio, 2017; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Previous studies have shown that IR can also mitigate agency costs. 
 
García-Sánchez and Noguera-Gámez (2017a) investigate the effect of voluntary 
disclosures concerning IR on information asymmetry. They argue that IR provides high 
extent and quality of voluntary disclosures, which can decrease information asymmetries. 
Their results indicate that there is a negative relationship between information asymmetry 
and the adoption of IR, suggesting that IR can mitigate information asymmetry. In another 
study, Pavlopoulos et al. (2017) find that a higher quality of IR disclosures decreases 
agency costs.  
 
Wen et al. (2017) use agency theory to test the association between the extent of IR 
disclosures of Malaysian public listed companies and financial performance. They 
believe IR can be seen as one of the monitoring mechanisms for the company 
performance because managers are willing to share a company’s private information with 
the capital market in order to maximise the company’s value. Finally, Wen et al. (2017) 
find that the extent of IR disclosures has a significant positive impact on financial 
performances. Similarly, Frías-Aceituno et al. (2014) find that there is a positive 
relationship between profitability and the extent of IR disclosures of a company. 
 
Kılıç and Kuzey (2018b) verify that firm size and practices of forward-looking 
disclosures contained in integrated reports have a positive relationship. They believe that 
according to agency theory, a larger company incurs a higher level of agency cost 
associated with high-level information asymmetry compared to small ones. Therefore, 
larger companies are willing to release forward-looking disclosures in integrated reports 
in a high-level manner to minimise information asymmetry and accordingly, agency costs. 
Similarly, Frías-Aceituno et al. (2014) use agency theory to investigate whether there is 
a positive relationship between firm size and the extent of IR disclosures. They state that 
larger companies have a greater need for external funds, resulting in an increased 
likelihood of conflicts of interest between investors and managers. Consequently, larger 
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companies face higher agency costs and greater problems of information asymmetry. IR, 
as a means of voluntary disclosure, can be adopted to reduce agency costs. Frías-Aceituno 
et al. (2014) show that firm size has a positive relationship with the extent of IR 
disclosures.  
 
2.4 Signalling theory 
2.4.1 Overview of signalling theory  
Signalling theory was initially developed to elucidate uncertainty in workforce markets 
(Spence, 1973). According to Spence’s (1973) findings, employers lack information 
about the quality of potential employees and this information asymmetry may impede 
employers’ selection ability; therefore, high-quality job applicants distinguish themselves 
from low-quality job applicants by using the signalling function of higher education. 
Spence’s (1973) work triggered massive studies using signalling theory in management 
research, in areas including corporate governance (Miller & Triana, 2009; Zhang & 
Wiersema, 2009), entrepreneurship (Busenitz et al., 2005; Certo, 2003; Elitzur & Gavius, 
2003; Lester et al., 2006), human resource management (Suazo et al., 2009), and 
voluntary disclosure in corporate reporting (Ross, 1977). 
 
According to Connelly et al. (2011), signallers are “insiders (e.g., executives or managers) 
who obtain information about an individual (e.g., Spence, 1973), product (e.g., Kirmani 
& Rao, 2000), or organisation (e.g., Ross, 1977) that is not available to outsiders” (p. 44). 
The receivers are defined by these researchers as “outsiders who lack information about 
the organisation in question but would like to receive this information.” According to 
Morris (1987), information asymmetry exists between signallers and receivers. In other 
words, the signallers’ information is superior to that of receivers. The signal is defined as 
“the publication of a device which acts as a prediction of superior quality” (Morris, 1987, 
p. 48). Information asymmetry is the precondition for the existence of the signal. In order 
to be effective, the signal provided by high-quality sellers must not be easily imitated by 
low-quality sellers. Signalling theory is used to depict the behaviour when signallers and 
receivers have access to different information and is concerned with reducing information 
asymmetries between these two parties (Spence, 2002). Typically, signallers must choose 
whether and how to signal the information, and receivers must choose how to interpret 




According to Connelly et al. (2011), quality is “the underlying, unobservable ability of 
the signaller to fulfill the needs or demands of an outsider observing the signal” (p. 43). 
In Spence’s (1973) example, higher education can be regarded as a reliable signal of a 
job applicant’s quality, based on two premises: (1) potential employees’ quality cannot 
be observed by employers; and (2) low-quality job applicants are not able to complete 
higher education. Similarly, Kirmani and Rao (2000) also provide a general example of 
signalling theory. A product warranty can be regarded as a reliable signal of a product’s 
quality, based on two premises: (1) buyers are not able to distinguish between high-
quality products and low-quality products; and (2) the sellers of low-quality products are 
not able to provide a product warranty. In Ross’s (1977) example, financial indicators 
(e.g., interest and dividend payments) can be regarded as a reliable signal of a company’s 
quality, based on two premises: (1) companies’ quality cannot be observed by external 
investors; and (2) low-quality companies are not able to sustain these payments. 
 
These above signals can be classified into three categories: intent, camouflage and need 
(Connelly et al., 2011). Intent signals indicate future action. For example, a company may 
signal its determination by responding to a competitive action initiated by a rival quickly 
(Baum & Korn, 1999). Camouflage signals disguise a potential liability by diverting 
attention away from a potential vulnerability to some other characteristic. For example, 
companies expanding globally signal their legitimacy by using strategic alliances in order 
to draw attention away from the liability of foreignness (Dacin et al., 2007). Need signals 
communicate requirements to the receiver. For example, each of the divisions or 
subsidiaries of a company signals its need for funds and resources, and the headquarter 
of the company decides which is signalling the greatest need (Gupta et al., 1999). 
 
2.4.2 Implications of signalling theory for IR 
According to signalling theory, voluntary disclosures, such as non-financial information 
in corporate reports can be seen as a signalling device to signal the superior quality of a 
company to the capital market (Cohen et al., 2012; Spence, 1973). In a similar vein, IR 
containing non-financial disclosures such as intellectual capital and CSR can be used as 
a signalling device (An, 2012; Visser, 2008).  
 
Albertini (2018) finds that French companies tend to disclose information on increases in 
capitals in integrated reporting, confirming that insiders in companies purposely use IR 
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to communicate the superior quality of the company. Based on signalling theory, Frías-
Aceituno et al. (2014) argue that profitable companies distinguish themselves from low-
quality companies through IR in order to reduce the cost of capital and to stabilise or 
enhance their company value. They then find there is a positive relationship between 
profitability and the adoption of IR. Likewise, Girella et al. (2019) develop a hypothesis 
about the relationship between the adoption of IR and profitability based on signalling 
theory. They find that higher profitability leads a firm to adopt IR. In addition, they also 
find that companies operating in collectivist countries tend to adopt IR voluntarily. Girella 
et al. (2019) argue that according to signalling theory, if a company operates in a country 
with high collectivism in which people are willing to share information, its managers are 
likely to signal more information out, resulting in the company applying IR voluntarily. 
 
2.5 Legitimacy theory 
2.5.1 Overview of legitimacy theory 
Legitimacy theory is concerned with the relationship between the organisation and 
society (Belal, 2008; Deegan, 2002). Legitimacy theory is based on the notion of a social 
contract between the organisation and society (Deegan et al., 2002; Deegan, 2006; 
Deegan & Samkin, 2009; Deegan & Unerman, 2011; Magness, 2006). Shocker and Sethi 
(1974) provide an explanation of the concept of the social contract:  
Any social institution and business with no exception operates in society via a social 
contract, expressed or implied, whereby its survival and growth are based on the delivery 
of some socially desirable ends to society in general; and the distribution of economic, 
social, or political benefits of groups from which it derives its power (p. 67). 
Deegan et al. (2000) describe the explicit term of the social contract as the legal system, 
whereas the implicit term of the social contract refers to un-codified societal expectations. 
 
Legitimacy 
According to Suchman (1995), legitimacy is “a generalised perception or assumption that 
the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (p. 574). Lindblom (1994) 
defines legitimacy as “a condition or status which exists when an entity’s value system is 
congruent with the value system of the larger social system of which the entity is a part” 
(p. 2). Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) also provide an explanation of legitimacy:  
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Organisations seek to establish congruence between the social values associated with or 
implied by their activities and the norms of acceptable behaviour in the larger social 
system of which they are a part (p. 122).  
The above three definitions are concerned with whether the value system of an 
organisation is congruent with the societal value system. Gray et al. (2009, p. 28) believe 
that “organisations can only continue to exist if the society in which they are based 
perceives the organisation to be operating to a value system that is commensurate with 
the society’s own value system”. This assertion is also supported by other scholars, such 
as Dowling and Pfeffer (1975), Lindblom (1994), and Magness (2006). Therefore, 
legitimacy is regarded as a resource, which can determine the organisation’s survival 
(Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; O’Donovan, 2002; Suchman, 1995). 
 
Lindblom (1994) distinguishes between legitimacy and legitimation. Legitimacy is 
considered to be a status or condition, while legitimation is considered to be the process 
of being adjudged legitimate (Lindblom, 1994). Maurer (1971) also claims that 
“legitimation is the process whereby an organisation justifies to a peer or superordinate 
system its right to exist” (p. 361). Therefore, Suchman (1995) argues that “legitimacy is 
possessed objectively, yet created subjectively” (p. 574).  
 
Suchman (1995) proposes three different legitimacy conceptions: pragmatic legitimacy, 
moral legitimacy and cognitive legitimacy. Pragmatic legitimacy means that if 
organisational actions or policies benefit relevant members of the public, the relevant 
public may see these organisational actions as legitimate. Pragmatic legitimacy is 
classified into exchange legitimacy, influence legitimacy and dispositional legitimacy 
(Dumitru & Guse, 2017). Moral legitimacy reflects the notion that the relevant public 
may see organisational actions as legitimate when they judge these actions or policies to 
be “the right things”. Moral legitimacy has four forms: consequential, procedural, 
structural, personal legitimacy, and legal legitimacy (Durocher et al., 2007; Suchman, 
1995). Cognitive legitimacy is based on the relevant public’s cognition rather than on 
their benefit or moral judgement. Organisations are perceived to be cognitively legitimate 
if their actions follow the pre-existing pattern of other organisations that are 





According to Lindblom (1994, p. 3), “legitimacy is dynamic in that the relevant publics 
continuously evaluate corporate output, methods, and goals against an ever-evolving 
expectation”. Lindblom (1994, p. 2) also argues “when a disparity, actual or potential, 
exists between the two value systems, there is a threat to the entity’s legitimacy”. The 
disparity between an organisation’s value system and the societal value system is referred 
to as the legitimacy gap (Liu & Anbumozhi, 2009).  
 
Wartick and Mahon (1994) contend that legitimacy gaps may occur when:  
1. There is a change in the organisation’s output, methods, and goals, but societal 
expectations of the organisation’s output, methods, and goals remain unchanged;  
2. The organisation’s output, methods, and goals and societal expectations change in 
different directions, or change in the same direction but with differing momentum; 
3. The organisation’s output, methods, and goals are unchanged, but societal expectations 
of the organisation’s output, methods, and goals have changed.  
Changes in societal expectations include changes in social awareness (Choi et al., 2013; 
Freedman & Jaggi, 2005); changes in media influence (Brown & Deegan, 1998; Deegan 
et al., 2002); changes in relevant group pressure (Deegan & Gordon, 1996); and changes 
in regulations (Cowan & Deegan, 2011; Patten, 2002). 
 
Alrazi et al. (2016, p. 671) comment on the implications of a legitimacy gap as follows: 
The implications of a legitimacy gap could be enormous, leading to potential product 
boycotts by customers, withdrawals of investments by shareholders, and difficulties in 
securing loans from banks, while increased lobbying activities by the public, which could 
lead to increased regulation, and difficulties in hiring qualified staff.  
However, it is not easy to determine the legitimacy gap’s existence and size (Wartick & 
Mahon, 1994). 
 
Strategic perspective and institutional perspective 
Depending on the purpose of legitimation, there are two perspectives on legitimacy – 
institutional legitimacy and organisational (or strategic) legitimacy (Ashford & Gibbs, 
1990; Gray et al., 1996; Suchman, 1995). The distinction between institutional legitimacy 
and organisational/strategic legitimacy is “a matter of perspective, with strategic theorists 
adopting the viewpoint of organisational managers looking ‘out’, whereas institutional 
theorists adopt the viewpoint of society looking ‘in’” (Suchman, 1995, p. 577). The 
institutional perspective assumes that “cultural definitions determine how the 
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organisation is built, how it is run, and, simultaneously, how it is understood and 
evaluated” (Suchman, 1995, p. 576). From an institutional perspective (a wider 
perspective), institutional legitimacy focuses on what institutional structures, procedures 
and practices as a whole (such as capitalism/socialism) are accepted by society (Chen & 
Roberts, 2010). These pre-existing structures, procedures and practices are adopted as the 
baseline to estimate whether the organisation complies with social expectations (Chen & 
Roberts, 2010). A strategic perspective (a narrower perspective) emphasises “the ways in 
which organisations instrumentally manipulate and deploy evocative symbols” (Suchman, 
1995, p. 572), assuming legitimacy is a “high level of managerial control over 
legitimating processes” (Suchman, 1995, p. 576). Generally, institutional legitimacy and 
organisational/strategic legitimacy are complementary, rather than conflicting (Ahmed 
Haji & Anifowose, 2017). 
 
The strategic perspective focuses on strategies employed by companies to “obtain, 
maintain or repair” organisational legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). Maintaining legitimacy 
is generally easier than obtaining or repairing legitimacy (O’Donovan, 2002). In order to 
maintain legitimacy that has already been established and to respond to challenges that 
may threaten legitimacy, an organisation keeps an eye on changing social expectations 
and emerging challenges (Maroun, 2018). The extent of an organisation’s efforts to 
maintain or repair legitimacy relies on the importance of legitimacy for the organisation’s 
survival. For some organisations, such as those with low-level legitimacy, it is not 
necessary to invest too much effort into maintaining or repairing legitimacy. Conversely, 
some organisations, such as those with high-level legitimacy, need to manage their 
legitimacy more proactively (Clarkson et al., 2008; O’Donovan, 2002; Suchman, 1995).  
 
Legitimation strategies 
When organisations face a threat to their legitimacy or a perceived legitimacy gap, there 
are four legitimation strategies they may apply (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Lindblom, 
1994).  
1. Adaptation and conformance: change the organisation’s output, methods, and goals to 
conform with relevant public expectations about the organisation’s performance. 
2. Alter expectations: do not change the organisation’s output, methods, and goals but 
change relevant public expectations about the organisation’s performance. 
3. Manage perceptions: do not change the organisation’s output, methods, and goals but 
educate the relevant public about its actual performance. 
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4. Avoidance/denial: do not change the organisation’s output, methods, and goals but 
distract or manipulate/divert relevant public attention away from the issue. 
 
Legitimation strategies can vary between substantive management and symbolic 
management (Setia et al., 2015). Substantive management is seen as “making real, 
material changes in organisational goals, structures, process and socially constituted 
practices”, while symbolic management is depicted acting “so as to appear consistent with 
social values and expectations” (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990, pp. 178-180). According to 
Kim et al. (2007), substantive management is more effective than symbolic management 
in managing social expectations. In addition, Meznar and Nigh (1995) also propose two 
strategies named “bridging” and “buffering”. “Bridging” is similar to the concept of 
substantive management, while “buffering” focuses on protecting organisations from 
external interference or affecting the external environment through political action, 
lobbying and advertising. Additionally, Deegan (2002) points out that legitimisation 
strategies may vary between countries. In this sense, choosing legitimisation strategies 
requires explicit consideration of the specific jurisdictional context (Deegan, 2002). 
 
2.5.2 Implications of legitimacy theory for IR 
Corporate reports have been regarded as a critical source of legitimation (Dyball, 1998; 
O’Donovan, 2002). Both mandatory disclosures and voluntary disclosures can lead to 
legitimisation (Lightstone & Driscoll, 2008; Magness, 2006). Corporate reports, such as 
IR, are regarded as documents that facilitate companies achieving organisational 
legitimacy (Chu et al., 2013). In other words, organisations prepare IR in order to gain, 
maintain or repair their legitimacy to ensure continued access to resources (De Villiers & 
Maroun, 2017). Managers may prepare integrated reports to manipulate others’ 
perceptions of their companies by selective reporting of favourable information (Melloni 
et al., 2016). Albetairi et al. (2018) examine the extent of IR disclosures of Bahraini listed 
insurance companies and find that a high practice of performance indicator disclosures in 
a firm’s integrated report is associated with the poor financial performance of the firm. 
They explain this result using legitimacy theory: a company whose legitimacy is 
threatened (e.g., one that has poor financial performance) tends to increase the extent of 
IR disclosures to enhance its communication with stakeholders, gain a better reputation, 




Velte and Stawinoga (2017) see IR as a tool to communicate organisational legitimisation 
actions; therefore, by being a qualified corporate citizen, an organisation’s image is 
enhanced. Ahmed Haji and Anifowose (2017) find that there is an overall significant 
increase in the quality of IR disclosures in South African companies, and the quality of 
IR disclosures are increasing over time in particular industries. They explain their 
findings using both the strategic and institutional perspectives of legitimacy theory: the 
overall significant increase in the quality of IR disclosures is a response to external 
pressures (strategic legitimacy), and the increase in the quality of IR disclosures within a 
particular industry indicates institutionalisation (institutional legitimacy). The findings 
suggest that the strategic and institutional perspectives of legitimacy theory are 
complementary, rather than conflicting. Nicolò et al. (2020a) find a positive relationship 
between the environmentally and socially sensitive industry membership of European 
SOEs and the extent of IR disclosures. By using institutional theory, Nicolò et al. (2020a) 
argue that environmentally sensitive companies are likely to make more IR disclosures to 
show that they are operating within accepted environmental and social boundaries so as 
to maintain their legitimacy. Moreover, socially sensitive companies tend to make more 
IR disclosures to repair their legitimacy. 
 
2.6 Institutional theory 
2.6.1 Overview of institutional theory 
Institutionalists focus on identifying institutions and institutional pressures as well as 
explaining institutional impacts on organisational structures, processes and practices 
(Greenwood et al., 2008). Institutional researchers contend that organisational structures, 
processes and practices are the result of institutional pressures (Farooq & Maroun, 2017). 
Institutions generate institutional pressures on various social actors (individuals and 
organisations) to force these individuals and organisations to adopt similar structures, 
processes and practices (De Villiers et al., 2014; De Villiers & Alexander, 2014; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
 
Institutionalisation 
The concept of institutionalisation stems from the explanation of the nature and origin of 
social order (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). They argue that social order emerges as 
individuals communicate and disseminate interpretations with others about their actions 
(also defined as social interactions), creating a shared social reality. Institutionalisation is 
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defined by Scott (1987) as the process by which actions become repeated over time and 
acquire similar meanings among members of society. Institutional theory has evolved 
from the creation of social reality to the institutionalisation of organisations, which 
emphasises the patterns of organisational behaviour and those patterns’ conformity 
among organisations (Chen & Roberts, 2010; Scott, 1987). Some scholars (e.g., 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) question what makes organisations 
so similar. They conclude that not all organisational behaviour can be attributed to pursing 
maximising organisational efficiency and effectiveness; the reason that organisations 
increasingly homogenise their organisational structures, processes and practices is to 
meet social expectations or to be socially acceptable.  
 
Isomorphism and Decoupling dimensions  
There are two dimensions in institutional theory: isomorphism and decoupling. 
Isomorphism, as the core concept of institutional theory, is described as the “adaptation 
of an institutional practice by an organisation” (Dillard et al., 2004, p. 509). DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983, p. 149) define isomorphism as “a constraining process that forces one 
unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental 
conditions”. Moll et al. (2006) divide isomorphism into two components: competitive 
isomorphism and institutional isomorphism. They define competitive isomorphism as 
“how competitive forces drive organisations towards adopting least-cost, efficient 
structures, and practices” (Moll et al., 2006, p. 187). Institutional isomorphism can be 
divided into three isomorphism processes: coercive, mimetic, and normative (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983).  
 
According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 150), coercive isomorphism “results from 
both formal and informal pressures exerted on organisations by other organisations upon 
which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society in which 
organisations function”. Coercive pressure results from resource dependence, which 
means organisations that depend on resources can be constrained by an organisation 
which effectively controls the same resources (Salter & Hoque, 2018). Coercive 
isomorphism is usually the result of laws, regulations or social pressures, which force 
organisations to comply with the respective prescription (Farooq & Maroun, 2017). In 
other words, coercive isomorphism means organisations are forced by external factors to 
apply specific internal structures and procedures (Moll et al., 2018). Mimetic 
isomorphism means that organisations imitate the internal structures and procedures 
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applied by other organisations or themselves that are perceived to be more legitimate and 
more successful (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Farooq & Maroun, 2017; Moll et al., 2018). 
Normative isomorphism stems from professionalisation. It is evident when organisations 
apply structures and procedures promoted by educational institutions and professional 
institutions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Farooq & Maroun, 2017; Moll et al., 2018).  
 
Decoupling is the other dimension of institutional theory. It occurs when “the formal 
organisational structure or practice is separate and distinct from actual organisational 
practice” (Dillard et al., 2004, p. 510). This separation may be an intentional and/or 
unintentional action of the organisation (Moll et al., 2006). Organisational structures, 
procedures and practices are not necessarily the result of maximising organisational 
efficiency and effectiveness but rather stem from the need to conform to institutional 
pressures (DiMaggio, 1983; Lounsbury, 2008; Powell, 1988). In order to balance actual 
structures, procedures and practices with conformity to institutional pressures, 
organisations “buffer their formal structures from the uncertainties of technical activities 
by becoming loosely coupled, building gaps between their formal structures and actual 
work activities” (Meyer & Rowan 1977, p. 357). There are three indicators of decoupling 
(see Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995). The first is ambiguous or generally defined 
goals, targets and performance indicators, which avoid clear connections between 
processes and outcomes and technical data. The second is ambiguous or unclearly 
understood technical processes, and is based on the assumptions that if qualified experts 
perform the assigned task carefully, the outcome is correct. The third is ambiguous or 
inexplicitly explained connections between the characteristics of the organisation.  
 
2.6.2 Implications of institutional theory for IR 
Institutional theory is one of the theories used to explain and to predict IR practices 
(Katsikas et al., 2016). Both isomorphism and decoupling mechanisms can explain the 
adoption of IR by organisations. For instance, the presence of regulations in South Africa, 
illustrated by the King III and King IV reports mandating the adoption of IR, is an 
example of the coercive mechanism (Vaz et al., 2016). Also, the development of the IIRC 
and its publication of IIRF have become sources of normative pressure for organisations, 
impelling organisations to do well in IR practices (Farooq & Maroun, 2017; Humphrey 
et al., 2017). Additionally, organisations’ successful peers who have performed well in 
IR practices introduce mimetic pressure for organisations (Farooq & Maroun, 2017; Vaz 
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et al., 2016). Producing merely empty rhetoric in IR can be interpreted as evidence of 
decoupling (Chikutuma, 2019; Deegan & Unerman, 2011; Farooq & Maroun, 2017).  
 
Previous studies have also shown that jurisdictional factors in a country, such as its legal, 
economic, financial, and cultural systems, have an impact on IR practices. For instance, 
Jensen and Berg (2012) identify potential country-level determinants of the adoption of 
IR, based on institutional theory. They find that the adoption of IR is determined by the 
financial, educational and labour, cultural, and economic systems of a country. They 
explain that, according to institutional theory, a country’s comprehensive system of 
financial, educational, cultural and economic institutions exerts institutional pressure on 
the country’s companies.  
 
Frías-Aceituno et al. (2013a) investigate whether the adoption of IR is determined by the 
legal system of a country. Their findings indicate that companies from countries with civil 
law are more likely to adopt IR, and companies from a country where regulations are 
strictly enforced are also more likely to adopt IR. The researchers use institutional theory 
to explain their findings. Generally, they believe a country’s legal institutions exert 
institutional pressure (coercive and normative pressures) on companies. Specifically, they 
assert that the civil law system is more stakeholder-oriented compared with the common 
law legal system, which focuses on protecting shareholders. Companies in the countries 
where there is coercive and normative pressure (i.e., the legal system seeks to protect 
stakeholders) are likely to adopt IR. Moreover, if regulations are strictly enforced, it can 
be seen as effective protection of stakeholders’ interests. IR is seen as a complementary 
mechanism to the control mechanisms that ensure companies comply with regulations; 
thereby, IR is more likely to be adopted in countries that have stronger legal enforcement. 
Higgins et al. (2014) interpret the findings of interview surveys with managers of early 
IR-adopting of Australian companies using institutional theory and indicate that the 
motivation for adopting IR is to signal a company’s strategy and to meet institutional 
expectations. 
 
2.7 Theoretical framework 
2.7.1 The relationship between theories 
These aforementioned five theories can be broadly classified into two main categories: 
socio-political theories that include stakeholder, legitimacy, and institutional theory; and 
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economics-based theories based on the wealth maximisation and individual self-interest 
concepts inherent in agency and signalling theory (Gray et al., 1995b). Stakeholder, 
legitimacy, and institutional theories are mainly concerned with how companies react to 
societal and/or political pressures, which means these three theories do not consider 
company value. In contrast, agency and signalling theories are primarily concerned with 
maximising company value (Perez, 2018). Table 2.2 shows the similarities among the 
respective theories.  
 
Table 2.2 The similarities among theories 
 Common concept  
Agency theory  1.Information asymmetry 












1. Signals conformity to the established patterns 




1.Social system  Legitimacy theory 
2.External pressure  
(from stakeholders) 
2.External pressure  
(from the whole society) 
Stakeholder 
theory  
1.Social system Institutional 
theory 2.External pressure 
(from stakeholders) 
2.External pressure 
(from other social 
organisations) 










(To all stakeholders) 
Signalling 
theory  














(from the whole 
society) 
2.External pressure  




Source: Author’s design 
 
Agency theory and signalling theory 
Signalling theory is closely linked to agency theory. Agency theory and signalling theory 
consider only the economic outcomes of the company. In other words, both theories 
primarily consider financial stakeholders, rather than a broader spectrum of stakeholders 
(Fernando & Lawrence, 2014). Moreover, information asymmetry is one of the key 
concepts in both agency theory and signalling theory. From the perspectives of agency 
theory and signalling theory, a company has an incentive to mitigate information 
asymmetry between company management and investors (An, 2012; Liu, 2014).  
 
Stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory, and institutional theory  
Stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory, and institutional theory evolve from a similar 
philosophical background, providing complementary and overlapping views (Azizul 
Islam & Deegan, 2008). All three theories treat the organisation as part of a broader social 
system (Deegan, 2006). They also have a common interest: explaining how organisations 
can survive in a changing society (Chen & Roberts, 2010). Stakeholder, legitimacy, and 
institutional theories all consider that economic outcomes, as well as organisational 
efficiency and effectiveness, are necessary but not sufficient for organisations to survive 
(Chen & Roberts, 2010).  
 
Institutional legitimacy is directly related to institutional theory (Chen & Roberts, 2010). 
Institutional theorists (e.g., Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995) 
suggest that conformity to pre-existing institutional patterns is the easiest path to 
legitimacy because pre-existing institutional patterns must already have the characteristic 
of legitimacy (Chen & Roberts, 2010). From this perspective, Suchman (1995, p. 576) 
states “legitimacy and institutionalisation are virtually synonymous”. However, the 
perspective of institutional theory is narrower than that of legitimacy theory (Chen & 
Roberts, 2010). Institutional theory does not examine the value systems of society directly 
(Chen & Roberts, 2010). It sees the pre-existing institutional patterns as symbolic 
representations of the social value system (Chen & Roberts, 2010). While legitimacy 
theory does not specifically express how to meet social expectations or to be socially 
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acceptable, institutional theory emphasises that organisations can incorporate pre-existing 
institutional patterns to achieve survival and success. Carpenter and Feroz (2001) believe 
institutional theory views organisations as operating within a social framework of norms, 
values, and taken-for-granted assumptions about what constitutes expectable or 
acceptable behaviour. Institutional theory is able to describe the reinforcement of the 
existing condition of legitimacy but is not sufficient to explain the changes in social 
expectation or the dynamics of legitimacy (Chen & Roberts, 2010; Gray et al., 1996).  
 
An overlap also exists between stakeholder theory, especially in its managerial branch, 
and legitimacy theory (Azizul Islam & Deegan, 2008). According to Gray et al. (1995a, 
p. 67), “The different theoretical perspectives (legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory) 
need not be seen as competitors for explanation but as sources of interpretation of 
different factors at different levels of resolution.” However, compared with legitimacy 
theory, which sees the “environment” as a whole, stakeholder theory is concerned with 
the relationships between an organisation and its various stakeholders, who constitute the 
environment, and recognises that some stakeholder groups in the society are more 
powerful than other stakeholder groups (Chen & Roberts, 2010; Woodward et al., 1996). 
From the perspective of stakeholder theory, legitimacy is subjectively evaluated based on 
the value criterion of stakeholder groups, rather than the value system of the whole society 
(Chen & Roberts, 2010). Therefore, the focus of stakeholder theory is narrower than that 
of legitimacy theory (Azizul Islam & Deegan, 2008). Gray et al. (1997) argue that 
stakeholder theory, focusing on market forces, is reliant on organisation-centred 
legitimacy, which ignores the force of the whole society and social legitimacy.  
 
Other relationships 
The concept of accountability is explicitly or implicitly incorporated in agency, 
stakeholder, and legitimacy theories. Agency theory is mainly concerned with the 
relationship between company management and investors and emphasises accountability 
to financial stakeholders (Parker, 2005; Segrestin & Hatchuel, 2011). However, agency 
theory ignores the relationship between the company and other stakeholders. Stakeholder 
theory complements agency theory, and extends the relationship between management 
and investors to a wider range of stakeholders and emphasises accountability to all 
stakeholders (An, 2012; Liu, 2014). Legitimacy theory argues that a company should 




By connecting the concepts of signal and information asymmetry, signalling theory links 
to stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory (Albers & Günther, 2010; Hahn & Kühnen, 
2013), although the information asymmetry concept is not included in stakeholder theory 
(An, 2012) and legitimacy theory (Liu, 2014). The existence of information asymmetry 
impairs the decision-making ability of stakeholders (Dilling & Caykoylu, 2019), 
intensifies conflicts of interests between managers and various stakeholder groups (Velte, 
2018), and threatens the legitimacy of an organisation in society (An, 2012).  Thus, a 
company has incentives to develop a signalling tool to mitigate information asymmetry 
between the organisation and various stakeholders to meet stakeholders’ expectations 
(Hill & Jones, 1992) as well as to mitigate information asymmetry between the 
organisation and the society as a whole to signal that it is complying with society’s 
cultural values and expectations (An, 2012).  In addition, signalling theory connects with 
institutional theory (Fuhrmann, 2019). In order to respond to institutional pressures, a 
company will pursue a strategy to signal that it is conforming to the established patterns 
of other organisations.    
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2.7.2 The integrated theoretical framework 
Although each of the aforementioned five theories can be used to partly explain IR 
practices, any single one is inadequate if it is applied as the sole theoretical framework to 
elucidate IR practice (Fuhrmann, 2019). Thus, an integrated IR theoretical framework is 
developed on the basis of stakeholder, agency, signalling, legitimacy, and institutional 
theories. Some previous studies of corporate reporting practice have adopted the same 
theories to establish their theoretical framework. For example, An (2012) constructs a 
comprehensive theoretical framework consisting of stakeholder, agency, signalling, and 
legitimacy theories to interpret intellectual capital disclosure practices by Chinese 
companies and Liu (2014) establishes a theoretical framework by combining stakeholder, 
agency, signalling, legitimacy, and institutional theories to illuminate corporate internet 
reporting practices by Chinese companies. Some IR studies have also attempted to use 
multiple theories to justify the rationale of IR practice. For example, institutional, 
legitimacy, and agency theories are used by Camilleri (2018) to shed light on IR practice, 
and institutional, signalling, stakeholder, and legitimacy theories are applied by 
Fuhrmann (2019) as a theoretical basis for interpreting a firm’s decision to release an 
integrated report.   
 
An integrated IR theoretical framework is developed on the basis of the relationships 
between stakeholder, agency, signalling, legitimacy, and institutional theories (refer to 
Figure 2.1). Each theory incorporated in the integrated theoretical framework sees IR as 
having different functions, which are summarised in Figure 2.1. For instance, IR is a 
legitimation tool from the perspective of legitimacy theory, while IR is a monitoring 
mechanism from the perspective of agency theory. Each theory can be used to interpret 
the motivation for higher IR disclosure practices by organisations. For instance, the 
reason for higher IR disclosure practices by organisations is to gain legitimacy from 
society from the perspective of legitimacy theory, while it is to mitigate information 
asymmetry between principals and agents from the perspective of agency theory. 
Considering the theories are interrelated and underpin each other in explaining IR 
disclosure practices by organisations, the drivers for higher IR disclosure practices are 
integrated into three categories: 
1. To mitigate information asymmetry between the organisation and all stakeholders 
2. To signal superior quality, legitimacy and conformity to all stakeholders 




Despite the three motivations for higher IR disclosure practices of organisations, there 
are also two explanations for lower IR disclosure practices. Specifically, IR induces both 
direct and indirect disclosure costs, which discourage firms from higher IR disclosure 
practices (Grassmann et al., 2019; Fuhrmann, 2019). Direct disclosure costs include the 
costs of preparing, disseminating, and auditing an integrated report (Admati & Pfleiderer, 
2000; Wang et al., 2013). Indirect disclosure costs include unwillingness to set a 
disclosure precedent (Wang et al., 2013); higher volatility in the stock market (Bushee & 
Neo, 2000); and all proprietary costs (An, 2012; Fuhrmann, 2019; Grassmann et al., 2019; 
Wang et al., 2013), including competition costs (i.e., the possibility of losing competitive 
disadvantage), political costs (i.e., increased labour costs; intensified regulations), and 
litigation costs. For example, a company may be reluctant to report forward-looking 
information because such information may be used by its competitors, thus diminishing 
its competitiveness (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018b). Also, releasing forward-looking information 
may incur litigation, which is another reason that a firm avoids disclosing such 
information (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018b). It can be said that managers’ decisions on IR 
disclosure practices constitute a cost-benefit analysis process (Beattie & Smith, 2012; 
Wang et al., 2013). In other words, a firm will use IR only when the firm believes that the 





Figure 2.1 The integrated theoretical framework 




Application of the integrated theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework is applied to guide the methodology of this thesis. Firstly, from 
the perspective of signalling theory, if an explicit guideline for a company in terms of 
how to use IR to signal its superior quality is not given, wrong signalling may happen 
(An, 2012). Thus, when implementing IR in China, an explicit IR framework for Chinese 
companies is required. The objective of this thesis – establishing a Chinese IR framework 
– meets this expectation. Secondly, legitimacy theory and institutional theory suggest that 
firms’ disclosure decisions vary between countries; hence, the national characteristics of 
the country where a firm is resident need to be considered (Baldini et al., 2018; Deegan, 
2002; Fuhrmann, 2019). Thus, when constructing the Chinese IR framework in this thesis, 
Chinese jurisdictional factors, such as the political system, the cultural system, the legal 
system, and the economic system are taken into consideration (see Chapter three), and a 
stakeholder-consultation approach is also adopted (see the first-round questionnaire 
survey in Chapter six).  
 
Thirdly, stakeholder theory emphasises balancing the conflicting expectations of different 
stakeholder groups with regard to disclosures (Hasnas, 1998); therefore, it is necessary to 
identify the expectations of each stakeholder group about IR disclosures. Also, on the 
basis of legitimacy theory, some scholars propose that knowledge is needed about 
whether there are specific stakeholder groups who are more easily influenced by 
legitimising disclosures than others (An, 2012; Deegan, 2002; Liu, 2014); hence, 
analysing which stakeholder groups are sensitive to IR disclosures is important. Thus, in 
order to identify the expectations of various stakeholder groups about IR disclosures, and 
the sensitive stakeholder groups affected by IR disclosures, in this thesis different 
weightings are assigned according to the importance of different disclosures in Chinese 
stakeholders’ minds (see the second-round questionnaire survey in Chapter six).  
 
Fourthly, the legitimation and institutionalisation processes of IR are dynamic and change 
over time (Deegan, 2018; Ryan, 2011; Van Bommel, 2014; Zilber, 2008); therefore, a 
longitudinal approach is used to examine the changes in IR disclosure practices by 
Chinese companies over a 5-year period. Lastly, IR is a totally new reporting format 
(Briem & Wald, 2018; Kannenberg & Schreck, 2018), especially for China. According 
to institutional theory, firms who are pioneers in adopting a new reporting format such as 
IR in one country would be considered as “organisational role models” for other firms in 




Hassan et al., 2019; Higgins et al., 2014). Thus, how firms adapt to IR and how to 
implement the adoption of IR both within a country and within a company need to be 
considered. This thesis consults with Chinese stakeholder groups on two aspects: the 
barriers to IR adoption in China and recommendations for the implementations of IR in 
China.  
 
The integrated theoretical framework is used to make sense of the analysis and to provide 
reflections on the findings of this study. Firstly, the integrated theoretical framework is 
applied to give meaning to the construction of the Chinese IR framework (see Chapter 
six). Secondly, the integrated theoretical framework is employed to shed light on the 
current status and development of IR disclosure practices by Chinese companies (see 
Chapter seven). Thirdly, the integrated theoretical framework is adopted to develop 
hypotheses on factors influencing IR disclosure practices in China, the effect of IR 
disclosure practices on agency costs and to interpret the findings (see Chapter eight and 
Chapter nine). Lastly, the integrated theoretical framework is used to interpret the 
perceptions of Chinese stakeholders on both the barriers to the adoption of IR and 
recommendations for IR implementation (see Chapter ten). 
 
The integrated theoretical framework in China 
There are two main reasons that the integrated theoretical framework for IR is applicable 
to the Chinese context. One is that although all theories in the integrated theoretical 
framework are derived from western countries, Chinese companies have become more 
and more similar to their Western counterparts, enabling the possibility of applying 
Western theories to the Chinese context (Liu, 2014). In fact, all theories incorporated in 
the theoretical framework have already been used in many corporate reporting studies in 
the Chinese context (e.g., An, 2012; Liu, 2014). The other is that the integrated theoretical 
framework is established for interpreting IR, which is a new reporting format for China. 
Compared with traditional corporate reporting, the nature of IR fits the Chinese context 
better. For instance, China is a socialist country, and its social system emphasises that 
every person is equal. This belief ideally fits the concept of embracing all stakeholders in 
IR. Moreover, with rapid economic ascendance, China faces many challenges, including 
high inequality, rapid urbanisation, challenges to environmental sustainability, and 
external imbalances. Therefore, in order to meet the information demands of stakeholders, 
Chinese companies need to provide disclosures on sustainability. IR is the most recent 




2014; De Villiers et al., 2017). In addition, considering China’s growing international 
affiliations, IR, as an international corporate reporting, can be adopted by Chinese 
companies to adapt to the scrutiny of international investors (Maroun et al., 2014). Thus, 
a theoretical framework is needed that is more relevant to the Chinese context and can 
replace the traditional ones so as to better interpret IR in the Chinese context. Therefore, 
a constructed integrated theoretical framework, which comprises five mainstream 
theories underpinning IR and takes the concept of stakeholder theory as the core, is 
believed to be appropriate for this current study.  
 
2.8 Summary  
This chapter provides an integrated theoretical framework for the present study by 
integrating a series of theoretical traditions, comprising stakeholder theory, agency theory, 
signalling theory, legitimacy theory, and institutional theory. Each theory has its own 
features, although common concepts and differences exist between theories. By 
combining the features of IR, this integrated theoretical framework analyses the three 
drivers for companies to improve their IR disclosure practices (to mitigate information 
asymmetry between the organisation and all stakeholders; to signal superior quality, 
legitimacy, and conformity to all stakeholders; and to discharge accountability to all 
stakeholders). It then provides two reasons for limiting higher IR disclosure practices 
(direct and indirect costs). It also explains how the integrated theoretical framework is 
used in this thesis and why the integrated theoretical framework is appropriate for the 

















3 CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH CONTEXT 
3.1 Introduction 
The People’s Republic of China was established on 1 October 1949. It is the world’s third-
largest country, with a population of 1.39 billion. It is home to 56 ethnic groups, with over 
91.9% of the people being Han Chinese. China is a country with more than 5,000 years 
of civilisation, and Mandarin is the official language. The government system is a 
communist state, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the only ruling party. 
China’s official currency is the renminbi (yuan) (CNY). 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the cultural, economic, political, legal, international, 
social, and environmental factors that influence corporate reporting practices in China 
and discusses the importance of these factors in the development of a Chinese IR 
framework. The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 explains the implications of 
three traditional cultures for modern-day China. Section 3.3 discusses the economic 
context of China. Section 3.4 considers the influence of the Chinese government on CSR 
and introduces the attitude of the Chinese government towards developing IR in China. 
Section 3.5 introduces the current Chinese legislation that has implications for IR 
practices. Section 3.6 considers international relations that may dictate how Chinese 
companies operate business globally. Section 3.7 reviews the social and environmental 
context in China. Section 3.8 elaborates the implications of the jurisdictional factors for 
the construction of Chinese IR framework. Finally, section 3.9 summarises the chapter. 
 
3.2 The Chinese cultural context 
Chinese culture stems from Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism, which are widely 
viewed as the most influential philosophies that shape Chinese society (Thompson & 
Pope, 1979; National Geographic, 2019). These teachings have been advocated and 
practised in Chinese society for over 2500 years. It is argued that these cultures engender 
systems of thought that resonate with how Chinese people think and act (Gao & Handley-
Schachler, 2010; Suen et al., 2007). Taoism, Confucianism and Buddhism preach a 
“philosophy of life”. Their common ultimate goal for adherents is enlightenment (Liu et 






Taoism originated in China between 600 and 500 BC. It is a genuinely Chinese religion 
(Du, 2013a). It is an important part of Chinese civilisation and has the most profound 
impact on Chinese culture (Bai et al., 2011). In today’s China, Taoism is still the source 
of wisdom for Chinese people (Bai et al., 2011).  Tao (in other words, naturalness) is the 
ultimate pursuit of Taoism (Bai et al., 2011). Taoists refer to this state of naturalness as 
“non-action” (Drake, 2018). Non-action is not a withdrawal from action, but rather the 
achievement of a higher kind of action: action in accord with the natural order (Drake, 
2018). In other words, Taoism is an inner way as well as an outward path, which means 
outwardly “going with the flow” while inwardly adhering to one’s true nature. Taoism 
highlights the harmony between man and nature. Moreover, Taoism teaches contributing 
to society, including the willingness to share wealth, and to give comfort, compassion, 
concern and care (Cao et al., 2016). Tao Te Ching (the classic text of Taoism) suggests 
that “Sages do not accumulate wealth. The more you do things for others, the more you 
have. The more you give others, the more you get.” It is believed by many scholars that 
CSR has deep roots in Taoism and CSR is closely aligned with the spirit of Taoism (Gao, 
2011; Parsa et al., 2016). 
 
Confucianism 
Confucianism forms the essential basis of Chinese civilisation (Waldmann, 2000). There 
are five virtues: Ren (humanity–benevolence), Yi (righteousness), Li (propriety), Zhi 
(wisdom), and Xin (trustworthiness) that underpin Confucian thought (Gao & Handley-
Schachler, 2010).  Confucianism preaches that humans live in harmony with nature. For 
instance, Confucius believes a noble person only fishes with a rod instead of a net and 
only shoots birds on the wing, not birds that are resting in the nest (Low, 2012). 
Confucianism is concerned with the welfare of ordinary people (Low, 2012). Confucius 
believes ren (humanity–benevolence) is to love people and advocates that you should 
“love your fellow men” (Suen et al., 2007). Li (etiquette/ politeness) represents the criteria 
or standards for correct behaviour; any deviation from li will lead to adverse 
consequences. Therefore, it is important to follow these criteria or standards (Suen et al., 
2007). Many scholars believe Confucianism has a close connection with CSR and 
Confucianism fosters CSR in China (Wang & Juslin, 2009; Zhang et al., 2014). 
 
Buddhism 
Buddhism is China’s oldest imported religion (Du, 2013a). It was introduced to China in 




(Yang, 1967). Chinese Buddhists say that people’s material desires are the root of evil. 
Buddhism preaches that if a person wants to get rid of suffering and distress, he/she has 
to give up all his or her material desires (Gao & Handley-Schachler, 2010). There are 
three core tenets to giving up material desires: self-discipline, wealth-sharing and altruism. 
In order to achieve the three core tenets, people need to have four ethical virtues: 
compassion, loving-kindness, happiness-sharing, and equality. All these three core tenets 
and four ethical virtues motivate corporate social responsibility (Du et al., 2016). 
Buddhism has a strong philosophy of “do not take what you do not give”, and encourages 
sharing wealth with others. “Doing-good and gathering of blessings” are major values of 
Buddhism (Ip, 2003). A number of scholars believe that Buddhism has a close linkage 
with CSR and that CSR conforms to the spirit of Buddhism (Parsa et al., 2016; Vermander, 
2013).   
 
Overall, the concept of social responsibility has a long history in China and is embedded 
in traditional Chinese cultures (Wang & Juslin, 2009). Taoism, Confucianism, and 
Buddhism all advocate people-oriented behaviour, express sympathy for vulnerable 
groups, teach people the correct attitude toward the temptations of money (materialism) 
and condemn greed and illegitimate profit. Thus, they can drive companies to behave 
morally and ethically (Du, 2013a, 2013b). Jensen and Berg (2012) verify that if a 
country’s culture highlights CSR, companies from such countries are more likely to adopt 
IR. Fasan et al. (2016) point out that if a country’s culture highlights CSR, its companies 
are more likely to have higher IR disclosure practices. Moreover, it is generally believed 
that Chinese collectivism stems from Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism (Van de 
Vliert et al., 2013). García-Sánchez et al. (2013) and Vaz et al. (2016) respectively find 
that companies from countries exhibiting stronger collectivism are more likely to adopt 
IR.  Therefore, it is deduced that Chinese culture provides support for adopting IR, 
because IR is strongly aligned with the spirit of Chinese culture. 
 
3.3 The Chinese economic context 
Since 1978, a centrally planned economy has been transformed into a socialist market 
economy, via the “Chinese economic reform” (Naughton, 1996). Prior to the economic 
reform in 1978, a centrally planned economy was implemented in China, and private 
ownership was forbidden. After the economic reform, the restrictions on private 
ownership were abolished. Discrimination against private ownership was eliminated on 




economy (Zhou, 2011). Moreover, since 1978, a series of state-owned company reforms 
have been implemented, including the privatisation of some state-owned companies and 
the transformation of some state-owned companies into public listed companies (Sun & 
Tong, 2003). At the end of 2012, 953 state-owned listed companies accounted for 51.4% 
of the total market capitalisation of China’s A-share listed companies (Yang et al., 2015). 
 
In 1978, China’s GDP ranked 11th in the world. In 2010, China’s GDP surpassed Japan 
and became the world’s second-largest economy. In 2017, China’s GDP was equivalent 
to 12.3 trillion US dollars, accounting for about 15% of the world’s total GDP (OECD, 
2019; National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018). China’s GNI per capita also 
increased from US$200 in 1978 to US$8250 in 2016, exceeding the average for middle-
income countries. In addition, China’s foreign exchange reserves have leapt from 
US$0.17 billion in 1978 to US$3.14 trillion in 2017. The living conditions of Chinese 
residents have continuously improved. In 2017, the national Engel coefficient6 was 29.3%, 
decreasing 34.6% from 1978. From 1979 to 2017, the disposable income per capita of 
Chinese residents increased by 8.5% annually. Moreover, China’s rural poor population 
fell from 250 million in 1978 to 30.46 million in 2017 (Wang, 2018). Also, the Chinese 
middle class outstripped the size of the American middle class for the first time and 
became the world’s largest in 2015 (Credit Suisse, 2016). China’s total R&D expenditure 
is now the second-largest in the world after the United States. In 2017, the gross enrolment 
rate in tertiary education reached 45.7%, which is higher than the average level of middle- 
and high-income countries (Li & Zhu, 2019). Despite the ongoing development of 
China’s economy, the country still has uneven economic development (XINHUANET, 
2018a). Although China’s government has committed to eradicating poverty, poverty is 
still a major problem in China, and a number of poverty-stricken areas continue to exist 
(Zhou et al., 2018). Income inequality also increased from 1978 to 2017. The Gini 
coefficient increased from 0.293 in 1978, to 0.372 in 2000, and to 0.467 in 2017 (OECD, 
2019). Rising income inequality may cause serious social problems, such as social 
conflict and violent crimes (Wang et al., 2015). These challenges present difficulties to 
the attempt to achieve a comprehensively well-off society in China (Zhou et al., 2018). 
 
Two stock exchanges in mainland China, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) were established in 1990 and 1991, respectively. The 
 




third stock exchange is the Hong Kong7 Stock Exchange (HKSE). At the end of 2017, the 
number of listed companies reached 1396 with a total market capitalisation of about 33.13 
trillion yuan8 in the SHSE (SSE, 2018). There were 2089 companies listed on the SZSE 
with a total market capitalisation of about 23.58 trillion yuan9 (SZSE, 2018). On the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), A-shares 
and B-shares are traded. A-shares are issued by companies registered and listed in 
mainland China and are available to residents of mainland China and qualified foreign 
institutional investors. B-shares are also issued by companies registered and listed in 
mainland China and are available to any investors globally. A-shares are subscribed and 
traded in Chinese currency, while B-shares are subscribed and traded in foreign 
currencies10. H-shares are issued by companies registered in mainland China but listed in 
Hong Kong and traded on the HKSE. By the end of 2018, there were 239 H-share 
companies. Companies registered in mainland China can simultaneously issue A-shares, 
B-shares and H-shares. By the end of 2018, there were 80 dual-list A- and B-share 
companies and 106 dual-list A- and H-share companies. The development of the Chinese 
stock market is still immature (Ellyatt, 2018). Some problems, such as the lack of 
transparency, the imperfect stock trading system and inappropriate stock market 
supervisory mechanisms still exist in the Chinese stock market (Ellyatt, 2018). For 
instance, tunnelling11 is a serious problem in China and is one of the main focuses of 
current Chinese corporate governance system (Li et al., 2018).   
 
Previous studies reveal that economic development is a determinant of IR practices. 
Jensen and Berg (2012) believe a new corporate reporting form is more likely to appear 
in a country with higher economic development. Their findings show that companies from 
countries with higher economic development are more likely to adopt IR. Similarly, Fasan 
et al. (2016) find that companies from countries with higher economic development are 
likely to have higher IR disclosure practices. Based on these studies, it is believed that 
the rapid economic development in China provides support for adopting IR as an 
innovative corporate reporting. What is more, the uneven economic development in China 
calls for a new corporate reporting that pays attention to sustainable development, and 
 
7 one of the special administrative regions of China 
8 Around 5 trillion US dollars 
9 Around 3.5 trillion US dollars 
10 B-shares on SHSE are traded in US dollars, and B-shares on SZSE are traded in Hong Kong dollars. 
11 Tunnelling occurs when the people who control the company, including majority shareholder or senior 
managers, expropriate other stakeholders to maximize the controllers’ own private benefits by transferring 




this supports the adoption of IR in China. Furthermore, Jensen and Berg (2012) verify 
that companies from countries with a higher degree of stock market maturity are more 
likely to adopt IR. Similarly, Fasan et al. (2016) indicate that companies from countries 
with a higher degree of stock market maturity are more likely to have higher IR disclosure 
practices. They explain that listed companies in a mature stock market depend more on 
their stakeholders. Therefore, these companies have an incentive to distinguish 
themselves by adopting innovative corporate reporting. By disclosing comprehensive, 
transparent and integrated information to stakeholders, IR has the potential to compensate 
for the limitations of existing Chinese financial markets. A series of IR studies confirm 
that IR is able to provide benefits for both companies and the stock market. For instance, 
IR can provide higher disclosure practices, thereby resulting in a lower cost of capital 
(e.g., García-Sánchez & Noguera-Gámez, 2017b; Zhou et al., 2017), lower information 
asymmetry (e.g., García-Sánchez & Noguera-Gámez, 2017a; Pavlopoulos et al., 2017), 
milder earnings management (e.g., Pavlopoulos et al., 2017), higher analysts’ forecast 
accuracy (e.g., Bernardi & Stark, 2018; Perez, 2018; Zhou et al., 2017) and higher 
company value (e.g., Lee & Yeo, 2016). Because of these potential benefits, it is expected 
that Chinese companies and the Chinese stock market will be motivated to adopt IR.  
 
3.4 The Chinese political context 
The Chinese government attaches great importance to sustainable development. In 
China’s 13th Five-Year (2016-2020) National Plan for economic and social development, 
the Chinese government committed to actively implementing the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development prescribed by the United Nations. In 2016, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs issued China’s Position Paper on the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development. In the same year, the Chinese State Council released two 
files: the National Plan on Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development and the Development of Innovation Demonstration Zones for the 
Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In 2017, the Chinese 
government submitted China’s Progress Report on the Implementation of the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development. In order to achieve sustainable development in 
China, the Chinese government has promoted many initiatives to motivate corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), such as offering financing (e.g., the Green Credit Guidelines 
by the China Banking Regulatory Commission), establishing a blacklist for excessively 
high-polluting companies (e.g., the Environmental Protection Black List produced by the 




Report on Social Responsibility of China by the Chinese Academy of Social Science), 
granting awards (e.g., the annual CSR awards by the People’s Daily), offering 
government-funded projects and rewards, and simplifying the requirements for 
examination and verification (e.g., SHSE corporate governance index) (Chen et al., 2018; 
Hui et al., 2018).  
 
Because IR highlights sustainable development and incorporates features of CSR, the 
development of IR in China has received support from the Chinese government. In 2011, 
the International Integrated Reporting Committee held its first meeting in China since its 
launch, which can be seen as an active response to IR from the Chinese government (GRI, 
2011; IIRC, 2011a). China’s Ministry of Finance has joined the IIRC and “expressed 
support for integrated reporting in its 13th Five Year Plan—a significant signal to the 
market towards greater adoption” (IIRC, 2018). Additionally, a series of research reports 
on IR has been published by the Accounting Department of the Ministry of Finance since 
30 November 2016. The latest one was released on 9 November 2018. The Chinese 
government believes IR is in line with the trend of corporate reporting reform towards 
global and domestic sustainable development, thereby encouraging Chinese companies 
to apply IR to achieve the sustainable development (CBCSD, 2015; Li, 2013; Yang et al., 
2012). IR is in line with the Chinese government’s vision on sustainable development; 
therefore, it is expected that IR can help the Chinese government achieve its mission.  
 
3.5 The Chinese legal context 
The legal system of China is based primarily on the civil law model and is officially 
defined as a socialist legal system (Zhang, 2018).  China’s legal system is classified into 
seven categories and divided into three different levels. The seven categories are the 
Constitution and Constitution-derived; civil and commercial; administrative; economic; 
social; criminal law; and lawsuit and non-lawsuit procedures. The three different levels 
are state laws, administrative regulations and local statutes. The Constitution of China is 
the highest law. 
 
The Chinese government has promulgated a series of legal documents on corporate 
governance, corporate social responsibility, and environmental protection. In 2001, the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued the Code of Corporate 
Governance of Chinese Listed Companies, which aims to improve corporate governance 




Law in 2006. It is stated that a company must, when engaging in business activities, abide 
by the laws and administrative regulations, observe social morals and business ethics, act 
with integrity and good faith, accept regulation by the government and the public, and 
undertake social responsibilities (Zhao, 2018). Chinese Company Law in 2006 implied 
that companies have to be socially responsible to all stakeholders (Zhao, 2018). In the 
same year, the SZSE issued the Guidelines for Social Responsibility of Listed Companies. 
In 2008, the SHSE promulgated the Guidelines for Environmental Information 
Disclosure of Listed Companies. The SHSE and the SZSE mandated certain listed 
companies to disclose CSR information starting from 200812 . Specifically, the SHSE 
mandated sustainability reporting for companies included in the SHSE Corporate 
Governance Index, companies that issue overseas-listed foreign shares, and companies in 
the financial industry. The SZSE mandated sustainability reporting for companies 
included in the Shenzhen 100 Index.  
 
Further, in 2008, the Guidelines to State-owned Enterprises Directly under the Central 
Government on Fulfilling Corporate Social Responsibility, issued by the State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) aimed to highlight eight 
aspects: legal and honest business; sustainable profits; high-quality products and services; 
resource conservation and environmental protection; independent innovation and 
technological advancement; production safety; legal rights of employees; and social 
public welfare. It provides guidance for the application of social responsibility by Chinese 
companies (Shin, 2014). In the same year, the Environmental Information Disclosure Act 
issued by the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) was introduced.  
 
In 2010, the MEP published Guidelines on Environmental Information Disclosure by 
Listed Companies, in which listed companies from sixteen polluting industries are 
required to release annual environmental reports. The Environmental Protection Law was 
introduced on 1 January 2015. In June 2017, CSRC and the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection jointly signed a cooperation agreement for the disclosure of environmental 
information by listed companies (Hofman et al., 2017). Based on the Notice of the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission on Promulgating the Standards Concerning the 
Contents and Formats of Information Disclosure by Companies Offering Securities to the 
Public No.2—Contents and Formats of Annual Reports (2017 Revision), all Chinese 
 
12 The requirements are prescribed in the SHSE Notice of Doing a Better Job for Disclosing 2008 Annual 




listed companies are encouraged to disclose social responsibility information and listed 
companies in polluting industries must disclose environmental information. More 
recently, since 1 January 2018, the Environmental Protection Tax Law was enacted. In 
the same year, the CSRC issued the amended Code of Corporate Governance of Chinese 
Listed Companies.  
 
In the Hong Kong stock market in 2012, the HKSE formally released its Guidelines for 
Environmental, Social and Governance Reporting and encouraged Hong Kong listed 
companies to prepare and publish ESG reports to help investors understand the non-
financial performance information of listed companies in Hong Kong. In December 2015, 
the HKSE issued revised guidelines for ESG reporting, raising the disclosure requirement 
from encouraging adoption to “disclose or explain”, and requiring all Hong Kong listed 
companies to release ESG reports from 2016 onwards. Hong Kong listed companies are 
required to disclose ESG information in their annual reports or publish a stand-alone ESG 
report within three months after the release of their annual reports.  
 
Although CSR reporting is not mandatory for all Chinese listed companies, these 
regulatory documents on corporate governance, environmental protection, and corporate 
social responsibility affect CSR practices and also impact Chinese companies’ voluntary 
disclosures on CSR (Liu & Anbumozhi, 2009; Qu et al., 2012; Yuen et al., 2009). Berger‐
Walliser and Scott (2018) explain that “this trend to impose formerly voluntary CSR 
engagement on companies leads to what we call legalisation of CSR” (p. 169). State-
owned companies follow the spirit of the regulations prescribed by the government and 
act as pilots to set an example to private companies (Hjaltadóttir, 2017). Eventually, 
private companies follow suit by complying with voluntary disclosure (Hjaltadóttir, 2017). 
In 2001, the China National Petroleum Corporation released China’s first environmental 
health and safety report, which began the process of environmental reporting in China. In 
March 2006, the State Grid Corporation of China released the first CSR report from a 
Chinese company. Since 2009, the number of Chinese listed companies that release CSR 
reports has gradually increased (Yu & Zheng, 2020). 
 
Jensen and Berg (2012) believe that countries whose legal systems emphasise the 
importance of CSR are more likely to favour IR. Fasan et al. (2016) show that countries 
in which the legal system emphasises the importance of CSR are more likely to have 




Sánchez and Noguera-Gámez (2018) respectively find companies from countries with 
efficient and strict legal systems are more likely to adopt IR. In addition, Mervelskemper 
and Streit (2017) claim that there is a strong incentive for companies that have issued 
stand-alone CSR reports or sustainability reports to convert stand-alone CSR reports or 
sustainability reports to IR. Lueg et al. (2016) believe that releasing CSR reports or 
sustainability reports is more likely to achieve successful IR implementation. Kılıç and 
Kuzey (2018a) confirm that issuing stand-alone CSR reports or sustainability reports 
increases the extent of IR disclosures. Therefore, the gradual improvement of laws and 
regulations related to corporate governance, environmental protection, and corporate 
social responsibility, and the continuous publication of CSR reports reflect the developing 
trend towards IR in China (Yang et al., 2012). However, the laws and regulations are 
issued by different government agencies with different focuses; therefore, the corporate 
reporting guidelines provided by those separate government agencies may be overlapping, 
redundant and isolating. Accordingly, the corporate reports that follow these guidelines 
may also be overlapping, redundant and isolating. In this case, an integrated approach to 
reporting is called for, and this translates to the necessity for the development and 
implementation of IR in China. 
 
3.6 Chinese international trade and investment  
Chinese economic reform has opened China to the outside world (Dorn, 1998). In the 40 
years since the economic reform, China has become an influential country in international 
trade and international investment. The total import and export volume of goods reached 
US$4.1 trillion in 2017, ranking first in the world (ANBOUND, 2018). Services trade 
have also developed rapidly. In 2017, the total import and export volume of services was 
US$659 billion, and it remained the second largest in the world for four consecutive years. 
China has become a hot spot for global investment (Wu, 2018). In 2017, China’s actual 
use of foreign direct investment was US$131 billion, an increase of 91.3 times over 1984, 
with an average annual growth rate of 14.7%. From 1979 to 2017, China’s cumulative 
foreign direct investment reached US$1,896.6 billion. In 2017, China’s overseas 
investment (excluding banking, securities, and insurance) was US$120.1 billion.  
 
In order to comply with the development trends in international trade and international 
investment, the Chinese government has been promoting the integration and adaptation 
of its business system with the international business system. For instance, Accounting 




(MOF) in 1992 and came into effect on 1 July 1993. Then in 2000, sixteen Chinese 
Accounting Standards were developed by the Chinese Accounting Standards Committee 
(CASC) with reference to International Accounting Standards. This change can be seen 
as the harmonisation of Chinese accounting standards with international accounting 
standards (Wang et al., 2013). Further, the Chinese government issued the New 
Accounting Standard for Business Enterprises, which came into effect on 1 January 2007. 
The New Accounting Standard for Business Enterprises consists of the basic ASBE and 
38 specific accounting standards that are substantially in line with international standards. 
It is regarded as being the closest to International Accounting Standards (Wang et al., 
2013). Furthermore, China is a member of a number of international trade and investment 
organisations, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC), and the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime 
Silk Road13. More than 100 countries and international organisations have participated in 
The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road, and more than 
80 countries and international organisations have signed cooperation agreements with 
China.  
 
The concept of CSR incorporates these organisations’ trade and investment agreements, 
which puts pressure on China to undertake CSR. GRI G4 guidelines and GRI standards 
are globally recognised international sustainability reporting frameworks (Parsa et al., 
2016). Currently, the guidelines followed voluntarily by some Chinese companies in 
compiling their CSR reports are mainly the GRI G4 guidelines, GRI standards and the 
Corporate Social Responsibility Report Compilation Guide released by the Corporate 
Social Responsibility Research Centre of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The 
Corporate Social Responsibility Report Compilation Guide is regarded as a framework 
for information disclosure on social responsibility for Chinese companies (Shin, 2014). 
According to GoldenBee (2018), among 1579 Chinese companies that issue CSR reports, 
22.36% of companies refer to GRI G4 or GRI standards, and 20.08% of companies refer 
to the Corporate Social Responsibility Report Compilation Guide. These guidelines, 
especially the GRI G4 guidelines and GRI standards, are adopted because there are no 
CSR report guidelines prescribed or explicitly appointed by the Chinese government. 
 
13 It is also known as the “Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)” or “One Belt One Road (OBOR)”. It is a 
development strategy applied by the Chinese government involving infrastructure development and 




Also, these guidelines provide a large number of information disclosure standards that are 
more detailed than government laws and regulations (Ma et al., 2016).  
 
In extant IR studies, Frías-Aceituno et al. (2014) find that companies that employ GRI 
standards are more likely to adopt IR. Similarly, Kılıç and Kuzey (2018a) find that 
adopting GRI standards has a positive impact on the extent of IR disclosures. IR, as a 
corporate reporting form recognised by international business systems, may serve as a 
new form of corporate reporting enabling China to adapt to the international business 
system. 
 
3.7 Social and environmental issues  
According to the Research Report on ESG Evaluation System of Chinese Listed 
Companies published by the Asset Management Association of China (2018), employees’ 
safety and health issues as well as consumers’ safety, health, and privacy issues are two 
of the most pressing social issues faced by Chinese companies. There were 219 coal mine 
accidents in 2017, causing 375 deaths (XINHUANET, 2018b). In the housing engineering 
and municipal engineering industry, there were 692 accidents in 2017, resulting in 807 
deaths. Occupational illness is another huge problem in China. Pneumoconiosis has 
become one of the most serious occupational diseases for Chinese workers. The total 
number of pneumoconiosis cases is the highest among all occupational diseases. By the 
end of 2017, there were more than 0.85 million reported cases of pneumoconiosis in 
China, of which 62% were in the coal industry. The Chinese government released a plan 
to control occupational diseases from 2016 to 2020, including stronger supervision, more 
effective prevention and treatment, and higher service level. In addition, a series of 
scandals that jeopardised consumers’ safety, health, and privacy have occurred in China 
in recent years, such as the 2008 milk scandal (a large dairy company adulterated milk 
with melamine); the 2011 lean meat powder scandal (meat products tainted with lean meat 
powders were found in a listed meat processing company); the 2012 plasticiser scandal 
(excessive levels of plasticiser in alcoholic drinks were found in a listed liquor-making 
company); the 2018 substandard vaccine scandal (a listed drug company sold substandard 
vaccines); the 2018 child abuse scandal (child abuse was found in a high-end Chinese 
preschool education company listed on the New York Stock Exchange); and the 2018 data 
leakage scandal (a listed information company stole users’ information). Food and drug 




safety have been published by the Chinese government, including stricter standards, more 
severe punishment, and stronger supervision. 
 
The fragility of the natural ecological environment places tremendous pressure on 
sustainable development in China (State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2012). 
A large percentage of the land is not suitable for human habitation. Arid and semi-arid 
regions account for 52% of the country’s total land area. Resource constraints have 
become a huge challenge for China’s sustainable development. The per capita freshwater, 
cultivated land, and forest resources in China account for 28%, 40%, and 25% of the 
world’s average, respectively. China has paid a heavy environmental price for its 
economic growth (Liu, 2015). Nowadays, air and water contamination problems are at 
the top of the agenda for the Chinese government (Yin et al., 2019). According to the 
monitoring results for 338 cities of China in 2017, only 99 cities met national air quality 
standards, accounting for 29.3% of the total; 239 cities (70.7%) failed to meet national 
air quality standards (MoEE, 2018). Water pollution is another environmental challenge 
that China has to face (Albert & Xu, 2016). In 2017, 32.1% of surface water and 37.5% 
of key lakes and reservoirs were unfit for potable use or human contact. Only 31.9% of 
groundwater reached a good or excellent quality (MoEE, 2018). A war on pollution was 
initiated by the Chinese central government in 2014 (Han et al., 2016). Many businesses, 
especially heavy industries, have been inspected, fined or shut down across the country 
(China Briefing, 2017). What is more, imports of foreign waste have been banned by the 
Chinese government since 2018. Protecting the environment is one of the top concerns of 
the Chinese public (China Daily, 2014). 
 
Stakeholders are users of corporate social and environmental disclosures (Lu & 
Abeysekera, 2014, 2017). The social and environmental issues in China call for 
stakeholder-oriented corporate reporting by Chinese companies. IR is a stakeholder-
oriented form of corporate reporting and incorporates information on CSR, thereby 
allowing stakeholders to examine both the ethical behaviour (e.g., human rights 
protection and environmental protection) and unethical behaviour (e.g., human rights 
violation and environmental damage) of companies in great detail (Jensen & Berg, 2012). 
Churet and Eccles (2014) find that IR practices can enhance companies’ environmental, 
social and governance management quality, which implies that IR can play an important 





3.8 The implication of contextual factors for the IR framework 
One of the main purposes of this study is to develop a Chinese IR framework. After 
analysing the Chinese contextual factors, it is clear that in the Chinese IR framework, 
these factors cannot be omitted and need to be considered. Two initiatives are adopted in 
order to incorporate the Chinese contextual factors in the present research. The first is 
that stakeholder surveys are adopted when constructing the Chinese IR framework 
because Chinese stakeholders are more conversant with Chinese contextual factors. 
Specifically, the preliminary IR disclosure items are scrutinised and validated by Chinese 
stakeholders in order to be adaptive and applicable to the Chinese context and meet 
Chinese stakeholders’ expectations. Chinese stakeholders also express their views on the 
importance of each disclosure item.  
 
The second initiative adopted is that two unique disclosure items are reflected in the 
Chinese IR framework. The first unique disclosure item is CCP-building. Chinese listed 
companies are required to carry out CCP-building activities. Since 1949, the CCP has 
been the dominating force and ruling party. China had 89.564 million CCP members at 
the end of 2017. The strength, resilience and adaptability of the CCP significantly rely on 
its pervasive primary party organisations, which are the smallest units of the Party (Chen 
et al., 2015; Han, 2015). In order to remain in power, the CCP has to maintain its pervasive 
penetration of the society (Chen et al., 2015; Han, 2015). Typically, in order to attract and 
manage talent in private sectors, the CCP has created primary party organisations in the 
private sector, especially in non-state-owned listed companies (Chen et al., 2015; Han, 
2015). The CCP constitution stipulates that any companies with more than three official 
communist party members must establish primary party organisations (XINHUANET, 
2017). The CCP pays special attention to party-building. According to the listed company 
governance guidelines, listed companies are required to provide the necessary support for 
the activities of the party organisation (REUTERS, 2018; Xie, 2018). Some Chinese state-
owned companies, such as the State Grid Corporation of China (since 2017), the State 
Development & Investment Corporation (since 2017), and the China National Offshore 
Oil Corporation (since 2015), have already published stand-alone CCP-building reports. 
Therefore, in the present study, a disclosure item on the CCP-building is incorporated in 
the Chinese IR framework.  
 
The second unique disclosure item is overseas social responsibility. More and more 




encourages Chinese companies to be socially and environmentally responsible to 
overseas stakeholders (Carey et al., 2017; Lu et al., 2015; Moon & Shen, 2010). In 2013, 
the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Environmental Protection published 
its Guidelines for Environmental Protection in Foreign Investment and Cooperation. The 
guidelines cover a wide range of issues related to overseas Chinese business, including 
community relations, environmental policies and legal compliance (International Rivers, 
2013). In 2017, the Chinese government published the Report on the Sustainable 
Development of Chinese Enterprises Overseas. Considering that Chinese companies’ 
overseas social responsibility performances have received much attention, in this present 
study, a disclosure item on overseas social responsibility is incorporated in the Chinese 
IR framework.  
 
3.9 Summary 
It is believed that jurisdictional factors are important considerations for developing a non-
financial reporting framework in different countries (Shareef et al., 2014; Visser, 2008). 
Therefore, in the development of an IR framework for China, it is important to consider 
jurisdictional factors that are context-specific to China. In this chapter, the economic, 
political, legal, international relational, cultural, social, and environmental factors that 
influence the corporate reporting practices in China are discussed. The importance of 
these factors in the development of a Chinese IR framework is explained as well. 
Moreover, in the extant international and Chinese corporate reporting frameworks, some 
disclosures, especially those in the Chinese context, have not been prescribed yet or are 
not presented sufficiently. By exploring and summarising China’s jurisdictional factors, 
this chapter extracts two disclosures that are recommended to be presented in a Chinese 














4 CHAPTER FOUR 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a review of the extant literature on IR research. The literature review 
has two primary purposes. First, it forms the basis for drafting a list of IR disclosure items, 
which will be used for stakeholder consultation (Chapter six). The second purpose is to 
identify the approaches adopted in prior studies for evaluating IR disclosure practices. 
Section 4.2 traces the development of IR worldwide and provides definitions of IR. 
Section 4.3 reviews the prior IR studies related to the measurement of IR disclosure 
practices, the determinants of IR practices, the effects of IR practices, the measurement 
of other attributes of IR, and stakeholder consultation. Section 4.4 identifies the research 
gaps in the prior IR studies and states how the present study is designed to fill these gaps. 
Section 4.5 establishes a preliminary list of IR disclosure items. Section 4.6 provides a 
summary of the chapter. 
 
4.2 The development and definitions of IR 
Different forms of non-financial reporting, including Corporate Social Responsibility 
Reporting (CSRR), Sustainability Reporting (SR), Environmental, Social and 
Governance (ESG) reporting, and Intellectual Capital Reporting (ICR), have gained 
popularity over many years (Liu et al., 2018). A number of international non-financial 
reporting guidelines have been published by various organisations including the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI), Accounting for Sustainability (A4S), the World Intellectual 
Capital Initiative (WICI), the Enhanced Business Reporting Consortium, the Carbon 
Disclosure Project, the International Corporate Governance Network, the Sustainability 
Reporting Standards Board and the Climate Disclosure Standards Board. Jurisdictional-
specific regulations on non-financial reporting were also developed, such as guidelines 
for strategic reporting by Britain (see Table 4.1). However, although companies are 
producing more sustainability reports and corporate social responsibility reports, these 
early non-financial reporting initiatives are often disconnected from financial reports, 
leading to non-financial information being isolated from financial information (Iannoconi 
& Sinnett, 2011; Mervelskemper & Streit, 2017). This disconnectedness undermines the 
effectiveness of communication with stakeholders and impedes stakeholders’ decision-
making (Aluchna et al., 2019; Frías-Aceituno et al., 2013a). IR represents a new corporate 




traction and momentum worldwide (Lee & Yeo, 2016). IR incorporates a number of 
features (e.g., intellectual capital, corporate social responsibility, strategy) of these early 
non-financial reporting practices. IR also addresses the shortcomings of the early non-
financial reporting practices by emphasising the connectivity of non-financial and 
financial information (Fasan, 2013). 
 
Table 4.1 Jurisdictional-specific regulations on non-financial reporting 
European Union Amendments for the Fourth and Seventh Accounting Directives 
United Kingdom Guidelines of strategic reports issued by the Financial Reporting 
Council; The Companies Act 2006 (strategic report and directors’ 
report) Regulations 2013 
Germany German Accounting Standard 15 
France Grenelle II (all companies with over 500 employees, 31 December 
2013 onward) 
Brazil The Sao Paulo Stock Exchange stipulates that listed companies 
must disclose non-financial KPIs on a “comply or explain” basis. 
Malaysia Public Consultation Paper of the Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance 2016 
Singapore Guide to sustainability reporting for Singapore Stock Exchange 
listed companies 
India The Exchange Board of India (SEBI) mandates the top 100 public 
listed companies to release ESG information; other public listed 
companies are encouraged to voluntarily release ESG information 
in order to meet the mandatory Business Responsibility Report 
(BRR) requirements. 
China The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE) mandated certain listed companies to disclose 
ESG information starting from 200814. 
Denmark Proposal Act amending the Danish Financial Statements Act 
United States SEC Regulation S-K item 101, item 103 and 303 
Source: Author’s design 
 
In order to encourage firms to report non-financial information, the King I Report on 
Corporate Governance was developed in South Africa in 1994, which is seen as the 
 
14 The SHSE mandated ESG reporting for companies included in the SHSE Corporate Governance Index, 
companies that issue overseas listed foreign shares, and companies in the financial industry. SZSE 




beginning of IR (De Villiers et al., 2017). The King II Report was then released in 2002 
and introduced the concept of “integrated sustainability reporting” (Baboukardos & 
Rimmel, 2016; Dumay et al., 2016). Companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange needed to incorporate a narrative statement in annual reports stating how the 
principles in the King II report were complied with (Hoffman, 2012). The King III report 
was issued in 2009, which can be seen as a break-through for IR (Rowbottom & Locke, 
2015). The King III report formally introduced the term “integrated reporting” and called 
for South African listed companies to prepare integrated reports (IoDSA, 2012). In South 
Africa, all companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange were mandatorily 
required to apply the King III report on an “apply or explain” basis from March 2010 
(IRCSA, 2011; WBCSD, 2014). In order to facilitate the adoption of the King III report, 
the Integrated Reporting Committee of South Africa (IRCSA) was established in May 
2010 (IoDSA, 2012). In January 2011, a discussion paper called “Framework for IR and 
the integrated report” was reported by the IRCSA (IRCSA, 2011). In this discussion paper, 
the IRCSA crystallised the concept of IR by outlining the elements of an integrated report 
(IRCSA, 2011; Rowbottom & Locke, 2015). It was the first time a regulator had aimed 
to codify IR. 
 
The International Integrated Reporting Committee was formed in August 2010, and its 
initial formation involved the Prince of Wales’ Accounting for Sustainability Project 
(A4S), the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), and the International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC) (Camilleri, 2018). Then the International Integrated Reporting 
Committee changed its name to the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC), 
which was registered as a not-for-profit company in the UK in November 2011. The 
IIRC’s mission is “to establish IR and thinking within mainstream business practice as 
the norm in the public and private sectors”15. Since its initial formation, the IIRC has been 
dedicated to the development of IR guidelines (see Table 4.2). In September 2011, a 
discussion paper on a draft framework for an integrated report, titled “Towards Integrated 
Reporting: Communicating Value in the 21st Century” was published by the IIRC 
(Magarey, 2012; Reuter & Messner, 2015). In October 2011, the IIRC launched a pilot 
program in which organisations trialled the application of the draft IR framework and 






point for the release of the International Integrated Reporting Framework (IIRF) in 2013 
(Sofian & Dumitru, 2017). 
 
Table 4.2 Important documents published by the IIRC 
Discussion Paper on IR in September 2011 
IIRC Pilot Programme in October 2011 
Prototype IR Framework in November 2012 
Consultation Draft of the IR Framework in April 2013 
A series of background papers on key IR concepts 
Finalised IR Framework in December 2013 
Reports on assurance on IR in 2014 
Reports on IR Framework implementation feedback in 2017 and 2018 
Source: Author’s design 
 
The International Integrated Reporting Framework (IIRF) prescribed by the IIRC is 
regarded as a significant development in IR (Eccles & Krzus, 2014). The IIRF is a 
principles-based document containing two main sets of requirements (guiding principles 
and content elements) for the preparation of an integrated report. This framework 
identifies information to be included in an integrated report and governs the overall 
content of an integrated report (see Table 4.3). Content elements are defined as “the 
categories of information required to be included in an integrated report” (IIRC, 2013, 
p.33). Guiding principles are “the principles that underpin the preparation and 
presentation of an integrated report, informing the content of the report and how 
information is presented” (IIRC, 2013, p.33). Capitals, as the fundamental concepts 
underpin guiding principles and content elements, are the “stocks of value on which all 
organisations depend for their success as inputs to their business model, and which are 
increased, decreased or transformed through the organisation’s business activities and 






Table 4.3 Guiding Principles, Content Elements and Fundamental concepts in the IIRF 
Guiding Principles Content Elements Fundamental concepts 
Strategic focus and future 
orientation 
Organisational overview and 
external environment 
Financial capital 
Connectivity of information Governance Manufactured capital  
Stakeholder relationships Business model Intellectual capital 
Materiality Risks and opportunities Human capital  
Conciseness Strategy and resource allocation Social and relationship capital  
Reliability and completeness Performance Natural capital 
Consistency and comparability Outlook Value creation process 
 Basis of preparation and 
presentation 
 
Source: Derived from IIRF (IIRC, 2013) 
 
The King IV Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa was issued in November 
2016. It replaced the King III Report and was effective for fiscal years starting on or after 
1 April 2017 (Dumay et al., 2017). With the publication of the King IV Report, the prior 
“apply or explain” requirement was replaced by an “apply and explain” approach, which 
requires firms to adopt all principles in the King IV Report and explain how the principles 
are complied with (Le Roux & Pretorius, 2019; Willows & Rockey, 2018). Now, the IIRF 
is a part of the new King IV Report (IIRC, 2016; IoDSA, 2016). 
 
The term “integrated reporting” was first mentioned explicitly by Allen White, the co-
founder of the GRI, in his discussion of Novo Nordisk’s company report, which he termed 
an example of “integrated, balanced, and candid reporting”. Some scholars, such as 
Burgman and Roos (2007), Cordazzo (2005), Hutton (2004), Kolk and Pinske (2010), 
and Pedrini (2007) call for connectivity of information, advocating the integration of 
various types of information. In the following studies, a number of researchers give their 
views on the definition of IR by summarising the features of IR (see Table 4.4).  
 
There are four critical aspects in IR: the constituted elements of IR; the relationship 
between constituted elements; value; and stakeholders, drawing on the definitions 
provided in Table 4.4. In terms of the elements of IR, all definitions state that both 
financial information and non-financial information are indispensable components of IR. 
However, there are different views on what constitutes non-financial information in an 




information. Similarly, Songini and Pistoni (2015) are concerned with social and 
environmental information. Branwijck (2012) and Katsikas et al. (2016) highlight both 
corporate social responsibility information and intellectual capital information. Several 
other studies have broader views. In their definitions, in addition to social and 
environmental information, there are a number of elements, including strategy (Bartolini 
et al., 2013; IIRC, 2011b; IIRC, 2013; IRCSA, 2011), governance (Bartolini et al., 2013; 
Eccles & Krzus, 2010; IIRC, 2011b; IIRC, 2013), risk (Bartolini et al., 2013; De Villiers 
et al., 2014), opportunity (De Villiers et al., 2014; Monterio, 2015), business model 
(Monterio, 2015), various capitals (Monterio, 2015; Rinaldi et al., 2018), external 
operating context (Rinaldi et al., 2018) and outlook (IIRC, 2011b; IIRC, 2013; Owen, 
2013). 
 
In terms of the relationship between constituted elements, Monterio (2015) describes the 
relationship as “interdependent and connected” whereas Rinaldi et al. (2018) describe the 
constituted elements as “interrelated”. Katsikas et al. (2016) use the term “interlinked” to 
depict the relationship. Eccles and Krzus (2010) believe that IR combines financial 
information and non-financial information, while Cortesi and Venay (2019) believe that 
IR merges financial information and non-financial information. In Bartolini et al.’s (2013) 
view, IR is the synthesis of financial and non-financial information. No matter which 
terms they use to define IR, what these scholars highlight is the connectivity between 
financial and non-financial information.  
 
Nearly all studies emphasise the importance of value. However, some definitions only 
focus on value creation (Busco et al., 2013; Casonato et al., 2018; IIRC, 2013; Katsikas 
et al., 2016; Rinaldi et al., 2018) while other definitions are concerned with both creating 
value and sustaining value (Bartolini et al., 2013; IRCSA, 2011; IIRC, 2011b). With 
regard to stakeholders, some definitions clearly state that IR is a stakeholder-oriented 
corporate reporting (Cortesi & Venay, 2019; IRCSA, 2011; Songini & Pistoni, 2015) 
whereas some definitions seem to omit the role of stakeholders in IR (IIRC, 2011b; IIRC, 
2013). Considering all the aspects highlighted by researchers, in this present study, IR is 
defined as a corporate reporting that provides interconnected material financial and non-
financial information, including but not limited to strategy, governance, risk, performance 
and prospects, to stakeholders, demonstrating to them about an organisation’s past, 
present and future, and how the organisation creates and sustains value over the short, 





Table 4.4 Definitions of integrated reporting 
Author Integrated reporting 
Eccles and Krzus (2010) A single report that combines the financial and narrative information found in a 
company’s annual report with the non-financial (such as on environmental, 
social, and governance issues) and narrative information found in a company’s 
‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ or ‘Sustainability’ report (p.10). 
IRCSA (2011) A report to stakeholders on the strategy, performance and activities of the 
organisation in a manner that allows stakeholders to assess the ability of the 
organisation to create and sustain value in the short, medium and long term. An 
effective integrated report reflects an appreciation that the organisation’s ability 
to create and sustain value is based on financial, social, economic and 
environmental systems and by the quality of its relationships with its 
stakeholders. The integrated report should be written in clear and 
understandable language in order for it to be a useful resource for its 
stakeholders (p. 6). 
IIRC (2011b) IR Integrated reporting brings together material information about an 
organisation’s strategy, governance, performance and prospects in a way that 
reflects the commercial, social and environmental context within which it 
operates. It provides a clear and concise representation of how an organisation 
demonstrates stewardship and how it creates and sustains value (p. 2).   
IIRC (2013) An integrated report is a concise communication about how an organisation’s 
strategy, governance, performance and prospects, in the context of its external 
environment, lead to the creation of value over the short, medium and long term 
(p. 7). 
Busco et al. (2013) IR is a process that leads to communicating value creation over time through 
the annual integrated report. 
Bartolini et al. (2013) IR represents a sort of synthesis of the financial report and the sustainability 
report and also aims to combine the “individualism” of the financial report with 
the implied “altruism” of the sustainability report. IR effectively and concisely 
describes the ability of a company to create sustainable value and provides combined 
information about governance, strategy, risk, operations, financial and non-financial 
performance.  
Owen (2013) IR includes “a strategic rather than operational or transactional focus; longer- 
rather than short-term outlook; prospective rather than retrospective analysis; 
qualitative commentary as well as quantitative information; and reports on 
wider business performance metrics rather than on narrower external financial 









Table 4.4 (Continued) 
Author Integrated reporting 
De Villiers et al. (2014) The main distinguishing feature of IR is it indicates “an organisation’s most 
material social, environmental and economic actions, outcomes, risks and 
opportunities in a manner that reflected the integrated nature of these factors for 
the organisation” (p. 1046). 
Monterio (2015) “IR gives companies around the world a consistent, yet flexible, way to tell their 
own unique stories, linking their business strategy, business model, various 
capitals, opportunities, and risks to future economic value over the short, 
medium, and long term. An integrated report shows interdependencies and 
connections between these important elements so that users of the information 
can clearly see how one impacts another and ultimately affects the value of the 
organisation” (p.36). 
Songini and Pistoni (2015) The integrated report is a holistic and integrated representation of a company’s 
status according to the financial performance, social performance and 
environmental performance. It is based on the recognition that the distinction 
between shareholders and stakeholders has to be removed. 
Katsikas et al. (2016) IR provides an answer to the need to understand the extent to which CSR, 
intellectual capital and environmental strategies are linked and take part in the 
value creation process. 
Rinaldi et al. (2018) The aim of an integrated report is to provide managers, investors and other 
stakeholders with information about several interrelated dimensions that affect 
or can be affected by organisations, including the external environment, six 
forms of capital employed to create value and the value creation process (which 
describes how organisations interact with both the external environment and the 
capitals). 
Casonato et al. (2018) IR emphasises the company’s future value-creation story and presents 
interactions between financial and non-financial information.   
Cortesi and Vena (2019) In response to the growing information needs of stakeholders, IR is to enhance 
overall transparency by merging traditional reporting and corporate social 
responsibility. 
Source: Author’s design 
 
4.3 Prior research on IR 
Extant IR studies primarily investigate the measurement of IR disclosure practices (Liu 
et al., 2018a), the determinants of IR practices (Ahmed Haji & Anifowose, 2016a), the 
effects of IR practices (Zhou et al., 2017), and the measurement, determinants and effects 
of other attributes of IR (Melloni et al., 2017). Many studies also conduct stakeholder 
consultation to conduct in-depth analyses of the implementation of IR (Adhariani & De 
Villiers, 2018; Attanayake Mudiyanselage, 2018). These existing studies are highly 





4.3.1 Measurement of IR disclosure practices  
Content analysis is the commonest approach to measuring IR disclosure practices. A 
disclosure index and a scoring system are the instruments for content analysis. A 
disclosure index begins with a list of disclosure items. According to Garegnani et al. 
(2015), when a study covers voluntary disclosure 16 , there is no predefined list of 
disclosure items; therefore, it is necessary to define a list of disclosure items that is ready 
to be employed before constructing the scoring system. The list of disclosure items is 
usually identified by referring to extant literature (Adhikari & Tondkar, 1992). Previous 
IR studies have primarily adopted four channels to identify IR disclosure items. The first 
channel is to extract disclosure items prescribed in extant international IR frameworks, 
such as the IIRF (Nakib & Dey, 2018; Songini & Pistoni, 2015). The second channel is 
to extract disclosure items prescribed by local IR frameworks, such as the King III or 
King IV reports (Pavlopoulos et al., 2017; Solomon & Maroun, 2012). The third channel 
is to extract disclosure items prescribed by sustainability reporting frameworks, such as 
GRI G4 guidelines or GRI standards (Marcia et al., 2015; Needles et al., 2018). The fourth 
channel is to extract disclosure items from other sources (Lipunga, 2015; Zinsou, 2018). 
According to Hammond and Miles (2004), verification by stakeholders can enhance the 
reliability of disclosure items. However, most IR studies do not employ stakeholder 
consultation when constructing the list of IR disclosure items. Only the studies of Marx 
and Mohammadali-Haji (2014), Naynar et al. (2018), and Zhou et al. (2017) consider 
stakeholders’ expectations and use a questionnaire survey or an interview survey to 
validate their IR disclosure items. Zhou et al. (2017) focus on investors, while Marx and 
Mohammadali-Haji (2014) are concerned about the views of knowledgeable people from 
commerce, industry and academia. Naynar et al.’s (2018) stakeholder panel comprises 
students majoring in accounting, accounting practitioners, accounting academics, 
chartered accountants, audit trainees, and students majoring in business without an 
accounting subject.  
 
The disclosure indices in extant IR studies can be categorised into two types according to 
their weighting systems: unweighted and weighted disclosure indices. Researchers who 
adopt an unweighted disclosure index do not assign any weighting to each item, as it is 
 
16  Voluntary disclosure represents free choices by the company’s management on the provision of 
information which exceeds the mandated requirements of generally accepted accounting principles and the 




assumed each item is equally important (Coy & Dixon, 2004; Hossain et al., 1995; Meek 
et al., 1995). Some scholars believe that assigning weightings increases subjectivity 
(Ahmed & Courtis, 1999; Ferguson et al., 2002), increases the complexity of the research 
(Hooks, 2000), but does not significantly influence the findings (Adhikari & Tondkar, 
1992; Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987; Firth, 1980). However, Marston and Shrives (1991) 
argue that subjectivity is inevitable, and Coy and Dixon (2004) contend that abandoning 
the assigning of weightings is itself a subjective phenomenon. Hooks (2000) suggests that 
the benefits of assigning weightings outweigh the subjectivity involved. Velte and 
Stawinoga (2017) recommend assigning weightings to each disclosure item according to 
the preferences of stakeholders. This disclosure index is termed the weighted disclosure 
index. A number of IR studies have adopted weighted disclosure indices. Lee and Yeo 
(2016), Zhou et al. (2017), and Naynar et al. (2018) consider the stakeholders’ preferences 
and use questionnaire surveys to assign weightings to each item. However, Zhou et al. 
(2017) and Lee and Yeo (2016) only consider whether a disclosure item is important or 
not important, while Naynar et al. (2018) classify the importance of the disclosure item 
into five levels. In addition, Zhou et al. (2017) and Lee and Yeo (2016) focus on investors 
and financial analysts, respectively. In contrast, Naynar et al. (2018) are concerned about 
the views of students majoring in accounting, accounting practitioners, accounting 
academics, chartered accountants, audit trainees, and students majoring in business 
without an accounting subject.  
 
A scoring system is incorporated in the disclosure index to assess IR disclosure practices. 
A scoring system can be categorised as being with or without quality criteria. A scoring 
system without quality criteria, usually a two-point scale, only can measure the presence 
or absence of a selected item; it cannot measure the quality of the item (Coy & Dixon, 
2004). Most IR studies adopt scoring systems without quality criteria, such as those by 
Santis et al. (2018) and Zhou et al. (2017). Some IR studies use scoring systems with 
quality criteria, but their quality criteria are not the same, and may involve a three-point 
scale (Ruiz-Lozano & Tirado-Valencia, 2016), a four-point scale (Zinsou, 2018), a five-
point scale (Van Zyl, 2013), a six-point scale (Lee & Yeo, 2016), or a seven-point scale 
(Liu et al., 2018a).  
 
Table 4.5 provides a summary of IR studies with regard to disclosure items, weighting 
systems and scoring systems. Some studies do not measure IR disclosure practices but 




or integral IR disclosure items (e.g., Demartini & Trucco, 2017; Katsikas et al., 2016). 
For instance, Garanina and Dumay (2017) identify disclosure items on intellectual capital 
in IR and Bowrin (2018) identifies disclosure items on human resources in IR. In studies 
that investigate IR disclosure practices, some examine partial disclosure practices in IR17 
(e.g., Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018b; Santis et al., 2018) while others measure the integral IR 
disclosure practices18 (e.g., Lee & Yeo, 2016; Zhou et al., 2017). For instance, Santis et 
al. (2018) examine intellectual capital disclosure practices in IR while Kılıç and Kuzey 
(2018b) measure forward-looking disclosure practices in IR. Among these studies, only 
Lee and Yeo (2016) adopt a weighted disclosure index and a scoring system with quality 
criteria.  
 
There are six main types of categorizations of disclosure items in prior IR literature. 
Firstly, several studies, including those of such as Kılıç and Kuzey (2018a), Lee and Yeo 
(2016), Marx and Mohammadali-Haji (2014), Menicucci (2018), Nakib and Dey (2018), 
Sofian and Dumitru (2017), Stent and Dowler (2015), and Zhou et al. (2017) primarily 
categorise their disclosure items into seven themes: organisational overview and external 
environment, governance, business model, risks and opportunities, strategy, performance, 
and outlook. These items are in line with the content element of the IIRF. Secondly, some 
studies, such as those by Demartini and Trucco (2017) and Melloni (2015) classify their 
disclosure items into six forms of capital: financial, manufactured, intellectual, human, 
social and relationship, and natural. These themes are in line with the fundamental 
concepts of the IIRF. Thirdly, Ahmed Haji and Anifowose (2016b) and Ruiz-Lozano and 
Tirado-Valencia (2016) classify their disclosure items based on the guiding principles of 
the IIRF. Fourthly, some researchers, such as Katsikas et al. (2016) and Songini and 
Pistoni (2015) categorise disclosure items based on both content elements and guiding 
principles prescribed by the IIRF. Fifthly, La Torre et al. (2018) develop a taxonomy for 
IR in which disclosure items are categorised by referring to both content elements and six 
forms of capital. Fasan et al. (2016) and Marcon and Mancin (2016) adopt the same 
approach. Sixthly, Liu et al. (2018) make the classification by considering content 
elements, six forms of capital, and guiding principles simultaneously. Content elements 
are the categories of information suggested to be included in an integrated report, and the 
six forms of capital are the fundamental concepts underpinning the guiding principles and 
content elements (IIRC, 2013). The guiding principles underpin the preparation and 
 
17 These studies provide partial disclosure items in IR as well. 




presentation of an integrated report (IIRC, 2013). According to WICI (2013), an 
integrated report should cover the content elements and fundamental concepts 
recommended by IIRF. Therefore, following La Torre et al. (2018), categorising 
disclosure items grounded on content elements and fundamental concepts seems most 
appropriate.  
 
Another finding is that the number of IR disclosure items varies between studies that 
provide integral IR disclosure items. The number of IR disclosure items ranges from 12 
(Marx & Mohammadali-Haji, 2014) to 123 (Liu et al., 2018a). Most studies have 
measured the IR disclosure practices of South African companies (Lee & Yeo, 2016; 
Zhou et al., 2017) and the IR disclosure practices of international sample companies from 
multiple countries (García-Sánchez et al., 2018). A few studies have focused on analysing 
the IR disclosure practices of a single country’s companies, such as New Zealand (Stent 
& Dowler, 2015), Australia (Liu et al., 2018), France (Zinsou, 2018), Malawi (Lipunga, 
2015), Turkey (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018a), Malaysia (Wen et al., 2017), and Bangladesh 















Cohen et al. (2012) Leading indicators disclosure 
practices in IR 
Previous literature No Unweighted Seven-point scale 
Solomon and Maroun (2012);  
Du Toit et al. (2017) 
IR disclosure practices (South 
Africa) 
King III Report No No Two-point scale 
Abeysekera (2013) Disclosure items in IR King III and IIRF No No No 
Frías-Aceituno et al. (2013a); Frías-
Aceituno et al. (2013b); Frías-
Aceituno et al. (2014); García-
Sánchez and Noguera-Gámez 
(2017a); García-Sánchez and 
Noguera-Gámez (2017b); García-
Sánchez et al. (2018); García-Sánchez 
and Noguera-Gámez (2018) 
IR disclosure practices 
(Worldwide) 
IIRF and Spanish Accounting and 
Business Administration Association (23 
disclosure items) 
No Unweighted Two-point scale 
Lai et al. (2013) Disclosure items on business 
model in IR 
IIRF and Lai et al.’s (2013) elaboration No No No 
Van Zyl (2013) Sustainability disclosure practices 
in IR 
King III Report and National 
Environmental Management Act 
No Unweighted Five-point scale 
Eccles and Krzus (2014) 
 
IR disclosure practices IIRF and researchers’ elaboration (20 
disclosure items) 
No Unweighted Four-point scale 
Marx and Mohammadali-Haji (2014) IR disclosure practices (South 
Africa) 
IIRF; related literature (12 disclosure 
items) 
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Eccles et al. (2015b) Disclosure items in IR IIRF and the study of Eccles and Krzus 
(2014) 
No No No 
Lipunga (2015) IR disclosure practices (Malawi) previous literature (25 disclosure items) No Unweighted Two-point scale 
Marcia et al. (2015) CSR disclosure practices in IR King III and GRI G4 No Unweighted Five-point scale 
Setia et al. (2015) Human, social and relational, 
natural and intellectual capital 
disclosure practices in IR  
IIRF No Unweighted Two-point scale 
Stent and Dowler (2015);  
Sofian and Dumitru (2017) 
IR disclosure practices (New 
Zealand; Europe) 
IIRF (33 disclosure items) No Unweighted Two-point scale 
and three-point 
scale 
Turturea (2015) Sustainability disclosure practices 
in IR 
King III Report and National 
Environmental Management Act 
No Unweighted Five-point scale 
Abeywardana (2016);  
Albetairi et al. (2018) 
IR disclosure practices (Sri Lanka; 
Bahrain) 
IIRF No Unweighted Two-point scale 
Ahmed Haji and Anifowose (2016a);  
Ahmed Haji and Anifowose (2016b) 
IR disclosure practices (South 
Africa) 
highly regarded integrated reports, IIRF, 
King III Report, and IRCSA (2011) (52 
disclosure items) 
No Unweighted A two-point scale 
and a four-point 
scale 
Ahmed Haji and Hossain (2016) Disclosure items in IR IIRF, King III Report, IRCSA (2011), 
Sigma Project, 2003, Forum for the 
Future, 2009 
No No No 
Bertinetti and Gardenal (2016) IR disclosure practices 
(Worldwide) 
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Bini et al. (2016) Disclosure items on business 
model in IR 
Bini et al.’s (2016) elaboration No No No 
Fasan et al. (2016) IR disclosure practices 
(Worldwide) 
IIRF (72 disclosure items) No Unweighted Two-point scale 
Katsikas et al. (2016)  Disclosure items in IR IIRF (72 disclosure items) No No No 
Lee and Yeo (2016) IR disclosure practices (South 
Africa) 
IIRF (40 disclosure items) No Unweighted/weighted 
(for robust test) 
Six-point scale 
Marcon and Mancin (2016) IR disclosure practices 
(Worldwide) 
IIRF (72 disclosure items) No Unweighted Two-point scale 
Ruiz-Lozano and Tirado-Valencia 
(2016) 
IR disclosure practices 
(Worldwide) 
IIRF (32 disclosure items) No Unweighted Three-point scale 
Vedovato (2016)  Disclosure items on strategy and 
business model in IR 
Vedovato (2016)’s elaboration No No No 
Ahmed Haji and Anifowose (2017) Intellectual relational/social 
capital and human capital 
disclosure practices in IR 
Sigma Project, 2003; Forum for the 
Future, 2009; highly regarded integrated 
reports, IIRF, King III Report and IRC 
(2011) of South Africa 
No Unweighted Four-point scale 
Demartini and Trucco (2017) Disclosure items in IR IIRF, King III, UNGC, typical companies’ 
integrated reports and Abeysekera (2013) 
No No No 
Garanina and Dumay (2017) Disclosure items on intellectual 
capital in IR 
Garanina and Dumay (2017)’s elaboration No No No 
Oshika and Saka (2017)  Disclosure items on sustainability 
KPIs in IR 
Oshika and Saka (2017)’s elaboration No No No 
Pavlopoulos et al. (2017) IR disclosure practices 
(Worldwide) 
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Rivera-Arrubla et al. (2017) IR disclosure practices 
(Worldwide) 
IIRF (25 disclosure items) No Unweighted Two-point scale 
Trébucq and Magnaghi (2017)  Disclosure items on capitals in IR European Foundation for Quality 
Management (EFQM) excellence model 
No No No 
Wen et al. (2017) IR disclosure practices (Malaysia) IIRF (115 disclosure items) No Unweighted Two-point scale 
Zhou et al. (2017) IR disclosure practices (South 
Africa) 
IIRF (31 disclosure items) Yes Weighted Two-point scale 
Albertini (2018) IR disclosure practices (France) IIRF No No Two-point scale 
Bowrin (2018) Disclosure items on human 
resources in IR 
Related literature and GRI G3 No No No 
Kılıç and Kuzey (2018a) IR disclosure practices (Turkey) IIRF (50 disclosure items) No Unweighted Two-point scale 
Kılıç and Kuzey (2018b) Forward-looking disclosure 
practices in IR 
Previous literature No Unweighted Two-point scale 
La Torre et al. (2018) Disclosure items in IR IIRF No No No 
Liu et al. (2018) IR disclosure practices (Australia) IIRF and GRI G4 (123 items) No  Unweighted Two-point scale 
and seven-point 
scale 
Maroun and Atkins (2018)  Disclosure items on bio-species 
protection in IR 
Maroun and Atkins (2018)’s elaboration No No No 
Menicucci (2018) Forward-looking disclosure 
practices in IR 
IIRF No Unweighted Two-point scale 
Nakib and Dey (2018) IR disclosure practices 
(Bangladesh) 
IIRF (50 disclosure items) No Unweighted Two-point scale 
Naynar et al. (2018) IR disclosure practices (South 
Africa) 
Financial service companies’ integrated 
reports (60 disclosure items) 
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Needles et al. (2018) IR disclosure practices 
(Worldwide) 
GRI G4 and IIRF No Unweighted Four-point scale 
Pistoni et al. (2018); Vitolla et al. 
(2019b, 2019c); Vitolla et al. 
(2020c) 
IR disclosure practices 
(Worldwide) 
IIRF No Unweighted Two-point scale 
and six-point 
scale 
Santis et al. (2018) Intellectual capital disclosure 
practices in IR 
IIRF No Unweighted Two-point scale 
Terblanche and De Villiers (2018) Intellectual capital disclosure 
practices in IR 
Previous classic studies on intellectual 
capital. 
No Unweighted Two-point scale 
Zinsou (2018) CSR disclosure practices in IR Previous studies and French Grenelle II 
Act 
No Unweighted Four-point scale 
Pavlopoulos et al. (2019) IR disclosure practices 
(Worldwide) 
King III Report (28 disclosure items) No  Unweighted Two-point scale 
Matemane and Wentzel (2019) IR disclosure practices Content elements of IIRF and the 
previous researches 
No Unweighted Four-point scale 
Rimmel (2019) Human resource disclosure 
practices in IR 
GRI G4 No Unweighted Two-point scale 
Sukhari and De Villiers (2019) Business model and strategy 
disclosure practices in IR 
IIRF and IIRC’s background paper on 
business model. 
No Unweighted Two-point scale 




4.3.2 Studies on the determinants and effects of IR practices 
4.3.2.1 Determinants of IR practices 
Several IR studies have investigated the determinants of IR practices (see Table 4.6). 
Jensen and Berg (2012) identify country-level determinants of the adoption of IR based 
on a sample of 309 worldwide companies. They find that nine factors positively affect 
the adoption of IR: investor protection; market orientation; dispersed ownership 
structures; the share of private expenditures for tertiary education; trade union density; 
level of environmental and social development; level of self-expression values; level of 
secular-rational values; and developed or developing country. At the same time, there is 
a significant negative correlation between employment protection and the adoption of IR. 
Frías-Aceituno et al. (2013a) analyse whether a country’s legal system determines the 
adoption of IR and find that companies from countries with civil law and countries where 
regulations are strictly enforced are more likely to adopt IR. García-Sánchez et al.’s (2013) 
results show that two country-level factors (a collectivist orientation and a feminist 
orientation) are determinants of the adoption of IR. In addition, firm size, industry type 
and profitability have positive effects on the adoption of IR. Fasan et al. (2016) follow 
Jensen and Berg (2012) to investigate the country-level determinants of the extent of IR 
disclosures; they find that civil law, strong employment protection, a higher degree of 
market orientation, a higher degree of state ownership, higher involvement in post-
secondary education, a higher density of trade unions, a higher national corporate 
responsibility, and higher economic development positively impact the extent of IR 
disclosures, while strong investor protection negatively impacts the extent of IR 
disclosures. Vaz et al. (2016) find that two country-level factors – the existence of IR 
regulations, and collectivism in Hofstede’s sense – are determinants of the adoption of 
IR.  
 
García-Sánchez and Noguera-Gámez (2018) confirm that three company-level factors 
(firm size, profitability, and industry concentration) and two country-level factors 
(judicial efficiency and levels of law and order) are determinants of the adoption of IR. 
They conclude that these company-level factors have relatively more weight than 
country-level factors in explaining the adoption of IR. García-Sánchez et al. (2018) 




environments19 and the adoption of IR. They confirm the assumption that munificence 
positively impacts managerial discretion; therefore, they find that munificence is 
negatively and significantly related to the adoption of IR. These researchers also find that 
internal forces (such as the strength of the board) and external forces (such as the level of 
investor protection and the country’s transparency) moderate the relationship between 
munificence and the adoption of IR, playing positive roles in the adoption of IR in 
munificent environments. Vitolla et al. (2019b) select 135 international companies 
representing 28 countries and find that four national cultural factors, including power 
distance, individualism, masculinity, and indulgence negatively impact the quality of 
integrated reports, whereas uncertainty avoidance positively influences the quality of 
integrated reports. Girella et al. (2019) report that companies located in countries with a 
higher level of corruption perception, a better risk rating, and more collectivist, more 
feminist, and long‐term orientations are more likely to adopt IR voluntarily. Fuhrmann 
(2019) investigates country-level and company-level drivers of the adoption of IR and 
reports that return on assets (ROA), leverage, level of market concentration in a sector, 
level of investor protection, level of power distance, and level of masculinity negatively 
impact the adoption of IR. In contrast, social performance, market-to-book value, and a 
civil law setting impact the adoption of IR positively. Vitolla et al. (2020b) focus on 
exploring country-level and company-level drivers of IR quality of financial institutions. 
Their findings suggest that IR quality is significantly and positively affected by return on 
equity (ROE), firm size, leverage and a civil law setting. 
 
Frías-Aceituno et al. (2013b) examine the relationship between board characteristics and 
IR adoption in 568 companies from 15 countries, for the period 2008–2010. The results 
show that four company-level factors: firm size, board size, gender diversity, and growth 
opportunities, are determinants of the adoption of IR. Frías-Aceituno et al. (2014) 
investigate company-level determinants of the adoption of IR of 1590 international 
companies for the years 2008–2010. They find that firm size, profitability, and application 
of GRI standards have a positive impact on the adoption of IR, while industry 
concentration has a negative impact on the adoption of IR. Sierra-García et al. (2015) find 
that region and industry are negatively related to the adoption of IR while three factors 
(assurance of the CSR report, the year for which the company has prepared the CSR report, 
and firm size) are positively related to the adoption of IR. Furthermore, Sierra-García et 
 




al. (2015) find that if companies have their CSR reports externally audited, four factors 
(region, industry type, the year for which the company has prepared the CSR report, and 
company size) are significantly related to the adoption of IR. Izzo and Fiori (2016) study 
the influence of corporate governance on the adoption of IR by 178 European companies. 
They find that a company with a smaller board size has a lower probability of adopting 
IR compared to companies with medium board sizes. They also find that if a female serves 
on the board, the probability of adopting IR decreases as company size increases. Ahmed 
Haji and Anifowose (2016a) find that the overall effectiveness of the audit committee, 
ownership concentration, audit committee meetings, audit committee authority, 
sustainability committee, and industry type affect the extent of IR disclosures positively. 
In contrast, leverage affects the extent of IR disclosures negatively. Also, the overall 
effectiveness of the audit committee, ownership concentration, audit committee meetings, 
audit committee authority, sustainability committee, company size and industry type 
affect the quality of IR disclosures positively. Lai et al. (2016) show that Bloomberg’s 
ESG disclosure rating is positively associated with the adoption of IR, using a sample of 
52 IR adopters (IIRC Pilot Program members) and 52 IR non-adopters.  
 
Pavlopoulos et al. (2017) indicate that fourteen factors result in a greater extent of IR 
disclosures: a higher percentage of independent directors on the nomination committee; 
a higher percentage of non-executive board members on the audit committee; the CEO is 
also the chairman of the board of directors; using the term “Integrated Annual Report” on 
corporate reports; higher asset turnover ratio; lower ROE; lower discretionary operating 
expenses; lower market-to-book ratio of equity; a lower percentage of nomination 
committee members who are independent of the board of directors; a higher dividend 
payout ratio; larger company size; a higher debt ratio; a larger number of pages in the 
company’s annual report; and a higher ratio of the number of shares owned by 
institutional shareholders to total outstanding common shares. Rivera-Arrubla et al. (2017) 
find that four factors are significantly associated with the extent of IR disclosures: the 
region where a company is based; the industry in which a company operates; assurance; 
and the decision to publish the annual report on the IIRC website. Buitendag et al. (2017) 
use the top 100 companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange as a sample and 
use the EY Excellence in IR Awards to substitute for the quality of IR disclosures. Their 
research shows that industry type, company size, growth in revenue and composition of 
the board of directors all impact the quality of IR disclosures. Kılıç and Kuzey (2018a) 




listing in a sustainability index, and the existence of a sustainability committee are 
significantly and positively associated with the extent of IR disclosures. Kılıç and Kuzey 
(2018b)’s findings show that gender diversity and firm size are positively related to 
forward-looking disclosure practices, whereas leverage is negatively related to IR 
practices (forward-looking disclosure practices). Similarly, Menicucci’s (2018) findings 
suggest that profitability (ROE) and firm size have a statistically significant relationship 
with forward-looking disclosure practices in IR.  
 
Pavlopoulos et al. (2019) find that companies that mandatorily use IR are more likely to 
have a higher extent of IR disclosures than companies that voluntarily use IR. 
Furthermore, Pavlopoulos et al. (2019) find that firm size, market-to-book ratio, whether 
the assurance provider is one of the big 4, CEO duality, whether a firm has a corporate 
governance committee, the proportion of a firm’s equity held by institutional shareholders, 
and dividend payout ratio positively impact the extent of IR disclosures, whereas ROE 
and earning quality negatively impact the extent of IR disclosures. A study by Girella et 
al. (2019) indicates that firm size, profitability, market‐to‐book ratio, and board size 
positively impact the voluntary adoption of IR. Vitolla et al. (2019c) investigate how 
pressure exerted by stakeholders affects the IR disclosure practices of 145 international 
companies, for the period 2011–2018. This study suggests that pressures from customers, 
environmental protection organisations, employees, shareholders, and governments 
positively impact IR quality. Based on an analysis of a sample of 134 international firms, 
Vitolla et al. (2020a) report that IR quality is positively associated with board size, board 
independence, board diversity, and board activity. By analysing 110 global companies 
that issued an integrated report for the fiscal year 2017, Dilling and Caykoylu (2019) 
report that a firm that has a larger size, a higher female board member ratio, and a listing 
in the IIRC examples database tends to show a higher quality of IR disclosures. However, 
a firm with a higher female executive ratio, external board member ratio, profitability, 
leverage, greater report length, and previous report experience, is likely to show a lower 
quality of IR disclosures. Maroun (2019a) explores whether external assurance 
contributes to a higher quality of IR disclosures20 and finds that the amount of information 
being assured in integrated reports (whether the assurance provider is one of the big 4; 
whether the company requires a reasonable or limited assurance engagement; and 
whether disclosures on general sustainability as well as AccountAbility principle and 
 




financial statistics are independently assured) can positively affect the quality of IR 
disclosure. Raimo et al. (2020) examine the role of ownership structure in IR quality. 
They find that institutional ownership positively affects IR quality, whereas ownership 
concentration, managerial ownership, and state ownership negatively affect IR quality.  
 
Several studies find that there are no associations between IR practices and some of the 
determinants assumed by the researchers. Jensen and Berg (2012) find that companies 
from countries with civil law are not more likely to adopt IR. García-Sánchez et al. (2013) 
find that tolerance of uncertainty, long-term orientation, and power distance are not 
determinants of IR practices. Frías-Aceituno et al. (2013b) find that the relationship 
between the independence of the board of directors and the adoption of IR is not 
significant and that the activity of the board does not have a significant relationship with 
the adoption of IR. Frías-Aceituno et al. (2014) report that there is no significant 
relationship between companies’ growth opportunities and the adoption of IR, and no 
significant relationship between companies’ business sector and the adoption of IR. Vaz 
et al. (2016) do not find statistical evidence that code-law countries, investor protection, 
economic development, feminism in Hofstede’s sense, company size, being a listed 
company, industry membership, or the decision to assure sustainability information are 
determinants of the adoption of IR. Rivera-Arrubla et al. (2017) indicate that the legal 
system, type of auditor, GRI application level, and length of the report do not show 
significant relationships with the extent of IR disclosures. Kılıç and Kuzey (2018a) 
indicate that external assurance does not have a significant impact on the extent of IR 
disclosures. Table 4.6 summarises the main findings of prior literature that investigates 




Table 4.6 Determinants of IR practices 
Author Determinants of IR practices 
Jensen and Berg (2012) (+) investor protection; market orientation; dispersed ownership 
structures; share of private expenditures for tertiary education; trade 
union density; level of environmental and social development; level 
of self-expression values; level of secular-rational values; 
developed countries 
(-) employment protection law 
Frías-Aceituno et al. (2013a)  (+) countries with civil law; countries where regulations are strictly 
enforced 
Frías-Aceituno et al. (2013b) (+) company size; board size; gender diversity; growth 
opportunities 
García-Sánchez et al. (2013) (+) countries with a collectivist orientation; countries with a 
feminist orientation; size; industry; profitability 
Frías-Aceituno et al. (2014)  (+) company size; ROA; application of GRI standards 
(-) industry concentration 
Sierra-García et al. (2015) (+) assurance of the CSR report; the year for which the company 
has prepared the CSR report; company size  
(-) region; industry 
If companies have assured their CSR reports: 
(+) region; industry; the year for which the company has prepared 
the CSR report; company size 
Ahmed Haji and Anifowose (2016a) (+) overall effectiveness of the audit committee; ownership 
concentration; audit committee meetings; audit committee 
authority; sustainability committee; industry type; company size 
(-) leverage  
Fasan et al. (2016) (+) civil law countries; employment protection; degree of market 
orientation; degree of ownership concentration; involvement in 
post-secondary education; density of trade unions; national 
corporate social responsibility; economic development 
(-) strong investor protection 
Izzo and Fiori (2016) (-) board size (limited to small and medium board size companies) 
If a female serves on the board: 
(-) company size  
Lai et al. (2016)  (+) Bloomberg’s ESG disclosure ratings 
Vaz et al. (2016)  (+) the existence of IR regulations; collectivism in Hofstede’s sense 





Table 4.6 (Continued) 
Author Determinants of IR practices 
Pavlopoulos et al. (2017) (+) percentage of independent directors on the nomination 
committee; the percentage of non-executive board members on the 
audit committee; CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors; 
using “Integrated Annual Report” on corporate reports; asset 
turnover ratio; dividend payout ratio; company’s size; debt ratio; the 
number of pages in the company’s annual report; the ratio of the 
number of shares owned by institutional shareholders to total 
outstanding common shares 
(-) ROE; discretionary operating expenses; market-to-book ratio of 
equity; percentage of nomination committee members who are 
independent of the board of directors  
Rivera-Arrubla et al. (2017)  (+) the region where a company is based; the industry where a 
company operates; the assurance; decision to publish the annual 
report on the IIRC website 
García-Sánchez and Noguera-Gámez 
(2018)  
(+) company size; profitability; industry concentration; judicial 
efficiency; levels of law and order 
García-Sánchez et al. (2018)  (-) munificence  
In munificent environments: 
(+) strength of the boards; level of investor protection; the country’s 
transparency  
Kılıç and Kuzey (2018a)  (+) publication of separate sustainability reports; adoption of GRI 
standards; listing in a sustainability index; the existence of a 
sustainability committee 
Kılıç and Kuzey (2018b) (+) gender diversity; company size 
(-) leverage 
Menicucci (2018) (+) ROE; company size 
Dilling and Caykoylu (2019)  (+) firm size; female board member ratio; listing in the IIRC 
examples database 
(-) female executive ratio; external board member ratio; 
profitability; leverage; report length; previous report experience 
Fuhrmann (2019)  (+) social performance; market-to-book value; a civil law setting 
(-) ROA; leverage; level of market concentration in a sector; level 
of investor protection; level of power distance; level of masculinity 
Girella et al. (2019) (+) company size; profitability; market‐to‐book ratio; board size; 










Table 4.6 (Continued) 
Author Determinants of IR practices 
Pavlopoulos et al. (2019) (+) a mandatory basis; firm size; market-to-book ratio; Big 4; CEO-
duality; firm has a corporate governance committee; ratio of 
number of shares owned by institutional shareholders to total 
outstanding common shares; dividend payout ratio 
(-) earning quality; ROE 
Maroun (2019a) (+) the amount of information being assured in integrated reports; 
the assurance provider is one of the Big 4; limited assurance; 
moderate assurance; general sustainability disclosures are 
independently assured; AccountAbility principle and financial 
statistics are independently assured 
Vitolla et al. (2019b) (+) uncertainty avoidance 
(-) power distance; individualism; masculinity; indulgence 
Vitolla et al. (2019c) (+) customer pressure; pressure from environmental protection 
organisations; employee pressure; shareholder pressure; 
government pressure 
Raimo et al. (2020) (+) institutional ownership  
(-) ownership concentration; managerial ownership; state 
ownership 
Vitolla et al. (2020a) (+) board size; board independence; board diversity; board activity 
Vitolla et al. (2020b) (+) ROE; firm size; leverage; civil law setting 
Note: Plus sign (+) indicates a positive association; minus sign (−) indicates a negative association 






4.3.2.2 Effects of IR practices  
Several researchers analyse the effects of IR practices (see Table 4.7). Churet and Eccles 
(2014) analyse the relationship between IR quality and environmental, social and 
governance management quality. They use the RobecoSAM database to identify a 
substitute for IR quality. Their findings suggest a significant and positive relationship 
between IR quality and environmental, social and governance management quality. Lee 
and Yeo (2016) also examine the association between the quality of IR disclosures and 
company value. They find that firm value (Tobin’s Q21) is positively associated with the 
quality of IR disclosures, especially in companies with higher organisational complexity 
or in companies with higher external financing needs. Serafeim (2015) uses the 
Thompson Reuters Asset4 database to identify a substitute for IR quality. Serafeim’s 
(2015) findings show that higher IR quality leads to more long-term-oriented and fewer 
transient investors and this association is stronger for companies with high growth 
opportunities, operating in industries with strong social criticism, showing more stable IR 
quality over time, and controlled by non-founding-family. 
 
Baboukardos and Rimmel (2016) explore the value relevance of accounting information 
under an integrated reporting approach. They find that the value relevance of earnings per 
share (EPS) of companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange increases after IR 
is mandatorily adopted. They also observe a significant decline in the value relevance of 
book value per share (BVPS). Similarly, Li (2017) observes that the value relevance of 
financial information increases after the publication of integrated reports by Japanese 
companies. Also, Li (2017) reports that earnings management by Japanese listed 
companies becomes milder after IR is implemented. Mervelskemper and Streit (2017) 
find that the value relevance of ESG performance is higher for companies that publish an 
integrated report compared with companies that publish a stand-alone ESG report. Barth 
et al. (2017) investigate the associations between the IR quality of South African 
companies and corresponding market reactions in the period 2011-2014. They measure 
IR quality based on the EY Excellence in IR awards. The results indicate that higher IR 
quality results in higher stock liquidity (lower bid-ask-spreads), higher firm value 
(Tobin’s Q) and higher expected cash flows. Zhou et al. (2017) find that higher IR quality 
leads to higher analysts’ forecast accuracy and results in a lower cost of capital for 
companies with a low analyst following. García-Sánchez and Noguera-Gámez (2017a) 
 




indicate that there is a negative relationship between information asymmetry and the 
adoption of IR based on a sample of 995 international companies listed for the years 2009 
to 2013. They also find that in countries with strong investor protection or in companies 
with lower quality of financial information, the negative relationship between information 
asymmetry and the adoption of IR is more statistically significant. Similarly, García-
Sánchez and Noguera-Gámez (2017b) study the association between the adoption of IR 
and the cost of capital. They confirm that the adoption of IR leads to a lower cost of 
capital and that in countries with lower investor protection or in companies with higher 
information asymmetry, the negative relationship between the cost of capital and the 
adoption of IR is more statistically significant. Pavlopoulos et al. (2017) report that an 
increased extent of IR disclosures results in milder earnings management (lower 
discretionary accruals) and lower agency costs. 
 
Wen et al. (2017) investigate the impact of the extent of IR disclosures on the financial 
performance of the top 50 Malaysian listed companies from 2012 to 2015 and shows that 
the extent of disclosures on governance, business model, risks and opportunities, and 
performance have a significant positive impact on ROE. In contrast, only the extent of 
disclosure on business model has a significant positive impact on ROA. By using the 
event study approach, Giorgino et al. (2017) find that releasing an integrated report 
impacts a company’s share prices significantly. Cosma et al. (2018) also employ the event 
study approach and conclude that abnormal stock returns react positively to IIRC-
recognised awards (e.g., EY excellence in IR awards; PwC’s building public trust 
‘excellence in reporting’ awards; CSSA IR awards; Nikonki top 100 JSE listed companies 
IR awards), which represent a high quality of IR disclosure. Bernardi and Stark (2018) 
use the Bloomberg ESG disclosure score to measure ESG disclosure practices in 
integrated reports from South African companies. They find a positive and statistically 
significant association between ESG disclosure practices in integrated reports and analyst 
forecast accuracy after IR became mandatory in South Africa. Perez (2018) adopts the 
Sustainability Disclosure Transparency Index (SDTI) score22 to identify a substitute for 
IR quality for 279 South African companies and finds that IR quality is associated with 
higher analysts’ forecast accuracy and positively associated with market liquidity. 
Albetairi et al. (2018) test the effects of the extent of IR disclosures on companies’ 
 
22 The SDTI score is prescribed by a South African accounting company named Integrated Reporting and 
Assurance Services. It evaluates the accuracy, consistency, completeness, and reliability of quantitative 




financial performance (ROA). They find that the extent of disclosures on business model, 
strategy, and resource allocation has a positive relationship with ROA, while the extent 
of disclosure on risk and opportunities is negatively related to ROA. Loprevite et al. (2018) 
report that the A4R integrated performance indicator, as a proxy for IR disclosure 
practices, is value relevant. 
 
Cortesi and Vena (2019) explore the value relevance of accounting information after 
adopting IR, using an international dataset (sample companies from 57 countries) and a 
longitudinal approach (15 years). The results indicate that the adoption of IR positively 
impacts companies’ share prices, and the value relevance of EPS increases after adopting 
IR. Using 99 South African listed companies during the period 2006–2015 as a sample, 
Tlili et al. (2019) observe that the mandatory adoption of IR enhances the value relevance 
of organisational capital. Pavlopoulos et al. (2019) find that a greater extent of IR 
disclosures leads to a higher ROA, a higher Tobin’s Q, a higher market value of equity, 
a higher market-to-book ratio of equity, and higher abnormal stock returns (especially for 
companies with high level of earnings quality or high market value). Matemane and 
Wentzel (2019) examine whether higher IR quality increases the financial performance 
of seven South African listed banks. The results indicate that IR quality positively impacts 
EPS. Using an international setting, Flores et al. (2019) investigate the relationship 
between the adoption of IR and the number of analysts following. The result suggests that 
IR adopters have more analysts than non-adopters and the researchers explain that this is 
because IR represents higher disclosure quality. Vitolla et al. (2020c) analyse the impact 
of the IR quality of 116 international companies on the cost of equity capital. The results 
indicate that higher IR quality leads to a lower cost of equity capital. Vena et al. (2019) 
examine the relationship between the cost of capital and the adoption of IR using a sample 
of 211 companies from 31 countries between 2009 and 2017. The results suggest that 
companies that adopt IR have a lower cost of capital, especially those in countries with 
low power distance, strong collectivism values, and high levels of masculinity. Akisik 
and Gal (2019) investigate the role of the adoption of IR in influencing financial 
performance for North American companies from 2011 to 2016 and find that there is a 
significant positive correlation between the adoption of IR and four indicators of financial 
performance: stock price growth based on the average of the annual high stock price and 
annual low stock price; ROE; ROA; and the natural logarithm of return on common stocks. 
These positive associations are greater when integrated reports are assured by accounting 




returns) and risk (beta) in South African firms are negatively associated with the 
mandatory adoption of IR. However, higher institutional shareholding and increased ESG 
scores are positively impacted by the mandatory adoption of IR. Gal and Akisik (2020) 
conduct an investigation for North American firms between 2011 and 2016 and find the 
adoption of IR is negatively correlated with firm value. Gal and Akisik (2019) believe 
that the negative impact of the adoption of IR is caused by IR preparation costs and 
proprietary costs. Internal control can moderate this negative association. 
 
Landau et al. (2020) analyse the value relevance of the adoption of IR on the basis of a 
sample of 50 companies of the STOXX Europe between the years 2010 and 2016. They 
find that the adoption of IR negatively affects firms’ market value and argue the reason 
that the finding is contrary to the findings of market-oriented studies is that proprietary 
costs of disclosing ESG issues are high in a country where ESG is voluntary. Obeng et al. 
(2020a) examine the relationship between IR practices that are proxied by the IR scores 
provided by ASSET4 and agency costs on a basis of a sample covering firms from 35 
countries in which IR is voluntarily adopted. They find that higher IR practices lead to 
lower agency costs, and this negative relation is more pronounced in countries with a 
stakeholder orientation than in shareholder-oriented countries. Obeng et al. (2020b) 
observe a positive relationship between the adoption of IR and earnings quality based on 
an analysis of global listed companies in ASSET4 from 2009 to 2015. Moreover, agency 
costs positively moderate the positive relationship between the adoption of IR and 
earnings quality. Muttakin et al. (2020) gauge the role of the adoption of IR in influencing 
the cost of debt on the basis of a sample of South African companies from 2009 to 2015. 
They find that adopting IR leads to a lower cost of debt, and the inverse relationship 
between financial reporting quality and cost of debt is stronger for companies that adopt 
IR. Albitar et al. (2020) examine the role of the adoption of IR in moderating the 
association between ESG disclosure and firm performance employing a sample of all 
companies of FTSE 350 over the period 2009-2018 (excluding 2013). They observe that 
the adoption of IR leads to higher financial performance and amplifies the positive effect 
of ESG disclosures on financial performance. 
 
Several studies do not find a significant relationship between IR practices and some 
potential effects assumed by the researchers. Barth et al. (2017) find no statistical 
evidence for a significant association between IR quality of South African companies and 




Zhou et al. (2017) conclude that higher IR quality cannot improve analysts’ forecast 
dispersion. Reimsbach et al. (2018) find that with regard to storing and recalling 
sustainability information, professional investors who receive an integrated report do not 
show higher performance than investors who receive separate financial and sustainability 
reports. Using an international sample of listed companies from 2002 to 2011, Maniora 
(2017) demonstrates that compared with stand-alone CSR reports, the adoption of IR is 
not associated with higher economic and sustainability performance. Wahl et al. (2020) 
gauge whether investors benefit from the adoption of IR using an international sample of 
167 listed companies. They do not find evidence that the adoption of IR has a significant 
effect on earnings forecast accuracy or on firm value and explain that in environments 
where IR is voluntary, the level of transparency of a company is too high to be enhanced 
by the adoption of IR. Table 4.7 summarises the main findings of previous literature that 




Table 4.7 Effects of IR practices 
Author Effects of IR practices 
Churet and Eccles (2014) (+) environmental, social and governance management quality 
Serafeim (2015) (+) long-term-oriented investors 
(-) transient investors 
Baboukardos and Rimmel 
(2016) 
(+) value relevance of accounting information 
Lee and Yeo (2016) (+) company value, especially in companies with higher organisational complexity 
or in companies with higher external financing needs 
Barth et al. (2017) (+) stock liquidity; company value; expected cash flows 
García-Sánchez and 
Noguera-Gámez (2017a) 
(-) cost of capital, especially in countries with lower investor protection or in 
companies with higher information asymmetry 
García-Sánchez and 
Noguera-Gámez (2017b) 
(-) information asymmetry, especially in countries with strong investor protection or 
in companies with lower quality of financial information 
Giorgino et al.  (2017) (+) share prices 
Li (2017) (+) value relevance of accounting information 
(-) earnings management 
Pavlopoulos et al. (2017) (-) earnings management; information asymmetry 
Wen et al. (2017) (+) ROE 
(-) ROA 
Zhou et al. (2017) (+) analysts’ forecast accuracy 
(-) cost of capital for companies with a low analyst following 
Cosma et al. (2018)  (+) share prices 
Bernardi and Stark (2018) (+) analysts’ forecast accuracy 
Perez (2018) (+) analysts’ forecast accuracy; market liquidity 
Akisik and Gal (2019) (+) financial performance (stock price growth based on the average of the annual 
high stock price and annual low stock price; ROE; ROA; the natural logarithm of 
return on common stocks), especially when integrated reports are assured by 
accounting firms. 
Flores et al. (2019) (+) the number of analysts following 
Gal and Akisik (2019)  (-) the firm’s market value (internal control can moderate this inverse association) 
Matemane and Wentzel 
(2019) 
(+) earnings per share 
Pavlopoulos et al. (2019)  (+) ROA; company value; value relevance of accounting information; abnormal 
stock returns, especially for companies with high levels of earnings quality or high 
market value.  











Table 4.7 (Continued) 
Author Effects of IR practices 
Vena et al. (2019) (-) cost of capital, especially firms in countries with low power distance, strong 
collectivism values, and high level of masculinity. 
Albitar et al. (2020) (+) higher financial performance; the positive effect of ESG disclosure on financial 
performance. 
Landau et al. (2020) (-) the firm’s market value 
Muttakin et al. (2020)  (-) the cost of debt; the inverse association between financial reporting quality and 
cost of debt 
Obeng et al. (2020a) (-) agency costs, especially the firms operating in high stakeholder orientation 
countries. 
Obeng et al. (2020b) (+) earnings quality, especially the firms experiencing higher agency costs. 
Vitolla et al. (2020c) (-) the cost of equity capital 
Note: Plus sign (+) indicates a positive association; minus sign (−) indicates a negative association 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
4.3.2.3 Summary  
Previous IR studies have investigated the determinants of IR practices and the effects of 
IR practices. Specifically, both country-level determinants (e.g., legal systems and 
cultural systems) and firm-level determinants (e.g., board characteristics and ownership 
structure) are verified. Moreover, the effects of IR practices (e.g., firm value, analysts’ 
forecast accuracy, expected cash flows, stock liquidity, cost of capital, agency costs, and 






Figure 4.1 The determinants and effects of IR practices 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
4.3.3 Studies on other attributes of IR 
A number of studies investigate other attributes of IR as well, such as materiality, 
readability, and balance. These studies complement the extant literature on IR practices 
and provide different understandings for research on IR practices. 
 
Materiality 
Fasan and Mio (2017) analyse the impact of company-level factors on the practices of 




industry type, board size, and women on the board, play a significant role in determining 
the practices of IR materiality disclosure of 65 companies in the IIRC Pilot Program. To 
measure the practices of IR materiality disclosure, they use two different variables: one 
is the word count of the terms “material” and “materiality” divided by the number of 
pages of the integrated report; the other is a categorical variable (0 to 5)23, which evaluates 
the relevance of the practices of IR materiality disclosure. Gerwanski et al. (2019) 
improve the approach of Fasan and Mio (2017) to evaluate the practices of IR materiality 
disclosure. They conduct content analysis for seven aspects of IR materiality disclosure: 
materiality section, identification process, description of material aspects, time horizon, 
materiality matrix, risks and opportunities, and mitigation actions. Gerwanski et al. (2019) 
find that the practices of IR materiality disclosure by 117 companies from 14 countries 
are positively associated with IR implementation experience, gender diversity in the 
board of directors, and the assurance of non-financial information in the integrated report. 
Beske et al. (2019) use a binary disclosure index to assess the IR materiality disclosure 
for a sample of 33 companies on the German 110 HDAX stock market index between 
2014 and 2017. The binary disclosure index contains three aspects: whether the term 
“materiality analysis” is defined in IR; whether a firm simply mentioned or elaborated on 
its most relevant stakeholder groups and the methods adopted for identifying them; and 
whether a firm simply mentioned or elaborated on its most relevant topics and the 
methods adopted for identifying them. 
 
Readability  
Many studies evaluate the readability of IR. Du Toit (2017) adopts the Flesch Reading 
Ease formula, the Gunning Fog index, and the Flesch-Kincaid measure to gauge the 
readability of IR, and tests for complex words, long words, Fog index difficult words, 
passive voice and wordy items. Melloni et al. (2017) use the Flesch Reading Ease formula, 
the Gunning Fog index, and the Flesch-Kincaid measure and find that companies with 
lower financial or non-financial performance are associated with less readable IR. Velte 
(2018) applies the Flesch Reading Ease formula and the Gunning Fog index to assess the 
readability of IR, and reports that ten factors (percentage of financial experts in the audit 
 
23 If the materiality is not mentioned at all, the variable is 0; the variable is 1, if the report only states that 
materiality is the principle of integrated report; the variable is 2 if it includes a brief discussion of what is 
considered material; The variable is 3 if it goes beyond the discussion of what is material and conveys the 
material issues that arise in the analysis; if the description of the process and its results are described in 





committee relative to total members; percentage of sustainability experts in the audit 
committee relative to total members; annual audit committee meetings; audit committee 
size; percentage of female members in the audit committee relative to total members; the 
appointment of one of the Big 4 audit companies; audit fees paid to the external auditor 
for financial audit; engagement of third-party assurance of the integrated report; 
ownership structure; and the type of industry) positively impact the readability of IR, 
while firm risk negatively affects the readability of IR. Roman et al. (2019) observe that 
companies from countries with stronger transparency tendencies, companies from non-
environmentally sensitive industries, and companies that adopt International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) are likely to publish less readable integrated reports. Roman 
et al. (2019) use the Gunning Fog index to measure the readability of integrated reports. 
Stone and Lodhia (2019) measure the readability of IR using the Flesch Reading Ease 
formula, the Gunning Fog index, and the Flesch-Kincaid measure. In addition, Stone and 
Lodhia (2019) provide two supplementary measures for evaluating the readability of IR. 
The first focuses on tables, graphs, photographs, pictures, figures, and diagrams in 
integrated reports, and the second deals with headings and sub-headings. 
 
Balance 
A balanced integrated report represents that it discloses matters using the positive and 
negative tones in a balanced way (Caglio et al., 2019; Melloni et al., 2017). In order to 
appraise the balance of IR, Beretta et al. (2018), Melloni et al. (2017), and Melloni et al. 
(2015) test the disclosure tone of IR. Beretta et al. (2018) adopt Loughran and 
McDonald’s Financial Sentiment Dictionary as a tool to measure the tone of intellectual 
capital disclosure within IR. If an intellectual capital text unit24 contains one of the words 
listed in the positive word lists in the dictionary, it is classified as embodying a positive 
disclosure tone. Their results indicate that higher non-financial performance, smaller 
companies, companies which provide more text on intellectual capital disclosure, and 
companies which report more backward-looking intellectual capital disclosure tend to 
have a more optimistic tone in intellectual capital disclosures. Melloni et al. (2017) use 
DICTION’s optimism index to measure the tone of IR. They establish that companies 
with lower financial performance are associated with a more optimistic tone. Melloni et 
al. (2015) investigate whether the tone of business model disclosure within IR is a positive 
or non-positive connotation. They find that a bigger board, declining financial 
 




performance, and forward-looking disclosure are associated with a more optimistic tone. 
Roman et al. (2019) apply Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) to capture the tone 
of integrated reports. Their results show that high revenue companies, newly established 
companies, and companies with shorter integrated reports tend to adopt an optimistic tone 
in their integrated reports. 
 
Others 
Three studies test multiple attributes of IR. Pistoni et al. (2018) examine the readability 
and clarity of IR (presence of multiple forms of information), conciseness of IR (number 
of pages in the document) and accessibility of IR (hard-copy documents versus website 
accessibility). Similarly, Melloni (2015) investigates the volume of capital disclosure 
(presence or absence), the time orientation of capital disclosure (forward-looking or non-
forward looking), type of capitals disclosure (quantitative or non-quantitative), the tone 
of capital disclosure (positive or non-positive) and the topic of capital disclosure (inputs 
or outcomes). Caglio et al. (2019) explore the economic consequences of the readability, 
length, and tone of IR. Three measures: the Gunning Fog index, the Flesch-Kincaid grade 
level, and the Smog index, are adopted for evaluating the readability of IR. The length of 
IR is proxied by the number of words and the number of characters, respectively. The 
tone of IR is represented by the optimism and certainty. Optimism and certainty are 
calculated using the DICTION optimism score and the DICTION certainty score, 
respectively. Caglio et al. (2019) find that a less readable integrated report leads to a lower 
market value but if the less readable integrated report is assured, the negative impact of 
reading difficulty on market value is compensated. Furthermore, the length of IR is 
negatively associated with stock liquidity, but if a lengthy integrated report is assured, the 
negative impact of verbosity on stock liquidity is lessened. The result also indicates that 
the biased tone of IR results in lower dispersed analysts’ estimates, and if an integrated 
report with a biased tone is assured, analysts’ forecast dispersion is lower as well. 
 
4.3.4 Stakeholder consultation in IR research 
A number of IR studies use stakeholder consultation to collect stakeholders’ views on the 
implementation of IR. Adhariani and De Villiers (2018), James (2015), and Steyn (2014) 
use questionnaire surveys to conduct stakeholder consultation, while the majority of 
extant IR studies use interview surveys (see Appendix A). In these studies, most 




The main questions posed in the stakeholder consultation include the benefits of the 
adoption of IR, the challenges in adopting IR, how to address these challenges, the drivers 
of the adoption of IR, the understanding of IR, how to use the IR framework, who are the 




4.4 Limitations of prior IR studies 
The overall research objective of this study is to develop an IR framework for China and 
apply the framework to evaluate the IR disclosure practices of Chinese listed companies. 
In order to identify IR disclosure items, many extant IR studies use IIRF as their 
framework rather than developing a jurisdiction-specific IR framework by considering 
country-specific factors. However, IIRF has several shortcomings, which explain why it 
could not be used indiscriminately in the present study. The problems are described as 
follows:  
 
The first shortcoming of IIRF is that there is a lack of sustainability information. IIRF is 
established based on the belief that IR is intended to “explain to providers of financial 
capital how an organisation creates value over time” (IIRC, 2013, p.4). It has been 
critiqued by many scholars (e.g., Alexander & Blum, 2016; Brown & Dillard, 2014; 
Flower, 2015; Reuter & Messner, 2015) because IIRF focuses primarily on value to 
investors (Oll & Rommerskirchen, 2018). Critics, such as Brown and Dillard (2014), 
Flower (2015), and Alexander and Blum (2016) argue that IIRF falls far short of 
highlighting sustainability information. 
 
The second shortcoming of IIRF is that it shows a lack of consideration of jurisdictional 
factors. The history, cultural and legal environments of different countries create a variety 
of obstacles to implementing IIRF (Dumay et al., 2017). Some scholars, such as Visser 
(2008) and Shareef et al. (2014) believe jurisdictional factors are important considerations 
for developing non-financial reporting frameworks. For instance, Visser (2008) argues 
that jurisdictional factors are drivers for non-financial reporting (e.g., CSR reporting) 
because they construct a distinctive picture of how non-financial reporting is understood 
and practiced in a specific country and make it necessary to be sensitive to a specific 
country’s context (Visser, 2008). 
 
The third shortcoming of IIRF is that there is a lack of specific disclosure and description. 
The disclosures prescribed by IIRF are too general; specific disclosures and their 
descriptions are needed (Abhayawansa et al., 2019). 
 
The current study overcomes the limitations of IIRF. Firstly, sustainability information is 
incorporated into the Chinese IR framework. Secondly, Chinese jurisdictional factors are 




international, cultural, social, and environmental factors, which influence corporate 
reporting practices in China, are discussed and analyzed. Two disclosure items – Chinese 
Communist Party-building and overseas social responsibility – are incorporated into the 
Chinese IR framework. Thirdly, specific disclosures and descriptions are prescribed in 
the Chinese IR framework.  
 
Strong (2015) argues that it is important to have stakeholders participating in shaping the 
IR framework. However, only a few studies adopt stakeholder consultation to validate IR 
disclosure items (e.g., Marx & Mohammadali-Haji, 2014; Naynar et al., 2018; Zhou et 
al., 2017) or to assign a weighting to each disclosure item (e.g., Lee & Yeo, 2016; Naynar 
et al., 2018; Zhou et al., 2017). Although stakeholders’ perspectives are considered in 
these studies, they lack broader stakeholder participation. Abeysekera (2013) suggests 
that all stakeholders should be considered in an integrated report. Similarly, Velte and 
Stawinoga (2017), and Eccles and Krzus (2014) believe that IR should reflect all 
stakeholders’ information needs. In the present research, a broader stakeholders’ panel, 
including scholars in accounting, editors in financial media, financial managers, financial 
analysts in banks, auditors, officials in government agencies in charge of supervising 
Chinese companies, industry analysts in consultant companies, and financial analysts in 
investment companies, are involved in validating the disclosure items and assigning 
weightings to disclosure items to establish a weighted IR disclosure index. 
 
In terms of the scoring system, although some IR studies adopt a scoring system with 
quality criteria (e.g., Lee & Yeo, 2016; Liu et al., 2018; Ruiz-Lozano & Tirado-Valencia, 
2016; Van Zyl, 2013; Zinsou, 2018), their quality criteria lack consideration of the 
connectivity between financial and non-financial information, and of the connectivity 
between quantitative and qualitative information. Both Eccles and Krzus (2014) and 
Eccles et al. (2015a) assert that “connectivity of information” is the “spirit” of IR. In the 
scoring system of the present research, connectivity between financial and non-financial 
information, and connectivity between quantitative and qualitative information, are 
considered. 
 
In order to collect stakeholders’ views on the implementation of IR, the extant IR studies 
mainly focus on the perspectives of report preparers, senior managers, auditors, regulators 




researchers. In this study, a broader range of stakeholders participate in consultation to 
discuss the implementation of IR in China.  
 
In addition, according to Manes-Rossi et al. (2020), “there is a limited amount of research 
that assesses IR disclosure levels” (p. 7). In particular, studies exploring IR disclosure 
practices by Chinese companies are scarce. In the present research, the most current IR 
disclosure practices of Chinese companies are measured using a newer dataset (2014-
2018). The IR disclosure practices of Chinese companies are examined from various 
angles, including disclosure items analysis, themes analysis, overall analysis, trend 
analysis (2014-2018), listing type analysis (pure A-share listed companies and dual A- 
and H-share listed companies), and ownership type analysis (state-owned companies and 
non-state-owned companies). The determinants of IR disclosure practices and the effect 
of IR disclosure practices on agency costs are also investigated.  
 
4.5 The selection and categorization of preliminary disclosure items 
There are five main instruments on mandatory disclosure in mainland China, including 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange: Notice of Doing a Better Job for Disclosing 2008 Annual 
Reports; the Shanghai Stock Exchange: Guidelines for Environmental Information 
Disclosure of Listed Companies; the China Securities Regulatory Commission: 
Regulations on Information Disclosure of Listed Companies; the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange: Notice of Doing a Better Job for Disclosing 2008 Annual Reports; and the 
Notice of the China Securities Regulatory Commission on Promulgating Standards 
Concerning the Contents and Formats of Information Disclosure by Companies Offering 
Securities to the Public No.2—Contents and Formats of Annual Reports (2017 Revision). 
The details are provided in Appendix B. Rather than prescribing specific disclosure items, 
these lengthy and overlapping instruments on mandatory disclosure are more like 
promotions for information disclosure. Zheng (2014) believes that the instruments on 
information disclosure in China are complex and numerous, which is not conducive to 
accurate and efficient retrieval and referencing. Moreover, Zheng (2014) points out that 
the requirements of these instruments on information disclosure are broad and vague. 
 
IR studies are selected as the primary reference literature for the identification of IR 
disclosure items considering the above arguments. Twenty-four articles regarding IR 
disclosures are chosen as the key literature. The key literature has a variety of features. 




2017) provide concise but not comprehensive IR disclosure items while others (e.g., La 
Torre et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2018) attempt to offer comprehensive but excessively 
exhaustive IR disclosure items. Other studies have different priorities. For instance, Kılıç 
and Kuzey (2018b) focus on forward-looking information disclosures, while the study by 
Du Toit et al. (2017) is concerned with CSR disclosures. The studies of Terblanche and 
De Villiers (2018) and Ahmed Haji and Anifowose (2017) cover information disclosures 
on human, relational and intellectual capitals. Hence, disclosure items are identified based 
on different features of the key literature. First, disclosure items that appear with high 
frequency in different literature sources are selected. Second, multiple academic articles 
are compared to prevent the omission of an important disclosure item and to ensure the 
comprehensiveness of the disclosure list; however, the list of disclosure items needs not 
to be too exhaustive (An, 2012). Lastly, academic articles that focus on a particular topic 
are referred to as well, such as those that place emphasis on intellectual capital disclosures. 
As a result, 52 disclosure items identified in the key literature are incorporated into the 
list of disclosure items. Among these disclosure items, two disclosure items are used by 
four different articles, while ten disclosure items are used by three different articles. 
Twenty-five disclosure items are applied by two different articles, while 15 disclosure 
items are employed by only one article. 
 
Several studies on voluntary disclosure in the Chinese context, including those by Wang 
et al. (2008), Xiao and Yuan (2007) and Yuen et al. (2009) are also reviewed. Considering 
some sample companies in the present research are dual-listed A and H share companies, 
two instruments on mandatory disclosure published by the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, 
the Corporate governance code and the revised guidelines for ESG reporting, are referred 
to. In addition, a number of corporate reports, including annual reports and CSR reports, 
are scrutinized in case some important disclosure items might otherwise be omitted in the 
present research. Based on Chapter three, two disclosure items – overseas corporate social 
responsibility and Chinese Communist Party-building – are incorporated into the present 
research. Since this study is concerned with IR disclosure items that are generally 
applicable across industries, rather than focusing on a particular industry, the list of 
disclosure items does not need to be exhaustive. Therefore, several disclosure items are 
presented in an integrated manner. For instance, patents, copyrights and trademarks are 
similar in nature (An & Davey, 2010); thus, they are combined under the item of 






In previous IR studies, Kılıç and Kuzey (2018a), Lee and Yeo (2016), Zhou et al. (2017), 
Frías-Aceituno et al. (2013b), and Naynar et al. (2018) adopt 50 disclosure items, 40 
disclosure items, 31 disclosure items, 23 disclosure items and 60 disclosure items 
respectively. The number of disclosure items in the present research is 54. This list of 
disclosure items, capturing the important elements of IR, is considered to be 
comprehensive and of an appropriate size, and thus applicable to one of the objectives of 
this study: to evaluate IR disclosure practices by Chinese companies.  
 
Based on the previous discussion about the classification of IR disclosure items (see 
Section 4.3.1), in the present study, the preliminary disclosure items are categorised under 
eleven themes: namely organisational overview and external environment; governance; 
risks and opportunities; strategy; outlook; financial capital; manufactured capital; 
intellectual capital; human capital; social and relationship capital; and natural capital. The 
business model and performance are omitted because these seem to repeat other themes. 
According to IIRF, a business model is “an organisation’s system of transforming inputs 
(refer to the capitals that the organisation draws upon for its business activities) through 
its business activities into outputs (an organisation’s products and services, and any by-
products and waste) and outcomes (the internal and external consequences for the capitals 
as a result of an organisation’s business activities and output) that aims to fulfil the 
organisation’s strategic purposes and create value over the short, medium and long term” 
(IIRC, 2013, p.33). Performance is defined as “an organisation’s achievements relative to 
its strategic objectives, and its outcomes in terms of its effects on the capitals” (IIRC, 
2013, p.33). The six forms of capital can provide financial and non-financial key 
performance indicators, and the business model is an illustration of how a company 
processes its six forms of capital (Silvestri et al., 2017; Stent & Dowler, 2015). In addition, 
considering value creation (the other fundamental concept in addition to the six forms of 
capital) is implicitly considered in the six forms of capital, it is not listed as one of the 
preliminary disclosure items (Stent & Dowler, 2015). 
 
Therefore, the preliminary list of disclosure items consists of 54 potential IR disclosure 
items, grouped as follows: 6 in corporate overview and external environment; 3 in 
strategy and competitiveness; 3 in governance; 2 in risk and opportunity; 3 in future 




intellectual capital; 9 in human capital; and 11 in social and relational capital. Table 4.8 




Table 4.8 Draft list of IR disclosure items 
Theme Disclosure item Reference 
 
 
Corporate overview & 
external environment 
 
Mission and vision (Abeysekera, 2013; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018a; Lee & Yeo, 2016; Sukhari & 
De Villiers, 2019) 
Culture, ethics and values (Abeysekera, 2013; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018a; Santis et al., 2018; Sukhari & 
De Villiers, 2019) 
Operating context (Lee & Yeo, 2016; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018a; Rivera-Arrubla et al., 2017) 
Ownership structure (Nakib & Dey, 2018) 
Operating structure (Nakib & Dey, 2018) 
Business and market (Frías-Aceituno et al., 2013; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018a) 
Strategy & competitiveness 
 
Strategy (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018a; Zhou et al., 2017) 
Competitive landscape (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018a; Lee & Yeo, 2016; Terblanche & De Villiers, 2018) 
Core competitiveness (Lee & Yeo, 2016; Menicucci, 2018; Zhou et al., 2017) 
Governance 
 
Leadership structure (Marx & Mohammadali-Haji, 2014; Zhou et al., 2017) 
Management remuneration and 
incentives 
(Menicucci, 2018; Rivera-Arrubla et al., 2017) 
Management experience and capability (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018a) 
Risk and opportunity 
 
Risk (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018a; Lee & Yeo, 2016) 









Table 4.8 (Continued) 
Theme Disclosure item Reference 
Future outlooks 
 
Business plans (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018b) 
Business objectives (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018a; Sukhari & De Villiers, 2019) 
Challenges & uncertainties (Lee & Yeo, 2016; Nakib & Dey, 2018) 
Financial capital  
 
Present financial KPIs (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018a) 
The linkage between past and 
present financial KPIs 
(Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018a; Nakib & Dey, 2018) 
Fund from financing (Demartini & Trucco, 2017; Melloni, 2015) 
Fund from operations or 
investments 
(Demartini & Trucco, 2017; Melloni, 2015) 
Manufacturing capital  
 
Buildings  (La Torre et al., 2018) 
Equipment (Liu et al., 2018) 
Infrastructure (Liu et al., 2018) 
Natural capital 
 
Pollution & pollution reduction  (La Torre et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2018) 
Resource consumption & resource 
saving 
(La Torre et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2018) 








Table 4.8 (Continued) 
Theme Disclosure item Reference 
Intellectual capital 
 
Management processes (La Torre et al., 2018; Terblanche & De Villiers, 2018) 
Brand (Ahmed Haji & Anifowose, 2017; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018a; Terblanche & De Villiers, 
2018) 
Information technology & 
system  
(Ahmed Haji & Anifowose, 2017; Terblanche & De Villiers, 2018) 
Research & development (Ahmed Haji & Anifowose, 2017; Setia et al., 2015) 
Intellectual property (Ahmed Haji & Anifowose, 2017; Santis et al., 2018; Terblanche & De Villiers, 2018) 
Marketing (Naynar, Ram, & Maroun, 2018) 
Entrepreneurial spirit (Terblanche & De Villiers, 2018) 
Human capital 
 
Recruitment and job creation (Lai et al., 2013; Lee & Yeo, 2016; Naynar et al., 2018) 
Employee remuneration (Ahmed Haji & Anifowose, 2017; Garanina & Dumay, 2017; Terblanche & De 
Villiers, 2018) 
Employee equality (Bowrin, 2018; Naynar et al., 2018; Terblanche & De Villiers, 2018) 
Employee care (Terblanche & De Villiers, 2018) 
Resignation, layoffs and 
dismissal 
(Bowrin, 2018; Garanina & Dumay, 2017) 
Employee career development (Bowrin, 2018; Terblanche & De Villiers, 2018) 
Employee health and safety (Ahmed Haji & Anifowose, 2017; Terblanche & De Villiers, 2018) 
Employee training and 
education 
(Ahmed Haji & Anifowose, 2017; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018a; Terblanche & De Villiers, 
2018) 






Table 4.8 (Continued) 
Theme Disclosure item Reference 
Social and relational 
capital 
 
Competitor relation                    (Liu et al., 2018; Setia et al., 2015) 
Customer relation                (Ahmed Haji & Anifowose, 2017; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018a; Terblanche & De 
Villiers, 2018) 
Business collaboration (Ahmed Haji & Anifowose, 2017; Terblanche & De Villiers, 2018) 
Supplier or distributor 
relation   
(Naynar et al., 2018; Terblanche & De Villiers, 2018) 
Government relation                 (La Torre et al., 2018; Naynar et al., 2018) 
Shareholder relation (Setia et al., 2015) 
Creditor relation                         (Terblanche & De Villiers, 2018) 
Overseas CSR   Own elaboration 
Society & community 
support  
(Naynar et al., 2018; Setia et al., 2015) 
Product or service quality (Lai et al., 2013; Terblanche & De Villiers, 2018) 




4.6 Chapter summary 
IR is a new form of corporate reporting, which emphasises “the connectivity between 
financial and non-financial information”, “creating and sustaining value”, and 
“stakeholder-orientation”. The origin of IR practices can be traced to developments in 
early corporate reporting practices. Developments in related regulations globally are also 
heading towards the adoption of IR. A significant global IR development has been the 
establishment of the IIRC and its IIRF, which is regarded as an important achievement in 
IR. Most previous studies have used the IIRF as their IR framework instead of developing 
a jurisdictional IR framework for a specific country. Content analysis using a disclosure 
index and a scoring system is widely applied to assess IR disclosure practices. However, 
a weighted disclosure index and a scoring system with quality criteria are seldom used in 
IR disclosure practices measurement approaches.  
 
Due to the scarcity of IR research in the Chinese context, the present study develops a 
Chinese stakeholder-oriented IR framework and uses this framework to assess IR 
disclosure practices by Chinese companies. Drawing on previous IR studies, this chapter 
provides a preliminary list of disclosure items, which forms the basis for stakeholder 



















5 CHAPTER FIVE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHOD 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the research methodology and method adopted in this study. The 
emphasis is on the mixed method comprising both quantitative and qualitative analysis. 
Key concepts related to the mixed method are defined and justifications are provided for 
the use of the methodology and method in this research.  
 
Section 5.2 describes the assumptions underpinning three research paradigms: positivist, 
constructivist and pragmatist, and explains the choice of mixed methods as the research 
methodology. Section 5.3 explains how the mixed method is applied in this study, 
including data collection and data analysis. Section 5.4 summarises the chapter. 
 
5.2 Research methodology 
A research paradigm is “a framework that guides how research should be conducted, 
based on people’s philosophies and their assumptions about the world and the nature of 
knowledge” (Collis & Hussey, 2014, p. 43). Burrell and Morgan (1979) identify research 
paradigms based on objectivist-subjectivist approaches to ontology, epistemology, 
human nature and methodology. They believe that assumptions about ontology, 
epistemology and human nature guide the social science researcher’s choice of different 
methodologies (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). Table 5.1 provides a summary of the main 
features of the three main social science research paradigms: positivist, constructivist (or 
interpretivist), and pragmatist.   
 
With regard to ontology, positivist researchers believe that reality is objective and 
singular, while constructivist researchers believe that reality that is subjective and 
multiple (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). From the perspective of epistemology, positivist 
researchers assert that the researcher is independent of what is being researched, while 
constructivist researchers assert that the researcher is inseparable from what is being 
researched (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). Looking at axiology, positivist researchers 
advocate the research is value-free, while constructivist researchers hold that research is 
value-bound (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). From a methodology point of view, positivist 
researchers emphasise quantitative methodology, while constructivist researchers prefer 





Based on the contrast between the two paradigms, the positivist and constructivist 
paradigms are often viewed as opposite and incompatible with each other, which leads to 
the so-called qualitative-quantitative debate (or paradigm wars) in which researchers from 
two distinct paradigm camps reject each other’s paradigm (Gage, 1989; Howe, 1992; 
Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). A number of scholars have criticised viewing the positivist 
and constructivist paradigms as mutually exclusive dichotomies (Bryman, 2007; Datta, 
1994; Grafton et al., 2011; Hammersley, 1992; Hedrick, 1994; House, 1994). In order to 
reconcile the paradigm wars, pragmatism was introduced (e.g., see Datta, 1994; House, 
1994), focusing on the compatibilities between positivism and constructivism (Collis & 
Hussey, 2009; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998).  
 
The ontological assumptions underpinning pragmatism are that reality is viewed as 
singular as well as multiple, and the world is objective as well as subjective (Creswell, 
2014; Creswell & Clark, 2011). The epistemological assumption of pragmatism allows 
for the coexistence of both objective and subjective points of view (Creswell, 2003; 
Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). The axiology of pragmatism assumes that value plays a 
large role in research (Collis & Hussey, 2009; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). Pragmatism 
focuses on “what works” rather than being committed to any one system of philosophy 
and reality (Creswell, 2014). Therefore, pragmatist researchers are not constrained by a 
single paradigm and do not focus on the philosophical debate about reality and the nature 
of knowledge (Collis & Hussey, 2009). They advocate that researchers ought to be free 
to choose and mix different methods from different paradigms, based on whether these 
methods are useful for solving the research problem (Collis & Hussey, 2009). Thus, 
pragmatist paradigm is regarded as an attempt to cross the divide between the positivist 






Table 5.1 The features of three research paradigms 
Assumption Positivism; Post positivism Constructivism Pragmatism 
Ontology: the nature of reality Reality is objective and singular, 
apart from the researcher 
Reality is subjective and multiple as 
seen by participants in a study 
Is not committed to any one system of 
philosophy and reality; researchers have a 
freedom of choice; the world is not an absolute 
unity; the truth is not based in a duality between 
reality independent of the mind or within the 
mind; an external world is independent of the 
mind as well as that is lodged in the mind. 
Epistemology: relationship to that being 
researched 
A researcher is independent of that 
being researched 
Researcher interacts with that being 
researched 





Methodology Typically, quantitative Typically, qualitative Typically, mixed methods 
Form of data Typical numeric Typical narrative Narrative plus numerical 
Purpose of research  (Often) confirmatory plus 
exploratory 
 (Often) exploratory plus 
confirmatory 
Confirmatory plus exploratory 
Logic Deductive process; Mutual 
simultaneous shaping of factors 
Inductive process; Cause and effect Both inductive and deductive logic; inductive-
deductive research cycle 
Typical studies or 
designs 
Experimental designs; 
Nonexperimental designs, such as 
surveys 
Narrative research; Phenomenology; 
Grounded theory; Ethnographies; 
Case study 
Convergent; Sequential; Transformative, 
embedded, or multiphase; Concurrent 
Sampling Mostly probability Mostly purposive Probability, purposive, and mixed 
Data analysis Statistical analysis; descriptive and 
inferential  
Thematic strategies; categorical and 
contextualising 




Accurate and reliable through 
validity and reliability (testing) 
Accurate and reliable through 
verification 
Inference quality; inference transferability 




Grounded in pragmatism, pragmatist researchers propose mixed methods methodology 
as the third methodology in addition to qualitative and quantitative methodology (Hall & 
Howard, 2008; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). Mixed methods research uses both 
qualitative and quantitative methods for collecting, integrating, analysing, and 
interpreting quantitative and qualitative data in order to obtain breadth and depth of 
understanding and corroboration (Johnson et al., 2007; Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2009; 
Tashakkori & Creswell, 2007; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003) and has gained in popularity 
in multiple disciplines (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2009).  
 
According to Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003), compared with only adopting single 
quantitative methods or qualitative methods, there are three areas in which mixed methods 
may have advantages. Firstly, “mixed methods research can answer research questions 
that the other methodologies cannot” (p.14). Secondly, “mixed methods research provides 
better (stronger) inferences” (p.14). Thirdly, “mixed methods provide the opportunity for 
presenting a greater diversity of divergent views” (p.15). Brannen (2005) also believes 
that mixed methods research can provide a more holistic picture of the research 
phenomenon. Firstly, the adoption of one type of method can enrich the understanding 
obtained from another type. Secondly, the adoption of one type of method can generate 
complementary insights with another type. Thirdly, the adoption of one type of method 
can spark new research questions that can be explored using another type. In addition, 
contradictions obtained from mixed methods can be juxtaposed in order to be explored in 
further research (Brannen, 2005). In summary, no single type of method is best because 
each method has its own advantages and disadvantages (De Silva, 2011). Mixed methods 
research can overcome the methodological weaknesses of a sole type of method to some 
extent (Creswell, 2003). 
 
According to Creswell (2003), several factors influence the selection of a paradigm; these 
include the researcher’s worldview, the training and experience of the researcher, the 
nature of the research problem, and the audience for the study. Firstly, the worldview of 
the researcher in the present study coincides with the philosophical assumptions of mixed 
methods. The researcher in the present study believes researchers are free to select the 
methods that best meet their needs and purposes, rather than subscribing to only one type 
of method. Therefore, the worldview of the researcher enables the researcher not to 
confine the study to a certain type of method. Secondly, the researcher in the present study 




computer statistical skills, computer text-analysis skills, and library skills and thus has 
the ability to apply different research methods to some degree. Thirdly, in terms of the 
nature of the research problem, IR practices, as one of the corporate reporting practices, 
are a reflection of human behaviour, and thereby can be examined using various types of 
research methods (De Silva, 2011). A number of studies on IR practices, such as those of 
Zhou et al. (2017), Fernando et al. (2018), and Naynar et al. (2018) have used mixed 
methods. Lastly, the potential research audiences of the study are broad stakeholders. 
Some audiences may tend to prefer quantitative research, but other may tend to prefer 
qualitative research. Compared with a single research method, mixed methods can 
provide comprehensive findings and interpretations for the broad research audience. Thus, 
given the benefits of mixed methods and the above arguments on paradigm choices, 
mixed methods are adopted in the present research, as shown in Figure 5.1. Overall, both 
quantitative data and qualitative data are collected, processed, analysed and interpreted. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 The adoption of mixed methods methodology 
Source: Author’s design 
 
5.3 Research method 
A research method is “a technique for collecting and/or analysing data” (Collis & Hussey, 
2014, p.59). According to Smith (2015), archives, experiments, surveys, and fieldwork 
are commonly used data-collection methods. In order to achieve the purposes of the 
present research, surveys (questionnaires) and archives (corporate reports and financial 




and inferential statistics (including correlation, regression, analysis of variance and 
multivariate model building) are widely used to process and analyse quantitative data, 
while content analysis, narrative analysis, discourse analysis, and grounded theory are 
commonly applied to process and analyse qualitative data (Smith, 2015). In the present 
study, content analysis is adopted to deal with textual data gained from corporate reports 
while statistical analysis (descriptive statistics and inferential statistics) is used to deal 
with quantitative data gained from content analysis25 and financial databases. Overall, the 
methods of data collection and analysis are outlined in Figure 5.2.  
 
 
Figure 5.2 The process of data collection and analysis 
Source: Author’s design 
5.3.1 Stakeholder survey 
Designing a Chinese IR disclosure index and making recommendations for the 
implementation of IR practices in China are two of the main purposes of this research. In 
order to achieve the two research purposes, three rounds of stakeholder surveys with a 
stakeholder panel comprising 51 Chinese stakeholders are conducted. The 51 Chinese 
stakeholders consist of eight groups: scholars in accounting, editors in financial media, 
financial managers 26 , financial analysts in banks, auditors, officials in government 
agencies in charge of supervising Chinese companies, industry analysts in consultant 
companies, and financial analysts in investment companies. Of the 51 participants, 32 are 
 
25 Content analysis can systematically convert selected items of qualitative data to quantitative data (Collis 
& Hussey, 2014). 
26 Financial managers are also corporate report preparers due to preparing corporate reports are one of 




male while 19 are female. Complying with specific criteria can make the selection of 
stakeholders purposive rather than random. Firstly, every stakeholder has to be a Chinese 
resident. Because one of the objectives of this study is to develop a Chinese IR disclosure 
index, it is expected that Chinese residents would be the primary beneficiaries of this 
study. Furthermore, Chinese residents are more familiar with the Chinese context than 
with other countries’ residents. In addition, Chinese residents are the main users of 
corporate reports (Chinese language version) issued by Chinese listed companies. 
Secondly, the stakeholders are selected based on their professional background. Their 
different professional backgrounds represent different stakeholder groups that have a 
variety of professional voices. It is also expected that the selected stakeholders could 
provide critical insights from their professional perspectives. Thirdly, the stakeholders 
have to be familiar with corporate reporting. Fourthly, the selected stakeholder must agree 
to participate in this research. Therefore, each questionnaire contains two questions about 
professional details, including the job title of the participant and the type of organisation 
where the participant works. Each questionnaire also provides two tick-boxes to verify 
the stakeholder is a Chinese resident and a corporate reporting reader. This research has 
been granted Ethics Approval by Waikato Management School Human Research Ethics 
Committee (see Appendix C). Each participant is also provided with a participant 
information sheet (see Appendix D) and asked to sign a consent form (see Appendix E) 
to indicate their willingness to participate in the study. 
 
The sampling method adopted in the questionnaire survey is convenience sampling. 
Convenience sampling is a type of nonprobability sampling in which people are sampled 
because they are “convenient” sources of data to contact or to reach (Etikan et al., 2016). 
The potential participants are identified by the researcher of the study using personal 
channels, involving the researcher’s personal relationship network. For instance, the 
researcher contacted family members, friends, previous classmates, previous teachers, 
and previous colleagues and briefly introduced the study and the criteria for selection of 
stakeholders. Then the researcher invited them to participate in this study if they met the 
criteria for selection. The researcher also asked them to invite any eligible professional 
people they were familiar with by using their relationship networks. Specifically, 
acquaintances of the author introduced someone they were familiar with and asked those 
potential participants whether they were willing to participate in this research and whether 
they were willing to provide their contact information to the researcher. After obtaining 




and contacted potential participants. The personal channel is considered a common way 
to build an informal personal connection between two or more persons (Liu, 2014). In the 
initial contact process, all the potential participants were fully informed of the necessary 
information for this study and their rights to confidentiality, withdrawal, and further 
queries about the research. 
 
This stakeholder consultation panel consists of 51 professionals from eight stakeholder 
groups. Dalkey (1969) believes that the minimum number of participants is 15-20, while 
Martino (1993) points out that 10-30 participants are reasonable. In previous IR studies, 
Lee and Yeo (2016) use 40 professionals. In other corporate reporting studies, An (2012) 
has 24 participants and Md Zaini (2017) has 41 participants. The 51 participants in this 
research represent a wide range of stakeholders and could provide comprehensive views 
from multiple angles. Therefore, it is considered that 51 participants are appropriate for 
this research. 
 
The data collection documents (consisting of a cover letter, participant information sheet, 
questionnaires, and consent form) were sent to participants via email. All the data 
collection documents were originally written in English by the author of this study. As 
the data collection documents were used for collecting views from Chinese stakeholders, 
a certified translator was invited to translate the content of these documents from English 
to Chinese.  
 
In order to ensure that the certified translator’s Chinese version provided the same 
information as the author’s English version and to reach equal status, the researcher asked 
a Chinese PhD candidate from the Waikato Management School to translate the certified 
translator’s Chinese version back into English. A comparison was then made between the 
Chinese PhD candidate’s English version and the author’s English version by the author’s 
two PhD supervisors (both of whom were native English-speakers), and only minor 
differences were found. For instance, in the consent form for participants, the author 
stated “I also understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time until 31 
August 2020, or to decline to answer any particular questions in the study” while the 
Chinese PhD candidate states “I also understand that I can withdraw from the study at 
any time until 31 August 2020, or refuse to answer any specific questions in the study”. 
Another example is that in the questionnaire, the author described a disclosure item, 




the company and initiatives to reduce resources consumption” whereas the Chinese PhD 
candidate described the same disclosure item as “various resources consumed by the 
company and measures to reduce resource consumption”. As all these differences were 
different ways of expressing (using different words and phrases) the same content, the 
differences were acceptable and no changes were made.  
 
Finally, the author asked an associate professor (bilingual in both English and Chinese) 
who worked in the Waikato Management School to assess the author’s English version 
and the certified translator’s Chinese version. The associate professor indicated that the 
Chinese version was accurate and tightly consistent with the author’s English version. 
Therefore, the certified translator’s Chinese version was used as the final version of the 
questionnaire surveys. Once the feedback from all the participants was received by the 
author, the certified translator translated participants’ comments from Chinese to English 
and the Chinese PhD candidate from the Waikato Management School checked these 
translations.  
 
The first-round stakeholder survey 
The purpose of the first-round and second-round stakeholder surveys is to design a 
Chinese IR disclosure index. Because most disclosure items are identified as being 
principally based on prior IR frameworks used to investigate IR disclosure practices in 
other countries, it is necessary to assess their applicability in the Chinese context. 
Therefore, stakeholder consultation is important to construct the Chinese-specific IR 
framework because stakeholders are more conversant with the Chinese context. 
Specifically, the first-round stakeholder survey is to validate preliminary IR disclosure 
items. Prior corporate reporting studies, such as those by Coy and Dixon (2004), Guthrie 
et al. (2004) and Hooks et al. (2002), emphasise the importance of validation of disclosure 
items by corporate report users. In previous IR studies, Zhou et al. (2017), Marx and 
Mohammadali-Haji (2014), and Naynar et al. (2018) collect such data from the 
questionnaire survey or interview survey. In the present study, the tool for data collection 
is a questionnaire containing three open-ended questions and a preliminary list of 54 
disclosure items developed mainly based on the literature review (an example is provided 
in Table 5.2). Each disclosure item is provided with a brief description and the 
reference(s). Compared with solely offering the list of disclosure items without 
corresponding references, providing reference(s) is deemed to be a better way (An, 2012). 




stakeholders in order to be adaptive to the Chinese context and meet Chinese stakeholders’ 
expectations. The questionnaire (See Appendix F) was sent to 51 Chinese stakeholders 
from eight stakeholder groups via email. After negotiating with stakeholders who had 
varied views, and achieving consensus, the formal list of 68 disclosure items was 
established.  
 
Table 5.2 An example of the first questionnaire 
Item Description 
3.2 Brand Brand ranking, brand value, brand image, brand reputation, etc. 
… … 
Question No. 1: Which disclosure items do you think are not necessary to appear in the list and 
can be deleted? Why do you think these disclosure items are unnecessary? 
Question No. 2: Which disclosure items presented in the list need to be adjusted? Why do you 
think these disclosure items need to be adjusted and how would you suggest modifying these 
disclosure items? 
Question No. 3: In addition to the disclosure items presented in the list, are there any additional 
disclosure items that ought to be disclosed? Why do you think these disclosure items are 
necessary? 
 
Each questionnaire contains two questions about participants’ professional details, 
including the job title of the participant and the type of organisation where the participant 
works. In order to verify the participants are Chinese residents and are familiar with 
corporate reports, two tick-boxes are incorporated into the questionnaire. The first one is 
“Are you a Chinese resident?” and the second one is “Are you familiar with the corporate 
reports?” The questionnaire also provides a brief introduction to IR, which enables 
participants who are not familiar with IR to understand its nature. 
 
The questionnaire includes a preliminary list of IR disclosure items, followed by blank 
spaces to allow participants to answer three open-ended questions. The first question is 
“Which disclosure items do you think are not necessary to appear in the list and can be 
deleted? Why do you think these disclosure items are unnecessary?”. The second question 
is “Which disclosure items presented in the list need to be adjusted? Why do you think 
these disclosure items need to be adjusted and how would you suggest modifying these 
disclosure items?”. The third question is “In addition to the disclosure items presented in 




think these disclosure items are necessary?” In addition, a tick-box is incorporated to 
allow the participants to check. The option of “yes” could be chosen if a participant has 
no further comments and totally agrees with the disclosure items. 
 
The second-round stakeholder survey 
The second-round stakeholder survey is to assign a weighting for each formal IR 
disclosure item. In extant IR studies, Zhou et al. (2017), Naynar et al. (2018), and Lee 
and Yeo (2016) have collected such data from questionnaire surveys. Both Zhou et al. 
(2017) and Lee and Yeo (2016) adopt a 2-point Likert-like scale, only considering 
whether a disclosure item is important or not important, while Naynar et al. (2018) use a 
5-point Likert-like scale, which is similar to that used in the present study. In the present 
study, the tool for data collection is a questionnaire containing a list of formal IR 
disclosure items with a 5-point Likert-like scale (for an example, see Table 5.3). The 
questionnaire (See Appendix G) was sent to 51 Chinese stakeholders from eight 
stakeholder groups via email. Hooks (2000) believes “the weightings result from 
feedback from a wide range of stakeholders so that the bias that would be imposed by just 
one-user group, for example, financial analysts, is avoided and may be eliminated” (p. 
128). All Chinese stakeholders gave a weighting to the importance of each disclosure 
item presented in the questionnaire.  
 
In this 5-point Likert-like scale, 1 indicates the least important; 2 indicates less important; 
3 indicates moderately important; 4 indicates very important; and 5 indicates extremely 
important. Such a scale has some advantages, being easy to understand and fast to use 
(Hooks, 2000), constraining the extent to which the participants can distinguish their 
responses, and avoiding participants having different understandings about the level of 
importance indicated by a specific numerical value (Ingram & Robbins, 1992). Many 
studies have used 5-point Likert-like scales, including those by Adhikari and Tondkar 
(1992) in the international context, Hooks et al. (2002) in the New Zealand context, An 
(2012) and Liu (2014) in the Chinese context, and Md Zaini (2017) in the Malaysian 
context.  
 
All weightings assigned to each item are summed and divided by 51 (the total number of 
panel members) to calculate a mean scale of importance for each item (An, 2012; Coy & 
Dixon, 2004; Hooks et al., 2002; Liu, 2014). The reasons for using a mean scale of 




misleading results (Dinius & Rogow, 1988; Hooks et al., 2002). Once the weightings are 
assigned to all disclosure items, a weighted IR disclosure index is established. 
 
Table 5.3 An example of the second questionnaire 
Item Description Your weighting (1-5) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Unimportant 
to disclose 

















     
… … … 
 
The third-round stakeholder survey 
The purpose of the third-round stakeholder survey is to make recommendations for the 
implementation of IR practices in China. Specifically, the third-round stakeholder survey 
is to collect Chinese stakeholders’ views on the challenges of adopting IR in China and 
obtain Chinese stakeholders’ suggestions. In previous IR studies, Adhariani and De 
Villiers (2018), James (2015) and Steyn (2014) collect such data from questionnaire 
surveys. However, more IR studies use interviews to collect such data (e.g., Abhayawansa 
et al., 2019; Atkins & Maroun, 2015; Chaidali & Jones, 2017; James, 2015; Lodhia, 2015). 
Interviews have some advantages over questionnaires (Phellas et al., 2011). If 
interviewees do not understand some questions, the interviewer can provide further 
explanations; if interviewers do not understand the responses, interviewees can be asked 
for further elaboration (Phellas et al., 2011). However, compared with questionnaires, 
interviews are more time consuming (Phellas et al., 2011). Moreover, questionnaires can 
avoid interviewer bias and allow respondents more time to collect necessary information 
or to deliberate their answers (Phellas et al., 2011). Therefore, based on the above 
arguments, the tool for data collection is a questionnaire containing a series of open-ended 
questions (see the example in Table 5.4). The questionnaire (See Appendix H) is sent to 
51 Chinese stakeholders via email. The questionnaire includes blank spaces to allow 
participants to answer two open-ended questions. The first question is “If IR is to be 




and the second one is “What are your recommendations on the implementation of IR in 
China?” Additionally, each questionnaire provides a tick-box. The “no” option means 
that a participant has no comments on the two open-ended questions. 
 
Table 5.4 An example of the third-round questionnaire 
Question Reply 
1. If IR is to be adopted in China, what are the 




5.3.2 Content analysis  
Assessing IR disclosure practices of Chinese listed companies is one of the main purposes 
of this research. In order to achieve this purpose, content analysis is employed. According 
to Krippendorff (2014), “content analysis is a research technique for making replicable 
and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use” 
(p. 18). Denscombe (1998) believes the strength of content analysis is that “it provides a 
means for quantifying the contents of a text, and it does so by using a method that is clear 
and, in principle, repeatable by other researchers” (p. 168). Content analysis is a widely 
accepted tool for textual analysis (Silverman, 1993). This textual analysis tool has been 
commonly used to examine corporate reporting disclosure practices (Steenkamp, 2018). 
Content analysis is also widely used in previous IR studies to evaluate IR disclosure 
practices (Cohen et al., 2012; Eccles & Krzus, 2014; Lipunga, 2015; Needles et al., 2018; 
Santis et al., 2018; Terblanche & De Villiers, 2018).   
 
Data collection  
The textual data displayed on the annual reports and CSR reports are necessary for content 
analysis (De Silva, 2011). In this study, the source of data collection is five fiscal years 
(2014-2018) annual reports and CSR reports by Chinese A-shares listed Companies. The 
annual report and CSR reports issued by a listed company are usually comprehensive 
documents, including mandatory and voluntary information in the form of numbers, 
narratives, photographs and charts, to present the overall picture of a company. In 
previous IR studies, Lipunga (2015) collects such data from annual reports by Malawi 
listed companies and Stent and Dowler (2015) gather such data from annual reports by 
New Zealand companies. Kılıç and Kuzey (2018a) obtain such data from annual reports 




selection of the corporate reports published for fiscal years 2014-2018 is that one of the 
purposes of the present study is to investigate the most recent IR disclosure practices by 
Chinese companies. Corporate reports of 2014 were the first that can be impacted by the 
IIRF because the IIRF was published on 8 December 2013 (Grassmann et al., 2019). 
 
In the present study, according to market capitalisation at the end of the fiscal year 201427, 
the top 100 A-share listed companies are selected as sample companies, for the following 
four reasons. Firstly, the sample companies are the largest companies in China. Compared 
with smaller ones, large companies are subject to more significant scrutiny from 
stakeholders and regulatory bodies (Deegan et al., 2002). Thus, considering larger 
companies are regarded as benchmarking companies for medium and small companies 
(Shin, 2014), their IR disclosure practices are of more concern to Chinese stakeholders. 
Moreover, large companies have more mature corporate reporting systems, more 
developed accounting infrastructure, and more expertise, allowing larger companies to be 
the forerunners in preparing corporate reports with high IR disclosure practices (Maroun 
& Atkins, 2018). Secondly, the sample companies cover a wide range of industrial sectors; 
therefore, IR disclosure practices in various industries could be investigated, which 
ensures the findings are not specific to a particular type of industry (Maroun & Atkins, 
2018). Thirdly, the sample includes both pure A-share and dual-listed A- and H-share 
Chinese companies, which represent a unique stock market. Fourthly, a sample of 500 
firm-year observations represents a reasonable sample size for further statistical analysis 
in Chapter nine (VanVoorhis & Morgan, 2007). The market capitalisation of sample 
companies as at 31 December 2014 ranges from 74.7 billion yuan to 20.8 trillion yuan 
with a mean of almost 1.38 trillion yuan. The 100 sample companies belong to 10 industry 
sectors: consumer goods (7); consumer services (4); technology (6); telecoms (1); oil and 
gas (2); basic materials (5); industrial (24); utilities (7); financial (34); and real estate (10). 
 
Some IR studies do not select financial companies (e.g., banks and insurance companies) 
as sample companies. García-Sánchez et al. (2013) exclude financial companies from 
their sample because they believe that compared with non-financial companies, assets 
evaluation and corporate structures of financial companies are quite different. Gerwanski 
et al. (2019) eliminate financial companies because they show significant differences 
from non-financial companies regarding asset structure and financial leverage, 
 
27 According to Regulations on Information Disclosure of Listed Companies issued by CSRC in 2007, the 




accounting standards and practice, and disclosure regulation and supervision. Zinsou 
(2018) believes that financial companies have a special corporate reporting system. 
However, some researchers do not avoid financial companies in their research (e.g., Lee 
& Yeo, 2016; Vaz et al., 2016; Zhou et al., 2017). Sofian and Dumitru (2017) choose 
financial companies because the financial sector is the largest sector in Europe. Sofian 
and Dumitru (2017) claim that although financial companies are excluded from a number 
of previous studies, they offer an interesting setting for IR research. The financial services 
sector is the largest sector in China’s stock market and represents more than one-fifth of 
the total market capitalisation (Cheng & Li, 2014). Also, financial companies have started 
attracting more attention from stakeholders and regulatory bodies with regard to the 
accountability, legitimacy, and influence of the financial sector since the global financial 
crisis in 2007 (Vitolla et al., 2020b). Therefore, financial companies are not excluded 
from the present study. 
 
Many studies select sample companies based on market capitalisation. For instance, 
Ahmed Haji and Anifowose (2016b) identify the top 100 companies listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange according to market capitalisation. Kılıç and Kuzey 
(2018a)’s sample companies consist of the top 100 companies listed in Borsa Istanbul 
according to market capitalisation. Marx and Mohammadali-Haji (2014) focus on the top 
40 companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange based on market capitalisation. 
In this research, the top 100 Chinese A-shares listed companies are chosen based upon 
their market capitalisation on 31 December 2014. The pure A-share listed companies 
mainly publish Chinese-language corporate reports (annual reports based on Chinese 
accounting standards as well as stand-alone CSR reports)28 while dual-listed A- and H-
share companies produce separate Chinese-language and English-language corporate 
reports (annual reports based on International Financial Reporting Standards as well as 
stand-alone CSR reports). In this study, only the Chinese-language versions of corporate 
reports (annual reports and CSR reports) are collected. These corporate reports are 





28 According to Regulations on Information Disclosure of Listed Companies issued by China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 2007, information disclosure can be compiled in Chinese and other 
languages simultaneously, but the Chinese version is mandatory and in the event of any disparities between 




Rules of coding  
The rules of coding are the basis of content analysis (Berelson, 1952; Krippendorff, 1980; 
Stemler, 2001; Weber, 1990), and are important in ensuring the reliability of content 
analysis (Milne & Adler, 1999). Three rules of coding are applied in this research.  
 
The first coding rule is “code for meaning rather than looking for exact words” (Schneider 
& Samkin, 2008, p.472). Interpretative content analysis is employed in the present study 
because according to the explanations of Beck et al. (2010), interpretative content analysis 
captures meaning by disaggregating narrative into textual units and then interpreting the 
contents of each disaggregated textual unit. Interpretative content analysis focuses on 
gaining a greater understanding of what is communicated; therefore, it is more concerned 
with the meaning of the narrative. Thus, all coding is undertaken manually rather than 
using the qualitative data analysis software that specializes in looking for exact words. 
 
The second rule of coding is that a sentence is the text unit. In previous IR studies, words 
or sentences of corporate reports have been used as text units. For instance, Menicucci 
(2018) takes words as the text units while some studies, such as those of Stacchezzini et 
al. (2016), Melloni (2015), Melloni et al. (2015), and Beretta et al. (2018), choose 
sentences as text units. Vandemaele et al. (2005) believe that compared with words, 
sentences are more reliable as the text units. According to Milne and Adler (1999), 
“individual words have no meaning to provide a sound basis for coding social and 
environmental disclosures without a sentence or sentences for context” (p. 243). 
Therefore, the second coding rule is that a sentence containing a single piece of 
information relating to IR disclosure items in the list constructed previously is chosen to 
be the textual unit in the present research. However, if a sentence includes more than one 
single piece of information, different pieces of information are considered separately as 
a single textual unit. It is noted that if the meaning of a sentence is implied, it is not coded 
(Schneider & Samkin, 2008). Furthermore, if the same disclosure item is presented more 
than once in different sentences, a score is given based on the aggregate of disclosure 
quality (An, 2012; An & Davey, 2010; Schneider & Samkin, 2008). In addition, tables 
are coded and one row is considered as one sentence (An & Davey, 2010; Schneider & 
Samkin, 2008). Also, information in the form of pictures, photographs, figures, or charts 
may convey a meaningful message (Md Zaini, 2017). If a picture, photograph, figure, or 





The third rule of coding is that auditors’ reports, financial statements and notes to the 
financial statements contained in the annual report29 are not coded (An, 2012; An & 
Davey, 2010; Md Zaini, 2017; Schneider & Samkin, 2008). The reason is that auditors’ 
reports are rigidly based on the Auditing Standards for the Chinese Certified Public 
Accountants, and financial statements and notes to the financial statements are compiled 
rigidly based on the Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises (ASBE). These parts 
cannot reflect the level of commitment held by companies towards reporting more 
transparent information (An, 2012; An & Davey, 2010; Guthrie et al., 2006). 
 
Scoring system 
Once the coding of corporate reports is completed, a score for each disclosure item30 is 
assigned according to the scoring system. As stated earlier in Chapter four, a scoring 
system can be categorised as either with or without quality criteria. A scoring system 
without quality criteria is used to assess the extent of IR disclosures. Most IR studies only 
consider the extent of IR disclosures (the presence or absence of a given disclosure item) 
(e.g., Nakib & Dey, 2018; Rivera-Arrubla et al., 2017; Santis et al., 2018; Wen et al., 
2017; Zhou et al., 2017). In other words, they use a two-point scale (0-1) where “0” is 
assigned when a disclosure item in the list is not disclosed at all, and “1” is assigned when 
the item is disclosed. Figure 5.3 shows the process of evaluating the extent of IR 
disclosures. Assessing the extent of IR disclosures is consistent with the guiding principle 










29 According to Regulations on Information Disclosure of Listed Companies issued by CSRC in 2007, there 
are ten parts in an annual report: (1) basic information of the company; (2) major accounting figures and 
financial indexes; (3) company stock and bond issuance and changes; (4) the number of shares, the number 
of bonds, the number of shareholders, and the top 10 shareholders (at the end of the reporting period); (5)  
shareholders who have stakes of 5% or above, controlling shareholders and actual controllers; (6) positions, 
stock holding changes and annual remunerations (directors, supervisors and senior managers); (7) the board 
of directors’ report; (8) management discussion and analyses; (9) major incidents and their influence on the 
company during the reporting period; and (10) financial reports and full text of audit report. 











Figure 5.3 The process of evaluating the extent of IR disclosures 
Source: Author’s design 
 
A scoring system with quality criteria is used to assess the quality of IR disclosures and 
to differentiate the quality of disclosures (Liu, 2014). Ruiz-Lozano and Tirado-Valencia 
(2016) use a three-point scale (0-2: 2 for a sufficiently explained disclosure item and 1 
for an insufficiently explained disclosure item). Some researchers (e.g., Ahmed Haji & 
Anifowose, 2017; Eccles & Krzus, 2014; Needles et al., 2018) use a four-point scale (0-
3: 3 for a detailed described disclosure item, 2 for a moderately described disclosure item 
and 1 for a generally described disclosure item). Similarly, Zinsou (2018) applies another 
four-point scale (0-3: 3 for a numerical and detailed described disclosure item, 2 for a 
numerical but not detailed described disclosure item, and 1 for a generally described 
disclosure item). Marcia et al. (2015) and Van Zyl (2013) use a five-point scale (1-5: 5 
for the highest quality disclosure item and 1 for the lowest quality disclosure item). Pistoni 
et al. (2018) and Lee and Yeo (2016) apply a six-point scale (0-5: 5 for an excellent 
description of a disclosure item; 4 for good and detailed description; 3 for a balanced 
description; 2 for a quantitative description; and 1 for a poor description). Liu et al. (2018) 
use a seven-point scale by considering the time dimension (past, present and future) and 
value dimension (absolute as well as relative amounts, amounts disaggregated into 
different levels and amounts compared with targets). If a disclosure reveals its past values, 
present values, future values, absolute as well as relative amounts, amounts disaggregated 
into different levels, and amounts compared with targets, then a maximum score of 6 is 
assigned. Stent and Dowler (2015) and Sofian and Dumitru (2017) give each disclosure 
item a quality criterion by considering the specificity of each disclosure item. By referring 
to the guiding principles of IIRF and previous IR studies, the quality criteria adopted in 
the present study use a five-point scale (0-4) (see Table 5.5). Several prior studies have 
used a five-point scale, including those of Davey (1985) on CSR disclosure in New 
Score:1 Score:0 
No Yes 




Zealand, An (2012) on intellectual capital disclosure in China, and Md Zaini (2017) on 
voluntary disclosure in Malaysia. 
 
Table 5.5 The basic quality criteria 
Disclosure quality Score Criteria Reason 
Comprehensive disclosure  4 The key content of a 
disclosure item is 
elaborated using 
monetary description, 
actual physical quantified 
description, and clear 
narrative description.  
Considering the connectivity of non-
financial-qualitative information, non-
financial-quantitative information and 
financial information. 
Note31:  
1.Monetary description represents 
financial information.  
2. Actual physical quantified description 
represents non-financial-quantitative 
information. 
3.Narrative description represents non-
financial-qualitative information. 
Disclosure with two forms 3 The key content of a 
disclosure item is 
elaborated using 
monetary description and 
actual physical quantified 
description, or narrative 
description and actual 
physical quantified 
description, or monetary 
description and clear 
narrative description. 
Disclosure with one form  2 The key content of a 
disclosure item is 
elaborated using 
monetary description 
only or actual physical 
quantified description 
only or clear narrative 
description only. 
Brief disclosure 1 A disclosure item is only 
briefly mentioned.  
Non-disclosure 0 A disclosure item does 
not appear in the 
corporate report.    
 
Previous corporate reporting researchers, such as Boesso and Kumar (2007), Broberg et 
al. (2010), and Malola and Maroun (2019) believe that information can be disclosed in 
three ways: (1) quantitative monetary form; (2) quantitative non-monetary form; and (3) 
 
31 Financial Times Lexicon (2015) and INTOSAI Working Group on Environmental Auditing (2013) 




qualitative form. Both the connectivity between financial and non-financial information 
and the connectivity between quantitative and qualitative information are considered in 
the quality criteria. A number of scholars emphasise the importance of the connectivity 
between financial and non-financial information in IR (Attanayake Mudiyanselage, 2018; 
De Villiers & Maroun, 2017; Zhou et al., 2017), and the importance of connectivity 
between quantitative information and qualitative information in IR (Oliver et al., 2016; 
Wulf et al., 2014; Zinsou, 2018). However, emphasising the connectivity does not mean 
a directive to monetise or quantise all information (Albertini, 2018; Burke & Clark, 2016; 
Goicoechea et al., 2019). Each description form has its advantages (Beattie et al., 2004; 
Md Zaini, 2017; Watson et al., 2002). For instance, some researchers, such as Schneider 
(2006) and An (2012) believe that in some cases a disclosure presented in qualitative form 
can provide more informative content and a greater understanding than its quantitative 
form. Furthermore, some disclosures can only be described using narrative and not 
monetised or quantified (Goicoechea et al., 2019). For instance, several disclosure items 
(e.g., mission and vision; culture, ethics and values) are narrative in nature (An & Davey, 
2010). Therefore, firstly, it is assumed that monetary description, actual physical 
quantified description and narrative description have equal quality of disclosure. 
Secondly, each disclosure item is provided with a quality criterion. For disclosure items 
that can be described in narrative form, actual physical quantified form and monetary 
form, their maximum quality score is 432. For disclosure items that can only be described 
in two forms (e.g., narrative and actual physical quantified form), their maximum quality 
score is 3. For disclosure items that can only be described in one form, their maximum 
quality score is 2.  
 
Based on the above explanations, among the 68 disclosure items33, six disclosure items 
(basic information about the company; company history; mission and vision; culture, 
ethics and values; leadership structure; management experience and capability) have a 
score scale of 0 to 2 while two disclosure items (employee allocation; employee 
qualifications) have a score scale of 0 to 3; the remaining 60 disclosure items have a score 
scale of 0 to 4. Figure 5.4 shows the process of evaluating the quality of IR disclosures. 
 
32 Some researchers (e.g., An et al., 2017; Malola & Maroun, 2019; Marrone & Oliva, 2019) believe that if 
the information type of a reported sentence is a mix of monetary, physical quantitative, and narrative 
qualitative, it represents the highest disclosure quality. 
33 Some items are added to the preliminary list of 54 disclosure items as a result of the first round of the 




Each disclosure item is assigned a score based on the degree of compliance of the 


























Figure 5.4 The process of evaluating the quality of IR disclosures 
Source: Author’s design 
 
With the establishment of the weighted IR disclosure index and the scoring system with 
quality criteria, an instrument for evaluating IR disclosure practices is constructed. This 
evaluation instrument, as one of the components of Chinese IR framework, incorporates 
the features of IIRF that include fundamental concepts and content elements (see Chapter 




Is this sentence related to an item in the IR 
disclosure index? 
No 
Do not code 
68 items in the IR disclosure index 
Yes 
Which item does it belong to? 
What is the quality of disclosure? 




four, which provides explanations in section 4.5), as well as guiding principles (see 
Chapter six, which provides explanations in section 6.5).  
 
Four examples of content analysis are provided to illustrate the process clearly. In the 
annual report of 2017, Air China Limited described the disclosure item “brand” in the 
following manner:  
From 2007 to 2017, according to World Brand Lab’s data, our company has been ranked as 
one of the world’s top 500 brands for 11 consecutive years. The ranking rose from 461 in 2007 
to 290 in 2017. We are the only Chinese airline company selected and our brand value reached 
128.536 billion yuan in 2017. The company also won the “2017 China Brand Annual Awards 
NO.1 (airline company)” and “2017 Five-Star Diamond Award” and won a special award – 
“2017 China Cultural Brand of the Year”. In addition, the company also successfully listed on 
“the 2017 BrandZ Top 30 Chinese Brands” and “BrandZ Top 100 Most Valuable Chinese 
Brands”. For the third consecutive year, the company was rated as an A-class company in the 
assessment of the central company of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission. The excellent practice of corporate brand building was compiled by the State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission into the “On the topic of the brand 
building of central companies” (thematic compilation of 8 central companies) 34. 
Considering the disclosure item (brand) is elaborated using monetary description, actual 
physical quantified description, and narrative description, a score of “4” is assigned. 
 
In the annual report of 2014, Air China Limited provides a description of the disclosure 
item “brand” in the following manner: 
With a long history of operation, the company has a world-class safety flight record and a 
domestic leading comprehensive competitiveness. It has extensive brand recognition and good 
brand reputation among consumers…. From 2007 to 2014, the company was selected as one 
of the world’s top 500 brands for eight consecutive years, ranking from 461 to 322, becoming 
the only Chinese airline company selected. The company was also selected as one of “China’s 
500 Most Valuable Brands”. The ranking was steadily increased from 32 in 2004 to 24 in 2014, 
ranking first among China’s airline companies. 
Considering the disclosure item (brand) is elaborated using actual physical quantified 
description and narrative description, a score of “3” is assigned. 
 
In the annual report of 2017, Air China Limited describes the disclosure item “business 
objectives” in the following manner: 
 




Based on the analysis of the external context and the comprehensive judgement of our own 
conditions, the main production objectives of the company in 2018 are:  
1.Hours of flight: 2.242 million; 
2.Total turnover:27.814 billion tonne-kilometres; 
3.Number of passengers: 109 million; 
4.Goods and mail turnover: 8 billion tonne-kilometres.  
Given the disclosure item (business objectives) is elaborated using actual physical 
quantified description, a score of “2” is assigned. 
 
In the CSR report of 2014, Air China Limited offers a description of the disclosure item 
“government relationship” in the following manner: 
The company participated in policy planning, investigation and formulation, made research 
reports for the government, is supervised and assessed by the government, guaranteed special 
governmental flights, and carried out poverty alleviation and disaster relief. 
Due to the disclosure item (government relationship) is only briefly mentioned, a score 
of “1” is assigned. 
 
The pilot test 
A pilot test is a pre-test of the coding process, aiming to assess and ensure the reliability 
of the coding process of a study (An, 2012; Melloni, 2015). Similar to some previous IR 
studies, such as those of Lee and Yeo (2016) and Zhou et al. (2017), two coders are 
involved in the current study to conduct the pilot test. One of the coders is the author of 
this study and the other is a Chinese PhD candidate in accounting at the University of 
Waikato35. 
 
Initially, both two coders are trained in the coding process prior to the pilot test, which is 
to ensure the quality criteria and rules of coding are being adequately and accurately used 
(Beck et al., 2010; Lombard et al., 2002). Then ten corporate reports from the sample 
companies are selected on a random basis for the pilot test. Both coders coded the selected 
corporate reports independently. Each textual unit (a sentence) contained in the corporate 
reports is transferred and recorded on separate coding sheets by the two coders 
respectively. The two coders then compare the coding sheets to confirm the same textual 
units have been extracted. Then, each sentence is carefully read in order to capture its 
 
35 This Chinese PhD candidate is selected is because this student is familiar with corporate reports of 




meaning and identify a suitable theme for it. In other words, the coders decide whether or 
not the sentence falls under one of the themes of the IR disclosure index and contains 
information that fits within a disclosure item of the IR disclosure index. In the coding 
sheet, each coder then independently assigns a score for each sentence and provides a 
note to justify the basis for their scores. This cross-referencing system is in place from 
the start in order to be convenient for future comparison between two coding sheets.  
 
In order to ensure “reproducibility or intercoder reliability…when multiple coders are 
involved” (Melloni, 2015, p. 670), the coding sheets are compared to examine the level 
of agreement and deviation between the two coders, by calculating Krippendorff’s alpha 
coefficient of agreement. According to Lombard et al. (2002), the advantages of 
Krippendorff’s alpha are that it is applicable for any number of coders and for variables 
at different levels of measurement from nominal to ratio and it accounts for chance 
agreements between coders. Table 5.6 shows the Krippendorff’s alpha for each corporate 
report, indicating the extent to which the results of content analysis by the two coders are 
in agreement. The results show that all corporate reports tested are above the threshold 
value of 0.800 (the acceptable level of reliability in Krippendorff’s alpha coefficient 
(Boesso & Kumar, 2007; Milne & Adler, 1999)), confirming the reproducibility 
(intercoder reliability) of the content analysis (Melloni, 2015; Md Zaini, 2017). In order 
to ensure consistency of the coding process, the author codes the rest of corporate reports 
independently after the pilot test (Ahmed Haji & Anifowose, 2017; Manes-Rossi et al., 
2020). 
 
Table 5.6 The pilot test using Krippendorff’s alpha 
Company Year Krippendorff’s Alpha 
Ping An Bank Co., Ltd. 2015 0.8642 
China Vanke Co., Ltd. 2015 0.8871 
Avic Capital Co., Ltd. 2014 0.9104 
Jiangsu Yanghe Brewery Joint-Stock Co., Ltd. 2016 0.8714 
Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Ltd. 2018 0.8779 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank Co., Ltd. 2014 0.9227 
Metallurgical Corporation of China Ltd. 2014 0.8715 
Poly Development Holding Group Co., Ltd. 2016 0.8510 
TBEA Co., Ltd. 2018 0.9356 





5.3.3 Statistical analysis 
Developing and testing several hypotheses with respect to the determinants of IR 
disclosure practices and the effect of IR disclosure practices on agency costs is one of the 
main purposes of this research. To achieve this purpose, statistical analysis is employed. 
The top 100 A-share companies in terms of market capitalisation at the end of the fiscal 
year 2014 are selected as sample companies. Firstly, in order to investigate the firm-level 
factors that determine IR disclosure practices by Chinese companies, sixteen variables 
(leverage, firm size, audit quality, profitability, financial sector, environmentally sensitive 
sector, consumer-based sector, listing status, independent directors, ownership 
concentration, state-owned shares, board size, CEO duality, regulatory authority, 
community, and overseas customers) are adopted as independent variables. These factors 
are commonly adopted as independent variables in prior studies regarding information 
disclosure practices (e.g., Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018b; Raffournier, 1995; White et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, listing status, state-owned shares, and independent directors are closely 
linked with the Chinese business environment. The data for sixteen variables are collected 
from a Chinese local financial database, called China Stock Market and Accounting 
Research (CSMAR). The CSMAR Databases provide data on the China stock markets 
and the financial statements of Chinese listed companies. The IR disclosure practices 
obtained from the content analysis are used as the dependent variable. Hypothesis 
development is introduced and described in Chapter 8.  
 
Secondly, in order to investigate the effect of IR disclosure practices by Chinese 
companies, one variable (agency costs) is adopted as a dependent variable. The data on 
agency costs are also collected from CSMAR. The IR disclosure practices obtained from 
the content analysis are employed as the independent variable. A set of control variables 
is applied by referring to some IR studies that explore the association between IR 
practices and agency costs (or information asymmetry) (e.g., García-Sánchez and 
Noguera-Gámez, 2017b; Pavlopoulos et al., 2017). Hypothesis development is also 
introduced and described in Chapter 8.   
 
Univariate analysis and multiple regression analysis are applied to examine the 
correlations between the dependent variables and the independent variables. Univariate 
analysis tests the correlation between the dependent variable and each independent 
variable, using Pearson’s correlation coefficient test and Spearman’s rank correlation 




between the dependent variable and a set of independent variables, using an Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) model. OLS “is one of the most popular statistical techniques used 
in the social sciences. It is used to predict values of a continuous response variable using 
one or more explanatory variables and can also identify the strength of the relationships 
between these variables” (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999, p. 55). In order to conduct 
univariate analysis and multiple regression analysis, two popular software packages used 
for statistical analysis: Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS), and Stata, are 
applied.  
 
In order to evaluate the robustness of the findings, two types of robustness tests are 
conducted by altering the measurement of IR disclosure practices. The first type is to alter 
the measurement of the extent of IR disclosures. Specifically, each disclosure item is 
assigned a weighting, according to its importance from the Chinese stakeholders’ 
perspective. The second type is to alter the measurement of the quality of IR disclosures. 
Specifically, all disclosure items are assigned equal weighting. Accordingly, the new 
extent of IR disclosures and the new quality of IR disclosures are adopted in multiple 
regression analysis. The use of the new IR disclosure practices is to investigate the 
determinants and effects of IR disclosure practices by Chinese companies from an 
unbiased perspective. 
 
5.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter provides a detailed discussion of the research methodology and methods 
employed in the study. It begins by explaining the assumptions underpinning the three 
main research paradigms and justifies the choice of the mixed method as the research 
methodology. This chapter emphasises describing the process of data collection and data 
analysis. Three sources of data collection: questionnaires, annual reports and CSR reports, 
and the financial database are used for the current study. The main data analysis in this 
study contains content analysis and statistical analysis. For the content analysis, the rules 
of coding and the quality criteria are set, and the quality criteria (a five-point scale) are 
exhibited in this chapter. Examples of content analysis and the coding process are offered 
as well. In order to investigate the potential determinants of IR disclosure practices 
(leverage, firm size, audit quality, profitability, financial sector, environmentally sensitive 
sector, consumer-based sector, listing status, independent directors, ownership 




community, and overseas customers) and the effect (agency costs) of IR disclosure 



































6 CHAPTER SIX 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE IR DISCLOSURE INDEX 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the review of preliminary disclosure items and the development of 
the final IR disclosure index by incorporating the views of 51 Chinese stakeholders. The 
51 participants who participated in the questionnaire survey comprised eight stakeholder 
groups, including scholars in accounting, editors in financial media, financial managers, 
financial analysts in banks, auditors, officials in government agencies in charge of 
supervising Chinese companies, industry analysts in consultant companies, and financial 
analysts in investment companies. In the first-round questionnaire survey, the participants 
validated the preliminary list of IR disclosure items, added new disclosure items and 
adjusted their categories. In the second-round questionnaire survey, the participants 
assigned a weighting for each IR disclosure item on the basis of what they considered to 
be the most important to the least important. A final IR disclosure index, containing 68 
disclosure items, was established by the participants. The final IR disclosure index 
provided the themes for the content analysis to assess IR disclosure practices of Chinese 
corporate reports (see Chapter seven).   
 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 describes the selection of the 
stakeholders’ panel. The results of the first-round stakeholder survey are detailed in 
section 6.3. Section 6.4 presents the results of the second-round stakeholder survey. 
Finally, section 6.5 summarizes the chapter. 
 
6.2 Selection of the stakeholders 
Invitation letters were sent to 58 participants who initially agreed to participate in the 
survey. However, seven of them subsequently declined to participate, including two 
editors in financial media, one chief finance officer, one bank financial analyst, one 
financial analyst from an investment company and two scholars in accounting. The 
financial analyst from an investment company and one financial media editor apologized 
because they did not have enough time, while two scholars in accounting felt they were 
not sufficiently expert in the area of IR. Three other participants withdrew from the survey 
on the grounds that they were afraid of disclosing sensitive information in the survey, 
which might jeopardize their careers. The chief finance officer was concerned that the 




claimed the survey did not conform with her company’s confidentially requirements and 
that employees were not permitted to participate in external surveys. The bank financial 
analyst commented:  
I am truly sorry that I cannot be involved in the survey because we signed a 
confidentiality agreement with the bank. There have been some similar problems 
previously. The risk is really everywhere. I am really sorry. Our bank emphasises 
information security and confidentiality almost every day.  
Details of the 51 participants who participated in the survey are provided in Table 7.1. 
The participants are coded as P1 to P51, and classified according to their stakeholder 
group. 
 
Table 6.1 List of panel members 
ID Participant classification 
P1-P8 Scholars in accounting (one professor, five associate professors and 
two lecturers) 
P9-P10 Editors in financial media (two chief editors) 
P11-P17 Financial managers (four senior financial accounting managers, one 
head of financial accounting department, two regular accountants) 
P18-P25 Financial analysts in banks 
P26-P31 Auditors (one senior auditor and five regular auditors) 
P32-P36 Officials in government agencies in charge of supervising Chinese 
companies  
P37-P42 Industry analysts in consultant companies (three senior analysts and 
three regular analysts) 
P43-P51 Financial analysts in investment companies (three directors, one 
chief investment officer, one chief risk management officer and four 
senior managers) 
 
6.3 First-round stakeholder survey 
Twenty-four participants agreed with the preliminary list of IR disclosure items (see 
Table 4.8 in Chapter four) and did not provide any further comments. The remaining 27 





Three participants (P1, P10, and P13) suggested removing the item of “CCP-building” 
because they considered this item not necessary. Nine items that were considered 
sensitive information by participants were suggested to be deleted, including “employee 
remuneration” (Participant P26) “competitor relation” (Participant P14), “core 
competitiveness” (Participant P42), “R&D activities” (Participant P42), “operational 
structure” (Participant P43), “leadership structure” (Participant P43), “business and 
market” (Participant P43), “government relation” (Participant P13), “management 
processes” (Participant P3) and “equipment” (Participant P6). A financial analyst (P44) 
in investment companies doubted the authenticity of information on natural capital and 
believed that “even if the company discloses them, the information is not real”. Another 
financial analyst in investment companies (P46) stated that the items of “mission and 
vision”, “culture, ethics and value” and “society and community support” are always 
empty rhetoric in corporate reports and suggested deleting these three items. This 
participant’s argument was not surprising because companies may use decoupling 
(producing empty rhetorical disclosures) to deal with institutional pressures (Boxenbaum 
& Jonsson, 2017). According to Boxenbaum and Jonsson (2017, p.7), “decoupling means 
that organisations abide only superficially by institutional pressure and adopt new 
structures without necessarily implementing the related practices.” In fact, some 
researchers have found that rhetorical disclosures exist in integrated reports (Setia et al., 
2015; Solomon & Maroun, 2012). However, in order to maintain the completeness of the 
disclosure items, the author of the current study did not accept the suggestions proposed 
by participants who advised removing certain items because these participants accounted 
for only a minor proportion of all participants and provided little evidence to establish 
why these items should be deleted.  
 
Several participants proposed adding some new disclosure items. According to 
stakeholder theory, companies must take notice of information disclosures and meet their 
stakeholders’ information demands if they expect to obtain ongoing support from their 
stakeholders (Xu et al., 2019). A professor in accounting (P2) argued that basic 
information about a company, such as its industry type, its registered capital and its 
registered location is important and can be shown under the theme of corporate overview. 
A financial analyst in an investment company (P45) contended that the history of a 
company is necessary and ought to be provided under the theme of corporate overview 





An associate professor in accounting (P4) stated that although the six capitals contained 
in the preliminary list of IR disclosure items can provide an explanation of a company’s 
business model, it is still important to see how a company describes and summarizes its 
business model. Thus, the scholar suggested adding the item of “business model” and 
listed it under the theme of “strategy”. Although the details of business model, such as 
inputs and outcomes can be revealed by other themes such as the different types of 
capitals, there is a need to identify the statement of its business model by the organisation. 
An organisation’s business model is its core, and the organisation should answer the 
question in its IR that “what is the organization’s business model?” in a holistic way 
(Beattie & Smith, 2012; IIRC, 2013). Presenting the business model in a holistic way, 
though difficult, enables an organisation to connect business model to the strategy 
(Attanayake Mudiyanselage, 2018; IIRC, 2012; Sukhari & De Villiers, 2019).  
 
A financial manager (P12) would like to see how a company allocates its employees, such 
as the number of employees in various positions (e.g., technicians). Hence, this 
participant suggested incorporating the item of “employee allocation” into the theme of 
human capital. Three participants: an official in government agencies in charge of 
supervising Chinese companies (P33), a financial manager (P15), and an associate 
professor in accounting (P8), pointed out that warnings or penalties for companies (or 
senior management) (e.g., violation of the Labour Protection Act, the Environmental 
Protection Act, or the Consumer Protection Act) can reflect the level of corporate 
governance. Thus, they suggested adding the item of “warnings or penalties for 
companies (or senior management)” under the theme of governance. From the perspective 
of legitimacy theory, a company may obscure or dismiss any negative information (e.g., 
warnings or penalties) that potentially undermines its legitimacy (Savage et al., 2001), 
while in some circumstances a company may release negative information with detailed 
descriptions to maintain its legitimacy (De Villiers & Van Staden, 2011; Fuhrmann, 2019). 
A financial manager (P14) and an official in government agencies in charge of 
supervising Chinese companies (P34) stated that they were keen to include information 
on taxation (e.g., tax incentives, tax rates for overseas subsidiaries or branches, 
company’s tax credit rating, tax contribution rate). They believed an item on “taxation” 
belongs to the theme of financial capital. A new item called “insurance” was allocated 
under the theme of financial capital because a financial manager (P12) favoured 
information on the purpose, coverage, amount, and claims related to insurance bought by 




(P18). In the participant’s opinion, debtor relations can reflect the level of accounts 
receivable management. Sherman (2011) believes accounts receivable are not effectively 
managed in many companies; thus, based on agency theory, investors have incentives to 
detect managers’ behaviours. 
 
Apart from the above eight items suggested for inclusion in the list, there were another 
five new items proposed by some participants. A scholar in accounting (P5) highlighted 
three items to be included under the theme of social and relational capital: industry 
association relations, media relations (an editor of financial media (P9) emphasised this 
item as well), and NGO relations. In term of industry association relations, the scholar 
(P5) argued that: 
The relationship with industry associations is a kind of public relations. The industry 
association, as the bridge and the link between the government and companies, has become 
the third force to promote economic development. Industry associations can promote industry 
self‐regulation, can help companies to improve competitiveness and to expand the market, and 
can provide an in-depth understanding of industry policies. Therefore, the relationship with 
industry associations needs to be considered. 
With regard to media relations, the scholar (P5) argued that: 
Media relationships are an important part of public relations. The media can promote a 
company’s reputation and can harm a company’s reputation as well. Especially when a 
company faces a reputational crisis, how to utilize media to address the crisis is extremely 
important. Listed companies must maintain media relations actively and correctly. 
As for NGO relations, the scholar (P5) pointed out that: 
NGO relations are easily overlooked by companies. However, NGOs cover a wide range of 
groups who are concerned with consumer rights protection, employee rights protection, 
environmental protection, poverty alleviation, and so on. In fact, as I know, some listed 
companies have disclosed their relationship with NGOs on their CSR reports, although they 
didn’t provide this kind of information in very great detail. 
Industry associations, media and NGOs are all stakeholders of a company (Sternad, 2019). 
The IIRC (2013, p.17) states that “an integrated report should provide insight into the 
nature and quality of the organisation’s relationships with its key stakeholders…”. Thus, 
the scholar (P5)’s proposal for adding industry association relations, media relations and 





The views of other participants who suggested incorporating new items in the final 
disclosure index included the following. A financial analyst in an investment company 
(P46) emphasised the importance of other financial relations:  
I think some financial relations, such as the financial analyst relation, credit rating agency 
relations, etc. are important. They directly or indirectly impact investors’ perception and 
judgment. Generally speaking, financial analysts are very familiar with the company. A well-
known sell-side analyst usually has good relationships with directors, supervisors or senior 
managers of listed companies. 
An official in government agencies in charge of supervising Chinese companies (P35) 
noticed the importance of the item of “anti-corruption”: 
Since 2012, the Chinese government has been implementing an aggressive anti-corruption 
campaign, which is considered as the largest anti-corruption campaign in Chinese history. As 
I know, by the end of 2014, a total of 41 provincial and ministerial officials were investigated 
and arrested during the anti-corruption campaign. I think the current anti-corruption 
campaign may change China’s business environment fundamentally. Anti-corruption is also 
incorporated into GRI’s sustainability reporting framework. However, information on anti-
corruption is not presented sufficiently in the current Chinese corporate report. Therefore, I 
suggest the disclosure item on anti-corruption be added in your framework.  
The suggestion for incorporating an “anti-corruption” item into the IR disclosure index is 
in line with the perspective of institutional theory. One of the sources of coercive pressure 
is the policies, laws, or regulations issued by the government or regulatory authorities 
(Joseph et al., 2016). This regulatory authority is seen as a highly institutionalized 
external formal structure that exerts pressure on companies to disclose anti-corruption 
information (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Therefore, companies conduct anti-corruption 
activities and report related information to show that their behaviours comply with the 
institutional environment (Joseph et al., 2016; Oliver, 1991). Legitimacy theory suggests 
that the pressure from a strong anti-corruption environment forces companies to disclose 
anti-corruption information to increase their legitimacy (Xu et al., 2019). 
 
Four participants suggest switching two disclosure items to different themes. An industry 
analyst in consultant companies (P41) advised reclassifying two items, “shareholder 
relations” and “creditor relations” as financial capital. The industry analyst (P41) believed 
that: 
I understand shareholder relations and creditor relations are two important components of 
relational capital. However, I still believe that they are more appropriate to list under the 




organisation for creating products or services. Apart from the funds generated by operations 
and investments, shareholder relations and creditor relations directly impact whether a 
company can finance funds from the capital market successfully.  
A scholar in accounting (P7) saw the item of CCP-building as a component of governance 
and commented that: 
I think CCP-building is an important component of corporate governance. CCP-building has 
been incorporated into the new listed company governance guidelines. Several academic 
articles also advocate incorporating CCP-building into corporate governance. Therefore, I 
suggest that CCP-building can be recategorized into governance. 
Similarly, one industry analyst in the consultant company (P38) believed that the item of 
“CCP-building” does not belong under the theme of “human capital” because the 
connection between “CCP-building” and “human capital” is weak. Thus, in line with the 
recommendation of participants, the item “CCP-building” was reallocated to the theme 
of governance. 
 
In addition to the above adjustments, an item called “overseas CSR” was divided into two 
separate items: “overseas CSR (social aspect)” and “overseas CSR (environmental 
aspect). An auditor (P27) stated that: 
I think overseas corporate social responsibility can be divided into two aspects, namely social 
aspect and environmental aspect. The social aspect is related to overseas social and relational 
capital and the environmental aspect is related to natural capital.   
 
Once the draft final list of disclosure items was established, the author contacted the rest 
of the participants and sent them the modified disclosure items with explanations of why 
changes had been made to the preliminary list of IR disclosure items. All the participants 
accepted the reasons and agreed with these changes made. No additional disclosure items 
were suggested, and no current disclosure items were suggested to be deleted. Thus, the 
final list of disclosure items (see Table 7.2) contained 68 IR disclosure items including: 
7 in corporate overview and external environment, 4 in strategy and competitiveness, 6 
in governance, 2 in risk and opportunity, 3 in future outlooks, 10 in financial capital, 3 in 
manufacturing capital, 4 in natural capital, 7 in intellectual capital, 10 in human capital, 
and 12 in social and relational capital. Stakeholders’ participation in establishing the final 
list of disclosure items resulted in significant changes from the preliminary one, which 
can be regarded as a contribution from stakeholders. Stakeholders’ expectations of IR, as 
well as the legitimization and institutionalization of IR, vary between countries, as each 




leading to significant differences in IR disclosures between countries (De Abreu et al., 
2012; Dong et al., 2014; Visser, 2008).  
 
Table 6.2 The final list of disclosure items 
1. Corporate overview & external environment 
1.1 Basic information about the company 
1.2 Mission and vision 
1.3 Culture, ethics and value 
1.4 Operating context 
1.5 Business and market 
1.6 Company history 
1.7 Operational structure 
2. Strategy & competitiveness 
2.1 Strategy  
2.2 Core Competitiveness  
2.3 Competitive landscape 
2.4 Business model 
3. Governance 
3.1 Ownership structure 
3.2 Leadership structure 
3.3 Management remuneration 
3.4 Management experience and capability 
3.5 Warnings and penalties  
3.6 Chinese Communist Party-building 




5.1 Business plans 
5.2 Business objectives 
5.3 Challenges and uncertainties 
6. Financial capital  
6.1 Funds from financing 
6.2 Funds from operations or investments 
6.3 Present financial KPIs 
6.4 The linkage between past and present 
financial KPIs 
6.5 Shareholder relations  
6.6 Creditor relations 
6.7 Debtor relations 
6.8 Other financial relations 
6.9 Taxation 
6.10 Insurance 
7. Manufacturing capital  
7.1 Buildings  
7.2 Equipment 
7.3 Infrastructure 
8. Natural capital 
8.1 Pollution and pollution reduction  
8.2 Resource consumption and resource 
saving 
8.3 Extra environmental protection 
8.4 Overseas CSR (environmental aspect) 
9. Intellectual capital 
9.1 Management processes 
9.2 Brand 
9.3 Technology  
9.4 Research and development 
9.5 Intellectual property 
9.6 Marketing 
9.7 Entrepreneurial spirit 
10. Human capital 
10.1 Recruitment 
10.2 Employee remuneration 
10.3 Employee equality 
10.4 Employee care 
10.5 Resignation, layoffs and dismissal 
10.6 Employee career development 
10.7 Employee health and safety 
10.8 Employee training and education 
10.9 Employee qualifications 
10.10 Employee allocation 
11. Social and relational capital 
11.1 Competitor relations 




11.3 Business collaborations 
11.4 Supplier or distributor relations 
11.5 Government relations 
11.6 Society & community support 
11.7 Product or service quality 
11.8 NGO relations 
11.9 Media relations 
11.10 Industry association relations 
11.11 Anti-corruption 
11.12. Overseas CSR (social aspect) 
 
6.4 Second-round stakeholder survey 
The final list of IR disclosure items, as presented in Table 6.2 was sent to the 51 
participants and they were asked to weight the disclosure items in order of importance. 
The weightings for each disclosure item assigned by each participant are presented in 
Appendix I. In order to calculate a mean scale of importance for each item, all weightings 
assigned by 51 panellists to each item were summed and divided by 51 (the total number 
of panel members). The higher the score of a disclosure item, the greater the importance 
of the item in the corporate report.  
 
As shown in Table 6.3 to Table 6.13, 7.35% of the disclosure items were weighted as 
extremely important, 63.24% as very important, and 29.41% as moderately important. 
Participants valued traditional financial information most highly. Among all disclosure 
items, “present financial KPIs” was seen as extremely important to disclose and had the 
highest weighting, with an average weighting of 4.57 out of 5. The disclosure item named 
“the linkage between past and present financial KPIs” was also viewed as extremely 
important to disclose and was the second highest-weighted item, with a weighting of 4.51 
out of 5. Three disclosure items: “Chinese Communist Party-building”, “employee care”, 
and “industry association relations”, were rated as the least important disclosure items, 
with an average weighting of 2.78 out of 5. 
 
In terms of the responses of stakeholder groups (also see Appendix I), the group of 
accounting scholars (eight members) assigned the highest weighting (an average of 3.97) 
to the overall disclosure items. The lowest weighting (an average of 3.35) was assigned 
by the group of editors in financial media (two members). For the accounting scholars, 
two disclosure items, namely “research and development” and “intellectual property”, 
were of the utmost importance while “Chinese Communist Party-building” was the 




important disclosure items were “employee health and safety”, “pollution and pollution 
reduction”, “resource consumption and resource saving”, “product or service quality” and 
“Chinese Communist Party-building”. From financial managers’ perspectives, “present 
financial KPIs” was the most important disclosure item while three disclosure items – 
“employee equality”, “employee care” and “media relations” – were the least important. 
Auditors saw “buildings”, “equipment”, “infrastructure” and “basic information about the 
company” as the top four important disclosure items and perceived “employee equality”, 
“employee care” and “industry association relations” as the least important disclosure 
items. “Present financial KPIs” and “the linkage between past and present financial KPIs” 
were regarded as the most important disclosure items by analysts in banks, officials in 
government agencies and analysts in consultant companies. In contrast, “employee care”, 
“employee equality” and “Chinese Communist Party-building” were respectively 
regarded as the least important disclosure items by analysts in banks, officials in 
government agencies and industry analysts in consultant companies. The financial 
analysts in investment companies viewed five disclosure items – “basic information about 
the company”, “company history”, “present financial KPIs”, “the linkage between past 
and present financial KPIs” and “shareholder relation” – as the most important disclosure 
items.  
 
(a) Corporate overview and external environment 
From Table 6.3, it can be seen that the stakeholder panel viewed five disclosure items 
under the theme of “corporate overview and external environment” as very important 
items and the remaining two as extremely important items. The average weighting of this 
theme was 3.86. “Business and market” was the most highly weighted item (with an 
average weighting of 4.43) in the theme: 60.78% of the stakeholders considered it 
extremely important and 23.53% deemed it very important. “Culture, ethics and value” 
was the least weighted item (with an average weighting of 3.55) in the theme. Of the eight 
stakeholder groups, financial analysts in investment companies assigned the highest 
weighting to this theme (an average weighting of 4.29) while analysts in banks give the 
lowest weighting to this theme (an average weighting of 3.41). Among eleven themes, 
financial analysts in investment companies believed the theme of “corporate overview 






Table 6.3 Responses of the stakeholder panel on corporate overview and external 
environment 
1. Corporate overview and external environment Frequency36 Weighting Importance 




Basic information about the company (e.g., 
industry type, registered capital). 













The impacts of various external contexts on a 
company’s business, including economic, 
industrial, political, environmental, legal, and 
social contexts. 




Product or service differentiation, sales 
volume and sales revenue of each product or 
service in each market (region or country) 








Hierarchy within a company related to 
departments, offices, branches, and 
subsidiaries 
0 5 10 23 13 3.86 Very 
important 
  
 (b) Strategy and competitiveness 
Table 6.4 shows that all disclosure items under the theme of “strategy and 
competitiveness” were given similar weightings and were weighted as very important by 
the stakeholder panel. The theme of “strategy and competitiveness” was recognized as 
the second most important theme of the eleven themes, reaching an average weighting of 
4.02. There was a large variation in the weightings assigned by each stakeholder group. 
Accounting scholars assigned the highest weighting for this theme (an average of 4.38), 
whereas editors in financial media gave the lowest weighting (an average of 3.38). Of the 
eleven themes, financial managers deemed that the theme of “strategy and 








Table 6.4 Responses of the stakeholder panel on strategy and competitiveness 
2. Strategy and competitiveness Frequency Weighting Importance  
1 2 3 4 5  
2.1 Strategy Strategy statements, strategic profile, 
strategic summary and how does the 
company intend to get there? 





Competitive advantages owned by the 
company, such as talent, technology, natural 
resource, and business model. 





Market share and ranking of each product or 
service in each market (region or country) 





The company’s business model to depict its 
value creation process and the impact of 
business models on the company  





In the theme of “governance”, five disclosure items were weighted as very important, 
while “Chinese Communist Party-building” was weighted as moderately important (see 
Table 6.5). Of the surveyed stakeholders, 17.65% considered “Chinese Communist Party-
building” was unimportant and 27.45% deemed it less important. The average weighting 
of this theme was 3.76. The theme was given the highest weighting (an average of 3.97) 
by officials in government agencies. Editors in financial media assigned the lowest 





Table 6.5 Responses of the stakeholder panel on governance 
3. Governance Frequency Weighting Importance 
1 2 3 4 5 
3.1 Ownership 
structure 
Shareholders’ backgrounds and proportion 
of shareholding; the actual controller of the 
company; the history of shareholder equity 
changes 





Leadership hierarchy within a company 
related to board of directors, board of 
supervisors, senior managers; the duties of 
the company’s senior management 




Management remuneration policy and 
implementation (e.g., the stock options 
plan and how the company uses stock 
options plans to motivate management) 





Senior management’s background on 
education, career experience and 
occupational qualification 
1 3 15 14 18 3.88 Very 
important 
3.5 Warnings and 
penalties 
Warnings or penalties for companies (or 
senior management) (e.g., violation of the 
Labour Protection Act, the Environmental 
Protection Act or the Consumer Protection 
Act) 





Chinese Communist Party-building 
activities such as conferences, seminars, 
lessons, and visits.  
9 14 14 7 7 2.78 Moderately 
important 
 
(d) Risk and opportunity 
The average weighting of the theme of “risk and opportunity” was 3.64. Under this theme, 
disclosure items of “risk” and “opportunity” were all considered very important (see 
Table 6.6). Different stakeholder groups had different perceptions of the importance of 
the theme. Accounting scholars assigned an average weighting of 4.44 for this theme. 
However, officials in government agencies only gave an average weighting of 2.90. Of 












Table 6.6 Responses of the stakeholder panel on risk and opportunity 
4. Risk and opportunity Frequency Weighting Importance 
1 2 3 4 5 
4.1 Risk Internal and external risks that companies 
identify and initiatives to mitigate risk, such as 
internal audit, internal control, risk 
management, and so on. 
3 5 10 14 19 3.80 Very 
important 
4.2 Opportunity Internal and external opportunities that 
companies identify and initiatives to seize the 
opportunity 




All disclosure items belonging to the theme of “outlook” were considered very important 
by the stakeholder panel (see Table 6.7). The average weighting of this theme was 3.69. 
The theme was given the highest weighting (an average of 4.13) by accounting scholars. 
Editors assigned the lowest weighting for this theme (an average of 3.33).  
 
Table 6.7 Responses of the stakeholder panel on outlook 
5. Outlook Frequency Weighting Importance 
1 2 3 4 5 
5.1 Business 
plans 
Future business plans for marketing, 
financing, recruitment, M&A, R&D, etc.   




Various business objectives set by the 
company and initiatives to achieve the 
objectives  




Challenges and uncertainties regarding 
pursuing its business objectives and potential 
responses to critical challenges and 
uncertainties 
3 4 14 18 12 3.63 Very 
important 
 
(f) Financial capital 
The theme of “financial capital” was recognized as the most important of the eleven 
themes, reaching an average weighting of 4.04. Three disclosure items: “present financial 
KPIs”, “the linkage between past and present financial KPIs” and “shareholder relations” 
were weighted as very important while “insurance” was weighted as moderately 
important. The remaining six disclosure items were weighted as very important (see Table 
6.8). Among the eight stakeholder groups, analysts in consultant companies assigned the 
highest weighting to this theme (an average of 4.55) while the editors in financial media 
gave the lowest weighting (an average of 3.35). Among the eleven themes, three 
stakeholder groups, including analysts in consultant companies, officials in government 





Table 6.8 Responses of the stakeholder panel on financial capital 
6. Financial capital Frequency Weighting Importance 
1 2 3 4 5 
6.1 Funds from 
financing 
The pool of funds available to a 
company through financing 
2 1 11 12 25 4.12 Very 
important 
6.2 Funds from 
operations or 
investments 
The pool of funds that is available to a 
company generated through operations 
or investments 




Important financial indicators and 
analysis of the comparison with the 
target  
1 1 3 9 37 4.57 Extremely 
important 
6.4 The linkage 
between past and 
present financial 
KPIs 
Analysis of the changes in important 
financial indicators 




Relationship between the company and 
shareholders 




Relationship between the company and 
creditors (e.g., Bank) 




Relationship between the company and 
debtors (e.g., the collection of accounts 
receivable) 
0 2 11 18 20 4.10 Very 
important 
6.8 Other financial 
relations 
Relationship between the company and 
other financial stakeholders (e.g., 
financial analysts, credit ratings 
agencies) 
0 4 20 11 16 3.76 Very 
important 
6.9 Taxation The company’s information on taxation 
(e.g., tax incentives, tax rates for 
overseas subsidiaries or branches, 
company’s tax credit rating, tax 
contribution rate) 
0 3 15 16 17 3.92 Very 
important 
6.10 Insurance The purpose, coverage, amount, and 
claims relating to the insurance 
purchased by the company 
5 11 9 13 13 3.35 Moderately 
important 
 
(g) Manufacturing capital 
The average weighting of the theme of “manufacturing capital” was 3.38. All disclosure 
items belonging to this theme were considered very important by the stakeholder panel 
(see Table 6.9). Of the eight stakeholder groups, auditors assigned the highest weighting 
to this theme (an average of 4.72) and they also believed the theme of “manufacturing 
capital” had the highest importance of all the eleven themes. However, three stakeholder 
groups, including analysts in consultant companies, editors in financial media, and 




of all the eleven themes. Editors in financial media assigned the lowest weighting to this 
theme (an average of 2.50).  
 
Table 6.9 Responses of the stakeholder panel on manufacturing capital 
7. Manufacturing capital Frequency Weighting Importance 
1 2 3 4 5 
7.1 Buildings  Important buildings (e.g., factories and 
plants) used within the company 
3 8 15 11 14 3.49 Very 
important 
7.2 Equipment Important equipment (e.g., machines and 
tools) used within the company 
5 6 16 9 15 3.45 Very 
important 
7.3 Infrastructure Important infrastructure (e.g., roads, ports, 
bridges) used within the company 
5 6 15 11 14 3.45 Very 
important 
 
(h) Natural capital 
Table 6.10 shows that “pollution and pollution reduction” and “resource consumption and 
resource saving” were very important disclosure items while the importance of “extra 
environmental protection” and “overseas CSR (environmental aspects)” was moderate. 
The average weighting of the theme of “natural capital” was 3.44. Among the eight 
stakeholder groups, accounting scholars assigned the highest weighting to this theme (an 
average of 4.16) while officials in government agencies gave the lowest weighting to this 
theme (an average of 2.90). Of the eleven themes, editors in financial media indicated the 
theme of “natural capital” had the highest importance. However, analysts in investment 





Table 6.10 Responses of the stakeholder panel on natural capital 
8. Natural capital Frequency Weighting Importance 
1 2 3 4 5 
8.1 Pollution and 
pollution reduction 
Pollution caused by the company 
and initiatives to reduce pollution 





Resources consumed by the 
company and initiatives to reduce 
resource consumption 





Voluntary environmental protection 
activities 
7 13 12 7 12 3.08 Moderately 
important 
8.4 Overseas CSR 
(environmental 
aspect) 
Corporate social responsibility 
activities (environmental aspects) in 
overseas markets   
8 14 10 9 10 2.98 Moderately 
important 
 
(i) Intellectual capital 
The average weighting of the theme of “intellectual capital” was 3.69. Five disclosure 
items belonging to this theme were considered very important by the stakeholder panel, 
while the importance of two disclosure items, “marketing” and “entrepreneurial spirit” 
was moderate (see Table 6.11). Of the eight stakeholder groups, accounting scholars 
assigned the highest weighting to this theme (an average of 4.09) while auditors and 




Table 6.11 Responses of the stakeholder panel on intellectual capital 
9. Intellectual capital Frequency Weighting Importance 
1 2 3 4 5 
9.1 Management 
processes 
The processes related to the 
management of a company, such as cost 
management, and marketing 
management.  
0 4 22 13 12 3.65 Very 
important 
9.2 Brand Brand ranking, brand value, brand 
image, and brand reputation.  
0 6 18 16 11 3.63 Very 
important 
9.3 Technology  Application of various technologies 
(e.g., ERP, database, internet, e-
commerce for internal administrative 
management, marketing management, 
customer relationship management, 
supplier management, and employee 
management) 
2 5 16 13 15 3.67 Very 
important 
9.4 Research and 
development 
Research and development activities for 
new products and services creation, 
products and service upgrades.  




Patents, copyrights, and trademarks 
owned by the company 
0 6 9 10 26 4.10 Very 
important 
9.6 Marketing Marketing activities such as advertising, 
commercial sponsorship, promotions, 
social media presence, roadshows, and 
relationships with the media. 




The spirits of innovation, proactive and 
reactive abilities, changeability, 
empowerment, responsibility taking, 
risk taking, employee engagement, 
creativity, knowledge sharing; 
initiatives to spur and cultivate these 
spirits.                                 
3 11 14 10 13 3.37 Moderately 
important 
 
(g) Human capital 
In Table 6.12, there were ten disclosure items under the theme of “human capital”. Eight 
of them were considered moderately important. Three disclosure items: “employee 
equality”, “employee care” and “employee career development” were weighted below 
3.00. This theme was recognized as the least important theme of all the eleven themes by 
the stakeholder panel, only reaching an average weighting of 3.13. Four stakeholder 
groups: officials in government agencies, analysts in banks, auditors, and financial 
managers all regarded the theme of “human capital” as the least important theme of the 






Table 6.12 Responses of the stakeholder panel on human capital 
10. Human capital Frequency Weighting Importance 
1 2 3 4 5 




Employee remuneration policy and 
implementation (e.g., the comparison with 
the average wage of companies in the same 
industry or in the same region) 




Equality for disabilities, females and 
ethnic minorities in recruitment, and 
remuneration. 




Employee care activities, such as 
providing counselling for employees who 
have personal crises, holding sports 
competitions for employees, etc. 





Employee turnover and the impact of 
turnover of important employees on the 
company 





Initiatives that support career development 
amongst employees 
5 13 19 8 6 2.94 Moderately 
important 
10.7 Employee 
health and safety 
Initiatives to ensure occupational health 
and safety 





Training or education programs provided 
by the company to employees 




Information on academic and vocational 
qualifications held by employees 




Information on employees in various 
positions (e.g., technicians) and 
employees of various ages 
1 5 21 9 15 3.63 Very 
important 
 
(k) Social and relational capital 
The average weighting of the theme of “social and relational capital” was 3.32. Six 
disclosure items belonging to this theme were considered very items by the stakeholder 
panel while the other six disclosure items were rated as being of moderate importance 
(see Table 6.13).  Among eight stakeholder groups, accounting scholars gave the highest 
weighting to this theme (an average of 3.90) while the financial managers offered the 






Table 6.13 Responses of the stakeholder panel on social and relational capital 
11. Social and relational capital Frequency Weighting Importance 
1 2 3 4 5 
11.1 Competitor 
relations 
Relationships between the company and 
its competitors, such as anti-competitive 
initiatives 




Relationships between the company and 
its customers, such as initiatives to 
increase customer satisfaction, and 
customer loyalty.  




Business activities with other companies 
or non-governmental organisations, such 
as joint ventures, mergers or acquisitions, 
marketing, strategic alliances, and R&D. 
0 2 16 15 18 3.96 Very 
important 
11.4 Supplier or 
distributor 
relations 
Relationships between the company and 
its suppliers or distributors, such as 
policies for suppliers or distributors, 
support for suppliers or distributors, 
identification of qualified suppliers and 
distributors 




Relationships between the company and 
government, such as strategic cooperation  
1 8 12 15 15 3.69 Very 
important 
11.6 Society & 
community 
support 
Various types of voluntary services 
provided by the company to society and 
communities 
4 15 18 8 6 2.94 Moderately 
important 
11.7 Product or 
service quality 
Initiatives to ensure consumer safety, 
health and privacy 




Relationships between the company and 
non-profit organisations (e.g., 
environmental NGOs) 
7 14 16 7 7 2.86 Moderately 
important 
11.9 Media 
relations             
Relationships between the company and 
the media 





Relationships between the company and 
industry association 









Corporate social responsibility activities 
(social aspects) in overseas markets 
4 14 16 7 10 3.10 Moderately 
important 
 
Overall, the theme of “financial capital” was the most important and the theme of “human 
capital” was the least important. From the perception of each stakeholder group, the theme 
of “corporate overview and external environment” was regarded as the most important 
theme among all eleven themes by financial analysts in investment companies. Financial 
managers believed the theme of “strategy and competitiveness” was the most important 




importance. Analysts in consultant companies, officials in government agencies, and 
analysts in banks reached a consensus that the theme of “financial capital” was the most 
important. Officials in government agencies, analysts in banks, auditors and financial 
managers all agreed that the theme of “human capital” was the least important of all 
eleven themes. Stakeholder groups had varied perceptions about the importance of the 
themes of “manufacturing capital” and “natural capital”. Analysts in consultant 
companies, editors in financial media and accounting scholars deemed that 
“manufacturing capital” was the least important of all eleven themes but auditors believed 
had the highest importance. In terms of the theme of “natural capital”, editors in financial 
media believed this was the most important theme while analysts in investment 
companies saw it as the least important.  
 
In this second-round questionnaire survey, certain stakeholder groups weighted the 
disclosure items quite differently than others. This confirms the notion that the 
information expectations of different stakeholder groups are dissimilar; the information 
expectations of different stakeholder groups are even sometimes conflicting (Chen & 
Roberts, 2010; Dong et al., 2014; Huang & Kung, 2010). In this circumstance, 
organisations need to balance these conflicting expectations in IR, whether from the 
ethical perspective of stakeholder theory or the managerial perspective of stakeholder 
theory (Azizul Islam & Deegan, 2008; Deegan & Blomquist, 2006; Dong et al., 2014; 
Huang & Kung, 2010). This study also finds that accounting scholars seemed to be more 
sensitive to IR disclosures while editors in financial media were less sensitive compared 
with other stakeholder groups. Identifying stakeholder groups that are more sensitive to 
IR disclosures is in line with legitimacy theory. 
 
6.5 Chapter summary 
A final IR disclosure index is established in this chapter. In order to achieve this, two-
round questionnaire surveys are conducted. A total of 51 stakeholders, consisting of 
scholars in accounting, editors in financial media, financial managers, financial analysts 
in banks, auditors, officials in government agencies in charge of supervising Chinese 
companies, industry analysts in consultant companies and financial analysts in investment 
companies, constitute the stakeholders’ panel. With the establishment of a Chinese IR 





In the first-round questionnaire survey, the preliminary list of IR disclosure items 
constructed in Chapter four, containing a total of 54 disclosure items, is checked, 
validated, and revised by stakeholders. Thus, the final list of disclosure items contains 68 
IR disclosure items in eleven themes. The second-round questionnaire survey is to 
identify the weighting of each IR disclosure item. The responses (weightings) from the 
participants for each IR disclosure item are summed and the total is divided by 51 to 
obtain an average score that indicates the weighting of the item. Thus, the final IR 
disclosure index is established and is presented in Table 6.14.  
 
The guiding principles of the IIRF have been implicitly or explicitly incorporated in the 
list of IR disclosure items (Stent & Dowler, 2015). For instance, “strategic focus and 
future orientation” is evident in the themes of “strategy and competitiveness” and “future 
outlooks”; “stakeholder relationships” are explicitly incorporated in some themes like 
“social and relational capital”. All the disclosure items, both positive and negative 
information, contained in the IR disclosure index, are scrutinized by Chinese stakeholders 
and weighted as at least moderately important, meeting the IIRF’s guiding principles of 
“materiality” and “reliability and completeness”, which focus on including all material 
information in integrated reports (IIRC, 2013). The IR disclosure index is adopted in 
Chapter seven to undertake content analysis to corporate reports published by Chinese 
listed firms to assess IR disclosure practices by Chinese companies for the years 2014-
2018, thus enabling comparison the IR disclosure practices between years and between 
firms. This is in line with the guiding principle of “consistency and comparability” in the 
IIRF (IIRC, 2013). According to Stent and Dowler (2015), the guideline principle of 
conciseness is difficult to achieve in lists of IR disclosure items. Thus, an additional 
assessment for “conciseness” of corporate reports is carried out in Chapter seven. Also, 
“connectivity of information” can only be achieved implicitly in the list of IR disclosure 
items (Stent & Dowler, 2015), thus failing to highlight the essence of IR (Eccles et al., 
2015a). Therefore, the “connectivity of information” is particularly emphasized and 
incorporated in the quality criteria of the scoring system (see Chapter five).  
 
From a theoretical point of view, the features of some theories, such as stakeholder, 
legitimacy, institutional, agency and signalling theories, are explicitly or implicitly 
reflected in Chinese stakeholders’ views. Moreover, stakeholder theory is supported 
because with the construction of the IR disclosure index it is found that the information 




is also supported as a result of identifying which stakeholder group is more sensitive to 




Table 6.14 Final IR index 
1. Corporate overview & external environment Weighting 
1.1 Basic information about the company 4.31 
1.2 Mission and vision 3.73 
1.3 Culture, ethics and value 3.55 
1.4 Operating context 3.92 
1.5 Business and market 4.43 
1.6 Company history 3.61 
1.7 Operational structure 3.86 
2. Strategy and competitiveness Weighting 
2.1 Strategy 4.04 
2.2 Core competitiveness  4.06 
2.3 Competitive landscape 3.98 
2.4 Business model 4.18 
3. Governance Weighting 
3.1 Ownership structure 4.18 
3.2 Leadership structure 4.14 
3.3 Management remuneration 3.98 
3.4 Management experience and capability 3.88 
3.5 Warnings and penalties 3.75 
3.6 Chinese Communist Party-building 2.78 
4. Risk and opportunity Weighting 
4.1 Risk 3.80 
4.2 Opportunity 3.61 
5. Outlook Weighting 
5.1 Business plans 3.78 
5.2 Business objectives 3.80 
5.3 Challenges & uncertainties 3.63 
6. Financial capital Weighting 
6.1 Funds from financing 4.12 
6.2 Funds from operations or investments 4.16 
6.3 Present financial KPIs 4.57 
6.4 The linkage between past and present financial KPIs 4.51 
6.5 Shareholder relations 4.27 
6.6 Creditor relations 4.18 
6.7 Debtor relations 4.10 
6.8 Other financial relations 3.76 
6.9 Taxation 3.92 





Table 6.14 (Continued) 
7. Manufacturing capital Weighting 
7.1 Buildings  3.49 
7.2 Equipment 3.45 
7.3 Infrastructure 3.45 
8. Natural capital Weighting 
8.1 Pollution and pollution reduction 3.88 
8.2 Resource consumption and resource saving 3.67 
8.3 Extra environmental protection 3.08 
8.4 Overseas CSR (environmental aspects) 2.98 
9. Intellectual capital Weighting 
9.1 Management processes 3.65 
9.2 Brand 3.63 
9.3 Technology  3.67 
9.4 Research and development 4.08 
9.5 Intellectual property 4.10 
9.6 Marketing 3.33 
9.7 Entrepreneurial spirit 3.37 
10. Human capital Weighting 
10.1 Recruitment 3.06 
10.2 Employee remuneration 3.53 
10.3 Employee equality 2.73 
10.4 Employee care 2.78 
10.5 Resignations, layoffs and dismissals 3.22 
10.6 Employee career development 2.94 
10.7 Employee health and safety 3.20 
10.8 Employee training and education 3.08 
10.9 Employee qualifications 3.25 
10.10 Employee allocation 3.63 
11. Social and relational capital Weighting 
11.1 Competitor relations 3.53 
11.2 Customer relations 3.69 
11.3 Business collaborations 3.96 
11.4 Supplier or distributor relations 3.78 
11.5 Government relations 3.69 
11.6 Society & community support 2.94 
11.7 Product or service quality 3.94 
11.8 NGO relations 2.86 
11.9 Media relations             2.88 
11.10 Industry association relations 2.78 
11.11 Anti-corruption 3.16 




7 CHAPTER SEVEN 
IR DISCLOSURE PRACTICES BY CHINESE 
COMPANIES 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the IR disclosure practices (the extent and quality of IR 
disclosures37) of Chinese listed companies using content analysis of five years (2014-
2018) corporate reports (annual reports and stand-alone sustainability reports) from 100 
top A-share Chinese listed companies (see Appendix K). The IR disclosure index 
(designed in Chapter six) is used as a basis for the content analysis. This chapter reports 
the extent and quality of IR disclosures of the Chinese companies in terms of: items, 
themes, companies, industry type, listing status, and ownership. The chapter is organized 
in the following sections.  
 
Section 7.2 shows the extent and quality of IR disclosures by items. Section 7.3 presents 
the extent and quality of IR disclosures by themes. Section 7.4 describes the extent and 
quality of IR disclosures by companies. Section 7.5 presents the trend of extent and 
quality of IR disclosures. Sections 7.6 and 7.7 report the extent and quality of IR 
disclosure by listing status and ownership, respectively. Section 7.8 provides interpretive 
comments. Finally section 7.9 summarizes the chapter. 
 
7.2 IR disclosure practices by items 
Extent and Quality 
Details of the extent and quality of IR disclosures38 are shown in Appendix L. From 2014 
to 2018, the extent of disclosure of 48 items (71% of total items) improves. There is only 
a slight decline in the extent of disclosure for 5 items and the remaining 15 items keep 
the same extent of disclosure. Over the five-year period, the extent of disclosure related 
to “business model” shows the highest improvement, with an increase of 46% (98%-52%) 
while that for “warnings and penalties” shows the greatest decrease of 16% (78%-62%). 
There is a clear upward trend in the number of IR items presenting the highest extent of 
disclosure from 2014 to 2018 and the number of IR items with the lowest extent of 
 
37 Refer to Appendix J for calculation of the extent and quality of IR disclosures. 
38 “The extent of IR disclosures” here is a normalized score ranging from 0 to 1, referring to the extent of 
“one item of all firms in one year” and “the quality of IR disclosures” here is also a normalized score 





disclosure decreases. The results indicate that the extent of disclosure of IR items 
improves over the five-year period.   
 
It can be seen that the quality of disclosure of 55 items (81% of total items) improves 
from 2014 to 2018, although the quality of disclosure of the other 13 items decreases 
slightly. The quality of disclosure of “business model” shows the highest improvement 
with an increase of 0.3900 (0.5850-0.1950) over the five-year period. In addition, the 
quality of disclosure of “Chinese Communist Party-building” also substantially improves, 
with an increase of 0.3300 (0.3650-0.0350). However, because the Chinese Communist 
Party-building was incorporated into the Chinese listed company governance guidelines 
in 2018, it is not surprising to see an increase in its quality of disclosure. Seven items: 
“business and market”; “the linkage between past and present financial KPIs”; 
“operational structure”; “ownership structure”; “management experience and capability”; 
“society and community support”; and “funds from financing” show the highest quality 
of disclosures in 2014, achieving a quality score of over 0.800. In 2018, the number of 
items that shows the highest quality of disclosures increases to 9 with the addition of three 
new items (“shareholder relations”, “operating context” and “employee allocation”) while 
“ownership structure” no longer shows the highest quality of disclosure. In 2014 the 
number of items whose quality score exceeded 0.500 is 34, accounting for half of the total 
items. In comparison, the number reached 41 (60% of total items) in 2018. In addition, 
the number of disclosure items whose quality scores are lower than 0.200 rapidly reduces 
from 14 to 8 over the five years analyzed. However, there are still two disclosure items 
(“insurance” and “overseas CSR (environmental aspects)”) that in 2018 attain a quality 
score below 0.100.  
 
By combining the data on the extent and quality of IR disclosure items, “business and 
market” has the best disclosure practices (both in extent and quality) during the period 
2014-2017, while the disclosure practices for “management experience and capability” 
are the highest in 2018. However, the disclosure practices for “overseas CSR 
(environmental aspects)” are the lowest of all items in each sample year. In addition, 
“business model” is the item whose disclosure practices show the greatest enhancement 






The information gap refers to the gap between the quality of disclosure of an item and 
stakeholders’ expectations of it (An et al., 2015; Hooks et al., 2002). By comparing the 
quality score of an item and its importance (see Appendix L) (An et al., 2015), it can be 
seen that there is an information gap39 between the quality of disclosure of several IR 
items and the perceptions of Chinese stakeholders for the importance of these IR items40. 
According to the 2018 dataset, the quality of disclosure of 10 items exceeds stakeholders’ 
expectations while for 27 items the quality of disclosure is consistent with stakeholders’ 
expectations. However, there are 31 items (45% of the total) which fail to meet Chinese 
stakeholders’ expectations, indicating that there is an information gap between the 
disclosure practices of these 31 IR items by Chinese companies and the views of Chinese 
stakeholders on the importance of these IR items.  
 
7.3 IR disclosure practices by themes 
A total of 68 items are categorized under 11 themes. Table 7.1 shows the extent and 
quality of IR disclosures in terms of the 11 themes. Across five years, “outlook” has the 
highest extent of IR disclosures while “manufacturing capital” has the lowest extent of 
IR disclosures among the 11 themes. There is an increasing trend for all IR themes in 
terms of the extent of disclosures from 2014 to 2018. “Strategy and competitiveness” and 
“intellectual capital” have the highest increasing trend in the extent of disclosures whereas 
“financial capital” and “outlook” have the lowest increasing trend.  
 
“Corporate overview and external environment” has the highest quality of IR disclosures 
of the 11 themes in each sample year. In comparison, “manufacturing capital” has the 
lowest quality score in each sample year. The quality of disclosure of all 11 themes shows 
an increasing trend from 2014 to 2018. Two themes (“strategy and competitiveness” and 
“intellectual capital”) have the highest increasing trend in the quality of disclosures while 
the other 9 themes show only a slight increase. 
  
 
39 A quality score of below 0.2000 corresponds to an unimportant item; a quality score of 0.2 to 0.4 
corresponds to an item of minor importance; a quality score of 0.4 to 0.6 signifies a moderately important 
item; a quality score of 0.6 to 0.8 indicates a very important item; and a quality score of 0.8 to 1.0 
corresponds to the extremely important item. For instance, if an item is seen as a moderately important item 
and if its quality score is below 0.4, then its quality of disclosure is below the stakeholders’ expectations; 
if its quality score is between 0.4 and 0.6, then its quality of disclosure is consistent with the stakeholders’ 
expectations; if its quality score is above 0.6, then its quality of disclosure is above the stakeholders’ 
expectations. 




Table 7.1 Extent and quality of IR disclosures for each theme 
Theme 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Extent Quality Extent Quality Extent Quality Extent Quality Extent Quality 
Corporate overview 
& external 
environment 0.7886 0.7082 0.7957 0.7317 0.8029 0.7404 0.8129 0.7514 0.8829 0.7589 
Strategy and 
competitiveness 0.7750 0.4272 0.9000 0.5256 0.9025 0.5418 0.9150 0.5588 0.9625 0.5676 
Intellectual capital 0.7057 0.4425 0.7357 0.4746 0.7486 0.4842 0.7700 0.5080 0.8786 0.5688 
Manufacturing 
capital 0.1333 0.0917 0.1600 0.1286 0.1700 0.1336 0.1800 0.1419 0.2300 0.1703 
Human capital 0.7820 0.4988 0.7980 0.5138 0.7940 0.5237 0.8060 0.5338 0.8450 0.5613 
Natural capital 0.5775 0.3971 0.5825 0.4048 0.6025 0.4344 0.6150 0.4442 0.6375 0.4822 
Financial capital 0.7250 0.5385 0.7580 0.5753 0.7630 0.5823 0.7670 0.5832 0.7560 0.5763 
Social and relational 
capital 0.6825 0.4112 0.6775 0.4138 0.7133 0.4423 0.7383 0.4606 0.7558 0.4946 
Governance 0.8100 0.5718 0.7833 0.5636 0.7933 0.5724 0.8250 0.5927 0.8817 0.6171 
Risk and opportunity 0.8800 0.5538 0.8950 0.5599 0.9150 0.5833 0.9200 0.5881 0.9500 0.5987 
Outlook 0.9533 0.5611 0.9467 0.5644 0.9400 0.5646 0.9367 0.5749 0.9767 0.5739 
 
7.4 IR disclosure practices by companies 
Appendix M summarizes the IR disclosure practices of each sample company from 2014 
to 2018. In terms of the extent of disclosures, no companies disclose all the IR items in 
each sample year. In 2014, the extent of overall IR disclosures is 0.72 (=49.01/68), 
suggesting that the average number of IR items disclosed per company is 49 out of a 
maximum possible of 68 items. The lowest extent of overall IR disclosures is 0.50 
(=34/68) while the highest extent of overall IR disclosures is 0.88 (60/68). The extent of 
overall IR disclosures, the lowest extent of overall IR disclosures, and the highest extent 
of overall IR disclosures increase gradually year by year. In 2018, the three indicators are 
0.80, 0.62 and 0.93, respectively. By comparing the data for 2014 and 2018, it is apparent 
that the extent of IR disclosures of 90 companies (90% of the total) has improved and a 
decrease has occurred for the remaining 10 companies.  
 
In terms of the quality of IR disclosure, Appendix M shows the overall IR disclosure 
quality score exceeds 0.5000 from 2015 to 2018, indicating that the recent quality of 
overall IR disclosures by Chinese companies is good in general. In 2014, the overall IR 
disclosure quality score is 0.4839 and this steadily increases year by year. In 2018, the 
overall IR disclosure quality score reaches 0.5548. In 2014, there are 41 companies (41%) 
scoring over 0.5000 for the quality of overall IR disclosures. In 2018, the number of 




datasets, it is apparent that the quality of IR disclosures of 91 companies (91% of the total) 
is enhanced and a slight decrease occurs for the remaining 9 companies.  
 
7.5 IR disclosure practices by trend 
Figure 7.1 shows an upward trend in the extent of overall IR disclosures from 2014 to 
2018, with an increase from 49.01 to 54.62 over 5 years. To compare the extent of overall 
IR disclosures between years, ANOVA is considered. One-way ANOVA assumes 
normality and homogeneity of variance (Warner, 2012). Firstly, the results of the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test reject the assumption of normality. Secondly, the tests of 
homogeneity of variances for the extent of overall IR disclosures meet the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance (p>.10). Considering that the one-way ANOVA tolerates 
violations of its normality assumption reasonably well, one-way ANOVA is applied for 
the extent of overall IR disclosures.  
 
The results of the one-way ANOVA suggest that the increase in the extent of overall IR 
disclosures between years is significant (F=19.210, p=.000)41. The Tukey post-hoc test 
indicates that the increases between 2014 and 2016, 2014 and 2017, 2014 and 2018, 2015 
and 2018, 2016 and 2018, and 2017 and 2018 are significant (p<.05). However, there is 
no significant increase between 2014 and 2015, 2015 and 2016, 2016 and 2017, and 2015 
and 2017.  
 
 
41 A robustness test (the Kruskal-Wallis test, which does not require an assumption of normality (Liu, 2014)) 
is also used for the extent of overall IR disclosures. The results of the Kruskal-Wallis test are consistent 





Figure 7.1 Trend in the extent of overall IR disclosures from 2014 to 2018 
Source: Author’s design 
 
Figure 7.2 shows that the quality of overall IR disclosures improves from 2014 to 2018, 
with an increase in disclosure quality score from 0.4839 to 0.5548 over 5 years. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows the quality of overall IR disclosures meet the 
assumption of normality (p>.10). Additionally, tests of homogeneity of variances for the 
quality of overall IR disclosure meet the assumption of homogeneity of variance (p>.10).  
 
One-way ANOVA indicates that the increase of the quality of overall IR disclosures 
between years is significant (F=18.093, p = .000). The Tukey post-hoc test indicates that 
the increases in the quality of overall IR disclosures between 2014 and 2016, 2014 and 
2017, 2014 and 2018, 2015 and 2017, 2015 and 2018, and 2016 and 2018 are significant 
(p<.05). However, there is no significant increase between 2014 and 2015, 2015 and 2016, 
2016 and 2017, and 2017 and 2018.  
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Figure 7.2 Trend in the quality of overall IR disclosures from 2014 to 2018 
Source: Author’s design 
 
The upward trend in the quality of overall IR disclosures is very consistent with the extent 
of overall IR disclosures. The gradual improvement in IR disclosure practices can be 
explained using stakeholder theory; that is, the gap between the firms’ actual IR 
disclosure practices and stakeholders’ expectations causes pressure to be exerted by 
stakeholders, and firms then gradually enhance their IR disclosure practices to respond to 
their stakeholders’ concerns in order to reduce transparency and accountability pressures 
and maintain legitimacy (Marrone & Oliva, 2019; Nicolò et al., 2020a). The gradual 
improvement in IR disclosure practices also reflects the processes of legitimation and 
institutionalisation of IR practices by Chinese firms. 
 
7.6 IR disclosure practices by listing status 
Listing status can be seen as a notable feature in the Chinese stock market (An, 2012; Liu, 
2014). Since 19 April 1993, Chinese firms have been allowed to simultaneously issue A-
shares on mainland Chinese stock markets and H-shares on the HKSE (Li et al., 2015). 
Compared to solo-listed A-share firms, it is generally believed that dual-listed A- and H-
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share firms have resource advantages, abide by stricter listing rules, are subject to an 
environment of stronger investor protection, and face more mature investors (An, 2012; 
Li et al., 2015). However, between 1993 and 2007, mainland Chinese investors could not 
access H‐shares and foreign investors could not access A‐shares. Between 2007 and 2014, 
mainland Chinese investors were allowed to trade H-shares. Only after 17 November 
2014, were foreign investors allowed to trade A‐shares (Luo et al., 2020). Some studies 
have found that dual-listed A- and H-share firms outperformed their solo-listed A-share 
peers in reporting disclosures before 2014 (An, 2012; Liu, 2014). Thus, understanding 
the IR disclosure practices of dual-listed A- and H-share firms after 2014 and comparing 
IR disclosure practices between dual-listed A and H-share firms and their solo-listed A-
share counterparts is important and contributes to the extant literature. The sample 
companies comprise 224 dual-listed A- and H-share companies and 276 solo-listed A-
share companies. The disclosure practices of the dual-listed companies and solo-listed 
companies are shown in Table 7.2, which shows that both the extent of disclosure and the 
quality of disclosures of companies that are dual-listed are better than those of companies 
that are solo-listed.  
 




2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Average 
Solo-listed           Extent 0.7160 0.7274 0.7337 0.7435 0.7745 0.7390 
Quality 0.4741 0.4953 0.5059 0.5131 0.5286 0.5029 
Dual-listed           Extent 0.7272 0.7503 0.7669 0.7874 0.8370 0.7748 
Quality 0.4974 0.5215 0.5377 0.5564 0.5856 0.5406 
Extent Z=-5.490 P=0.000 
Quality T=-6.508 P=0.000 
  
Based on the results of normality tests for the dual-listed A- and H-share company group 
and the solo-listed A-share company group, a t-test for the 5-year average quality of 
overall IR disclosures is carried out. In addition, the 5-year average extent of overall IR 
disclosures are tested using the Mann-Whitney test. The dual-listed A- and H-share 
companies show overwhelming advantages in releasing IR disclosures, compared with 
solo-listed A-share companies. Specifically, the 5-year average extent and quality of 
overall IR disclosures by dual-listed A- and H-share companies are significantly higher 





The distinction between the dual-listed A- and H-share company group and the solo-listed 
A-share company group can be explained using institutional theory. In order to respond 
to institutional pressure, companies tend to employ similar patterns in disclosing 
information (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Firms listing on the same stock exchange 
generally have similar disclosure practices and vary from firms listing on other stock 
exchanges. If a firm does not adopt similar disclosure practices to others listing on the 
same stock exchange, it would be perceived as a failure of the firm by its stakeholders, 
which endangers the relationship between the firm and its stakeholders and negatively 
affects the company’s legitimacy. Thus, the difference in IR disclosure practices between 
A and A+H shares is significant. This finding provides evidence for institutional theory.  
 
7.7 IR disclosure practices by ownership 
State-owned shares are another noteworthy feature in the Chinese stock market (An, 2012; 
Liu, 2014). For instance, the Chinese government controls approximately 50% of all the 
shares of Chinese listed companies (Keller, 2017). State-owned firms dominate China’s 
economy and are seen as social enterprises—enterprises that aim to fulfil social goals 
using business as an approach (Lin et al., 2020). Chinese state-owned firms, integrating 
both non-financial and financial logics, are created to balance the expectations of various 
stakeholder groups, which is in line with one of the spirits of IR—embracing all 
stakeholders including ‘employees, customers, suppliers, business partners, local 
communities, legislators, regulators and policymakers’ (IIRC, 2013, p. 4; Lin et al., 2020). 
Thus, understanding the IR disclosure practices of Chinese state-owned firms and 
comparing IR disclosure practices between state-owned firms and their non-state-owned 
peers is necessary and complements the existing literature. The sample companies consist 
of 95 non-state-owned companies and 405 state-owned companies. The disclosure 
practices of these two groups are shown in Table 7.3. Both the extent of IR disclosures 
(except in 2014) and the quality of IR disclosures of state-owned companies are better 















2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Average 
NON-SOE           Extent 0.7283 0.7345 0.7368 0.7515 0.7895 0.7481 
Quality 0.4773 0.4988 0.5041 0.5130 0.5364 0.5059 
SOE                     Extent 0.7190 0.7382 0.7518 0.7665 0.8065 0.7564 
Quality 0.4854 0.5087 0.5244 0.5377 0.5591 0.5231 
Extent Z=-1.409 P=0.159 
Quality Z=-2.276 P=0.023 
 
After carrying out normality tests for the two groups, the Mann-Whitney test reveals that 
the 5-year average quality of overall IR disclosures by state-owned companies is 
significantly higher than those by non-state-owned companies. Some researchers believe 
that the Chinese government encourages state-owned companies to increase the level of 
information disclosures in order to exhibit a good image of corporate governance (Xiao 
& Yuan, 2007; Wang et al., 2008); and the Chinese government also pressures state-
owned companies to become role-models for non-state-owned companies in reporting 
information, considering state-owned companies are likely to be scrutinized more rigidly 
by the public (Tagesson et al., 2009). Moreover, according to Nicolò et al. (2020a), state-
owned companies have more responsibilities in terms of the need to “create and deliver 
public value for citizens” (p.2), and they face greater pressure compared with their non-
state-owned counterparts in discharging accountability to the public, especially in the 
non-financial aspects. This finding supports legitimacy theory. 
 
7.8 Discussion 
7.8.1 IR disclosure practices in China 
The results of the formal content analysis indicate that many Chinese companies have 
already used three forms of IR disclosures: monetary, numerical and, narrative 
descriptions, in their corporate reports. However, IR disclosure practices by some Chinese 
companies are at a low level, and specifically, some sample companies tend to describe 
items using qualitative description rather than quantitative description, which supports 
the findings of previous studies (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018b). This is especially so for negative 
information; although many companies have already released this kind of information, it 
is usually described using a qualitative format, which is consistent with Casonato et al.’s 




disclose…negative information in a qualitative format” (p. 150). Considering there has 
not been a constructed or generally accepted IR framework in current China so far, the 
low IR disclosure practices of some firms are understandable. Also, according to An 
(2012), the small size of the corporate reports for some companies causes low IR 
disclosure practices by those companies.  
 
A high IR disclosure practice represents a more transparent firm, meaning the firm faces 
the possible risk of higher indirect costs, including political, litigation, and proprietary 
costs (Trucco, 2015). Firms may hesitate to pursue higher IR disclosure practices to avoid 
potential penalization, political attacks, and the release of proprietary information to 
competitors (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018b; Trucco, 2015). Furthermore, traditional Chinese 
culture may amplify Chinese firms concerns about the possible negative effect of high IR 
disclosure practices. Because of the impact of traditional Chinese culture, Chinese listed 
companies may be very reluctant to provide certain types of information that are regarded 
as sensitive (Qu & Leung, 2006). In the traditional Chinese cultural environment, which 
features conservatism and secrecy, transparency of information disclosure by corporates 
is difficult to achieve (Qu & Leung, 2006). Thus, the impact of traditional Chinese culture 
may cause low IR disclosure practices in some Chinese firms. However, with the 
economic development of China, China’s culture is changing and Chinese listed 
companies are becoming more willing to gradually improve their transparency (Qu & 
Leung, 2006), as shown by the gradual improvement in IR disclosure practices of the 
sample companies in this study. 
 
In addition to the results of content analysis, there are two other interesting findings. 
Firstly, no company incorporates its sustainability report into its annual report. The IIRC 
(2013) believes that an integrated report can be a stand-alone report or a part of another 
report. Eccles and Saltzman (2011) contend that “an integrated report is a single document” 
(p.27). According to Paternostro (2013), there are three approaches to facilitating IR 
practices: weak aggregation, strong aggregation, and the best aggregation. The weak 
aggregation approach involves a simple combination of financial reports and 
sustainability reports. In this approach, financial reports may be seen as the primary 
reports and sustainability reports as the secondary reports. The primary report and the 
secondary report can be differentiated easily in an integrated report. The strong 
aggregation approach contends that in an integrated report, the boundary between the 




financial reports and sustainability reports is balanced. However, in this approach, the 
information provided by financial reports and sustainability reports can be identified and 
distinguished easily. Under the best aggregation approach, the information provided by 
financial reports and sustainability reports is completely integrated and the boundary 
between the two types of information cannot be recognized. Based on the above 
arguments, separation between the annual report and the sustainability report would not 
be conducive to improvement in the IR disclosure practices of Chinese companies. Thus, 
Chinese firms may attempt to apply the aforementioned three approaches gradually to 
facilitate their IR disclosure practices. Secondly, no company mentions the term 
‘integrated reporting’ in their annual reports and sustainability reports or states that they 
prepare their corporate reports in accordance with the IIRF, indicating either that Chinese 
companies do not see their corporate reports as integrated reports, or that the concept of 
IR has not diffused widely among Chinese firms yet. 
 
7.8.2 Chinese IR disclosure practices in the international level 
A comparison of the findings of the current study with those of other countries is essential 
to ascertain the status of IR practices in China in the international arena. In terms of 
disclosure extent, Zhou et al. (2017) examine the 4-year average (2009-2012) extent of 
IR disclosures by all Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) listed companies, which is 
0.2027 (6.283/31). Pavlopoulos et al. (2017) find that the 5-year average (2011 to 2015) 
extent of IR disclosures by international companies reached 0.702. Kılıç and Kuzey 
(2018a) measure the extent of IR disclosures by the 100 largest companies on the Istanbul 
Stock Exchange (BIST) in 2015, which is 0.63. Sofian and Dumitru (2017) investigate 
European listed financial companies and obtain their extent of IR disclosure in 2015, 
which is 0.7382. In Bangladesh, the extent of IR disclosures by the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange 30 companies is 0.6148 in 2016 (Nakib & Dey, 2018). Nicolò et al. (2019) find 
that the extent of IR disclosures of international SOEs in 2016 reached 0.65. In 
comparison, the present research, the 5-year average (2014-2018) extent of IR disclosures 
by Chinese listed companies is 0.7548 and their extent of IR disclosures in 2015 and 2016 
is 0.7375 and 0.7490 respectively. The findings indicate that the extent of IR disclosures 
by Chinese listed companies is higher than those by South African listed companies, 
Bangladeshi listed companies, Turkish listed companies and the worldwide average level. 
However, it also shows that the extent of IR disclosures by Chinese listed companies is 





In terms of disclosure quality, Lee and Yeo (2016) find the 4-year average (2010-2013) 
quality of IR disclosures by all JSE listed companies is 0.4650 (93/200). In a study 
conducted by Perez (2018), the 3-year average (2013-2015) quality of IR disclosures by 
South African listed companies is 0.4750. Similarly, Pistoni et al. (2018) show that the 
quality of IR disclosure by international companies in 2014 is 0.5816 (29.08/50). In the 
present study, the 5-year average (2014-2018) quality of IR disclosures by Chinese listed 
companies is 0.5198 and their quality of IR disclosures in 2014 is 0.4839. The results of 
the comparison suggest that the quality of IR disclosures in China is higher than those in 
some countries such as South Africa, but it has not reached the worldwide average level. 
 
7.8.3 Conciseness and readability 
The IIRF (IIRC, 2013, p.5) highlights that “an integrated report should be concise.” One 
of the purposes of IR is to avoid redundant information (Zhou et al., 2017). Drawing on 
prior studies by De Franco et al. (2015) and Li (2008), Melloni et al. (2017) believe that 
conciseness can be captured by the length of the corporate report. Many researchers have 
used the number of pages in integrated reports to proxy their conciseness (Pavlopoulos et 
al., 2019; Nicolò et al., 2020a; Tirado-Valencia et al., 2019). Tirado-Valencia et al. (2019) 
find that the 5-year (2013 to 2017) average number of pages in integrated reports released 
by 17 state-owned international companies is 188. In a study by Pavlopoulos et al. (2019), 
the 5-year (2011 to 2015) average number of pages in integrated reports released by 82 
international companies is approximately 131 pages. Nicolò et al. (2020a) find that the 
average number of pages in integrated reports produced by 34 European state-owned 
companies for the year 2016 is 206.65; thus, the researchers believe these corporate 
reports are concise. Zinsou (2018) find that the average number of pages in integrated 
reports by French listed companies is 347. Diverging from prior results observed by 
different scholars, the current study demonstrates that the number of pages in corporate 
reports disclosed by Chinese companies is increasing gradually year by year, from 282 to 
340, indicating that the conciseness of corporate reports is on a downward trend. 
Moreover, the 5-year (2014 to 2018) average number of pages is 305 (see Table 7.4). One 
explanation for the downward trend is that the Chinese companies have been trying to 
cover more information in their corporate reports in order to achieve completeness 





One of the aims of IR is to facilitate the communication with different stakeholders; thus, 
the readability of integrated reports strongly influences the value of these reports for users 
(Du Toit, 2017; Gerwanski et al., 2019). Management can use the readability of IR to 
demonstrate they are behaving in stakeholders’ best interests (Gerwanski et al., 2019).  
The Fog index is a commonly used approach to measuring readability (Melloni et al., 
2017). The formula for calculating the Fog index is 𝐹𝑜𝑔 = (𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 +
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠) × 0.4. The index shows the number of years of formal 
education required for a reader of average intelligence to read the text once and 
understand that piece of writing. In the formula, the words per sentence and the 
percentage of complex words are measured 42  using the Chinese Readability Index 
Explorer43. The relationship between the Fog index and readability is as follows: Fog ≥ 
18 (unreadable); 14–18 (difficult); 12–14 (ideal); 10–12 (acceptable); and 8–10 (childish) 
(Melloni et al., 2017; Caglio et al., 2019; Roman et al., 2019). Melloni et al. (2017) test 
the readability of integrated reports released by IIRC Pilot Programme companies in 2013 
and 2014; the researchers obtain a Fog index value of 16.13. Stone and Lodhia (2019) 
find that the Fog index values of integrated reports of IIRC examples database companies 
in 2014 and 2015 are 16.1 and 15.6, respectively. Gerwanski et al. (2019) investigate the 
readability of the integrated reports of 352 cross‐national sample companies between 
2013 and 2016; the average Fog index vale across the 4 years is 17.2.  Roman et al. (2019) 
find that the Fog index value of the integrated reports of 29 international companies in 
2017 is 10.95. In addition, Barth et al. (2017) find the average Fog index value of 
integrated reports of South African sample companies across the 4 years (2011 to 2017) 
is 16.34. Similarly, Caglio et al. (2019) find that the Fog index value of integrated reports 
of South African sample companies in 2015 is 23.34. In comparison, Table 7.4 shows 
that the Fog index value of corporate reports from Chinese companies grows from 
16.4895 in 2014 to 17.1150 in 2018, with an average Fog index value of 16.8160. This 
result indicates that the readability of corporate reports of Chinese companies is in the 
“difficult” zone and is on a worsening trend. These corporate reports are similar to 
academic journal papers and only accessible to a reader with at least 16 years of education 
(a college senior) (Courtis, 1986; Du Toit, 2017). According to the OECD (2019, p.2), 
“in 2010, only 9% of adults in China hold a tertiary degree”. This figure suggests that 
 






these corporate reports may not be well understood by the normal public in China because 
of their low readability. 
 




2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Average 
Conciseness 282 284 304 318 340 305 
Readability 16.4895 16.6244 16.8098 17.0413 17.1150   16.8160 
 
7.9 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, the extent and quality of IR disclosure by Chinese listed companies are 
investigated in terms of items, themes, companies, listing status, and ownership structure. 
The IR disclosure practices of Chinese companies improve over the period 2014-2018. 
The extent of IR disclosures in China is not disappointing considering it has reached the 
worldwide average level and is near the level of developed countries. However, the 
quality of IR disclosures of Chinese listed companies still has considerable room for 
improvement in the future. There are a number of IR disclosure items that show a gap 
between stakeholders’ expectations and actual IR disclosure practices. These disclosure 
items are weighted as at least moderately important by the stakeholders. In order to satisfy 
stakeholder information needs, improving IR disclosure practices is necessary. From a 
theoretical point of view, the findings of this chapter strengthen stakeholder, legitimacy, 





8 CHAPTER EIGHT 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
8.1 Introduction  
This chapter develops seventeen hypotheses regarding IR disclosure practices, based on 
a review of previous studies. The objective of this chapter is to describe the formulation 
of hypotheses addressing the relationships between seventeen variables and IR disclosure 
practices. IR disclosure practices (extent and quality) are the dependent variables for 
sixteen hypotheses and the independent variable for one hypothesis. 
 
This chapter is structured in the following manners. Section 8.2 develops hypotheses 
based on prior literature and theories. Section 8.3 summarizes the chapter. 
 
8.2 Hypothesis development 
Relationship between leverage and IR disclosure practice 
According to agency theory, highly leveraged companies tend to show a higher quality 
and extent of disclosures to mitigate information asymmetry between management and 
creditors and to reduce agency costs (An, 2012; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Signalling 
theory posits that a higher quality and extent of disclosures is a signal to creditors in order 
to emphasize a firm’s quality and attract funds from potential investors (An, 2012; 
Oliveira et al., 2006). According to stakeholder theory, the higher financial leverage of a 
firm, the higher is the power of creditors “to recall loans or prevent the extension of 
further credit” (Huang & Kung, 2010, p. 439). Creditors are highly concerned about the 
social and environmental aspects of a firm because when the firm’s activities negatively 
affect society and the environment, creditors will consider the extent of the risks the firm 
faces (Huang & Kung, 2010; Liu & Anbumozhi, 2009). Consistent with these arguments, 
Bradbury (1992) finds a positive relationship between leverage and the extent of 
voluntary segment disclosures. Iatridis (2013) indicates that leverage positively impacts 
on the quality of environmental disclosures. Some studies find that there is a positive 
association between leverage and the extent of intellectual capital disclosures (Singh & 
Mitchell Van der Zahn, 2008; White et al., 2007). Pavlopoulos et al. (2017) report that 
highly leveraged companies are likely to show a greater extent of IR disclosures.  
 
However, some studies have shown an inverse relationship between the two factors. 




extent of IR disclosures in South Africa. Similarly, based on an analysis of an 
international sample of companies, Kılıç and Kuzey (2018b) also find that leverage 
negatively impacts on the extent of forward-looking disclosures in the integrated reports. 
Boubaker et al. (2011) provide explanations for the negative association between leverage 
and voluntary disclosure practices. Highly leveraged companies tend to offer debt holders 
more private information, which weakens the need for additional disclosures. 
Furthermore, according to Boubaker et al. (2011, p. 133), “the agency costs of free cash 
flow could be controlled by debt, which plays here a substitutive role for the monitoring 
of management. As a consequence, the control effect of debt shrinks the control effect of 
voluntary disclosure.” 
 
In line with prior studies (Liu & Anbumozhi, 2009; Huang & Kung, 2010), the ratio of 
total liabilities to total assets is used as a proxy for the level of leverage in this study. Also, 
financial leverage represents the creditors’ power (Huang & Kung, 2010; Liu & 
Anbumozhi, 2009). This study examines the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): Financial leverage affects the extent of IR disclosures. 
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): Financial leverage affects the quality of IR disclosures. 
 
Relationship between firm size and IR disclosure practice 
Firm size is one of the most widely used variables to explain disclosure practices (Kılıç 
& Kuzey, 2018b; Menicucci, 2018). Some studies (e.g., Gul & Leung, 2004; Xiao & 
Yuan, 2007; Yuen et al., 2009) show that firm size impacts the extent of voluntary 
disclosures positively. Yuen et al. (2009) and Xiao and Yuan (2007) find that larger 
Chinese listed companies have a greater extent of voluntary disclosures, supporting 
similar findings by Liu and Anbumozhi (2009) and Li et al. (2013). Liu and Anbumozhi 
(2009) investigate the relationship between the quality of environmental disclosures and 
firm size while Li et al. (2013) examine the relationship between the quality of CSR 
disclosures and firm size. Several prior studies also verify the positive association 
between firm size and intellectual capital disclosure practices (An, 2012; García-Meca et 
al., 2005)44. Several IR stuides (e.g., Frías-Aceituno et al., 2013b; Frías-Aceituno et al., 
2014; García-Sánchez & Noguera-Gámez, 2018) find that larger companies are more 
likely to adopt IR; Ahmed Haji and Anifowose (2016a) find that a larger company leads 
to a higher quality of IR disclosures.  
 
44 An (2012) examines the quality of intellectual capital disclosures while García-Meca et al. (2005) 





There are five reasons for the positive association between company size and information 
disclosure practices. Firstly, according to agency theory, larger companies face higher 
agency costs associated with higher information asymmetry (An, 2012; Celik et al., 2006; 
Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018b). Thus, larger companies tend to engage in higher disclosure 
practices to reduce agency costs (Frías-Aceituno et al., 2014). Secondly, larger companies 
are likely to face more scrutiny from the public and government (Watts & Zimmerman, 
1986); thus, larger companies tend to have higher disclosure practices to reduce political 
costs and to attract funds (Xiao & Yuan, 2007). Thirdly, according to stakeholder theory, 
larger companies have a broad range of stakeholder participation, and therefore engage 
in higher disclosure practices as a means of discharging their accountability to different 
stakeholders (An, 2012). Fourthly, according to signalling theory, larger companies 
depend on more extensive use of capital markets for financing; thus, higher disclosure 
practices convey positive signals to various investors so as to attract funds (Frías-
Aceituno et al., 2014). Fifthly, lower information production costs enable larger 
companies to engage in higher disclosure practices (Ferguson et al., 2002).  
 
In line with prior studies (Ho et al., 2012; Nicolò et al., 2020a), the number of employees 
is used as a proxy for firm size in this study. Also, the number of employees can represent 
the pressure exerted on the company by its employees (Huang & Kung, 2010; Fernandez‐
Feijoo et al., 2014; Vitolla et al., 2019c), because the employees in large firms are usually 
organised well and their views more easily influence the decisions of top management 
(Huang & Kung, 2010). Consistent with prior studies, it is anticipated that there is a 
relationship between firm size and IR disclosure practices (both extent and quality). This 
study examines the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): Firm size affects the extent of IR disclosures. 
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): Firm size affects the quality of IR disclosures. 
 
Relationship between audit quality and IR disclosure practice 
According to agency theory, auditing is a mechanism for reducing agency problems 
(Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). Large auditing firms (such as Big N) set more stringent 
and extensive information disclosure standards for their client companies in order to 
maintain their reputation, enhance their expertise, and retain their existing clients 
(Oliveira et al., 2006). Signalling theory suggests that companies that choose large 




to follow the more stringent and extensive information disclosure standards required by 
large auditing firms (An, 2012; Wang et al., 2008). Consistent with the theories, some 
studies observe a positive relationship between audit quality (Big N selection) and the 
extent of voluntary disclosures (Raffournier, 1995; Wang et al., 2008; Xiao et al., 2004). 
Similarly, Oliveira et al. (2006) find that companies that are audited by Big Four45 
auditors are likely to have a higher extent of intellectual capital disclosures. However, 
Rivera-Arrubla et al. (2017) adopt international companies as samples and find that the 
audit quality (i.e., the use of a Big Four auditor) has no association with the extent of IR 
disclosures. 
 
Similar to the approach used by Oliveira et al. (2006), a dummy variable is adopted to 
proxy audit quality in this study, with a value of 1 if a company is audited by a Big N 
(Four International Accounting Firms); and 0 otherwise. This variable also represents the 
auditors’ power (Huang & Kung, 2010). The following hypotheses are tested in this study: 
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): Audit quality affects the extent of IR disclosures. 
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): Audit quality affects the quality of IR disclosures. 
 
Relationship between profitability and IR disclosure practice 
Based on signalling theory, when a company’s management has an information advantage 
over its investors, highly profitable companies tend to provide a higher quality and extent 
of disclosures in order to portray the company’s superior quality, thereby distinguishing 
themselves from less successful ones and improving investors’ confidence in them 
(García-Meca et al., 2005; Singhvi & Desai, 1971). Agency theory posits that the 
managers of highly profitable companies are stimulated to release high quality and extent 
of disclosures to investors to show their performance in operating the firm, thereby 
maintaining their performance-based positions and remuneration levels (Frías-Aceituno 
et al., 2014; Oliveira et al., 2006). A number of studies examine the relationship between 
disclosure practices and profitability, and their findings support these theories. Wang et 
al. (2008) find a positive association between the extent of voluntary disclosures and 
profitability whereas Li et al. (2013) find a positive association between the quality of 
CSR disclosures and profitability. Some studies also indicate that the extent of intellectual 
capital disclosures has a positive association with profitability (García-Meca et al., 2005; 
Li et al., 2008). In prior IR literature, García-Sánchez et al. (2013), Frías-Aceituno et al. 
 




(2014) and García-Sánchez and Noguera-Gámez (2018) find that profitability has a 
positive impact on IR adoption. Similarly, Menicucci (2018) concludes that profitability 
positively influences the extent of forward-looking disclosures in integrated reports. 
 
Conversely, Celik et al. (2006) indicate that there is a negative association between the 
extent of forward-looking information disclosures and profitability. Sonnier et al. (2007) 
show a negative association between the extent of intellectual capital disclosures and 
profitability. Similarly, Pavlopoulos et al. (2017) find that profitability negatively 
influences the extent of IR disclosures. Sonnier et al. (2007) explain that highly profitable 
companies resist high information disclosure practices to protect their confidential and 
strategic information and to maintain their comparative advantages.  
 
On the basis of the above discussions, the current study postulates that there is a 
relationship between profitability and IR disclosure practices (both extent and quality). 
Based on prior studies (Frías-Aceituno et al., 2014; García-Sánchez et al., 2013), ROA is 
the proxy for the variable of profitability. Thus, this study examines the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4a (H4a): Profitability46 affects the extent of IR disclosures. 
Hypothesis 4b (H4b): Profitability affects the quality of IR disclosures. 
 
Relationship between industry type and IR disclosure practice 
Disclosure practices47 vary between sectors (Cooke, 1992; Meek et al., 1995; Raffournier, 
1995). Some scholars, such as Verrecchia (1983), Meek et al. (1995), and García-Meca 
et al. (2005), attribute the differences to varied proprietary costs (e.g., competitive and 
political costs) across sectors. The difference between sectors can be explained as follows. 
Firstly, companies are subject to industrial regulations; a company that operates in an 
industry in which there are rigid industrial regulations tends to exhibit high disclosure 
practices (Md Zaini, 2017; Owusu-Ansah, 1998). For instance, Chinese mining 
companies must comply with “the law on the prevention and control of environmental 
pollution by solid waste” and “mineral resources law”. Secondly, companies operating in 
the same industry generally have similar disclosure practices and vary from companies in 
other industries. If a company does not employ similar disclosure practices to others in 
 
46 net profit (after interest and taxation) divided by the total assets at the end of each fiscal year 
47 Cooke (1992) investigates the extent of both voluntary and mandatory disclosures; Meek et al. (1995) 





its industry, it might be perceived by stakeholders as a failure of the company, which 
would jeopardize the relationship between the company and its stakeholders and 
negatively impact the company’s legitimacy (Liu, 2014). Thirdly, according to 
institutional theory, mimetic isomorphism happens when firms operating in the same 
industry sector mimic the disclosure practices of the industry leader, aiming to avoid 
uncertainty and obtain legitimacy (Nicolò et al., 2020b). 
 
(1) Financial sector and IR disclosure practice 
The financial sector is highly risky and is the first sector to be influenced if the economy 
goes down (Sofian & Dumitru, 2017). Furthermore, financial companies also play an 
important role in society because they support job and business creation, provide funds 
and risk protection and attract savings (Sofian & Dumitru, 2017). Such characteristics of 
the financial sector demand that financial companies exhibit more transparency in 
disclosing non-financial information (Sofian & Dumitru, 2017). Furthermore, financial 
companies are subject to more rigorous regulation and supervision (Gerwanski et al., 
2019), which affects their disclosure practices (Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Pursuant to 
legitimacy theory, a firm belonging to the financial sector would make great efforts to 
report both financial and non-financial disclosures in order to reduce pressures from 
stakeholders and avoid damaging its legitimacy (Nicolò et al., 2020a). Liu (2014) 
indicates that Chinese financial companies are likely to present higher quality of corporate 
internet reporting disclosures than non-financial companies. An (2012) suggests that 
Chinese companies in the service sector (including financial companies) have a higher 
quality of intellectual capital disclosures than those in the industrial sector because 
companies in the service sector have fewer tangible assets; thus, they have to report better 
quality of intellectual capital disclosures to demonstrate their legitimacy and signal their 
quality. These above-mentioned studies indicate that financial companies tend to exhibit 
higher disclosure practices compared to their non-financial counterparts. 
 
However, there is hardly any research that examines the relationship between the financial 
sector and IR disclosure practices for Chinese companies. In the current study, the 
financial sector is a dummy variable with a value of “1” if companies belong to the 
financial sector, otherwise “0” (Sierra-García et al., 2015). The hypotheses examined are:  
Hypothesis 5a (H5a): Being in the financial sector affects the extent of IR disclosures. 





(2) Environmentally sensitive sector and IR disclosure practice 
For a firm operating in an environmentally sensitive industry, the activities of the firm 
significantly affect the environment (Liu & Anbumozhi, 2009; Fernandez‐Feijoo et al., 
2014). An environmentally sensitive industry attracts attention from the public and is 
exposed to the scrutiny of stakeholders (Lai et al., 2016; Nicolò et al., 2020a). Thus, a 
firm operating in an environmentally sensitive industry, according to legitimacy theory, 
would make efforts to provide non-financial information explaining how they operate in 
a sustainable way so as to “reduce pressure from stakeholders and maintain the legitimacy 
of their operations” (Nicolò et al., 2020a, p. 4). Marrone and Oliva (2019) find that 
companies belonging to environmentally sensitive industries have a higher quality of IR 
disclosures. Ahmed Haji and Anifowose (2016a) categorize industry types into the 
environmentally sensitive and non-environmentally sensitive and use a dummy variable 
as a proxy for the industry type. They find that industry type is a determinant of IR 
disclosure practices (both extent and quality). In the current study, a dummy variable 
equaling “1” is applied if a firm belongs to an environmentally sensitive industry48 and 
“0” if it belongs to a non-environmentally sensitive industry. This variable represents the 
environmental protection organisations’ power (Vitolla et al., 2019c). The following 
hypotheses are tested in this study: 
Hypothesis 6a (H6a): Being in the environmentally sensitive sector affects the extent of 
IR disclosures. 
Hypothesis 6b (H6b): Being in the environmentally sensitive sector affects the quality 
of IR disclosures. 
 
(3) Consumer-based sector and IR disclosure practice 
In an integrated report, customers are concerned about both financial and non-financial 
information (Vitolla et al., 2019c). IR disclosure practice is seen as a demonstration of a 
company’s image and reputation, thereby influencing consumers’ purchasing decisions 
(Vitolla et al., 2019c). Fernandez‐Feijoo et al. (2014) report that companies in consumer-
based industries have higher CSR disclosure practices than companies in non-consumer-
based industries. Vitolla et al. (2019c) find that IR quality is positively affected by a firm 
being in a consumer-based sector. In the current study, firms in the consumer-based sector 
 
48 Based on the sector classification for environmentally sensitive industries by SEPA (State Environmental 
Protection Administration) and related IR studies, such as those by Roman et al. (2019), Melloni (2015), 




take a value of “1” if a firm belongs to a consumer-based industry49 and “0” if it belongs 
to a non-consumer-based industry. This variable also represents the customers’ power 
(Vitolla et al., 2019c). The following hypotheses are tested in this study: 
Hypothesis 7a (H7a): Being in the consumer-based sector affects the extent of IR 
disclosures. 
Hypothesis 7b (H7b): Being in the consumer-based sector affects the quality of IR 
disclosures. 
 
Relationship between listing status and IR disclosure practice 
Many studies investigate the correlation between listing status and voluntary disclosure 
practices. Cooke (1989) provides evidence that companies listed on multiple stock 
exchanges (local Stockholm Stock Exchange and international stock exchange) have a 
higher extent of disclosures compared to companies solely listed on the local Stockholm 
Stock Exchange. Cooke (1992) finds that compared with companies solely listed on the 
local Tokyo Stock Exchange, companies listed on multiple stock exchanges have a higher 
extent of both voluntary and mandatory disclosures. Three reasons explain these findings. 
In order to raise money at a low cost of capital, companies listed on multiple stock 
exchanges comply with both domestic and foreign rules and regulations on information 
disclosure (Cooke, 1992). The second reason, pursuant to stakeholder theory, is that 
companies listed on multiple stock exchanges are exposed to more stakeholders than 
solely listed companies. Thus, companies listed on multiple stock exchanges face higher 
pressure for greater disclosure practices (An, 2012). Other researchers indicate similar 
findings in several other jurisdictions (Meek et al., 1995; Raffournier, 1995)50.  The third 
reason, according to institutional theory, is that firms listed on the same stock exchange 
tend to mimic the disclosure practices of the best firms in the stock exchange in order to 
acquire legitimacy, via mimetic isomorphism (Nicolò, et al., 2020b).  
 
Listing status is important to the Chinese context (An, 2012; Liu, 2014). An and Davey 
(2010) believe that dual-listed A- and H-share companies face investors from both 
mainland China and overseas and the majority of them are large and reputable. Thus, 
compared with solo-listed A-share companies, dual-listed A- and H-share companies are 
more likely to be active in exhibiting a high level of information disclosures (An, 2012). 
 
49 Based on previous studies, such as Sweeney and Coughlan (2008), Branco and Rodrigues (2008), and 
Vitolla et al. (2019b). 
50 Meek et al. (1995) analyse the extent of voluntary disclosures while Raffournier (1995) examines the 




According to Xiao and Yuan (2007), dual-listed A- and H-share companies have to 
comply with rules and regulations in both mainland China and Hong Kong 
simultaneously, and they must be audited by international audit companies, which 
increases the extent of voluntary disclosures. However, Liu (2014) finds that the quality 
of corporate internet reporting disclosures from dual-listed A- and H-share companies 
show no significant differences with those of solo-listed A-share companies. Liu (2014) 
believes that this is because Chinese society makes a comparison between solo-listed A-
share companies and dual-listed A- and H-share companies, resulting in institutional 
pressure for both dual-listed A- and H-share companies and solo-listed A-share 
companies. Therefore, these two kinds of companies tend to imitate each other’s 
corporate reporting behaviour in order to respond to institutional pressure.  
 
Consistent with prior studies, in the present study, listing status is a dummy variable with 
a value of “1” if a company is listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and Chinese 
mainland Stock Exchange simultaneously, and a value of “0” if a company is only listed 
on the Chinese mainland Stock Exchange. The following hypotheses are examined in the 
current study: 
Hypothesis 8a (H8a): Listing status affects the extent of IR disclosures. 
Hypothesis 8b (H8b): Listing status affects the quality of IR disclosures. 
 
Relationship between independent directors and IR disclosure practice 
According to the Code of Corporate Governance issued by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC), director independence refers to directors who are 
independent of the listed company that employs them and the company’s major 
shareholders (Conyon & He, 2011). In 2001, the CSRC issued the Guidelines of 
Establishing the Independent Director System in Listed Companies, in which all Chinese 
listed companies were required to confirm that their board of directors would consist of 
no less than one-third independent directors by 30 June 2003 (Firth et al., 2016). There 
are some initiatives aimed at ensuring the independence of independent directors to some 
extent. Firstly, many independent directors in China are scholars or professional experts 
who have a Communist Party or government background. Compared to internal directors, 
the independent directors do not fully obey the controller of the company when the 
controller tries to force independent directors to agree to “pass unjustified corporate 
policies and egregious transactions” (Kang, 2016, p. 155). Secondly, the CSRC requires 




the listed company or its subsidiaries, do not directly or indirectly hold more than 1% of 
the issued shares of the listed company, do not rank in the top ten shareholders, and do 
not hold positions in organisations that directly or indirectly hold not less than 5% of the 
issued shares of the listed company or that rank in the top five shareholders of the listed 
company (Kang, 2016). Thirdly, in terms of the nomination of independent directors, a 
listed company must submit the relevant information about an independent director 
candidate to the CSRC, which then checks and scrutinizes the candidate’s independence 
or qualification (Kang, 2016).  
 
Agency theory posits that an independent director is an important tool for monitoring 
management (Bowrin, 2018; Fama & Jensen, 1983). The existence of independent 
directors can reduce information asymmetry and agency problems (Akhtaruddin et al., 
2009; Kelton & Yang, 2008). A company is expected to release more voluntary 
disclosures if there is a higher proportion of independent directors (Yuen et al., 2009). 
Ibrahim et al. (2003) believe that independent directors tend to employ a stakeholder 
perspective. Therefore, independent directors can foster high voluntary disclosure 
practices in order to discharge their accountability to various stakeholders (Bowrin, 2018). 
 
Consistent with the theories, a number of studies report that a higher proportion of 
independent directors leads to a greater extent of voluntary disclosures (Adams & Hossain, 
1998; Xiao et al., 2004). Xiao and Yuan (2007) state that independent directors have 
incentives to enhance their expert reputations, which motivates them to facilitate the 
quantity and quality of disclosures. The researchers further establish that there is a 
positive association between the proportion of independent directors and the extent of 
voluntary disclosures of listed companies in China. Li et al. (2010) find a positive 
association between independent directors and the extent of CSR disclosures. Some 
studies observe a significantly positive association between the quality and extent of 
intellectual capital disclosures and the proportion of independent directors (An, 2012; 
White et al., 2007). In the extant IR literature, Pavlopoulos et al. (2017) conclude that a 
higher proportion of independent directors on the board leads to a greater extent of IR 
disclosures. 
 
However, the findings of previous studies are inconclusive. Some studies indicate that a 
negative relationship exists between the extent of voluntary disclosures and the 




2004). Eng and Mak (2003) believe that three aspects may explain the inverse association. 
Firstly, independent directors may be elected by blockholders and thus may represent the 
interests of blockholders. Secondly, independent directors can access information directly 
instead of using corporate reports. Thirdly, an independent director is a monitoring 
mechanism and can become a substitute for information disclosure which is another 
monitoring mechanism. Thus, the need for a higher corporate reporting disclosure 
practice is decreased. 
 
However, in contrast to the above studies, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) find that there is no 
association between the extent of voluntary disclosures and the proportion of independent 
directors. Similarly, Frías-Aceituno et al. (2013) suggest that there is no association 
between the percentage of independent directors on the board and IR adoption.  
 
Most empirical evidence provided by previous studies supports a significant association 
between the proportion of independent directors on the board in a company and the level 
of information disclosures, although the empirical results are mixed. In the present study, 
the variable of independent directors is proxied by the proportion of independent directors 
to the total number of directors (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018b). Thus, this study postulates and 
tests the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 9a (H9a): The proportion of independent directors on the board affects the 
extent of IR disclosure. 
Hypothesis 9b (H9b): The proportion of independent directors on the board affects the 
quality of IR disclosure. 
 
Relationship between ownership concentration and IR disclosure practice 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), separation between ownership and 
management results in agency problems. The wider a firm’s share dispersion, the greater 
the agency problems in the firm (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Information disclosure can be 
used as a tool to reduce agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Controlling 
shareholders tend to rely less on information disclosure from public channels because 
they can obtain information from internal channels (Fasan et al., 2016; Yuen et al., 2009).  
Companies that have lower ownership concentration tend to present a higher quality and 
extent of disclosures in order to reduce agency costs and information asymmetry (An, 
2012). In line with the above arguments, Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta (2010) show 




voluntary disclosures. Brammer and Pavelin (2006) conclude that companies with more 
dispersed ownership concentration have a higher extent of voluntary environmental 
disclosures. Gamerschlag et al. (2011) indicate that companies with more dispersed 
ownership concentration have a higher extent of voluntary CSR disclosures. Jensen and 
Berg (2012) indicate that the level of ownership concentration negatively impacts IR 
adoption. Liu and Anbumozhi (2009) support this argument and find that the degree of 
ownership concentration negatively impacts the extent of environmental information 
disclosures. Moreover, dispersed ownership usually means that a broader range of 
stakeholders hold the shares; thus, firms face higher pressures from the public (Raimo et 
al., 2020; Vitolla et al., 2019c). Raimo et al. (2020) point out that IR can be used as a tool 
to reduce pressures and empirically verify that ownership concentration has a significant 
negative effect on IR quality. In addition, share concentration presents the shareholders’ 
power (Liu & Anbumozhi, 2009; Huang & Kung, 2010). Thus, the following hypotheses 
are introduced, and the percentage of shares possessed by the top 10 shareholders is used 
to proxy share concentration:  
Hypothesis 10a (H10a): Ownership concentration affects the extent of IR disclosure. 
Hypothesis 10b (H10b): Ownership concentration affects the quality of IR disclosure. 
 
Relationship between state-owned shares and IR disclosure practice 
Differences in ownership structure have an impact on the disclosure practices of corporate 
reports (Van der Laan Smith et al., 2005). The Law of China on the State-Owned Assets 
of Enterprises indicates that state-owned assets are owned by the whole population, which 
suggests that companies with state-owned shares are accountable to all Chinese citizens. 
Based on stakeholder theory, companies with state-owned shares discharge accountability 
to all stakeholders. Thus, companies with state-owned shares are likely to show higher 
disclosure practices (An, 2012). Zu and Song (2009) argue that compared with private 
firms, SOEs tend to embrace CSR reporting. Firstly, unlike private companies, SOEs 
shoulder responsibilities for some social functions of the government (Kuo et al., 2012; 
Li et al., 2013). Secondly, the government offers more political and financial support for 
SOEs, such as listing privileges and debt financing (Aharony et al., 2000; Brandt & Li, 
2003; Li & Zhou, 2005; Sapienza, 2004); thus, SOEs, according to legitimacy theory, 
tend to be more transparent in disclosing their CSR activities in order to legitimize 
themselves (Li et al., 2013; Nicolò et al., 2020a). Thirdly, considering SOEs are 
supervised and frequently scrutinized by the government, SOEs tend to use CSR to signal 




find that the extent of voluntary disclosures for Chinese B-share companies is positively 
related to the proportion of state ownership. Amran and Haniffa (2011) find that the 
percentage of state ownership is positively associated with a higher extent of 
sustainability reporting disclosures. Similarly, in IR studies, Fasan et al.’s (2016) findings 
indicate that the level of state-owned share concentration is associated with a higher 
quality of IR disclosures. They explain that state-owned companies face stricter 
governmental requirements and scrutiny and are also seen as good examples for other 
companies.  
 
However, many studies (e.g., Li et al., 2013; Xiao & Yuan, 2007; Yuen et al., 2009) do 
not find evidence of a significant correlation between the extent of voluntary disclosures 
or CSR disclosures and the proportion of state ownership. In addition, some scholars 
claim that state-owned shares reduce the level of information disclosures because state 
shareholders can access information from other channels rather than corporate reports, 
and companies with state-owned shares can raise finance more easily than non-state-
owned companies (Xiao & Yuan, 2007). An (2012) finds that a higher level of state-
owned share concentration results in a lower quality of intellectual capital disclosures. 
Moreover, based on the investigation of 152 international companies that have adopted 
IR, Raimo et al. (2020) conclude that state ownership negatively affects IR quality. 
 
In this study, state-owned share concentration is associated with the quality and extent of 
IR disclosures, taking into account the above conflicting arguments. Similar to An (2012), 
in this research, the variable of the level of state-owned share concentration is proxied by 
the proportion of state-owned shares among the top 10 largest shareholders within a 
company. The state-owned share also presents the central government’s power (Dong et 
al., 2014). This study postulates and tests the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 11a (H11a): State-owned shares affect the extent of IR disclosure. 
Hypothesis 11b (H11b): State-owned shares affect the quality of IR disclosure. 
 
Relationship between the board of directors and IR disclosure practice 
According to agency theory, controlling and monitoring the work of management are the 
main functions of the board of directors (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Directors with different 
types of expertise, skill and competencies are more common in larger boards; thus, a 
larger board of directors has a better ability to control and monitor and accordingly fosters 




interconnections between the different types of information in IR, the preparation of a 
high-quality integrated report requires the input of directors with different backgrounds 
(Alfiero et al., 2018; Frías-Aceituno et al., 2013b; Vitolla et al., 2020a). Therefore, a 
larger board size helps a firm improve its IR disclosure practice (Vitolla et al., 2020a). 
Prior studies have similar findings with regard to the relationship between the board size 
and the adoption of IR or IR disclosure practices. For instance, Frías-Aceituno et al. 
(2013b) and García-Sánchez and Noguera-Gámez (2018) verify that board size positively 
and significantly affects the adoption of IR. Moreover, Vitolla et al. (2020a) and Raimo 
et al. (2020) report that board size has a significant and positive impact on IR quality. 
Therefore, this study postulates and tests the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 12a (H12a): Board size51 affects the extent of IR disclosure. 
Hypothesis 12b (H12b): Board size affects the quality of IR disclosure. 
 
Relationship between CEO duality and IR disclosure practice 
Agency theory suggests that a board ought to have separate positions for the chairman of 
the board of directors and the CEO (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Pavlopoulos et al., 2017). 
CEO duality hampers board independence and downgrades the board’s capacity for 
corporate governance (Gul & Leung, 2004), resulting in lower disclosure practices (Ho 
& Wong, 2001). Regulators and investors prefer to separate the role of CEO from that of 
chairman of the board (Yuen et al., 2009). For instance, the CSRC (China Securities 
Regulatory Commission) in 2001 advocated that large companies should separate the 
roles of CEO and chairman of the board. Xiao and Yuan (2007), using 559 Chinese 
companies in 2002 as their sample, find that CEO duality is associated with a lower extent 
of voluntary disclosures. In addition, although Yuen et al. (2009) do not find empirical 
evidence to support the association between CEO duality and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure by 200 Chinese companies, they believe the separation of the two roles could 
help to increase company transparency. However, in a study by Pavlopoulos et al. (2017), 
CEO duality is positively associated with the extent of IR disclosures. Although the 
empirical evidence is mixed, the following hypotheses are still proposed: 
Hypothesis 13a (H13a): CEO duality52 affects the extent of IR disclosure. 
Hypothesis 13b (H13b): CEO duality affects the quality of IR disclosure. 
 
 
51 The natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board is used to proxy board size. 
52 “CEO duality” is a dummy variable with a value of “1” if the same person serves as both CEO and 




Relationship between regulatory authority and IR disclosure practice 
The regulatory authority, as a stakeholder, has an impact on companies because the 
regulatory authority will punish and fine firms that violate laws and regulations (Huang 
& Kung, 2010). Huang and Kung (2010) investigate whether the regulatory authority, 
proxied by fines and penalties, influences the environmental disclosure practices of firms 
listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2005. They find that fines and 
penalties imposed by the regulatory authority on a firm positively affect the firm’s 
environmental disclosure practices. When a firm receives fines and penalties and thus its 
corporate image is impaired, higher environmental disclosure practices tend to be used 
by the firm to improve its corporate image. Moreover, if a firm receives fines and 
penalties, higher environment disclosure practices can be used to show its stakeholders 
that it has been discharging its corporate social responsibility, thereby improving its 
legitimacy (Cho & Patten, 2007). In a similar vein, because IR covers environmental and 
social disclosures, this study postulates and tests the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 14a (H14a): Regulatory authorities53 affect the extent of IR disclosure. 
Hypothesis 14b (H14b): Regulatory authorities affect the quality of IR disclosure. 
 
Relationship between community and IR disclosure practice 
According to Roberts (1992), the community demands that firms improve their corporate 
social and environmental responsibility, and disclosures can be used as a strategy to 
manage such demands. Taylor and Shan (2007) examine whether communities influence 
the extent and quality of CSR disclosures by Chinese firms listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange. They find a positive relationship between the donations of sample firms and 
their disclosure practices. Dong et al. (2014) explore whether the community impacts the 
CSR disclosure practices of Chinese mining and minerals firms in 2010. They use the 
donations of a firm to proxy community pressure on the firm. The results indicate that the 
association between communities and CSR disclosure practices is not significant, 
suggesting communities’ power to affect mining companies’ CSR disclosure practices is 
minimal. However, the study by Dong et al. (2014) is limited to the mining and mineral 
sector in 2010. To date, there is hardly any research investigating the relationship between 
the community and the IR disclosure practices of Chinese companies. Therefore, this 
study postulates and tests the following hypotheses: 
 
53 “Regulatory authorities” is a dummy variable with a value of “1” if the company violates regulations 




Hypothesis 15a (H15a): Community pressure54 affects the extent of IR disclosure. 
Hypothesis 15b (H15b): Community pressure affects the quality of IR disclosure. 
 
Relationship between overseas customer and IR disclosure practice 
In the overseas market, a firm needs to show that it is adopting good international 
practices so as to achieve ongoing legitimacy and maintain a competitive edge (Dong et 
al., 2014). Some studies, such as those of Azizul Islam and Deegan (2008) and Belal and 
Owen (2007) find that Bangladeshi firms report social and environmental disclosures in 
order to respond to pressure from overseas customers. Dong et al. (2014) use the overseas 
income of a firm to proxy the pressures of overseas customers on the firm and find a 
significant positive association between overseas income and the CSR disclosure 
practices of Chinese mining and minerals firms, indicating the influence of overseas 
consumers on CSR disclosure practices by Chinese mining companies is profound. They 
believe that because Chinese firms are criticized by overseas customers for their lack of 
social and environmental responsibilities for overseas markets, CSR disclosure practices 
by Chinese firms can be seen as compensation for overseas customers’ “expectation of 
responsible practice and demands for information” (p. 66). Considering IR is a globally 
recognised corporate reporting, it may help Chinese firms to satisfy the information 
demands of their overseas customers and to show their practices in fulfilling social and 
environmental responsibilities. Thus, this study postulates and tests the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 16a (H16a): Overseas customers55 affect the extent of IR disclosure. 
Hypothesis 16b (H16b): Overseas customers affect the quality of IR disclosure. 
 
Relationship between agency costs and IR disclosure practice 
The combination of monitoring costs, bonding costs and residual loss represents agency 
costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). According to LaFond and Watts (2008. p, 450), 
“information asymmetry generates agency cost”. In other words, information asymmetry 
between investors and managers aggravates agency problems (Barako & Brown, 2008; 
Scott, 1997). Specifically, managers have an information advantage over investors, 
enabling management to operate against the interests of investors (Donnelly & Mulcahy, 
2008). Information disclosure can be used as a monitoring mechanism which enables 
 
54 “Community pressure” is a dummy variable with a value of “1” if the company donates to the community 
and a value of “0” if otherwise. 
55 “Overseas customers” is a dummy variable with a value of “1” if the company has overseas income and 




investors to supervise managers’ operations (Frías-Aceituno et al., 2014); meanwhile, 
managers can choose information disclosure to present their willingness for transparency 
(e.g., revealing managers’ performance) toward investors, in order to reduce investors’ 
uncertainty (Briem & Wald, 2018; Girella et al., 2019; Raimo et al., 2020). Disclosing 
information can be used to maintain good relations with investors, reducing the cost of 
capital and allowing the company to be more competitive in the capital market (Frías-
Aceituno et al., 2014). Thus, information disclosure can mitigate agency costs by 
decreasing information asymmetry (Agyei-Mensah, 2016; Barth et al., 2017; De Villiers 
& Maroun, 2017). Increasing the extent and quality of information disclosures, such as 
IR, may thus mitigate the information asymmetry and reduce agency costs (Bowrin, 2018; 
Dilling & Caykoylu, 2019; Leuz & Wysocki, 2016; Li et al., 2008; Raimo et al., 2020; 
Vitolla et al., 2020c). An integrated report with a high disclosure practice is concise, 
comprehensive, integrated, and future-oriented (IIRC, 2013; Muttakin et al., 2020), 
enabling a firm to present a holistic picture of itself to investors, especially in terms of 
how the company creates value in the short, medium and long term (Raimo et al., 2020). 
Some researchers have provided preliminary evidence of the impact of IR on agency costs. 
For instance, García-Sánchez and Noguera-Gámez (2017b), using 995 international listed 
companies for the years 2009 to 2013 as a sample, report that IR adoption negatively 
affects information asymmetry. The researchers claim that companies that adopt IR 
provide a higher level and scope of information to the market, thereby reducing the 
information asymmetry. Obeng et al. (2020a) report that IR practices significantly 
mitigate agency costs. Similarly, Pavlopoulos et al. (2017) observe that the extent of IR 
disclosures negatively and significantly impacts agency costs. This study postulates and 
tests the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 17a (H17a): The extent of IR disclosures affects agency costs. 
Hypothesis 17b (H17b): The quality of IR disclosures affects agency costs. 
 
8.3 Chapter summary 
Many studies of IR disclosure practices have been carried out in varied contexts, 
including South Africa (Barth et al., 2017), Turkey (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2018), Japan (Li, 
2017), and internationally (Pavlopoulos et al., 2017). However, hardly any study has been 
conducted in the Chinese context. In order to fill the research gap, which is the scarcity 
of research on hypothesis testing of IR disclosure practices in the Chinese context, the 




Chinese companies and seventeen factors drawn from the literature. Accordingly, this 
chapter develops relevant hypotheses based on prior literature and theories.  
9 CHAPTER NINE 
HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the relationship between the IR disclosure practices of Chinese 
companies and sixteen impacting factors, including leverage, firm size, audit quality, 
profitability, financial sector, environmentally sensitive sector, consumer-based sector, 
listing status, independent directors, ownership concentration, state-owned shares, board 
size, CEO duality, regulatory authority, community, and overseas customers. In order to 
explore whether Chinese companies could benefit from higher IR disclosure practices, 
the effect of IR disclosure practices on agency costs is then examined. Table 9.1 
summarizes the hypotheses.  
 
Table 9.1 Summary of hypotheses 
H1a Financial leverage affects the extent of IR disclosures 
H1b Financial leverage affects the quality of IR disclosures 
H2a Firm size affects the extent of IR disclosures 
H2b Firm size affects the quality of IR disclosures 
H3a Audit quality affects the extent of IR disclosures 
H3b Audit quality affects the quality of IR disclosures 
H4a Profitability affects the extent of IR disclosures. 
H4b Profitability affects the quality of IR disclosures. 
H5a Being in the financial sector affects the extent of IR disclosures. 
H5b Being in the financial sector affects the quality of IR disclosures. 
H6a Being in the environmentally sensitive sector affects the extent of IR disclosures. 
H6b Being in the environmentally sensitive sector affects the quality of IR disclosures. 
H7a Being in the consumer-based sector affects the extent of IR disclosures. 
H7b Being in the consumer-based sector affects the quality of IR disclosures. 
H8a Listing status affects the extent of IR disclosures. 
H8b Listing status affects the quality of IR disclosures. 
H9a The proportion of independent directors on the board affects the extent of IR disclosure. 
H9b The proportion of independent directors on the board affects the quality of IR disclosure. 




H10b Ownership concentration affects the quality of IR disclosure 
H11a State-owned shares affect the extent of IR disclosure 
H11b State-owned shares affect the quality of IR disclosure 
H12a Board size affects the extent of IR disclosure 
H12b Board size affects the quality of IR disclosure 
H13a CEO duality affects the extent of IR disclosure 
H13b CEO duality affects the quality of IR disclosure 
H14a Regulatory authorities affect the extent of IR disclosure 
H14b Regulatory authorities affect the quality of IR disclosure 
H15a Community pressure affects the extent of IR disclosure 
H15b Community pressure affects the quality of IR disclosure 
H16a Overseas customers affect the extent of IR disclosure 
H16b Overseas customers affect the quality of IR disclosure 
H17a The extent of IR disclosures affects agency costs 
H17b The quality of IR disclosures affects agency costs 
 
This chapter is structured in the following manner. Section 9.2 provides the model 
specification, along with the results and discussion examining the determinants of IR 
disclosure practices. Section 9.3 presents the model specification, results and discussion 
for assessing the effect of IR disclosure practices on agency costs. Finally, section 9.4 
summarizes the chapter.   
 
9.2 Determinants of IR disclosure practices 
9.2.1 Model specification 
Based on the discussions in the course of hypothesis development in Chapter 8, sixteen 
impact factors of IR disclosure practices (H1-H16) are adopted as independent variables. 
Two regression models, including one for the extent of IR disclosures and one for the 
quality of IR disclosures, are developed as follows (see Equation (1)).  
 
𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟10𝑖,𝑡 +




𝛽16𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
(1) 
 
All variables shown in Equation (1) are defined in Table 9.2. 𝛽0  is a constant term 
(intercept) which signifies the neglected factors affecting IR disclosure practices in the 
regression model and 𝜀  is an error term that represents the difference between the 
predicted and observed values of IR disclosure practices.  
 
Table 9.2 Definitions of variables 
Variables Definitions 
The extent of IR disclosures 
(Extent) 
The extent of IR disclosures of each company 
The quality of IR disclosures 
(Totalquality) 
The quality of IR disclosures of each company 
Financial leverage (Leverage) Book value of the total liabilities of a company at the end of each 
fiscal year divided by the book value of the total assets of the 
company at the end of each fiscal year (H1) 
Firm size (Size) Natural logarithm of the total number of employees (Huang & 
Kung, 2010; Vitolla et al., 2019c) (H2) 
Auditor type (Big4) A dummy variable: 1 for companies audited by Big 4 accounting 
companies, 0 otherwise (H3) 
Profitability (ROA) Net profit (after interest and taxation) for each fiscal year divided 
by the book value of the total assets at the end of that fiscal year 
(H4) 
Financial sector (Finance) A dummy variable: 1 for companies in the financial sector, 0 
otherwise (H5) 
Environmentally sensitive sector 
(Environment) 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the activities of the company have an 
important impact on the environment and 0 if otherwise (Liu & 
Anbumozhi, 2009; Huang & Kung, 2010; Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 
2014; Vitolla et al., 2019c) (H6) 
Customer-oriented sector 
(Customer) 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company belongs to a consumer 
products and services industry and 0 if otherwise (Fernandez-
Feijoo et al., 2014; Vitolla et al., 2019c) (H7) 
Listing status (List) A dummy variable: 1 for dual listed A- and H-share companies, 0 
otherwise (H8) 
Independent directors (BoardInd) The proportion of independent directors on the board at the end of 
each fiscal year (H9) 
Ownership concentration 
(Shareholder10)  





State-owned share (Stateshare) The proportion of state-owned shares among the top 10 largest 
shareholders at the end of each fiscal year (H11) 
Board Size (Boardsize) Natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board (H12) 
CEO duality (Duality) Dummy variable equal to 1 if the same person serves as both CEO 
and chairman and 0 if otherwise (H13) 
Regulatory authorities’ pressure 
(Violation) 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company violates regulations 




Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company donates to the 
community and 0 if otherwise (Huang & Kung, 2010) (H15) 
Overseas pressure (Overseas) Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company has overseas income 




Table 9.3 presents the descriptive statistics for all the variables. The extent of IR 
disclosures ranges from 0.500 to 0.926, with a 5-year mean value of 0.755. Furthermore, 
the lowest quality of IR disclosures is 0.332 while the highest is 0.675, with a 5-year mean 
value of 0.520. The results indicate that both the extent of IR disclosures and the quality 
of IR disclosures amongst companies vary greatly.  
 
Table 9.3 Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Extent 500 .755 .076 .500 .926 
Totalquality 500 .520 .067 .332 .675 
Extent_new 500 .770 .072 .526 .930 
Totalquality_new 500 .504 .070 .314 .667 
Size 500 10.420 1.378 6.601 13.190 
Lev 500 .704 .180 .131 .945 
ROA 500 .037 .040 .001 .227 
Stateshare 500 .629 .293 .000 1.000 
Shareholder10 500 .231 .155 .007 .759 
Boardsize 500 2.336 .282 1.609 2.944 
BoardInd 500 .392 .075 .200 .800 
Dummy Variables N Percent of sample 
List 1 224 44.8% 
0 276 55.2% 




0 175 35% 
Duality 
1 56 11.2% 
0 444 88.8% 
Finance 
1 170 34% 
0 330 66% 
Customer 
 
1 330 66% 
0 170 34% 
Environment 
1 235 47% 
0 265 53% 
Donation 
 
1 312 62.4% 
0 188 37.6% 
Overseas 
 
1 276 55.2% 
0 224 44.8% 
Violation 
 
1 71 14.2% 
0 429 85.8% 
Notes: Extent is the extent of IR disclosures of each company; Totalquality is the quality of IR disclosures 
of each company; Leverage is the book value of the total liabilities of a company at the end of each fiscal 
year divided by the book value of the total assets of the company at the end of each fiscal year; Size is the 
natural logarithm of the total number of employees; Big4 is a dummy variable: 1 for companies audited by 
Big 4 accounting companies, 0 otherwise; ROA is the net profit (after interest and taxation) for each fiscal 
year divided by the book value of the total assets at the end of that fiscal year; Finance is a dummy variable: 
1 for companies in the financial sector, 0 otherwise; Environment is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
activities of the company have an important impact on the environment and 0 if otherwise; Customer is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the company belongs to a consumer products and services industry and 0 if 
otherwise; List is a dummy variable: 1 for dual listed A- and H-share companies, 0 otherwise; BoardInd is 
the proportion of independent directors on the board at the end of each fiscal year; Shareholder10 is the 
percentage of shares possessed by the top 10 shareholders; Stateshare is the proportion of state-owned 
shares among the top 10 largest shareholders at the end of each fiscal year; Boardsize is the natural 
logarithm of the number of directors on the board; Violation is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company 
violates regulations prescribed by the government and 0 if otherwise; Donation is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if the company donates to the community and 0 if otherwise; Overseas is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if the company has overseas income and 0 if otherwise. 
 
Univariate analysis 
Table 9.4 shows the results of the correlation analysis. The pair-wise correlation between 
variables is examined using the Pearson Correlation coefficient and Spearman 
correlations, respectively. The results suggest that there is no evidence supporting the 
existence of a multicollinearity problem for the independent variables because all the 
correlation coefficients are under 0.8 (An, 2012; Khanna et al., 2004). The findings 
indicate that all the explanatory variables except seven variables (Leverage, Finance, 
Customer, ROA, Stateshare, Boardsize, and Duality) have statistically significant 












Table 9.4 Correlation analysis 
 Extent Totalquality Size Leverage Finance Environment Customer List ROA BoardInd Stateshare Big4 Boardsize Duality Shareholder10 Donation Overseas Violation 
Extent 1 0.905*** 0.361*** -0.066 0.001 0.080* 0.017 0.246*** -0.057 0.230*** -0.024 0.235*** 0.009 -0.057 0.092** 0.184*** 0.142*** -0.096** 
Totalquality 0.905*** 1 0.454*** -0.113** -0.068 0.194*** -0.105** 0.283*** -0.030 0.241*** 0.006 0.226*** -0.011 -0.060 0.151*** 0.176*** 0.194*** -0.132*** 
Size 0.374*** 0.458*** 1 0.020 -0.141*** 0.322*** -0.160*** 0.463*** -0.040 0.229*** -0.049 0.430*** -0.020 0.067 0.397*** 0.068 0.198*** -0.319*** 
Lev -0.061 -0.105** -0.005 1 0.684*** -0.502*** 0.346*** 0.121*** -0.659*** -0.159*** -0.090** 0.126*** 0.392*** -0.056 -0.227*** 0.190*** -0.108** 0.133*** 
Finance 0.021 -0.053 -0.135*** 0.616*** 1 -0.676*** 0.515*** 0.109** -0.548*** -0.167*** -0.019 0.199*** 0.466*** -0.041 -0.359*** 0.243*** -0.084* 0.349*** 
Environment 0.076* 0.187*** 0.317*** -0.416*** -0.676*** 1 -0.762*** 0.199*** 0.334*** 0.191*** 0.132*** 0.011 -0.283*** 0.110** 0.410*** -0.138*** 0.300*** -0.222*** 
Customer 0.032 -0.095** -0.182*** 0.320*** 0.515*** -0.762*** 1 -0.160*** -0.120*** -0.148*** -0.254*** 0.093** 0.228*** 0.121*** -0.422*** 0.062 -0.129*** 0.195*** 
List 0.236*** 0.280*** 0.454*** 0.127*** 0.109** 0.199*** -0.160*** 1 -0.208*** 0.135*** -0.273*** 0.476*** 0.186*** 0.024 0.265*** 0.052 0.254*** -0.090** 
ROA -0.056 -0.062 -0.015 -0.706*** -0.398*** 0.163*** -0.006 -0.238*** 1 0.110** 0.043 -0.153*** -0.384*** 0.096** 0.161*** -0.190*** 0.011 -0.049 
BoardInd 0.221*** 0.228*** 0.248*** -0.095** -0.220*** 0.219*** -0.176*** 0.040 0.076* 1 0.078* 0.156*** -0.433*** 0.050 0.294*** -0.002 0.085* -0.052 
Stateshare 0.004 0.048 -0.019 -0.062 0.032 0.123*** -0.262*** -0.146*** -0.067 0.124*** 1 -0.179*** -0.157*** -0.138*** 0.293*** 0.097** -0.030 0.128*** 
Big4 0.244*** 0.239*** 0.432*** 0.093** 0.199*** 0.011 0.093** 0.476*** -0.062 0.097** -0.123*** 1 0.206*** 0.021 0.125*** 0.045 0.056 -0.206*** 
Boardsize 0.024 -0.006 -0.008 0.381*** 0.465*** -0.291*** 0.227*** 0.173*** -0.288*** -0.516*** -0.090** 0.187*** 1 -0.023 -0.279*** 0.103** -0.081* -0.031 
Duality -0.035 -0.047 0.044 0.001 -0.041 0.110** 0.121*** 0.024 0.090** 0.009 -0.147*** 0.021 -0.044 1 -0.153*** -0.078* 0.103** 0.074 
Shareholder10 0.132*** 0.178*** 0.434*** -0.242*** -0.300*** 0.373*** -0.384*** 0.264*** 0.106** 0.242*** 0.238*** 0.159*** -0.219*** -0.139*** 1 -0.040 -0.003 -0.229*** 
Donation 0.166*** 0.168*** 0.067 0.174*** 0.243*** -0.138*** 0.062 0.052 -0.213*** -0.008 0.097** 0.045 0.100** -0.078* 0.003 1 -0.010 0.079* 
Overseas 0.140*** 0.193*** 0.189*** -0.008 -0.084* 0.300*** -0.129*** 0.254*** -0.038 0.119*** 0.010 0.056 -0.094** 0.103** -0.031 -0.010 1 0.067 
Violation -0.083* -0.116*** -0.329*** 0.127*** 0.349*** -0.222*** 0.195*** -0.090** -0.090** -0.046 0.113** -0.206*** -0.034 0.074 -0.200*** 0.079* 0.067 1 
Notes: Pearson correlations reported below the diagonal and Spearman correlations above the diagonal. 
The superscripts ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
Variables definition: Extent is the extent of IR disclosures of each company; Totalquality is the quality of IR disclosures of each company; Leverage is the book 
value of the total liabilities of a company at the end of each fiscal year divided by the book value of the total assets of the company at the end of each fiscal year; Size is 
the natural logarithm of the total number of employees; Big4 is a dummy variable: 1 for companies audited by Big 4 accounting companies, 0 otherwise; ROA is the net 
profit (after interest and taxation) for each fiscal year divided by the book value of the total assets at the end of that fiscal year; Finance is a dummy variable: 1 for 
companies in the financial sector, 0 otherwise; Environment is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the activities of the company have an important impact on the environment 
and 0 if otherwise; Customer is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company belongs to a consumer products and services industry and 0 if otherwise; List is a dummy 
variable: 1 for dual listed A- and H-share companies, 0 otherwise; BoardInd is the proportion of independent directors on the board at the end of each fiscal year; 
Shareholder10 is the percentage of shares possessed by the top 10 shareholders; Stateshare is the proportion of state-owned shares among the top 10 largest shareholders 
at the end of each fiscal year; Boardsize is the natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board; Violation is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company violates 
regulations prescribed by the government and 0 if otherwise; Donation is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company donates to the community and 0 if otherwise; 














The data analysed are balanced panel data. Petersen (2009, p.458) believes that “since many panel 
data sets have more firms than years, a common approach is to include dummy variables for each 
time period (to absorb the time effect) and then cluster by firm”. Thus, as shown in Table 9.4, standard 
errors are clustered by firm, and dummy variables for year effects are included. In terms of the 
multicollinearity problem, the results of collinearity diagnostics based on variance inflation factors 
suggest that there is no evidence supporting the existence of a multicollinearity problem because the 
values of the variance inflation factors for each independent variable are less than 5 (Groebner et al., 
2018).  
 
Table 9.5 presents the results of the multiple regression analysis for determinants of both the extent 
of IR disclosures and the quality of IR disclosures. With regard to the overall regression, the OLS 
model is significant at the p< 0.01 level. The level of leverage has a significantly negative impact on 
the extent of IR disclosures, which supports H1a. There is a significant positive correlation between 
firm size and the extent of IR disclosures. Therefore, H2a is supported. Auditing quality has no 
statistically significant impact on the extent of IR disclosures, which rejects H3a. There is a 
significantly negative association between ROA and the extent of IR disclosures. Thus, H4a is 
supported. It has been reported that the financial sector does not significantly affect the extent of IR 
disclosures. Thus, H5a cannot be supported. There is no statistically significant correlation between 
the environmentally sensitive sector (Environment) and the extent of IR disclosures, so there is no 
support for H6a. The result shows a significant and positive association between the consumer-
orientated sector and the extent of IR disclosures, which supports H7a.  
 
No statistically significant correlation is found between firms’ listing status and the extent of IR 
disclosures. Therefore, there is no support for H8a. There is a statistically significant and positive 
correlation between the proportion of independent directors and the extent of IR disclosures. This 
result provides support for H9a. In addition, there is no statistically significant correlation between 
the ownership concentration (or state-owned shares, or board size) and the extent of IR disclosures; 
thus H10a, H11a, and H12a are rejected. There is a statistically significant and negative correlation 
between CEO duality and the extent of IR disclosures, providing support for H13a. Regulatory 
authority (Violation) is not significantly correlated to the extent of IR disclosures. Hence, H14a is 




H15a is supported. Overseas customers (Overseas) do not have a statistically significant impact on 
the extent of IR disclosures of Chinese firms. Thus, H16a is rejected.  
 
Table 9.5 also shows the results of the multiple regression analysis for determinants of the quality of 
IR disclosures. The OLS model is significant at the p< 0.01 level. H1b is supported, with the level of 
leverage showing a significantly positive association with the quality of IR disclosure. H2b is 
supported. The model shows a significant and positive association between firm size and the quality 
of IR disclosure. Auditing quality has no impact on the quality of IR disclosure. The result rejects 
H3b. There is an inverse association between ROA and the quality of IR disclosure. Thus, H4b is 
supported. The financial sector does not appear to have a significant effect on the quality of IR 
disclosures. Therefore, H5b is not empirically supported. No statistically significant correlation is 
found between the environmentally sensitive sector (Environment) and the quality of IR disclosures, 
so there is no support for H6b. The positive association between consumer-orientated sector and the 
quality of IR disclosures is significant, which supports H7b. 
 
The listing status has a positive but not significant effect on the quality of IR disclosure. Therefore, 
H8b is rejected. The proportion of independent directors has a positive and significant effect on the 
quality of IR disclosures, so H9b is accepted. Three variables (share concentration, state-owned 
shares, and board size) do not show a significant relationship with the quality of IR disclosures. Thus, 
H10b, H11b, and H12b are rejected.  A statistically significant and negative correlation is found 
between CEO duality and the quality of IR disclosures. The result provides support for H13b. There 
is not a statistically significant correlation between regulatory authority (Violation) and the quality of 
IR disclosures. Therefore, the result does not provide support for H14b. There is a significantly 
positive correlation between community (Donation) and the quality of IR disclosures. The result 
therefore provides support for H15b. No statistically significant correlation is observed between 
overseas customers (Overseas) and the quality of IR disclosures. Thus, H16b is not supported. 
 
Table 9.5 Regression results 
 (1) (2) 
 Extent Totalquality 
Leverage (H1a and H1b) -0.137** -0.127*** 
 (-2.52) (-2.82) 
Size (H2a and H2b) 0.015*** 0.018*** 
 (3.11) (4.41) 
Big4 (H3a and H3b) 0.003 -0.000 




ROA (H4a and H4b) -0.364** -0.339** 
 (-2.55) (-2.41) 
Finance (H5a and H5b) 0.013 0.009 
 (0.58) (0.51) 
Environment (H6a and H6b) 0.023 0.020 
 (1.20) (1.25) 
Customer (H7a and H7b) 0.045** 0.025* 
 (2.39) (1.66) 
List (H8a and H8b) 0.008 0.008 
 (0.65) (0.74) 
BoardInd (H9a and H9b) 0.214*** 0.149** 
 (3.22) (2.44) 
Shareholder10 (H10a and H10b) 0.001 -0.017 
 (0.01) (-0.48) 
Stateshare (H11a and H11b) 0.000 0.000 
 (0.04) (0.39) 
Boardsize (H12a and H12b) 0.037 0.028 
 (1.58) (1.39) 
Duality (H13a and H13b) -0.023* -0.022** 
 (-1.94) (-2.03) 
Violation (H14a and H14b) 0.003 0.002 
 (0.23) (0.25) 
Donation (H15a and H15b) 0.018** 0.018** 
 (2.16) (2.50) 
Overseas (H16a and H16b) 0.006 0.009 
 (0.57) (0.91) 
Year Yes Yes 
Constant 0.439*** 0.233*** 
 (4.75) (3.05) 
N 500 500 
Adj.R2 0.344 0.400 
F 14.032 15.972 
Notes: The superscripts ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
All reported t statistics are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level.  
Variables definition: Extent is the extent of IR disclosures of each company; Totalquality is the quality of IR 
disclosures of each company; Leverage is the book value of the total liabilities of a company at the end of each fiscal year 
divided by the book value of the total assets of the company at the end of each fiscal year; Size is the natural logarithm 
of the total number of employees; Big4 is a dummy variable: 1 for companies audited by Big 4 accounting companies, 0 
otherwise; ROA is the net profit (after interest and taxation) for each fiscal year divided by the book value of the total 
assets at the end of that fiscal year; Finance is a dummy variable: 1 for companies in the financial sector, 0 otherwise; 
Environment is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the activities of the company have an important impact on the environment 
and 0 if otherwise; Customer is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company belongs to a consumer products and services 
industry and 0 if otherwise; List is a dummy variable: 1 for dual listed A- and H-share companies, 0 otherwise; BoardInd 
is the proportion of independent directors on the board at the end of each fiscal year; Shareholder10 is the percentage of 
shares possessed by the top 10 shareholders; Stateshare is the proportion of state-owned shares among the top 10 largest 
shareholders at the end of each fiscal year; Boardsize is the natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board; 
Violation is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company violates regulations prescribed by the government and 0 if 
otherwise; Donation is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company donates to the community and 0 if otherwise; Overseas 




9.2.3 Robustness tests 
The use of the new extent of IR disclosures and the new quality of IR disclosures is to investigate the 
determinants of IR disclosure practices by Chinese companies from an unbiased perspective. Table 
9.6 provides the descriptive statistics for the new extent of IR disclosures and the new quality of IR 
disclosures. 
 
Table 9.6 Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Extent_new 500 .770 .072 .526 .930 
Totalquality_new 500 .504 .070 .314 .667 
Notes: Extent_new is the new extent of IR disclosures of each company; Totalquality_new is the new quality of IR 
disclosures of each company. 
 
Table 9.7 exhibits the results of the robustness analysis for determinants of the extent of IR disclosures. 
In this robustness test, the measurement of the extent of IR disclosures is changed. The weighting of 
each item collected from Chinese stakeholders is used. Accordingly, the new extent of IR disclosures 
is adopted in the multiple regression analysis. The regression result is identical to the main finding. 
Table 9.7 also shows the result of the robustness analysis for determinants of the quality of IR 
disclosures. In this robustness test, the measurement of the quality of IR disclosures is altered. All 
disclosure items are assigned equal weighting. Accordingly, the new quality of IR disclosures is 
adopted in the multiple regression analysis. The result is consistent with the main finding. Based on 















Table 9.7 Regression results 
 (3) (4) 
 Extent_new Totalquality_new 
Leverage (H1a and H1b) -0.128** -0.131*** 
 (-2.49) (-2.79) 
Size (H2a and H2b) 0.014*** 0.019*** 
 (2.99) (4.38) 
Big4 (H3a and H3b) 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.23) (-0.06) 
ROA (H4a and H4b) -0.327** -0.363** 
 (-2.43) (-2.46) 
Finance (H5a and H5b) 0.012 0.009 
 (0.57) (0.49) 
Environment (H6a and H6b) 0.024 0.018 
 (1.33) (1.12) 
Customer (H7a and H7b) 0.041** 0.027* 
 (2.32) (1.74) 
List (H8a and H8b) 0.006 0.010 
 (0.52) (0.86) 
BoardInd (H9a and H9b) 0.192*** 0.164** 
 (3.06) (2.62) 
Shareholder10 (H10a and H10b) -0.003 -0.016 
 (-0.07) (-0.43) 
Stateshare (H11a and H11b) -0.000 0.000 
 (-0.12) (0.52) 
Boardsize (H12a and H12b) 0.033 0.030 
 (1.48) (1.46) 
Duality (H13a and H13b) -0.022** -0.022* 
 (-2.02) (-1.98) 
Violation (H14a and H14b) 0.004 0.001 
 (0.43) (0.09) 
Donation (H15a and H15b) 0.018** 0.019** 
 (2.18) (2.55) 
Overseas (H16a and H16b) 0.007 0.007 
 (0.74) (0.74) 
Year Yes Yes 
Constant 0.487*** 0.193** 
 (5.57) (2.43) 
N 500 500 
Adj.R2 0.336 0.406 
F 13.619 16.301 
Notes: The superscripts ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
All reported t statistics are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level.  
Variables definition: Extent_new is the new extent of IR disclosures of each company; Totalquality_new is the 
new quality of IR disclosures of each company; Leverage is the book value of the total liabilities of a company at the end 
of each fiscal year divided by the book value of the total assets of the company at the end of each fiscal year; Size is the 
natural logarithm of the total number of employees; Big4 is a dummy variable: 1 for companies audited by Big 4 
accounting companies, 0 otherwise; ROA is the net profit (after interest and taxation) for each fiscal year divided by the 
book value of the total assets at the end of that fiscal year; Finance is a dummy variable: 1 for companies in the financial 
sector, 0 otherwise; Environment is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the activities of the company have an important impact 
on the environment and 0 if otherwise; Customer is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company belongs to a consumer 
products and services industry and 0 if otherwise; List is a dummy variable: 1 for dual listed A- and H-share companies, 
0 otherwise; BoardInd is the proportion of independent directors on the board at the end of each fiscal year; Shareholder10 
is the percentage of shares possessed by the top 10 shareholders; Stateshare is the proportion of state-owned shares among 
the top 10 largest shareholders at the end of each fiscal year; Boardsize is the natural logarithm of the number of directors 
on the board; Violation is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company violates regulations prescribed by the government 
and 0 if otherwise; Donation is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company donates to the community and 0 if otherwise; 





For leverage (H1a and H1b), the findings of this study are consistent with García-Sánchez 
et al. (2018), Dilling and Caykoylu (2019), and Ahmed Haji and Anifowose (2016a). A 
highly leveraged company tends to provide creditors with more private information (so 
called “information advantage”) (Xiao & Yuan, 2007), such as “a firm’s competitive 
advantages and its internal environments” (Pavlopoulos et al., 2017, p. 26), which 
weakens the need for higher IR disclosure practices. Also, debt itself has a control effect 
on agency costs, which weakens the control effect of information disclosure, as the 
monitoring mechanism of management, on agency costs (Boubaker et al., 2011). 
Therefore, the need for a higher IR disclosure practice is decreased. Furthermore, from 
the perspective of the creditors’ power, the result suggests that pressures from debtors do 
not positively impact IR disclosure practices, which is contrary to the finding of Huang 
and Kung (2010). The findings of H1a and H1b detract from agency, signalling, and 
stakeholder theories.  
 
The findings indicate that firm size is significantly and positively associated with the IR 
disclosure practices, which is consistent with the findings of Ahmed Haji and Anifowose 
(2016a), Girella et al. (2019), Vitolla et al. (2019c), and Huang and Kung (2010). Agency 
theory, stakeholder theory, and signalling theory provide support for this finding. Agency 
theory posits that a large company confronts greater information asymmetry and higher 
agency costs (Celik et al., 2006; An, 2012; Frías-Aceituno et al., 2014; Kılıç & Kuzey, 
2018b). Therefore, in order to mitigate agency problems, large companies have incentives 
to offer higher IR disclosure practices (Girella et al., 2019). According to stakeholder 
theory, large companies are subject to greater attention and pressure from stakeholders. 
Thus, providing a higher IR disclosure practice is a means to meet the information 
demands of different stakeholders and discharge accountability to them (An, 2012; 
Girella et al., 2019; Hahn & Kühnen, 2013). With reference to signalling theory, large 
companies have a higher need for financing. In order to attract funds from capital markets, 
a higher IR disclosure practice can be used by large companies to convey a positive signal 
to investors (Frías-Aceituno et al., 2014). From the perspective of employees’ power, 
Nicolò et al. (2020a) report that the number of employees affects the extent of IR 
disclosures. Similarly, Vitolla et al. (2019c) document that the quality of IR disclosures 
by 145 international companies that have adopted IR is significantly and positively 




financial and non-financial information because such information is closely related to 
employees’ rights and interests (Huang & Kung, 2010). A higher IR disclosure practice 
improves mutual understanding between employees and management, leading to greater 
employee loyalty (Guo et al., 2009). The findings of H2a and H2b provide support for 
agency, signalling, and stakeholder theories.  
 
Looking at audit quality (H3a and H3b), the findings indicate that audit quality has no 
significant impact on IR disclosure practices. This is similar to the findings of Rivera-
Arrubla et al. (2017). The reason that there is no significant association between the 
pressures from Big-4 auditors and IR disclosure practices is probably that IR contains 
many non-voluntary disclosures, which might not be influences by the type of accounting 
firms used (Huang & Kung, 2010). Agency and signalling theories are used as the basis 
for developing H3a and H3b. However, the two theories cannot be supported by the 
findings related to H3a and H3b. 
 
Profitability (ROA) negatively impacts IR disclosure practices (H4a and H4b), which 
may be explained by the fact that profitable companies tend to reduce their IR disclosure 
practices to prevent the release of their sensitive information, which may be used by their 
competitors (Frías-Aceituno et al., 2014; Sonnier et al., 2007). The findings of H4a and 
H4b detract from agency and signalling theories.   
 
With regard to H5a and H5b, the result reveals that although financial companies are 
subject to varied disclosure requirements in China, as compared with non-financial 
companies (Xiao & Yuan, 2007), whether a firm belongs to the financial sector does not 
affect IR disclosure practices. The findings related to H5a and H5b do not provide support 
for legitimacy and institutional theories.  
 
The results do not provide empirical evidence that pressure from environmental 
protection organisations (Environmentsensitive) affects IR disclosure practices (H6a and 
H6b), confirming that the power of environmental protection organisations, while strong 
in western countries, is still weak in China (Yang & Chan. 2011). Stakeholder, legitimacy 
and institutional theories are not supported by the findings for H6a and H6b.  
 
For H7a and H7b, the results imply that pressures from customers positively impact IR 




Fernandez-Feijoo et al. (2014). According to Fernandez-Feijoo et al. (2014, p. 60), 
“companies in industries with closer proximity to customers may be trying to improve 
their brand image by increasing the transparency of their reports”. The findings for H7a 
and H7b intensify signalling, stakeholder, legitimacy, and institutional theories. 
 
Listing status (H8a and H8b) does not significantly impact IR disclosure practices, 
implying that whether a firm is a solo-listed A-share company or a dual-listed A- and H-
share company does not influence IR disclosure practices. This is different from the 
findings of Xiao and Yuan (2007). Xiao and Yuan (2007) find that dual-listed on the 
mainland Chinese and Hong Kong stock exchanges is associated with the extent of 
voluntary disclosures. According to institutional theory, dual-listed A- and H-share 
companies and solo-listed A-share companies imitate each other’s corporate reporting 
behaviour to respond to institutional pressure, which derives from society’s comparison 
between solo-listed A-share companies and dual-listed A- and H-share companies (Liu, 
2014). The findings for H8a and H8b cannot support stakeholder and institutional theories.  
 
With regard to H9a and H9b, the proportion of independent directors positively and 
significantly affects IR disclosure practices, which supports the findings of Pavlopoulos 
et al. (2017) and Vitolla et al. (2020a), and claims made in agency theory. Agency theory 
posits that independent directors, as an important tool for monitoring management 
(Bowrin, 2018; Fama & Jensen, 1983), can reduce information asymmetry and agency 
problems (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Kelton & Yang, 2008). A higher proportion of 
independent directors seems beneficial for the improvement of a company’s IR disclosure 
practices because these directors can use higher IR disclosure practices to produce a better 
governance structure, which ensures minority shareholders can access adequate 
information and reduces the possibility of the management withholding information 
(Yuen et al., 2009). Agency theory is supported by the findings related to H9a and H9b.  
 
In terms of ownership concentration (H10a and H10b), the insignificant association 
between ownership concentration and IR disclosure practices may result from controlling 
shareholders tending to depend less on publicly available information because they are 
informed directly from internal sources (Fasan et al., 2016; Yuen et al., 2009). The 
insignificant coefficient of ownership concentration (Shareholder10) confirms that lower 




can encourage a firm’s IR disclosure practices (Liu & Anbumozhi, 2009). Agency and 
stakeholder theories cannot be supported by the findings relating to H10a and H10b.  
 
Although H11a and H11b are rejected, the result still confirms the findings of some 
studies that explore the information disclosures of corporate reporting by Chinese 
companies, such as Xiao and Yuan (2007), Yuen et al. (2009), and Li et al. (2013). The 
insignificant association between state shares and IR disclosure practices might result 
from the fact that state shareholders can access the information they need from the firm 
directly, rather than relying on publicly available information (Xiao & Yuan, 2007). The 
insignificant relationship between IR disclosure practices and state shares demonstrates 
that the Chinese government does not exert strong enough pressure on the IR disclosure 
practices of Chinese listed companies through state-owned shares. The findings of H11a 
and H11b do not confirm agency and stakeholder theories.  
 
For H12a and H12b, although the coefficient of Boardsize is positive, it is not statistically 
significant. This result may be because the positive effect of the increase of board size on 
IR disclosure practices is negated by the negative effect of the increase of board size on 
IR disclosure practices. The working efficiency of an excessively large board is low due 
to “the lack of communication and coordination…the limited capacity for supervision, 
discussion, and control in the decision-making process” (Cooray et al., 2020, p. 17), 
resulting in a negative effect on IR disclosure practices. Agency theory cannot be 
supported by the findings relating to H12a and H12b.  
 
The results for CEO duality (H13a and H13b) indicate a significant relationship between 
CEO duality and IR disclosure practices, which is analogous to the findings of Xiao and 
Yuan (2007). CEO duality impedes the provision of a high level of information 
disclosures to stakeholders because if a CEO also serves as the chairman of the board, 
she/he may neglect the well-being of stakeholders as a result of her/his overly strong 
power in the firm’s decision-making (Cooray et al., 2020). Agency theory is confirmed 
by the findings for H13a and H13b.  
 
The results do not provide empirical evidence that pressures from regulatory authorities 
(Violation) affect IR disclosure practices (H14a and H14b), indicating the role of 
regulatory authorities in influencing IR disclosure practices is weak. Although regulatory 




(Huang & Kung, 2010), the pressures from regulatory authorities do not influence the IR 
disclosure practices. Stakeholder theory cannot be supported by the findings for H14a and 
H14b.  
 
The results indicate that there is a significantly positive association between donation to 
communities and IR disclosure practices (both extent and quality) (H15a and H15b), 
meaning the pressures from communities have an impact on the IR disclosure practices. 
Drawing upon the argument presented by Jenkins (2004), attaining good community 
relationships is regarded as one of the most important drivers of IR disclosure practices 
by Chinese companies. Stakeholder theory is verified by the findings relating to H15a 
and H15b.  
 
The insignificant coefficient of overseas customer (Overseas) suggests that Chinese listed 
companies have not produced higher IR disclosure practices in response to pressures from 
international consumers (H16a and H16b). In order to obtain a competitive edge in the 
global market, Chinese companies need to offer higher IR disclosure practices to show 
that Chinese companies are working towards internationally recognised standards and to 
gain ongoing ‘legitimacy’ through international consumers (Dong et al., 2014). The 
findings for H16a and H16b do not provide support for stakeholder theory.  
 
Overall, the results suggest that the internal characteristics of a company (profitability, 
leverage, the proportion of independent directors on the board, CEO duality) and 
stakeholders’ pressures (customers, employees, and communities) are both drivers of IR 
disclosure practices in the Chinese context, indicating that IR disclosure practice is not 
only affected by the internal characteristics of a company, but also by stakeholders’ 
pressures on the company. Overall, at present, Chinese listed firms are providing IR 
disclosures primarily to meet the information needs of customers, employees, and 
communities and to show alignment with their expectations. Customers, employees, and 
communities, as important stakeholders in western countries, have become significant in 
China (Dong et al., 2014). From the perspective of stakeholder theory, IR can play a role 
in managing and responding to a firm’s various stakeholder groups, not only shareholders, 




9.3 The effect of IR disclosure practices on agency costs 
9.3.1 Model specification 
In order to confirm the hypotheses developed in Chapter 8 (H17a and H17b), the 
following regression model (see Equation (2)) is created. All variables shown in Equation 
(2) are defined in Table 9.8. Standard errors are clustered by firm; Year and Industry 
dummy variables are included to control for fixed effects of years and industries, 
respectively (Caglio et al., 2019). A lead-lag approach56 by one year for the independent 
variable and control variables, as adopted by Dhaliwal et al. (2011) and Lee and Yeo 
(2016), addresses endogeneity concerns.  
 
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +
+𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟10𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽7𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                                      (2) 
 
Table 9.8 Definitions of variables  
Variables Definitions 
Agency cost (Agencost) Tobin’s Q multiplied by the operating cash flow in fiscal year t 
scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year t (H17) 
(Pavlopoulos et al., 2017).  
The extent of IR disclosures 
(Extent) 
The extent of IR disclosures of each company 
The quality of IR disclosures 
(Totalquality) 
The quality of IR disclosures of each company 
Leverage (Lev) Book value of total liabilities of a company at the end of each fiscal 
year divided by the book value of total assets of the company at the 
end of each fiscal year  
Asset Natural logarithm of book value of total assets of a company at the 
end of each fiscal year 
Growth opportunity (MTB) The ratio of market value of equity and book value of equity  
 
56 Chinese listed companies are allowed to publish their annual reports within four months after the end of 
the financial year. As Landau et al. (2020) point out that “...data is not available to investors before the 
publication of their annual report...some companies of the data sample did not publish their annual report 
within a 3-month period after their fiscal year-end” (p.6-7), it is not reasonable to test the effect of IR 
disclosure practices of corporate reports published after the fiscal year on agency costs measured based on 
the end of the fiscal year. Thus, the dependent variable is the agency costs measured 12 months after the 




ROE Net profit (after interest and taxation) for each fiscal year divided 
by book value of the total equity at the end of this fiscal year  
Ownership concentration 
(Shareholder10) 
The percentage of shares possessed by the top 10 shareholders  
State Dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is a SOE and 0 otherwise 
CEO duality (Duality) Dummy variable equal to 1 if the same person serves as CEO and 
chairman of the board, and 0 if otherwise 
Independent directors (BoardInd) 
 
The proportion of independent directors on the board at the end of 
each fiscal year 
Board Size (Boardsize) Natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board 
 
Based on the prior literature, some control variables are included to increase the goodness 
of the regression model. In line with some previous studies, firm size (Asset), profitability 
(ROE), financial leverage (Leverage), and growth opportunity (MTB) are incorporated 
into the regression model (Du, 2013a; Pavlopoulos et al., 2017). Agency costs has a 
significant relationship with firm size and financial leverage, respectively (Obeng et al., 
2020a). Profitability and growth opportunity influence agency cost as well (Smith & 
Watts, 1982). Moreover, according to Panda and Leepsa (2017), ownership structure, 
board size, independent board members and CEO duality are also impact factors of 
agency costs; thus, following studies such as those of Du (2013a), Florackis (2008), and 
Singh and Davidson III (2003), ownership concentration (Shareholder10), state-control 
(State), board size (Boardsize), independent board members (BoardInd), and CEO duality 
(Duality) are adopted as control variables. By referring to industrial classification 
provided by industry classification benchmark (ICB), China Securities Regulatory 
Commission, and relevant literature (e.g., Melloni et al., 2017), 3 industry groups are 
distinguished: 95 firms in consumer goods, consumer service, technology, and 
telecommunication; 185 firms in oil and gas, basic materials, industrials, and utilities; and 
220 firms in financials and real estate. 
9.3.2 Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 9.9 shows the descriptive statistics for all the variables. The mean value of agency 








Table 9.9 Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Extent 500 .755 .076 .500 .926 
Totalquality 500 .520 .067 .332 .675 
Extent_new 500 .770 .072 .526 .930 
Totalquality_new 500 .504 .070 .314 .667 
Agencost 500 .082 .175 -.318 1.355 
Leverage 500 .704 .180 .131 .945 
ROE 500 .120 .066 .002 .433 
Asset 500 26.549 1.566 23.782 30.952 
Shareholder10 500 .231 .155 .007 .759 
MTB 500 1.678 1.163 .346 11.761 
Boardsize 500 2.336 .282 1.609 2.944 
BoardInd 500 .392 .075 .200 .800 
Dummy Variables N Percent of sample 
Duality 
1 56 11.2% 
0 444 88.8% 
State 
1 405 81% 
0 95 19% 
Notes: Extent is the extent of IR disclosures of each company; Totalquality is the quality of IR disclosures 
of each company; Extent_new is the new extent of IR disclosures of each company; Totalquality_new is 
the new quality of IR disclosures of each company; Agencost is the Tobin’s Q multiplied by the operating 
cash flow in fiscal year t scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year t; Leverage is the book value of 
total liabilities of a company at the end of each fiscal year divided by the book value of total assets of the 
company at the end of each fiscal year; Asset is the natural logarithm of book value of total assets of a 
company at the end of each fiscal year; MTB is the ratio of market value of equity and book value of equity; 
ROE is the net profit (after interest and taxation) for each fiscal year divided by book value of the total 
equity at the end of this fiscal year; Shareholder10 is the percentage of shares possessed by the top 10 
shareholders; State is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is a SOE and 0 otherwise; Duality is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the same person serves as CEO and chairman of the board, and 0 if otherwise; 
BoardInd is the proportion of independent directors on the board at the end of each fiscal year; Boardsize 
is the natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board. 
 
Univariate analysis 
Table 9.10 indicates that agency costs do not correlate significantly with either the extent 
of IR disclosures or the quality of IR disclosures in the Spearman and Pearson Correlation 
triangle. However, these univariate results do not capture other factors that have a 
potential impact on agency costs. Therefore, multivariate analysis is used to obtain more 
accurate results (Magnis & Iatridis, 2017). Both correlation tests and variance inflation 




Table 9.10 Correlation analysis 




Asset Leverage MTB State Shareholder10 Duality ROE Boardsize BoardInd 
Agencost 1 0.049 0.053 0.059 0.061 -0.221*** -0.495*** 0.223*** 0.095** 0.134*** 0.099** 0.097** -0.101** -0.006 
Extent 0.010 1 0.996*** 0.905*** 0.908*** 0.277*** -0.066 -0.192*** 0.063 0.047 -0.057 -0.130*** 0.009 0.230*** 
Extent_new 0.017 0.997*** 1 0.901*** 0.901*** 0.249*** -0.088** -0.181*** 0.051 0.042 -0.056 -0.137*** -0.006 0.227*** 
Totalquality -0.008 0.905*** 0.903*** 1 0.998*** 0.300*** -0.113** -0.252*** 0.102** 0.117*** -0.060 -0.148*** -0.011 0.241*** 
Totalquality_new -0.010 0.911*** 0.905*** 0.998*** 1 0.318*** -0.098** -0.258*** 0.114** 0.119*** -0.062 -0.147*** -0.002 0.243*** 
Asset -0.295*** 0.242*** 0.215*** 0.278*** 0.296*** 1 0.658*** -0.495*** 0.138*** 0.037 -0.071 0.037 0.355*** -0.010 
Leverage -0.548*** -0.061 -0.074* -0.105** -0.093** 0.612*** 1 -0.241*** -0.023 -0.238*** -0.056 0.095** 0.392*** -0.159*** 
MTB 0.485*** -0.151*** -0.139*** -0.228*** -0.233*** -0.438*** -0.305*** 1 -0.124*** -0.121*** 0.119*** 0.326*** -0.141*** -0.018 
State 0.001 0.042 0.031 0.101** 0.111** 0.116*** -0.043 -0.097** 1 0.176*** -0.087* -0.101** -0.025 0.073 
Shareholder10 0.076* 0.082* 0.074* 0.140*** 0.142*** 0.088** -0.245*** -0.062 0.158*** 1 -0.118*** -0.040 -0.302*** 0.243*** 
Duality 0.045 -0.035 -0.032 -0.047 -0.048 -0.072 0.001 0.074* -0.087* -0.114** 1 0.082* -0.023 0.050 
ROE 0.413*** -0.122*** -0.122*** -0.150*** -0.152*** -0.027 -0.091** 0.452*** -0.106** -0.037 0.146*** 1 0.058 -0.052 
Boardsize -0.170*** 0.024 0.011 -0.006 0.002 0.431*** 0.381*** -0.146*** -0.029 -0.260*** -0.044 -0.004 1 -0.433*** 
BoardInd 0.041 0.221*** 0.216*** 0.228*** 0.233*** -0.034 -0.095** -0.009 0.086* 0.213*** 0.009 -0.021 -0.516*** 1 
Notes: Pearson correlations reported below the diagonal and Spearman correlations above the diagonal.  
The superscripts ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
Variables definition: Extent is the extent of IR disclosures of each company; Totalquality is the quality of IR disclosures of each company; Extent_new is the 
new extent of IR disclosures of each company; Totalquality_new is the new quality of IR disclosures of each company; Agencost is the Tobin’s Q multiplied by the 
operating cash flow in fiscal year t scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year t; Leverage is the book value of total liabilities of a company at the end of each fiscal 
year divided by the book value of total assets of the company at the end of each fiscal year; Asset is the natural logarithm of book value of total assets of a company at 
the end of each fiscal year; MTB is the ratio of market value of equity and book value of equity; ROE is the net profit (after interest and taxation) for each fiscal year 
divided by book value of the total equity at the end of this fiscal year; Shareholder10 is the percentage of shares possessed by the top 10 shareholders; State is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if a firm is a SOE and 0 otherwise; Duality is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the same person serves as CEO and chairman of the board, and 0 if 
otherwise; BoardInd is the proportion of independent directors on the board at the end of each fiscal year; Boardsize is the natural logarithm of the number of directors 













Multivariate analysis and discussion 
Table 9.11 demonstrates the regressions of agency costs on the IR disclosure practices. Specifically, 
model 1 shows the regressions of agency costs on the extent of IR disclosures whereas model 2 
exhibits the regressions of agency costs on the quality of IR disclosures. In model 1, the coefficient 
on the extent of IR disclosures is negative and significant (at 5% level). Thus, H17a is accepted. In 
model 2, the regression analysis presents a significant negative association (at 5% level) between 
agency costs and the quality of IR disclosures. This result provides strong support for H17b.  
 
Table 9.11 Regression results 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
 Agencost Agencost 
Extent (H17a) -0.216**  
 (-1.98)  
Totalquality (H17b)  -0.323** 
  (-2.52) 
Asset 0.025*** 0.028*** 
 (3.36) (3.64) 
Leverage -0.407*** -0.421*** 
 (-4.40) (-4.56) 
MTB 0.048*** 0.047*** 
 (5.19) (5.21) 
State 0.012 0.013 
 (0.51) (0.56) 
Shareholder10 -0.029 -0.035 
 (-0.54) (-0.66) 
Duality -0.021 -0.022 
 (-0.95) (-1.00) 
ROE 0.551*** 0.544*** 
 (3.51) (3.50) 
BoardInd 0.025 0.023 
 (0.66) (0.62) 
Boardsize 0.027 0.033 
 (0.25) (0.31) 
Constant -0.284** -0.344*** 
 (-2.47) (-3.02) 
Year Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes 
N 500 500 
Adj.R2 0.521 0.524 
F 22.173 22.782 
Notes: The superscripts ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
All reported t statistics are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. 
Variables definition: Extent is the extent of IR disclosures of each company; Totalquality is the quality of IR 
disclosures of each company; Agencost is the Tobin’s Q multiplied by the operating cash flow in fiscal year t scaled by 
total assets at the beginning of the year t; Leverage is the book value of total liabilities of a company at the end of each 
fiscal year divided by the book value of total assets of the company at the end of each fiscal year; Asset is the natural 
logarithm of book value of total assets of a company at the end of each fiscal year; MTB is the ratio of market value of 
equity and book value of equity; ROE is the net profit (after interest and taxation) for each fiscal year divided by book 




shareholders; State is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is a SOE and 0 otherwise; Duality is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if the same person serves as CEO and chairman of the board, and 0 if otherwise; BoardInd is the proportion of 
independent directors on the board at the end of each fiscal year; Boardsize is the natural logarithm of the number of 




9.3.3 Robustness tests 
The use of the new extent of IR disclosures and the new quality of IR disclosures is to investigate the 
effect of IR disclosure practices on agency costs from an unbiased perspective. Table 9.12 shows the 
results of the robustness analysis for the effect of IR disclosure practices on agency costs. In this 
robustness test, the measurement of the extent of IR disclosures is changed. The weighting of each 
item collected from Chinese stakeholders is used. Accordingly, the new extent of IR disclosures is 
adopted in multiple regression analysis. The regression result is identical to the main finding. Table 
9.12 also exhibits the result of the robustness analysis for determinants of the quality of IR disclosures. 
In this robustness test, the measurement of the quality of IR disclosures is altered. All disclosure items 
are assigned equal weighting. Accordingly, the new quality of IR disclosures is adopted in multiple 
regression analysis. The result is consistent with the main finding. Based on the results from the 
robustness tests, it can be argued that the main findings of this research are reliable.   
 
Table 9.12 Regression results 
 Model (3) Model (4) 
 Agencost Agencost 
Extent_new (H17a) -0.230**  
 (-2.07)  
Totalquality_new (H17b)  -0.302** 
  (-2.42) 
Asset 0.025*** 0.028*** 
 (3.35) (3.63) 
Leverage -0.406*** -0.420*** 
 (-4.40) (-4.55) 
MTB 0.048*** 0.047*** 
 (5.20) (5.20) 
State 0.012 0.014 
 (0.49) (0.59) 
Shareholder10 -0.029 -0.034 
 (-0.55) (-0.64) 
Duality -0.021 -0.022 
 (-0.96) (-0.99) 
ROE 0.551*** 0.543*** 
 (3.49) (3.50) 
BoardInd 0.025 0.024 
 (0.65) (0.62) 
Boardsize 0.025 0.035 
 (0.24) (0.32) 
Constant -0.263** -0.361*** 
 (-2.22) (-3.17) 
Year Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes 
N 500 500 




F 22.275 22.691 
Notes: The superscripts ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
All reported t statistics are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. 
Variables definition: Extent_new is the new extent of IR disclosures of each company; Totalquality_new is the 
new quality of IR disclosures of each company; Agencost is the Tobin’s Q multiplied by the operating cash flow in fiscal 
year t scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year t; Leverage is the book value of total liabilities of a company at 
the end of each fiscal year divided by the book value of total assets of the company at the end of each fiscal year; Asset 
is the natural logarithm of book value of total assets of a company at the end of each fiscal year; MTB is the ratio of 
market value of equity and book value of equity; ROE is the net profit (after interest and taxation) for each fiscal year 
divided by book value of the total equity at the end of this fiscal year; Shareholder10 is the percentage of shares possessed 
by the top 10 shareholders; State is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is a SOE and 0 otherwise; Duality is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the same person serves as CEO and chairman of the board, and 0 if otherwise; BoardInd is the 
proportion of independent directors on the board at the end of each fiscal year; Boardsize is the natural logarithm of the 





The results suggest that IR disclosure practices can reduce agency costs, which provides 
support for agency theory. This confirms the finding of Pavlopoulos et al. (2017). The 
information asymmetry between stakeholders and managers aggravates agency costs 
(Barako & Brown, 2008; LaFond & Watts, 2008; Scott, 1997). Companies that release 
corporate reports with higher quality of IR disclosures will deliver more transparent 
financial and non-financial information (Cooray et al., 2020). IR, as a tool that can 
enhance the level of information disclosures, can reduce the information asymmetry 
between stakeholders and managers, leading to lower agency costs (Pavlopoulos et al., 
2017). For instance, a higher IR disclosure practice gives investors better monitoring 
ability to verify the behaviour of the management (Obeng et al., 2020a). Moreover, a 
higher IR disclosure practice means the provision of strategy-focused, future-oriented, 
and multi-capital-embedded information as well as a better compensation contract (a 
much wider range of metrics compared with traditional accounting metrics) (Obeng et al., 
2020a). Also, for managers, IR can reduce managerial myopia, improve the quality of 
decision making, and increase discussion about multiple aspects of the firm, thereby 
enhancing managers’ insights about creating and sustaining value (Obeng et al., 2020a). 
All these features of IR can allow for better interest alignment between investors and 
managers. Thus, this finding verifies that reducing information asymmetry between the 
organisation and all stakeholders is one of the motivations to encourage companies to 




9.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter firstly examines the determinants of IR disclosure practices. The results 
reveal that four internal characteristics of firms: profitability, leverage, the proportion 
of independent directors on the board, and CEO duality, are impact factors of IR 
disclosure practices. Specifically, three factors (profitability, leverage, and CEO duality) 
negatively affect IR disclosure practices while an increasing proportion of independent 
directors on the board positively affects IR disclosure practices. In addition, the 
pressures from customers, employees, and communities impact IR disclosure practices. 
IR disclosure practices are not only affected by the internal characteristics of a company, 
but also by stakeholders’ pressures on the company. This chapter investigates the 
association between IR disclosure practices and agency costs, and finds that the IR 
disclosure practices can reduce agency costs. A summary of the findings is provided in 
Table 9.13.  
 
Table 9.13 A Summary of the findings 
Hypothesis Findings 
H1a and H1b Financial leverage negatively affects IR disclosure practices 
H2a and H2b Firm size positively affects IR disclosure practices 
H3a and H3b Audit quality does not affect IR disclosure practices 
H4a and H4b Profitability negatively affects IR disclosure practices 
H5a and H5b Financial sector does not affect IR disclosure practices 
H6a and H6b Environmentally sensitive sector does not affect IR disclosure 
practices 
H7a and H7b Consumer-based sector positively affects IR disclosure practices 
H8a and H8b Listing status does not affect IR disclosure practices 
H9a and H9b The proportion of independent directors on the board positively 
affects IR disclosure practices 
H10a and H10b Ownership concentration does not affect IR disclosure practices 
H11a and H11b State-owned share does not affect IR disclosure practices 
H12a and H12b Board size does not affect IR disclosure practices 
H13a and H13b CEO duality negatively affects IR disclosure practices 




H15a and H15b Community positively affects IR disclosure practices 
H16a and H16b Overseas customers do not affect IR disclosure practices 
H17a and H17b IR disclosure practices negatively affects agency costs 
 
From a theoretical point of view, the theoretical framework consisting of five theories 
is explanatory in interpreting firms’ decisions to engage in high IR disclosure practices. 
The incentives for high IR disclosure practice are manifold, framed both by economic 
and societal considerations. The findings of this chapter intensify or refute stakeholder, 
agency, signalling, legitimacy and institutional theory to some extent. Specifically, the 
findings of this chapter provide supporting evidence for socio-political theories 
(stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory, institutional theory). However, economics-
based theories (agency theory and signalling theory) are both supported and refuted by 




10 CHAPTER TEN 




This chapter examines the perceptions of Chinese stakeholders on the barriers to the 
adoption of IR and recommendations for IR implementation. The analysis undertaken 
in this chapter is based on the findings of the third-round questionnaire survey of the 
51 stakeholders who participated in the construction of the IR disclosure index (as 
discussed in Chapter six). Two open-ended questions posed to the stakeholders include: 
“If IR is to be adopted in China, what are the barriers to IR adoption and challenges to 
IR adoption?” and “What are your recommendations on the implementation of IR in 
China?” The findings of the content analysis in Chapter seven reveal some of the 
shortcomings in IR disclosure practices. The views expressed by the stakeholders 
supplement the findings of Chapter seven by providing additional insights on how the 
barriers are possible causes for low IR disclosure practices in China. Also, the views 
held by participants in regard to the recommendations for the implementation of IR in 
China can provide insights into how to alleviate poor IR disclosure practices of some 
companies and improve the overall IR disclosure practices of Chinese companies. 
Additionally, as Chapter nine deals with hypothesis testing to determine some factors 
that affect IR disclosure practices and some factors that are affected by IR disclosure 
practices, this chapter provides some insights for understanding whether these factors 
can influence some of these barriers or alternatively be influenced by the barriers.   
 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 10.2 presents the findings 
and analysis of the first question. Section 10.3 presents the findings and analysis of the 
second question. Section 10.4 summarises the chapter. 
 
10.2 The barriers to IR adoption and challenges to IR adoption: 





A sample of 51 participants from various stakeholder groups was chosen to provide 
their insights on two questions. 39 participants responded and provided answers while 
the other 12 of the total of 51 participants did not provide any comments. The 
summaries about barriers to IR adoption and the identities of participants are listed in 
Table 10.1. There are eleven potential barriers to IR adoption.  
 
Table 10.1 Barriers to IR adoption 
Barrier Participant 
Being used as a marketing tool P5, P47 
Lack of integrated thinking P1, P11, P16, P19 
Lack of usefulness P48 
Cost constraints P12, P13, P17, P26, P50 
Varied interpretations of IR P4, P9, P38 
Lack of connected information P3, P15, P27 
Regarding it as a mere formality P2, P39 
Tension between conciseness and 
completeness 
P31, P45 
The relative importance of the six capitals P10, P49 
Missing some important information P8, P32, P35, P36 
Mandatory vs voluntary IR adoption P7, P14, P20, P21, P22, P25, P28, 
P33, P34 




Being used as a marketing tool  
The management of an organization may use IR as a marketing tool intentionally to 
build the image (Gerwanski, 2020). If IR becomes a marketing tool, it means IR is used 
as a tool to improve a firm’s reputation rather than providing reliable and credible 
information to improve decision usefulness and the firm’s transparency (Solomon & 
Maroun, 2012).  In this study, some participants were concerned that IR will become 
just a marketing tool. A participant stated that: 
Companies may use integrated reports as marketing tools. (P5, an accounting scholar) 




Unless integrated reporting can overcome weaknesses in both financial and sustainability 
reporting and can provide reliable and credible information, otherwise it may become a 
mere ‘marketing tool’. (P47, a financial analyst in an investment company) 
The opinions held by participants in this research who asserted that IR may become a 
mere marketing tool for companies are similar to views in previous studies, such as 
those of Attanayake Mudiyanselage (2018), Gerwanski et al. (2019) and Vitolla et al. 
(2019a). Vitolla et al. (2019a) argue that being used as a marketing tool is a potential 
risk linked to the implementation of IR. Referring to the study by Stubbs and Higgins 
(2018), Attanayake Mudiyanselage (2018) believes the reason that companies use 
integrated reports as marketing tools to manage their image and reputation is that they 
adopt a weak accountability approach towards stakeholders. Relying on integrated 
thinking is one of the important cures for this problem; otherwise, IR will not improve 
transparency and decision usefulness (Gerwanski et al., 2019). 
 
Lack of integrated thinking 
According to Dumay and Dai (2017), integrated thinking is “the crux of IR” (p. 579). 
Integrated thinking is a necessary condition of IR (Black Sun, 2012). Integrated 
thinking is defined by the IIRF as “the active consideration by an organisation of the 
relationships between its various operating and functional units and the capitals that the 
organisation uses or affects. Integrated thinking leads to integrated decision-making 
and actions that consider the creation of value over the short, medium and long term” 
(IIRC, 2013, p.33). Piermattei and Venturini (2016) describe the relationship between 
IR and integrated thinking as a “chicken and egg” relationship. The lack of integrated 
thinking can be a barrier to IR practices. Two participants believed that the lack of 
integrated thinking will become a barrier to IR adoption. One participant indicated that: 
No integrated thinking, no IR. It is important for every ordinary employee to obtain an in-
depth understanding of what integrated thinking is because ordinary staff are the 
participants of IR preparation. More importantly, I believe that integrated thinking must 
be embedded into top management’s thinking because the support from top management 
is the internal driver of IR adoption.  (P11, a financial manager) 
Another participant emphasized that: 
The lack of integrated thinking will be a barrier to IR adoption. I believe if integrated 
thinking is embedded in the activities of the company, various information will be 




integrated thinking within the organisation can facilitate the development of integrated 
reporting. (P19, a financial analyst in a bank)   
 
These views indicate the necessity of embedding integrated thinking in the 
understanding of every employee and in the activities of a company. This viewpoint 
supports previous studies. Incorporating IR in the company needs to permeate all layers 
of the company through integrated thinking (Al-Htaybat & von Alberti-Alhtaybat, 
2018). Implementing integrated thinking successfully needs deep employee 
participation (Attanayake Mudiyanselage, 2018; Feng et al., 2017), top management 
support (Attanayake Mudiyanselage, 2018; Gunarathne & Senaratne, 2017; Robertson 
& Samy, 2015), and embedding integrated thinking into the organisation’s activities 
(Hsiao & Kelly, 2018; IIRC, 2013). According to Atkins and Maroun (2015), top 
management needs to be more involved in IR preparation; otherwise, nothing can be 
really changed. Moreover, in accordance with the IIRC (2013, p. 2), “the more that 
integrated thinking is embedded into an organisation’s activities, the more naturally 
will provide the connectivity of information flow into management reporting, analysis 
and decision making, and subsequently into the integrated report.” 
 
A participant stated that: 
The separated departments will impede the process of integrated thinking, resulting in 
difficulty in implementing IR. This is because the silo effect57 will cause the loss of linkage 
between the annual reports and sustainability reports. Therefore, cross-departmental 
cooperation related to the company’s corporate reporting compilation is important. I 
suggest establishing a cross-departmental team to foster integrated thinking. (P1, an 
accounting scholar) 
In a similar vein, Robertson and Samy (2015) believe that the silo effect existing 
between different departments within a company may create a barrier to IR adoption. 
In order to implement integrated thinking successfully, cross-departmental 
collaboration is needed (Cosma et al., 2018; Robertson & Samy, 2015). 
 
However, a participant stated that: 
 
57 The silo effect is a phrase which describes a lack of communication and mutual objectives between 




It is hard to understand the meaning of integrated thinking. (P16, a financial analyst in a 
bank) 
According to this participant’s feedback, the concept of integrated thinking is difficult 
to understand. IIRC is the only professional organisation that has formally offered a 
definition of integrated thinking (Al-Htaybat & von Alberti-Alhtaybat, 2018). However, 
although IIRC has given a definition, it does not explain the definition well (Feng et al., 
2017).  
 
Lack of usefulness 
There is a concern about the lack of usefulness of IR itself. Hsiao and Kelly (2018) 
indicate that Taiwanese investors doubt the usefulness of IR in investment decision 
making. Slack and Tsalavoutas (2018) also find IR to be of little use to fund managers 
and equity analysts. In addition, Abhayawansa et al. (2019) report that IR has low 
usefulness to sell-side analysts. A participant doubted the usefulness of IR. In a similar 
vein, a participant of this study asserted that: 
I do not know why I need IR because it seems the annual report is sufficient for me. It 
seems investors do not perceive IR as relevant to their information needs. (P48, a financial 
analyst in an investment company) 
The participant believed that IR is irrelevant to investors’ information needs. This 
participant further pointed out that: 
IR has to add values to me; otherwise, it is only another cluttered corporate reporting. 
However, IR is still welcomed by me because no investor will reject an additional source 
of information. (P48, a financial analyst in an investment company) 
The participant emphasized that IR must be seen to add value for users. This argument 
supports Haller and van Staden (2014), who stated that value-added information 
contributes considerably to the usefulness of IR. 
 
Cost constraints 
Cost constraints constitute a barrier to IR adoption. Preparing IR is time- and money-
consuming for companies. For this reason, whether the advantages of IR can provide 
direct benefits, especially economic benefits, will determine the willingness of Chinese 
companies to adopt IR. Similarly, interviewees in Adhariani and De Villiers’s study 






Compiling an integrated report needs a vast amount of information (Gunarathne & 
Senaratne, 2017). In this present study, a participant admitted that: 
In addition to daily work, preparing IR, such as collecting necessary information, will 
cost abundant time. (P17, a financial manager) 
Another participant stated that: 
We are willing to embrace IR if it is seen as overcoming the shortcomings of existing 
corporate reporting rather than only generating additional costs. The corporate report 
preparer may be reluctant to produce an annual report, a sustainability report, and an 
integrated report simultaneously. (P12, a financial manager)  
A firm will adopt IR only when it perceives that the benefits of IR exceed the costs of 
IR (Kannenberg & Schreck, 2018). A participant asked: 
Whether the benefits of IR outweigh its costs? If it does, companies may be willing to 
adopt IR. As I know, the cost of preparing integrated reports is high, including the human 
costs, the financial cost, the compliance cost, etc., but it cannot produce immediate 
benefits. (P50, a financial analyst in an investment company) 
Another participant emphasized that: 
The willingness of a company for adopting IR depends on the competitive advantages of 
IR, especially whether the economic value of IR exceeds that of existing types of corporate 
reporting. (P26, an auditor) 
A third participant acknowledged that: 
In recent years, the economic development of companies has not been good. It is difficult 
for companies to make profits, so it is more difficult for companies to commit to the costs 
incurred by the preparing IR, although IR is a trend of the future. (P13, a financial 
manager) 
The participants’ responses are in line with concerns expressed in several studies that 
direct costs discourage firms from making higher IR disclosure practices (Grassmann 
et al., 2019; Fuhrmann, 2019). 
 
Varied interpretations of IR 
Rowbottom and Locke (2015) believe that the varied interpretations of IR cause 
misunderstandings. Many studies, such as those of Fasan (2013), Lodhia and Stone 
(2017), and Steenkamp (2018) support the perception that IR is not simply an evolution 
of sustainability reporting, but an evolution of corporate reporting. One of the 




evolution of sustainability reporting while sustainability reporting is one element of IR. 
However, by examining the GRI Sustainability Disclosure Database, Rowbottom and 
Locke (2015) find that some companies do interpret IR as the evolution of sustainability 
reporting. Adhariani and De Villiers (2018) challenge the perception that sustainability 
reporting is a subset of IR. Although 34% of interviewees in Adhariani and De Villiers's 
(2018) research view sustainability reporting as a subset of IR, Adhariani and De 
Villiers (2018) believe that it is a misconception. Adhariani and De Villiers (2018) 
assert that sustainability reporting and IR are overlapping approaches. Hence, mixing 
up sustainability reporting and IR is one of the barriers to IR adoption. A participant in 
the present study said: 
One barrier is that many practitioners cannot distinguish between IR and sustainability 
reporting. In my opinion, IR is not simply an evolution of the sustainability reporting, but 
an evolution of corporate reporting (P4, an accounting scholar) 
Another participant contended that:  
Most people do not know the difference between sustainability reporting and IR. I 
personally see the sustainability report as a subset of the integrated report. (P38, an 
industry analyst in a consultant company) 
Adams (2015) believes that sustainability reporting and IR can coexist, which is 
consistent with a participant’s view: 
There will be a situation where the integrated report coexists with the financial report 
and the sustainability report. However, IR is the only avenue for the future development 
of sustainability reporting. (P9, an editor in financial media) 
 
Lack of connected information 
The essence of IR is the connectivity of information (Eccles et al., 2015a). Hence, the 
lack of connected information may impede the process of IR adoption in China. Three 
participants expressed that the lack of connected information will become a barrier to 
IR adoption. The first participant contended that: 
In China, the independent appearance of all kinds of financial and non-financial reports 
makes the content of each report overlapped; the problem of redundant information is 
more prominent and some key information is not effectively connected, which not only 
reduces the effectiveness of corporate reporting decision-making but also increases 
compiling costs of corporate reporting and the difficulty of reporting users’ reading and 
understanding, leaving information users to easily overlook material information. I wish 




A similar view was held by another participant. This participant indicated that: 
The essence of an integrated report is not only a presentation of various information but 
to integrate various information that affects the company. The main challenge is not to 
simply increase the amount of information provided inside the annual reports, but to 
increase their relevance through new, comprehensive and condensed reporting practices, 
which combine and interconnect financial and non-financial data. (P15, a financial 
manager)  
Another participant expressed that: 
Establishing a clear link between the key elements of the IR framework is the core of IR. 
This advantage of IR transcends the existing corporate reporting boundaries and 
represents a shift to integrated thinking. However, how to accomplish the advantage is a 
challenge. (P3, an accounting scholar) 
 
Regarding IR as a mere formality 
In the study by Stubbs and Higgins (2014), an interviewee admits that their company’s 
first integrated report was only tacking the sustainability report and financial report 
together and renaming it as an “integrated report”. Ahmed Haji and Hossain (2016) find 
that although the terms relating IR have been applied in integrated reports by companies, 
the quality of disclosures in integrated reports has not actually increased, and companies 
continue to report symbolic disclosures. However, IR is more than just assembling a 
financial report and a sustainability report into a single report (Perez, 2018). In the 
current study, some participants are concerned that IR may become a mere formality. 
A participant stated that: 
I doubt the credibility of integrated reports, especially the accuracy, authenticity, 
sufficiency, objectivity, reliability, verifiability, completeness and traceability of the 
information disclosures in integrated reports. IR may become a mere formality. (P2, an 
accounting scholar) 
Another participant argued that: 
I think some companies may just copy information which they have been publishing in the 
CSR report into the annual report, which results in no real interaction between the 
information. (P39, an industry analyst in a consultant company) 
 
Tension between conciseness and completeness 
IIRC (2013) support the argument that there is an apparent tension between conciseness 




order to ensure completeness, the integrated report is too long and contains too much 
information. A participant in the current study also clearly pointed out that there is a 
tension between conciseness and completeness in IR. This participant questioned: 
I do not know how to ensure the conciseness and completeness of the information in IR 
simultaneously. (P31, an auditor) 
Materiality plays a crucial role in the balance between completeness and conciseness 
(Steenkamp, 2018). Another participant believed that: 
A genuine integrated report should be concise, which allows users to find the information 
they need easily. The integrated report begins with identifying the material issues of the 
company, which is the key to reaching conciseness. I think a set of processes to identify 
material issues is needed and there are three key points in the processes. The first one is 
to place the focus on the information needs of stakeholders. The second one is to discuss 
material issues at the senior management and board level. The last one is to make a clear 
statement about material issues within the integrated reports. (P45, a financial analyst in 
an investment company) 
 
The relative importance of six capitals 
Vitolla et al. (2019a) suggest that IR implementation may create conflicts of interest 
among different stakeholders. Abhayawansa et al. (2019) find that financial analysts 
believe that financial capital is the most important because financial analysts see 
themselves as the representatives of investors and most of their model valuation is 
driven by financial capital. In addition, non-financial capitals are not popular in 
financial analysts’ model valuations since non-financial capitals are hard to quantify 
(Abhayawansa et al., 2015). Van Bommel (2014) argues that there is a risk that 
integrated reports are mainly to satisfy investors’ demands rather than to meet a range 
of stakeholders’ needs. Chapter six verified that stakeholders believe the importance of 
the six capitals is different. Chinese stakeholders value financial capital most but value 
human capital least. 
 
In the current study, participants have varied opinions about the importance of the six 
capitals within IR. One participant highlighted human capital, stating that: 
Different stakeholders may have varied views on the importance of different capitals, 
which causes conflicts of interest among stakeholders and becomes a barrier for IR 
implementation. In my opinion, what dictates a company’s long-term future is human 




my factories, and soon grass will grow on the factory floors. Take away my factories, but 
leave my people, and soon we will have a new and better factory.” (P10, an editor in 
financial media) 
Another participant expressed a view that: 
The six forms of capital do not mean the same importance for each stakeholder. From the 
perspective of an investor, the most important information is financial capital because the 
model valuation is primarily driven by financial capital. However, that’s not to say other 
information is not important. The key non-financial information, especially those in 
human capital, relational capital and intellectual capital are considered as well to some 
extent. What I care about is whether the key non-financial information can be linked with 
financial information, in other words, whether the key non-financial information can be 
summarized by monetary numbers. (P49, a financial analyst in an investment company) 
 
Missing some important information 
Adhariani and De Villiers (2018) find that the fear of releasing sensitive information is 
one of the top challenges in IR implementation. Companies are not willing to divulge 
sensitive information in their integrated reports (Cosma et al., 2018; Dumay et al., 2018). 
The IIRC (2013) also recognizes that one of the constraints on IR is the divulgence of 
sensitive information that may harm companies’ competitive advantage. The sensitive 
information that companies are reluctant to reveal includes the business model (Silvestri 
et al., 2017), negative information (Ahmed Haji & Anifowose, 2016b), and forward-
looking information (Attanayake Mudiyanselage, 2018). For instance, the provision of 
negative information in the current CSR reports of Chinese companies is insufficient. 
According to GoldenBee (2017), only 24.27% of CSR reports contain negative 
information. Although the IIRF emphasizes the importance of releasing negative 
information, failing to disclose negative information can be explained on the basis that 
companies have limited incentives to signal negative matters (Fuhrmann, 2019); thus, 
they use symbolic management (symbolic disclosures) to obtain/maintain legitimacy, 
such as disguising, dismissing or minimizing negative information (Ahmed Haji & 
Hossain, 2016; Neu et al., 1998). Companies are reluctant to disclose any negative 
information unless they perceive the benefits outweigh the perceived costs (Adams, 





Some participants in the current study believed that Chinese companies are reluctant to 
reveal too much information, especially sensitive information, which is in line with the 
finding of Adhariani and De Villiers (2018). Many participants believed that omitting 
some important information will be a barrier to IR adoption. A participant indicated 
that: 
Some companies are not willing to report too much information, such as their business 
model. These kinds of information are often sensitive and seen as commercial secrets by 
companies. Because a large amount of information needs to be disclosed in integrated 
reports, the company may be afraid of leaking business secrets, jeopardizing its core 
competitiveness. (P32, an official in a government agency) 
Another participant also stated that: 
Companies will be resistant to disclosing too much information in integrated reports. 
(P35, an official in a government agency) 
Moreover, another participant stated that: 
Chinese companies usually avoid releasing negative information in their CSR reports. 
(P36, an official in a government agency) 
A fourth participant felt that: 
The current corporate reporting has not sufficiently reflected a forward-looking picture, 
which may still occur in future integrated reports. Information about future prospects 
should be clearly stated in the integrated reports. (P8, an accounting scholar) 
What participants conveyed is consistent with one of the reasons for lower IR disclosure 
practices of organisations; that is, indirect costs prevent firms from engaging in higher 
IR disclosure practices (Fuhrmann, 2019; Grassmann et al., 2019). 
 
Mandatory vs voluntary IR adoption 
There is a divergence on whether IR should be adopted mandatorily or voluntarily, 
which may become a barrier to IR adoption. Many participants support mandating IR 
from different perspectives. One participant admitted that: 
Without the mandatory requirements for IR, some companies are reluctant to disclose too 
much information and evade the crucial information in their integrated reports. In 
addition, the information provided by the company may also be distorted. Some 
companies may only disclose the information that is beneficial to their company. In other 
words, IR may be used by companies to prettify themselves. (P21, a financial analyst in a 
bank) 




Companies will cut the cost of preparing integrated reports if there is no mandatory 
requirement for IR adoption. (P28, an auditor) 
In addition, a participant noted that: 
The competition between IR and other non-financial reporting is another barrier to the 
voluntary adoption of IR. There are a number of guidelines for IR and other non-financial 
reporting; thus, a mandatory standard for IR is needed. Otherwise, inter-competed 
reporting and their guidelines leave companies undecided about which direction to 
choose. (P7, an accounting scholar) 
Similarly, a participant asserted that: 
Without pressure from regulation, companies may take a long time to adopt IR, and the 
lack of uniformity or convergence may become an issue. (P33, an officer in a government 
agency) 
Another participant emphasized that: 
The Chinese government must provide normative guidance and the company must strictly 
abide by it in the whole process of compiling integrated reports to prevent the 
phenomenon of discretion. (P25, a financial analyst in a bank) 
A participant offered an interesting view on mandating IR. This participant argued that: 
Voluntary IR guidelines may confuse the preparer. What an ordinary employee needs is 
a clear IR standard to follow. (P14, a financial manager) 
Consistent with the participants who supported mandating IR, some academics (e.g., 
Eccles & Krzus, 2010; Fasan, 2013) have made calls for mandating it. Bhasin (2017) 
believes that IR should become a universal reporting practice for all global listed 
companies within the next 5-10 years. Fasan (2013) states that voluntary IR is not 
complete and not easily comparable. Moreover, Gore and Blood (2010) contend that 
although voluntary IR is gaining momentum, it must be mandated by appropriate 
agencies such as stock exchanges and securities regulators to ensure swift and broad 
adoption. In fact, the evidence shows that mandatory compliance is the main driver for 
IR adoption among South African companies (Steyn, 2014). Vaz et al. (2016) also find 
that companies from countries that mandate IR on an “apply or explain” basis are more 
likely to adopt IR. According to Rivera-Arrubla et al. (2017), the extent of IR 
disclosures is significantly associated with the specific country of origin of 
organisations and the extent of IR disclosures is notably higher in South Africa than 
other regions. Their findings indicate that IR disclosure practices are significantly 
higher in regions where IR is mandatory. In a study by Stubbs and Higgins (2018), 




addition, Dumitru and Guşe (2017) indicate that interviewees believe that companies 
might not use IR if mandatory IR is absent. Additionally, from the perspective of 
Chinese culture, strong uncertainty avoidance58 is one of the characteristics of Chinese 
society (Chow et al., 1995). Companies that operate in countries where uncertainty 
avoidance is strong, such as China, prefer a structured environment (e.g., government 
prescriptions) to minimize the uncertainty (García-Sánchez et al., 2013; Ho et al., 2012). 
Chinese people are very likely to abide by rules and regulations (Xiao & Yuan, 2007), 
and there is evidence that Chinese listed companies show a high level of compliance 
with government prescriptions on mandatory information disclosures (Xiao, 1999). 
Thus, the adoption of IR in China can be promoted via mandatory requirements 
(García-Sánchez et al., 2013). Wahl et al. (2020) argue that IR has enormous potential 
for creating value for investors, but only when IR is mandatory. According to 
institutional theory, coercive isomorphism often takes place when an organisation is 
forced into a course of action as a result of external pressure from regulations (Dacin, 
1997; Vaz et al., 2016). If IR is mandatory, forces for coercive isomorphism will be 
formed and it is believed that IR will be widely facilitated in China. 
 
Conversely, some participant proposed opposing views. One participant contended that: 
It is unrealistic to mandate listed companies to release all IR disclosure items. I suggest 
that the first initiative for implementing IR in China can be issuing a Chinese IR guideline 
to encourage and to guide listed companies to implement IR on a voluntary basis, which 
may be a wiser way. (P34, an official in a government agency)  
Another participant acknowledged that: 
If IR replaces the existing corporate reporting, it is necessary to amend the extant 
regulatory rules and listing rules, which is difficult. (P20, a financial analyst of a bank) 
A third participant stated that: 
I support voluntary IR disclosures because it is a challenge to adopt the same mandatory 
IR framework in companies from different industrial sectors. I think a degree of flexibility 
can enable companies to identify the most sensible way to report for their company. (P22, 
a financial analyst of a bank) 
Similarly, in a study by Stubbs and Higgins (2018), although a number of stakeholders 
support mandatory IR, the majority of participants support voluntary IR adoption.  
 
58 According to Kimbro (2002, p. 333), “uncertainty avoidance is the degree to which individuals prefer 





A country- and industry-specific frameworks 
Country-specific and industry-specific factors are relevant to information disclosure in 
integrated reports (De Villiers & Maroun, 2017). Based on stakeholder theory, there is 
an implicit contract between society and the company, by which the company consumes 
various types of resources in society (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Kannenberg & 
Schreck, 2018). Based on this contract, the company’s success relies on managing its 
local stakeholders effectively, and therefore it might release an integrated report based 
on the country-specific IR framework to satisfy local stakeholders’ information 
demands (Kannenberg & Schreck, 2018). From the perspective of institutional theory, 
there are industry-related structures and norms with which a company has to comply in 
order to survive (Kannenberg & Schreck, 2018). Under institutional mimetic 
isomorphism, companies operating in the same industry may apply similar norms and 
behaviours, such as releasing an integrated report based on an industry-specific IR 
framework (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
 
Adopting a unified IR framework for all companies is likely to be a barrier to IR 
adoption. A participant pointed out that: 
An IR framework, no matter voluntary or mandatory, must be country-specific. 
Formulating a Chinese-specific IR framework will make IR adapt to the Chinese context 
because legal environments, investment environments and information needs of users are 
different in various countries. The international integrated reporting framework cannot 
be used indiscriminately in China but can be adopted as one of the references when 
establishing a Chinese-specific IR framework. (P6, an accounting scholar)  
A similar finding is presented by Dumitru and Guse (2017); most of their interviewees 
agree with the IIRF and specify that it is just a beginning, a first draft or a good starting 
point.  
 
Another participant believes that: 
Industrial factors need to be considered when establishing an IR framework. I suggest 
classifying IR framework according to the industrial sectors. (P40, a financial analyst in 





10.3 Recommendations on the implementation of IR in China: 
Chinese stakeholders’ perspectives 
 
In total, 27 participants answered this question in varying degrees of detail, while the 
remaining 24 participants did not make any comments. In particular, one participant 
acknowledged that: 
I am not familiar with IR like most people; thus, I can’t provide specific suggestions. (P35, 
an official in a government agency)  
The summaries of recommendations for IR adoption and the identities of participants 
are listed in Table 10.2. Overall, there were six recommendations proposed by 
participants.  
 
Table 10.2 Recommendations for IR adoption 
Recommendations Participant 
Governmental support P4, P9, P21, P18, P23, P24, P37, P43, P46  
Education P2, P3  
Organisation P5, P18, P32, P34 
Technology P6, P17, P33 
Assurance P7, P29, P30, P44, P51 
Activities P8, P31, P41, P42 
 
Governmental support 
Many participants emphasized the importance of governmental support for IR 
implementation in China. A participant stated: 
To implement IR in China, we must seek support from the Ministry of Finance, the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission, Asset Management Association of China, China 
Association for Public Companies, the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange. (P4, an accounting scholar) 
Considering the popularity of IR in China is not high, another participant suggested that: 
The government can provide support for promoting the popularity of IR. (P9, an editor in 
financial media) 




A series of relevant IR policies should be issued by the government to support IR 
implementation in China. In addition, the government should be responsible for 
supervising the implementation of IR in China (P21, a financial analyst in a bank) 
Similar to the above arguments, Sierra-García et al. (2015) highlight the importance of 
the government in promoting IR. Eccles and Serafeim (2011) propose three ways to 
accelerate IR implementation from the government’s perspective. The first is via 
legislation. For instance, South Africa is the first country to have mandated IR for listed 
companies. In April 2014, the European Parliament passed a new European directive 
regarding the disclosure of non-financial and diversity information (Amendments to 
Directive 2013/34/EU), requiring about 6000 companies with more than 500 employees 
each to disclose information on ESG (Simnett & Huggins, 2015; Stubbs & Higgins, 
2018; Wulf et al., 2014). The second is via a securities regulator, such as the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (Eccles & Serafeim, 2011). The third is via the 
requirements of the stock exchange, such as the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (Eccles & Serafeim, 2011). Many stock exchanges, 
including those in Sao Paulo, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Copenhagen, have 
mandated listed companies to disclose information on ESG (Simnett & Huggins, 2015). 
In addition, Simnett and Huggins (2015) point out that NGOs and industry associations 
(e.g., the Asset Management Association of China and the China Association for Public 
Companies) can accelerate the IR implementation by exerting influence on 
governments, securities regulator and stock exchanges. In a study by Adhariani and De 
Villiers (2018), their Indonesian respondents also highlight the importance of getting 




A participant said that: 
It is necessary to change the focus of accounting education in colleges and universities 
and pay close attention to other areas related to accounting, such as sustainable 
accounting and integrated thinking, rather than just focusing on accounting entries. It is 
necessary to fully emphasize the importance of cultivating students with the concept of 
“integrated accounting” in the future, which allows students to learn widely and to deal 
with the complexity of the modern business. (P2, an accounting scholar)  




The extant university education of the accounting major is backward because modern 
science and technology (especially advanced mathematics) have not well applied in the 
field of accounting theory. The focus of the next step of the IR implementation in China is 
to in-depth study the theory that can thoroughly explain IR. (P3, an accounting scholar) 
Kılıç and Kuzey (2018b) argue that the development of IR will significantly impact 
accounting education. Velte and Stawinoga (2017) point out that sustainable accounting 
had a limited impact on accounting education in the past, resulting in accounting 
students not being familiar with the development of IR. In addition, current accounting 
theory gives little consideration to the wider financial, social and environmental 
influences of business decisions (Brown & Dillard, 2014). Furthermore, Vitolla et al. 
(2019c) contend that universities play an important role in cultivating a culture of 
integrated thinking, and should highlight skills in relation to integrated thinking rather 
than focusing solely on financial knowledge. From the perspective of institutional 
theory, formal education offered by university specialists, setting standards for 
legitimate organisational practices, is one of the important sources of isomorphic 
pressure known as normative isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Jensen and 
Berg (2012) believe that if IR has not been introduced in business schools’ curricula, 
the isomorphic pressure exerted by educational authority is negligible. Thus, 
considering IR is new in China, it can be inferred that embedding IR into Chinese 
accounting education will exert isomorphic pressure on organisations and thus facilitate 
IR implementation in China. 
 
Organisation 
A participant believed that: 
A China IR Research Centre led by the Accounting Department of the Ministry of Finance 
can be established in China. The research members in there are experts and scholars from 
various universities. In the meantime, the participation of departments of environmental 
protection and departments of social security is being called for. The China IR Research 
Centre can be the leader of China’s IR research. (P32, an official in a government agency)  
In fact, the research concentrated on IR is still scant (Dumay et al., 2016; Dumay & Dai, 
2017; Wild & Van Staden, 2013). The establishment of an IR research centre may 
promote IR studies in China. 
 




In order to improve the understanding of Chinese companies on IR and to promote the 
implementation of IR in China, the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants can 
also set up an organisation specializing in IR. (P5, an accounting scholar) 
One participant also proposed that: 
I suggest establishing an IR steering committee in China. An IR steering committee can 
provide training programmes, organize conferences, seminars and forums, and offer 
guidance for the company’s preparing the integrated report.  (P34, an official in a 
government agency) 
Institutional theory posits that professional bodies that set standards for legitimate 
organisational practices (e.g., the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants and 
Chinese IR steering committee) are the sources of isomorphic pressure known as 
normative isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Organisations apply the 
structures and procedures promulgated by these professional bodies (Attanayake 
Mudiyanselage, 2018). Thus, based on institutional theory, establishing professional 
bodies related to IR may facilitate IR implementation in China. 
 
According to Eccles et al. (2010), companies that are industry leaders will strive to 
maintain high ratings from credit rating agencies. A participant who held a similar view 
argued that: 
I would like to see some IR credit rating agencies established in China. IR credit rating 
agencies can build an IR practice assessment system to conduct a comprehensive 
evaluation of the content, form and quality of the integrated reports issued by companies. 
Furthermore, IR credit rating agencies are also encouraged to publish credit rating 
rankings on a regular basis. (P18, a financial analyst in a bank) 
 
Technology 
One participant highlighted using IR and XBRL together. The participant stated: 
I think that integrated reports and the eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) 
can be used together. XBRL users can obtain information in standard electronic format 
directly from the source of information, and can analyze the data by themselves, which 
not only greatly improves the efficiency of using integrated reports, but also provides 
users with more systematic information. (P6, an accounting scholar) 
The participant’s view is supported by previous studies, such as those of Monterio 
(2013, 2014), Songini and Pistoni (2015), and La Torre et al. (2018). Songini and 




stakeholders of the IR. Moreover, La Torre et al. (2018) find that compared with static 
corporate reports, XBRL can offer dynamic IR disclosures for stakeholders and 
enhance the relevance of information. Monterio (2014) argues that the connectivity of 
information in an integrated report is closely related to XBRL. XBRL can provide 
connected information to various stakeholders (Monterio, 2014). Monterio (2013) 
summarizes some benefits of XBRL to integrated reporting, including 1) enabling IR 
data to be easily applied and read by information technologies; 2) ensuring integrity, 
credibility, correctness and comparability of IR data; 3) reusing IR data; 4) preserving 
the structure and context of IR data; and 5) allowing complex business logic to be 
embedded within IR data.  
 
Another participant proposed that: 
It is possible to build an IR big data platform for Chinese companies and encourage 
Chinese companies to actively participate in platform construction. (P33, an official in a 
government agency) 
Establishing an IR big data platform would have many benefits for companies. 
According to Maroun (2019b), an IR data platform could be used in the area of IR 
assurance by developing sophisticated models. An IR data platform can also support 
and significantly enhance integrated thinking within a company (Al-Htaybat & von 
Alberti-Alhtaybat, 2018). 
 
Similarly, another participant suggested that: 
Developing an IR information system in which the characteristics of IR in the context of 
big data are fully considered and a large number of corporate users are fully consulted. 
This set of technologically advanced and user-friendly information systems can promote 
the implementation of IR in Chinese companies. (P17, a financial manager)  
The IIRC (2011b) specifies that companies need to upgrade their information systems 
to satisfy the requirement of IR implementation. This information system needs to 
facilitate identifying the interrelations between financial and non-financial information 
(Lodhia & Stone, 2017). Similarly, Steyn (2014) believes that companies’ information 
systems need to be adjusted in order to fill the data gaps caused by IR’s requirement for 






A participant suggested that: 
It is necessary to promote the development of the IR audit and assurance services in China. 
There are basically three steps for the establishment of an IR audit and assurance system. 
The first step is to issue a draft for comments to be discussed by a wide range of 
stakeholders, and then the second step is to summarize the opinions of all participants. 
The final step is to prepare detailed rules for IR audit and assurance. (P7, an accounting 
scholar) 
 
IR assurance is important. Briem and Wald (2018) find that German companies, in the 
process of external assurance, use responses from auditors to guide their understanding 
and application to the IR framework. Moreover, in order to respond to the coercive, 
normative and mimetic pressures exerted by stakeholders for integrated reports, 
external assurance is called for (Maroun, 2019b). When considering stakeholder 
accountability, external assurance is important to ensure the accuracy, completeness 
and reliability of an integrated report (Maroun, 2019b). External assurance drives 
accountability towards a higher level and enlarges the advantages of high-quality IR; 
thus, Maroun (2019b) indicates that there is an incentive to develop a new external 
assurance system to maximize the benefits of stakeholders. In addition, the participant’s 
suggestion is in line with the findings of Goicoechea et al. (2019). Traditional 
methodology and methods of assurance do not suit integrated reports well because 
integrated reports include greater non-financial information, in the form of a mix of 
qualitative and quantitative data (Goicoechea et al., 2019; Maroun, 2017). 
 
Activity 
A participant stated that: 
An IR pilot programme can be conducted in China and some qualified companies can be 
encouraged to participate. In the pilot programme, the companies can summarize their 
experience and problems of IR implementation. (P8, an accounting scholar) 
Another participant believed that: 
The IR pilot programme can set benchmarking companies that have a higher level of IR 
disclosures quality as role models. (P41, an industry analyst in a consultant company)  
Participants encouraged conducting an IR pilot programme in China. Similar to this 
proposal, the IIRC pilot program was launched in 2011 to test the robustness of the 




a study by Attanayake Mudiyanselage (2018) indicate that the IIRC pilot program 
stimulates Sri Lankan firms’ enthusiasm for adopting IR.   
  
In addition to the pilot programme, another participant stated that: 
Incentives are critical to encouraging companies to make progress in IR. Incentives 
include IR award programmes or the IR stock market index. The IR stock market index is 
designed to stimulate listed companies to enhance the quality of IR practices. (P31, an 
auditor)  
This statement is consistent with the argument of Gunarathne and Senaratne (2017) for 
the organisation of IR competitions or IR award programmes. There are several IR 
award programmes worldwide, such as the EY excellence in IR awards, the CSSA IR 
awards, the Nikonki top 100 JSE listed companies IR awards, and the WICI (Japan) 
Awards for IR. In addition, the IR stock market index is similar to the SHSE corporate 
governance index. To date, except for some CSR indices (e.g., Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index and FTSE4Good Index), an IR stock market index has not been 
built in any country. Companies who are industry leaders will strive to stay on top of 
IR rankings and to be included in IR stock market indexes (Eccles et al., 2010). 
 
10.4 Chapter summary 
Compared with Chapters seven and nine, which use quantitative analysis, this chapter 
uses a qualitative analysis, aiming to enhance the breadth and depth of understanding 
about IR disclosure practices in China. In addition to quantitative methods, qualitative 
methods are the other important part of the mixed-method approach adopted in this 
study. This chapter complements Chapters seven and nine in an interpretive way by 
providing additional insights into the causes of the current status of and changes in the 
IR disclosure practices of Chinese firms; the reasons for the information gap in 
corporate reports; how pressure from stakeholders affects IR disclosure practices; and 
how IR disclosure practices lead to a transparent firm. 
 
Stakeholders’ perceptions are obviously influenced by Chinese contextual factors such 
as culture and politics. Firstly, Chinese stakeholders are cautious and conservative. The 
cultural attributes of conservatism and secrecy may impede the diffusion of IR in China 
and limit higher IR disclosure practices. Secondly, the results show that many Chinese 




may be due to the high level of uncertainty avoidance in Chinese culture. Thus, helping 
Chinese stakeholders explicitly understand whether the adoption of IR can really 
reward IR adopters, and reversing the perceptions of stakeholders who are wary of IR, 
are critical factors in the spread of IR in China and the enhancement of higher IR 
disclosure practices. The high uncertainty avoidance in Chinese culture leads to the 
need for clear IR guidelines and a mandatory IR regime. Thirdly, the results reflect that 
IR practices tend to be policy-driven rather than market-driven in China. Therefore, 
successfully spreading IR and improving IR disclosure practices relies heavily on the 
Chinese government’s policies and initiatives. From a theoretical point of view, 
stakeholders’ perceptions also explicitly or implicitly reflect the features of some 
theories, including stakeholder, legitimacy, institutional, agency and signalling theories. 
 
The questionnaire findings increase our understanding of Chinese stakeholders’ 
perspectives of the barriers to IR adoption and considerations of IR implementation, 
which help to prompt IR development in China. This chapter represents the final stage 
of the present study and focuses on investigating the implementation of IR in China 
through the stakeholder’s lens. The answers to the first question show that eleven 
factors (being a marketing tool; a lack of integrated thinking; lack of usefulness; cost 
constraints; varied interpretations of IR; a lack of connected information; being a mere 
formality, the tension between conciseness and completeness, the relative importance 
of the six capitals; missing some important information; the adoption basis; and 
country- and industry-specific IR frameworks) are the barriers or challenges to 
implementing IR in China. The answers to the second question suggest that successful 
implementation of IR practices in China requires the support of the government. In 
addition, the future focus of IR implementation in China is suggested to be centred on 





11 CHAPTER ELEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
11.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a summary and conclusions for the thesis. Section 11.2 provides 
a review of the study. Section 11.3 outlines the theoretical implications and practical 
implications of the study. Section 11.4 explains the contribution of this thesis. Section 
11.5 presents the reflections on this study. Section 11.6 explains the lessons learnt in 
carrying out the research. Section 11.7 suggests opportunities for future research based 
on the limitations of this study. Section 11.8 concludes the chapter. 
 
11.2 Review of the study 
Financial reporting and sustainability reporting are two major strands of current 
corporate reporting, but their isolated focuses cause a disconnection between financial 
information and non-financial information (Lodhia, 2015; Robertson & Samy, 2015). 
IR is perceived as a potentially useful tool to overcome this limitation by emphasizing 
the integration of various types of information (Reimsbach et al., 2018). If IR can be 
widely used in China – the world’s second-largest economy – it can demonstrate 
China’s serious commitment to building a sustainable country (Eccles & Lee, 2015). 
IR is regarded as one of the few management tools available for addressing social and 
environmental problems in China (Eccles & Lee, 2015). Additionally, the IIRC (2019) 
listed China as one of its two key markets and believed that the slower spread of IR in 
China could hinder the global adoption of IR. 
 
There were four main research objectives for the current research: 
⚫ Design a Chinese IR disclosure index that includes a list of IR disclosure items 
and a weighting system.  
⚫ Assess IR disclosure practices of Chinese listed companies using a scoring 
system and the above IR disclosure index.   
⚫ Develop and test several hypotheses with respect to the determinants of IR 
disclosure practices and the effect of IR disclosure practices on agency costs. 





11.2.1 The development of IR disclosure index 
A preliminary list of 54 IR items was identified by reviewing instruments for mandatory 
disclosure in mainland China (as well as Hong Kong); previous literature on voluntary 
disclosure in China; extant studies relating to IR disclosures; jurisdictional factors that 
are context-specific to China; and a number of corporate reports that have been released 
by Chinese companies. In order to check, revise, and validate the preliminary list of IR 
disclosure items from the Chinese stakeholders’ perspectives, a questionnaire survey 
with a panel of 51 stakeholders (the first-round questionnaire survey) was then 
conducted. The 51 stakeholders were from eight groups: officials in government 
agencies in charge of supervising Chinese companies; industry analysts in consultant 
companies; financial analysts in investment companies; scholars in accounting; editors 
in financial media; financial managers; financial analysts in banks; and auditors. 
Stakeholders added 14 new disclosure items to the preliminary list of IR disclosure 
items and adjusted the categories of some disclosure items. Thus, the final list of IR 
disclosure items, containing 68 IR disclosure items classified into eleven themes, was 
developed. These IR disclosure items were seen to be applicable to the Chinese context.  
 
In order to identify the weighting of each IR disclosure item, a second-round 
stakeholder survey was carried out. A five-point Likert-like scale (1-5) was used to 
gather opinions from the stakeholders on the importance of each disclosure item. The 
responses (weightings) from 51 stakeholders for each disclosure item were summed 
and then divided by 51 to obtain a mean score, which represented the weighting for the 
disclosure item. All the disclosure items were weighted as being at least moderately 
important. Of all the disclosure items, “present financial KPIs” had the highest 
weighting. Another disclosure item, “the linkage between past and present financial 
KPIs” was the second highest weighted item. Participants in this study valued 
traditional financial information most highly. Three disclosure items: “Chinese 
Communist Party-building”; “employee care”; and “industry association relations”, 
were the least weighted disclosure items.  
 
After the first and second-round of questionnaire surveys, the IR disclosure index was 
constructed. The IR disclosure index in this study was classified into two categories. 
The first category involved a two-point scale (0-1) scoring system without quality 




IR disclosure index involved a five-point scale (0-4) scoring system with quality criteria 
to assess the quality of IR disclosures. At this stage, the first research objective: 
designing a Chinese IR disclosure index that includes a list of IR disclosure items and 
a weighting system was completed. 
11.2.2 Extent and quality of IR disclosures by Chinese companies 
In order to achieve the second research objective, the Chinese IR framework was used 
to conduct content analysis to the corporate reports of the selected Chinese companies. 
In order to improve the reliability of the content analysis, a pilot test was independently 
initiated by two coders, using ten corporate reports from the sample companies, selected 
on a random basis. The results of the pilot test were examined using Krippendorff’s 
alpha coefficient. After the pilot test, content analysis to corporate reports released by 
the top 100 Chinese A-share listed companies in 2014-2018 was conducted and the data 
collected from content analysis were then recorded, organized, calculated, and analyzed. 
 
IR disclosure practices by items 
The extent of disclosure of IR items was good in general and improved for the majority 
of IR items from 2014 to 2018. Over the five-year period, “business model” was the 
most strikingly improved item in the extent of disclosure while “warnings and penalties” 
fell most noticeably.  
 
Although the quality of disclosure of IR items varied, most IR items improved from 
2014 to 2018. “Business model” and “Chinese Communist Party-building” showed the 
greatest improvement in the quality of disclosure over the five-year period. In 2018, the 
number of items whose quality score exceeded 0.500 accounted for most of the total 
items.  
 
In 2018, there were 31 items (45% of the total) that failed to meet the Chinese 
stakeholders’ expectations, indicating that there is an information gap between the 
disclosure practices of these 31 IR items by Chinese companies and the views of 
Chinese stakeholders on the importance of these IR items. 
 




Of the 11 themes, “outlook” and “corporate overview and external environment” 
showed the greatest extent of IR disclosures and the highest quality of IR disclosures, 
respectively. “Manufacturing capital” had both the lowest extent and the lowest quality 
of IR disclosures. There was an increasing trend for all IR themes in terms of the extent 
and the quality of disclosures from 2014 to 2018.  
 
IR disclosure practices by companies 
None of the companies analyzed disclosed all the IR items. In 2014, the average number 
of IR items disclosed per company was 49 out of a maximum possible of 68. In 2018, 
the indicator reached near 55. Comparing the data for 2014 and 2018, the extent of IR 
disclosures of 90 companies (90% of the total) improved.  
 
In 2014, there were 41 companies (41%) scoring over 0.5000 for the quality of overall 
IR disclosures. In 2018, the number of companies that scored over 0.5000 increased to 
78. Comparing the 2014 and 2018 datasets showed that the quality of IR disclosures of 
91 companies (91% of the total) was enhanced.  
 
IR disclosure practices by trend 
The extent of overall IR disclosures increased gradually year by year. Statistical 
analysis confirmed that this increase in the extent of overall IR disclosures between 
years was significant. The quality of overall IR disclosures also improved from 2014 to 
2018. Statistical analysis confirmed that this increase in the quality of overall IR 
disclosures between years was significant.  
 
IR disclosure practices by listing status and ownership structure 
First, the 5-year average extent and quality of overall IR disclosures by dual-listed A-
and H-share companies were significantly higher than those by solo-listed A-share 
companies. Second, the 5-year average quality of overall IR disclosures by state-owned 
companies was significantly higher than those by non-state-owned companies.  
 
IR disclosure practices in China and in the international level 
Many Chinese companies have already used three forms, involving monetary, 
numerical and narrative descriptions, to report a particular disclosure item, which 




disclosures in their corporate reports. Their corporate reports are on the way to being 
real integrated reports. However, IR disclosure practices of some Chinese companies 
are at a low level. In addition, no company incorporated its sustainability report into its 
annual report and no company mentioned the term ‘integrated reporting’ in its annual 
report and sustainability report, which indicates that Chinese companies’ understanding 
and appreciation of IR are not comprehensive. 
 
The extent of IR disclosures in China is not disappointing considering it has reached 
the worldwide average level and is near the level found in developed countries. 
However, the quality of IR disclosures by Chinese listed companies still has significant 
room for improvement in the future. 
 
Conciseness and readability 
The 5-year (2014 to 2018) average number of pages in corporate reports was 305. The 
length of corporate reports from Chinese companies increased gradually year by year, 
indicating the conciseness of corporate reports was on a downward trend. In terms of 
the readability of corporate reports, the corporate reports written by Chinese companies 
were difficult to read.  
11.2.3 Determinants and an effect of IR disclosure practices 
For the third research objective, firstly, a series of hypotheses about the associations 
between IR disclosure practices by Chinese companies and a number of influencing 
factors were developed based on prior literature and theories. Seven factors, comprising 
firm size, leverage, profitability, the proportion of independent directors on the board, 
CEO duality, customer-oriented sector, and communities, had a significant impact on 
IR disclosure practices in multiple regression analysis. However, it seems that the other 
nine factors (auditor type, financial sector, environmentally sensitive sector, listing 
status, ownership concentration, state-owned shares, board size, regulatory authority, 
and overseas customers) did not impact IR disclosure practices significantly. Secondly, 
this study explored the effect of IR disclosure practices on agency costs and found that 
both the extent and the quality of IR disclosures negatively affected agency costs.  




In order to accomplish the fourth research objective – making recommendations for the 
implementation of IR in China – a third-round questionnaire survey with a panel of 51 
stakeholders was conducted. There were two questions: “If IR is to be adopted in China, 
what are the barriers to IR adoption and challenges to IR adoption?” and “What are 
your recommendations on the implementation of IR in China?”. The responses to the 
first question showed that eleven factors (being a marketing tool; a lack of integrated 
thinking; lack of usefulness; cost constraints; varied interpretations of IR; a lack of 
connected information; being a mere formality, the tension between conciseness and 
completeness, the relative importance of the six capitals; missing some important 
information; the adoption basis; and country- and industry-specific IR frameworks) will 
provide barriers or challenges to implementing IR in China. Furthermore, the responses 
to the second question suggest that the successful implementation of IR practices in 
China will require the support of the government. In addition, the future focus of IR 
implementation in China is suggested to be on education, organisations, technologies, 
assurance, and activities. 
11.2.5 IR framework for China 
This thesis has established an IR framework for China. The IR framework is a broad 
package including the theoretical framework; the Chinese context; the evaluation 
instrument, which consists of a list of IR disclosure items (an unweighted IR disclosure 
index), a weighting system and a scoring system; and stakeholders’ concerns and 







Figure 11.1 IR framework for China 
Source: Author’s design 
 
11.3 Implications of the study 
Theoretical implications 
This study gives rise to several theoretical implications. Five theories (stakeholder 
theory, agency theory, signalling theory, legitimacy theory, and institutional theory) 
were incorporated to establish a theoretical framework for IR. This theoretical 
framework suggests the organisational motives behind higher disclosure practices. It 
was also applied to guide the methodology of this thesis, to make sense of the analysis, 
and to provide reflections on the findings of this study (see section 2.7.2 for details). 
Features of stakeholder, legitimacy, institutional, agency, and signalling theories were 
present in the Chinese stakeholders’ views, indicating the five theories are applicable 
to the context of China.  
 
The findings of this study provided supporting evidence for stakeholder, legitimacy, 
institutional, agency, and signalling theories, although agency and signalling theories 
were challenged in some situations. Specifically, first of all, stakeholder theory was 
confirmed by the finding that the information expectations of varied stakeholder groups 
were dissimilar while legitimacy theory was supported by identifying the stakeholder 
groups that were sensitive to IR disclosures. Secondly, IR disclosure practices between 
years were different, indicating the dynamic attributes of the legitimation and 




practices in line with stakeholder theory. Fourthly, this study indicates that there were 
differences in IR disclosure practices between A-share firms and dual A- and H-share 
firms, between SOEs and non-SOEs, and between firms in China and firms in other 
countries. This confirmed that contextual factors influence IR disclosure practices, 
supporting both institutional theory and legitimacy theory. Fifthly, the findings of 
hypothesis testing on the determinants of IR disclosure practices supported socio-
political theories (stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory, institutional theory). The 
economics-based theories (agency theory and signalling theory) were supported as well 
as refuted by the hypothesis testing. Sixthly, the analysis showed that IR disclosure 
practices can create a more transparent firm by mitigating the information asymmetry 
between the firm and its stakeholders. This finding is consistent with the assumption of 
information asymmetry held by agency theory and signalling theory. Lastly, the study 
showed that IR practices tend to be policy-driven and culturally-embedded in China.  
Overall, the findings of this study are unique to China, indicating the nature of IR 
practice in China is different from that in other jurisdictions. 
 
Practical implications 
This study also has several practical implications. In particular, it proposes some 
recommendations for China to proceed with IR implementation and strategy, drawing 
on the findings of this study in combination with a number of previous IR studies. 
Firstly, it needs to be realized that there were 31 IR disclosure items, such as “insurance” 
and “overseas CSR (environmental aspects)”, that showed a gap between the 
stakeholders’ expectations and the actual IR disclosure practices. These disclosure 
items were weighted as at least moderately important by the stakeholders. In order to 
satisfy stakeholder information needs, improving IR disclosure practices is necessary; 
thus, it is recommended that five dimensions of “integration” need to be paid attention 
to, including time (past-present-future), qualitative and quantitative information, 
financial and non-financial information, positive and negative information, and internal 
and external stakeholders.  
 
Secondly, this study suggests that IR practices tend to be policy-driven rather than 
market-driven in China. In the initial stages, the Chinese government (e.g., the Ministry 
of Finance; the China Securities Regulatory Commission) could publish some policies 




Finance, the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange could then 
prescribe general IR guidelines for fostering voluntary IR adoption. However, the 
market force is voluntary in nature and thus slows the penetration of IR (Eccles & 
Serafeim, 2011). Therefore, at a later stage, the Chinese government could issue 
policies and regulations to mandate IR adoption. Various stakeholder groups should 
participate in the designing of policies and regulations for IR in China. Specific policies 
and regulations for certain sectors, for SOEs as well as non-SOEs, and for A- and H- 
share firms could also be designed. 
 
Thirdly, considering that Chinese listed companies currently release an annual report 
and a stand-alone sustainability report separately, it is suggested that a company can 
incorporate its sustainability report into its annual report to reach weak aggregation and 
then gradually integrate the contents of the two parts to achieve the best aggregation 
(Paternostro, 2013). Fourthly, considering IR disclosure practices in some countries and 
regions are better than those in China, learning from the experience of leading foreign 
counterparts, such as Japan and Europe, is suggested. 
 
Fifthly, based on the results of the investigation for IR attributes in Chapter seven, 
Chinese companies, in order to achieve conciseness, may consider shortening the pages 
of corporate reports and removing cluttered and overlapping information. Materiality 
is the key to realizing conciseness and completeness simultaneously. The IIRF stresses 
the importance of “plain language over the use of jargon or highly technical 
terminology” (IIRC, 2013, p. 21). Considering the current corporate reports released by 
Chinese companies are difficult to read, it is recommended that Chinese companies 
avoid using verbose, convoluted language and jargon in their corporate reports.  
 
Sixthly, with regard to accounting education, sustainable accounting and integrated 
thinking need to be given greater importance. Also, knowledge and theory of modern 
science and technology should be incorporated into IR theory. Seventhly, some 
institutions should be established, such as an IR Research Centre, an IR steering 
committee, and an IR credit rating agency. Eighthly, the results of this study suggest 
combing IR and XBRL, constructing an IR big data platform, upgrading the current 
accounting information system or developing an IR information system. Ninthly, 




external assurance system that is adaptive to IR needs to be developed. Tenthly, IR 
related activities, such as IR pilot programmes, IR competitions, and IR award 
programmes should be organised.  
 
Lastly, it is strongly recommended that Chinese firms provide online integrated reports. 
Some well-known firms such as Mitsui & Co., Ltd59 and Tsogo Sun Group60 have 
published online integrated reports. In addition to providing a PDF file for users, an 
online integrated report is a highly interactive, website-based integrated report, 
allowing a user to access the contents directly from the firm’s website and generate a 
personalized report according to the user’s requirements. Also, considering that more 
and more Chinese firms engage in international trade and international investment or 
choose to list on foreign stock exchanges, a bilingual online integrated report (in both 
Chinese and English) could be used by a firm to improve the relationship with their 
overseas stakeholders and to attract overseas capital and customers. 
 
11.4 Contributions of the study 
Company disclosures (such as financial, non-financial, voluntary, CSR and 
sustainability disclosures) have been widely investigated in many jurisdictions 
worldwide. However, there is a scarcity of studies investigating IR disclosure practices 
(Manes-Rossi et al., 2020; Marrone & Oliva, 2019). This is not surprising because IR 
is a recent development that emerged with the publication of the King report in the last 
decade. Many studies tend to examine relationships that implicate CSR or sustainability 
as these concepts have evolved over many decades with several international guidelines 
and framework that researchers can adopt as a framework for their studies. Researchers 
have become comfortable with terms like CSR, sustainability and voluntary disclosures 
and have shied away from using the term IR or engaging in IR research to avoid the 
risk of rejection by the academic community who favours the conventional ideologies. 
The current study takes up the challenge avoided by previous studies. 
 
In the Chinese context, there has been a proliferation of CSR and sustainability studies. 
However, IR-related studies in the Chinese context are scarce. To the best of the 
 
59 Mitsui & Co., Ltd. as part of the Mitsui Group, is one of the largest general trading companies in Japan. 




author’s knowledge, the current study is the first to extensively investigate IR practices 
in China. China has been listed as one of the IIRC’s two key markets globally (IIRC, 
2019). The IIRC believed that the slower spread of IR in China could hinder the global 
adoption of IR, and has started focusing on accelerating the application of IR in China 
(Tho, 2019). Therefore, this study can be seen as an active response to the recent 
strategic objective of the IIRC. Moreover, according to Robert Eccles, a leading 
advocate for IR, “In China, we are seeing increased interest from companies…I think 
Hong Kong and China have a great opportunity to show leadership” (HKICPA, 2017, 
p. 31). Hence, this study can also be viewed as a presentation of the development of IR 
in China. 
 
The originality of the current study is premised on a holistic methodology of evaluating 
IR disclosure practices comprising a combination of a weighted IR disclosure index 
and a scoring system that are specifically designed for the Chinese context. Previous 
studies have adopted some features of such methodology, such as using the GRI 
guidelines and the binary scoring system. However, unlike the current study, the prior 
studies did not design a context-specific methodology that comprehensively considered 
the cultural, economic, political, legal, international relational, social, and 
environmental factors that are inherent in the jurisdictions they investigated. In that 
sense, the current study contributes to the extant literature in several ways. First, it 
constructs an IR disclosure index from a comprehensive set of literature to draft a 
preliminary disclosure index, rather than relying on a single framework, such as the 
GRI guidelines and the King report, as prior studies did. Second, the preliminary 
disclosure index is amended to incorporate the views of Chinese stakeholders and 
contextual factors that are unique to China. Third, the weighting system for measuring 
the value of the variables considers the weights that are assigned by the Chinese 
stakeholders. The final IR disclosure index reflects a context-specific index that 
incorporates jurisdictional factors deemed to affect IR disclosures in China. The 
stakeholder consultation process, though time-consuming, justifies the ingenuity of the 
context-specific disclosure index. Although several scholars provide theoretical 
justifications and prescriptions for the inclusion of jurisdiction or context-specific 
factors in the design and implementation of CSR framework (such as Visser et al., 




current study is the first to provide a holistic contextual analysis of IR practices and 
more specifically in the Chinese context.  
 
Compared with prior studies that solely investigated the extent of IR disclosures or the 
quality of IR disclosures, this study uses both the extent and the quality of IR 
disclosures to examine the relationship between a set of factors and IR disclosure 
practices by Chinese firms. As argued above, IR disclosure practice is measured in a 
unique way. Different ways of measuring IR disclosure practices may lead to different 
results from hypothesis testing. The unique procedures adopted for measuring IR 
disclosure practices to form variables (dependent or independent), which led to 
hypotheses and their testing, have seldom been used before and thereby can be 
considered a contribution to the literature.  
 
Exploring the possible explanatory factors of IR disclosure practices provides insights 
about which factors determine IR disclosure practices and which do not. The findings 
of this study also help Chinese stakeholders make predictions about which kinds of 
companies are more likely to exhibit higher IR disclosure practices. Furthermore, the 
findings of this study also provide an opportunity to compare the difference between 
this and similar studies in different jurisdictional contexts. In other words, some factors 
are determinants of IR disclosure practices in other countries, but maybe not in China, 
reflecting the different effects of varied national backgrounds on IR disclosure practices. 
Also, the hypotheses tested in this study are developed based on a number of theories, 
thus providing an opportunity to verify whether those theories are correct in interpreting 
the relationships between possible explanatory factors and IR disclosure practices. 
Additionally, in order to enhance IR disclosure practices, the top management of a firm 
may be able to adjust their strategies based on the findings of this study. Lastly, 
compared to previous IR studies that tested a lesser number of impact factors, the 
factors examined in this study are multiple. Although the models used to verify the 
hypotheses have some similarities to those in previous IR studies in other jurisdictional 
contexts, this study provides some extensions. For instance, the same independent 
variables are adopted, but some different independent variables that have a potential 
relationship with IR disclosure practices and could reflect some features of Chinese 





This study is beneficial for the penetration of IR in China as it provides direct evidence 
by verifying the positive effect of IR disclosure practices on mitigating agency costs, 
allowing Chinese practitioners to be aware of the benefit of IR. A high IR disclosure 
practice represents a more transparent way of disclosing information relating to 
corporates’ operation and performances. However, indirect costs caused by 
“transparency” are inevitable. Hence, companies may resist adopting IR due to this 
potential negative effect. If higher IR disclosure practices can generate lower agency 
costs, implying a more transparent firm can really be rewarded, management may be 
more motivated to enhance their firms’ IR disclosure practices. Stakeholders also pay 
attention to firms’ agency costs. If it can be verified that improved IR disclosure 
practices can reduce agency costs, stakeholders may accept the usefulness of IR. As 
Eccles and Lee (2015) stated, no country needs IR more than China because it is one of 
the few management tools that can effectively solve China’s social and environmental 
problems; thus this study is expected to make contributions to addressing China’s social 
and environmental problems to some extent, considering the sample companies in this 
study are the largest firms in China, including environmentally sensitive industries as 
well as socially sensitive industries. This study links organisations, society, and 
environment. If these benchmarking companies can realise the benefits brought by IR, 
other Chinese firms may follow the example set by their successful peers. Eventually, 
society and the environment in China may be significantly improved, forming a benign 
circle of sustainability. 
 
The analysis of stakeholder perceptions can be used to inform Chinese practitioners and 
policymakers about hindrances to the adoption of IR and provide them with 
recommendations about IR implementation and diffusion. Although some challenges 
to the adoption of IR have been identified in a small number of previous studies, this 
study captures empirical evidence on challenges to the adoption of IR, which verifies 
prior studies and complements the literature by identifying more challenges that may 
occur. Also, this study collects empirical evidence on how to implement IR in China, 
which supplements the currently sparse literature. 
 
From the point of view of theoretical contributions, this study shows how a theoretical 
framework comprising several theories could be expanded in the Chinese context-




as a theoretical basis to interpret IR disclosure practices in companies, to survey the 
views of various stakeholder groups on IR disclosures, and to examine the determinant 
factors of IR disclosure practices and the effects of IR disclosure practices. Thus, the 
thesis contributes to a theoretical understanding of IR practices. 
 
11.5 Critical reflections 
Reflections on the choice of methodology 
Methodological choices are framed by the researcher’s worldview, training and 
experience, the nature of the research problem, and the audience for the study (Creswell, 
2003). IR practices in China are complex and multifaceted, requiring comprehensive 
attention to many aspects. Thus, in order to conduct an in-depth study focusing on IR 
practices in China, this thesis has multiple objectives. In this thesis, the author as a 
pragmatist researcher uses the mixed methods approach (pragmatic approach: a 
combination of both the quantitative approach (positivistic approach) and the 
qualitative approach (interpretivist approach)).   
 
As suggested by Creswell (2007), a pragmatist researcher will “…use multiple methods 
of data collection to best answer the research question, …employ both quantitative and 
qualitative sources of data collection, and … emphasize the importance of conducting 
research that best addresses the research problem” (p. 23). Given that different 
approaches are appropriate for different objectives, both quantitative data and 
qualitative data are collected, processed, analysed and interpreted in this study. This 
study uses the positivistic approach and the interpretivist approach separately to achieve 
different research objectives, and also combines positivistic and interpretivist 
approaches where appropriate. In order to fulfil the first objective, the interpretivist 
approach and positivistic approach are used sequentially to form a Chinese IR 
disclosure index. Specifically, the selection of IR disclosure items relies on interpretive 
analysis of the first round of the questionnaire survey, while assigning weightings to 
different IR disclosure items depends on statistical analysis of the second round of the 
questionnaire survey. In order to complete the second objective, content analysis, which 
focuses on interpretation, is used to analyze the qualitative data contained in corporate 
reports and generate quantifiable data. The positivistic approach is then applied to 




the third and fourth objectives, the author determines that the positivistic approach and 
the interpretivist approach are most appropriate for the third objective (statistical 
analysis of quantitative data generated from content analysis and the financial database) 
and the fourth objective (interpretive analysis of qualitative data obtained from the third 
round questionnaire survey) of this study, respectively. 
 
The mixed methods approach is important to the multi-objective nature of the thesis. 
As the mixed methods approach allows the use of both the positivistic and the 
interpretivist approaches, the outcome of exploring IR practices in the Chinese context 
produced in this study is comprehensive (Liu, 2014). The adoption of the positivistic 
approach enhances the understanding obtained from the interpretivist approach. 
Similarly, the adoption of an interpretivist approach generates complementary insights 
with the positivistic approach, leading to an improved holistic understanding of IR 
practices in the Chinese context (Fernando, 2013). 
 
Reflections on the choice of theories 
Many different theories have been applied in prior information disclosure studies, 
including the diffusion of innovation theory, actor-network theory, stewardship theory, 
stakeholder theory, agency theory, signalling theory, legitimacy theory, and 
institutional theory. Faced with so many choices, the author needs to decide which 
theories should be focused on. The first consideration is that these theories should adapt 
to the nature of IR. Cotter et al. (2011, p.1) believe that “the choice of a suitable theory 
to underpin the research depends on the type of information disclosure being examined 
and the external parties considered”. Compared with financial or corporate social 
responsibility reporting, IR “is not exclusively addressed either to shareholders or to 
stakeholders but to both of them” (Girella et al., 2019, p. 3). Thus, stakeholder theory, 
agency theory, signalling theory, legitimacy theory, and institutional theory, which are 
generally adopted in IR studies and are regarded as theories that are consistent with the 
nature of IR, are chosen. The second consideration is that these theories should have 
internal connections. For instance, the notion of “signalling legitimacy” stemmed from 
legitimacy theory and can be borrowed by signalling theory (Watson et al., 2002). The 
last consideration is that these theories should be applicable to the context of China. 
During the analysis, the author constantly examines whether features of the theories are 




combination with the argument in section 2.7.2 of this study, suggests that the five 
theories that are selected in this study are appropriate in the context of China. 
 
Reflections on the contextual approach 
As suggested by the objectives and findings of this study, the nature of IR practices 
differs from one context to another and from one society to another. For this reason, a 
contextual approach that can reflect contextual features is advocated by this thesis. 
Compared with adopting a universal approach that does not consider contextual features, 
the importance of the contextual approach to the contextual nature of IR has been 
discussed by scholars such as Baldini et al., (2018), Deegan (2018), Fuhrmann (2019), 
Shareef et al. (2014), and Visser (2008). From a theoretical perspective, the findings 
obtained from a contextual approach are unique to the context being investigated. For 
instance, motives indicated by the theoretical framework of this study are inconclusive 
in different contexts. From a practical perspective, the contextual approach is more 
purposive and efficient than a universal approach because it is targeted to a specific 
context. The contextual approach is likely to be more easily accepted by other 
jurisdictions. However, a contextual approach might be subject to manipulation by local 
practitioners to show the positives and marginalize the negatives. For instance, if a food 
firm treats its animals cruelly, it may use “releasing such disclosures does not suit its 
national conditions” as an excuse to evade reporting disclosures on animal welfare. 
 
Reflections on the concept of IR 
As Schaper et al. (2017, p. 88) point out, “companies most likely would prefer not to 
disclose value relevant information”. Many sample firms in this study fail to tell the 
story about value creation well for stakeholders. Du Toit et al. (2017) note that “the 
users of integrated reporting should bear in mind that the purpose of an integrated report 
is to tell a story of the organisation” (p. 658). In fact, IR is a new corporate reporting 
approach to telling a story to stakeholders about a broader, holistic view of 
organisational value creation (Setia et al., 2015). According to Al-Htaybat and von 
Alberti-Alhtaybat (2018), all activities a firm undertakes will ultimately impact value 
for stakeholders. Telling the story of organisational value creation for all stakeholders 
is the primary aim of IR and the reason for the existence of IR. Thus, the author believes 
that all the principles underpinning the preparation of an integrated report, such as 




and effectively. It is worth noting that IR is also called “value creation reporting” in 
China. Value creation is defined as “the process that results in increases, decreases or 
transformations of the capitals caused by the organisation’s business activities and 
outputs” (IIRC, 2013, p. 33). Thus, a firm should not solely tell the story about value 
creation because the story about value destruction is also needed (Dumay et al., 2017). 
 
Reflections on IR practices in China 
The top management ultimately decides the extent and quality of disclosures of the firm 
(Gal & Akisik, 2020; Pavlopoulos et al., 2017). The author argues that the decision by 
top management to adopt IR or to change IR disclosure practices depends on three 
factors: external pressures from stakeholders (e.g., legitimacy pressures, institutional 
pressures and pressure from other stakeholders), external incentives (e.g., reducing 
information asymmetry among stakeholders relative to the management for lower 
agency costs), and internal incentives (e.g., discharging accountability to stakeholders 
for a moral and ethical purpose). These factors intertwine, making IR practices a 
complex and multifaceted phenomenon. 
 
It is obvious that Chinese contextual factors impact the perceptions of Chinese 
stakeholders and further influence the IR disclosure practices of Chinese companies. 
However, there are some tensions between the factors. In particular, as traditional 
Chinese culture emphasizes doing business ethically and morally, embracing IR is 
consistent with the principles advocated in Chinese culture. In contrast, the traditional 
Chinese culture also features conservatism and secrecy, impeding the creation of more 
transparent firms led by higher IR disclosure practices, and reducing the spread of IR 
in China. However, it is important to be aware that Chinese contextual factors, such as 
Chinese culture, have been changing. Therefore, their impacts on IR practices are 
dynamic.  
 
In this thesis, the study period is from 2014 to 2018, before the Covid-19 crisis. In 2020, 
irreversible changes have taken place in the world as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic. 
The Covid-19 pandemic has affected firms globally. IR is viewed as a key approach to 
helping enterprises cope with future risks caused by the Covid-19 pandemic (ACCA, 
2020; IRCSA, 2020). In view of the economic, social and environmental challenges 




on how organisations can participate in overcoming the crisis the pandemic has caused 
(Biondi et al., 2020). 
 
In order to recover from the Covid-19 pandemic and boost its economy, the Chinese 
government has initiated a long-term economic development strategy called “dual 
circulation” which focuses on the domestic market and cuts its dependence on overseas 
markets (Cheng, 2020; Yao, 2020). Since the economic reform in 1978, with the rise in 
foreign trade and investments, China has been opening up itself to the outside world, 
and the ways of life of Chinese people have been influenced by Western society and 
culture in many aspects (Qu & Leung, 2006). Thus, if China reduces reliance on 
overseas markets, the diffusion of IR – an exotic corporation reporting format – may be 
negatively affected.  
 
11.6 Lessons learnt 
At first, the author struggled to locate the primary objective of this study. When 
constructing the initial IR disclosure index, a large number of disclosure items from IR 
studies (and CSR/sustainability reporting studies as well), which focus on specific 
industries, could be chosen to form the IR disclosure index. The author then, however, 
realized that including all the possible disclosure items in the IR disclosure index is 
unrealistic and this thesis is not aiming to compile a detailed IR guideline for Chinese 
firms. In other words, since this thesis is concerned with the general state of IR practices 
in China rather than focusing on a particular industry, the IR disclosure index does not 
need to be too exhaustive. If designing an IR disclosure index for a sector in the future, 
industry-specific disclosures could be considered. For instance, for food firms, 
disclosures on animal welfare should be considered, while disclosures on biodiversity 
protection should be considered for energy firms.  
 
Conducting content analysis to corporate reports (including annual reports and 
CSR/sustainability reports) from 500 firm observations was quite a challenging 
experience. Analysing so many corporate reports was quite time-consuming; although 
the author initially attempted to use qualitative coding techniques in the Nvivo 11 
software, it was of limited use since the interpretative content analysis adopted in this 




words. Thus, the author had to read each corporate report thoroughly sentence by 
sentence. The author argues that the difficulty of content analysis limits the production 
of studies relating to IR disclosure practices, which may explain the scarcity of such 
studies (Manes-Rossi et al., 2020; Marrone & Oliva, 2019).  
 
Recruiting participants in China for the questionnaire survey was another challenging 
experience for the author. Chinese society is an acquaintances society (China Daily, 
2013). Some cultural attributes in China, such as power distance and uncertainty 
avoidance, may prevent a researcher from successfully approaching unfamiliar 
stakeholders. Initially, the author contacted 34 potential participants who were 
unknown to the author, such as managers in listed company associations, NGOs and 
industry associations, and sent them invitation letters via email (their email addresses 
were provided by their organisations’ official websites). However, none of them 
responded. Thus, as other Chinese researchers often do, the author turned to his own 
relationship network. The author learned from the challenging experience that when 
doing such a survey study in China, recruiting participants who are in the researcher(s)’ 
relationship network is probably more applicable to the Chinese context. 
 
Lastly, the author admits that the establishment of an IR framework for China in this 
study is just a beginning. With the social changes likely in China in the future, it will 
need to be adjusted and revised accordingly. A prior “legitimate behaviour” might be 
not considered legitimate in future as social values change. For instance, as indicated 
by Deegan (2018, p. 205), “…within Australia approximately 30 years ago there were 
many retail stores that sold clothes that were made from the fur of animals. With 
changing community attitudes towards the wearing of animal skins, and in particular, 
the treatment of animals from which the furs and skins were sourced, the demand for 
fur coats in Australia declined”. 
 
11.7 Research limitations and directions for future research 
The research limitations are introduced in section 1.9. However, although this study is 
subject to these limitations, they may form the basis for future studies and suggest 
valuable directions for them. The first normative research opportunity that can be 




integrated reports. Paternostro (2013) has provided ideas in this direction to some extent. 
The second normative research opportunity that can be considered is to explore 
integrated thinking by focusing on discriminating and mining the essence of 
comprehensive thinking. In addition, the theoretical framework constructed in this 
research can be further refined by incorporating other theories, such as the diffusion of 
innovation theory (Robertson & Samy, 2015), actor-network theory (Rowbottom & 
Locke, 2015) and stewardship theory (Adams et al., 2016). 
 
In terms of empirical research opportunities, firstly, in the future, the IR disclosure 
practices of small and medium-sized companies could be investigated in order to obtain 
a more in-depth understanding of IR disclosure practices in the Chinese context. For 
instance, the sample companies for future research could be extended to include all 
Chinese listed companies. Secondly, a comparative study of IR disclosure practices 
between different boards (i.e., the second board vs the main board) or between two 
stock exchanges (the Shanghai Stock Exchange vs the Shenzhen Stock Exchange) could 
be conducted in the future. Thirdly, the IR disclosure practices of a specific company, 
an industrial sector or public sector (e.g., higher education institutions, government and 
non-profit organisations) in the Chinese context could be investigated using fieldwork 
or case studies. In particular, IR practices in the public sector are underexplored 
(Dumay et al., 2016; Marasca et al., 2020). Fourthly, a comparative study with other 
countries could be conducted in order to attain an international perspective for IR 
disclosure practices. Fifthly, there is no empirical research on the relationship between 
IR and integrated thinking. In view of this, future empirical research could be 
considered to examine the impact of the level of integrated thinking within the company 
on IR practices (such as adoption or disclosure practices). Sixthly, in future studies of 
the influencing factors and effects of IR disclosure practices, the moderator and 
mediator variables could be investigated using an econometric model on the basis of 
theoretical or phenomenological observation. Seventhly, as indicated by this thesis, a 
contextual approach has seldom been adopted in prior IR studies. To fill this research 
gap, this thesis calls for more research focusing on IR practices in a specific jurisdiction 





11.8 Chapter summary 
IR practices in the context of Chinese companies are huge in scope and require 
comprehensive attention to a number of aspects. The wide coverage of the current study 
involves, among other aspects, the design of an IR framework for China where no 
framework currently exists, stakeholder consultation, content analysis, hypothetical 
testing, and analysis of stakeholder perceptions. 
 
This study constructs a comprehensive theoretical framework by linking the key 
theoretical underpinnings of the stakeholder, agency, signalling, legitimacy, and 
institutional theories to interpret IR disclosure practices of organisations. This study 
suggests that there are three incentives motivating Chinese companies to adopt an IR 
approach: (1) to mitigate information asymmetry between the organisation and all 
stakeholders; (2) to signal superior quality, legitimacy and conformity to all 
stakeholders; and (3) to discharge accountability to all stakeholders. All these 
motivations drive strong performance by Chinese firms with regard to IR disclosure 
practices. 
 
A mixed methods approach (i.e., quantitative and qualitative methodology) is applied 
in this research. After two rounds of questionnaire surveys, a weighted IR disclosure 
index consisting of 68 items is developed in consultation with 51 participants who 
represent Chinese stakeholders. The weighted index takes into consideration the 
political, cultural, economic, social, and other factors that are idiosyncratic to China. 
The weighted IR disclosure index and a scoring system are then applied, as instruments 
for content analysis, to the top 100 Chinese listed companies’ corporate reports for the 
years 2014-2018. The collected data are quantified and analysed to gauge the extent 
and quality of IR disclosures. Following the evaluation of IR disclosure practices, the 
study also conducts a number of hypothesis tests to examine the determinants of IR 
disclosure practices and the effect of IR disclosure practices on agency costs. Lastly, 
the third round of questionnaire survey is carried out to gain the opinions of 51 
participants representing Chinese stakeholders on the barriers to the adoption of IR and 
their recommendations for IR implementation in China. All these surveys, evaluations 





The findings of this study indicate that the IR disclosure practices of Chinese companies 
improve over the period 2014-2018. The extent of IR disclosures by Chinese listed 
companies is sound, but the quality of IR disclosures still has significant room for 
improvement. Furthermore, there are many IR disclosure items where there is a gap 
between the stakeholders’ expectations and the actual IR disclosure practices. This 
study indicates that there are differences in IR disclosure practices between A-share 
firms and dual A- and H-share firms, between SOEs and non-SOEs, and between firms 
in China and firms in other countries. This study also finds that there are anomalies in 
the conciseness and readability of corporate reports of Chinese listed companies. The 
findings indicate that many Chinese companies have already initiated the adoption of 
an IR approach for presenting disclosures in their corporate reports; their corporate 
reports are on the way to becoming genuine integrated reports. However, IR disclosure 
practices by some Chinese companies are at a low level. 
 
It is also found that pressures from customers, employees, and communities drive IR 
disclosure practices. Financial leverage, independent directors, CEO duality, and 
profitability are factors that influence the IR disclosure practices of Chinese firms. Both 
the extent and the quality of IR disclosures negatively affect agency costs. Additionally, 
the analysis of stakeholder perceptions reveals that eleven factors are the barriers or 
challenges to implementing IR in China, and successful implementation of IR practices 
in China requires the support of the government, as well as initiatives on education, 
organisations, technologies, assurance, and activities. 
 
This research provides readers with fresh knowledge and a comprehensive 
understanding of the evolution of the IR disclosure practices of Chinese firms, which 
will attract a wide-ranging audience of practitioners as well as academicians. It is hoped 
that this study can facilitate the disclosure practices of corporate reporting and promote 
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Appendix A Previous IR studies relating stakeholder consultation 
Author Method Recipients Main questions 
Higgins et al. (2014) interview managers How did the early adopters among Australian companies contribute to the institutionalization 
of IR? 
Steyn (2014) questionnaire senior managers 1. Benefits of IR implementation; 2. Challenges of IR implementation; 3. Motives for 
preparing an integrated report 
Stubbs and Higgins (2014) interview managers The internal mechanisms of IR adopting process and whether IR can create an innovative 
disclosure mechanism  
Stubbs et al. (2014) interview IR preparers Objectives of IR; Benefits and outcomes of IR; Barriers to and challenges of IR; Use of IR and 
six capitals in decision-making 
Van Bommel (2014) interview IR interest groups 1. The understanding of IR; 2. The users of IR; 3. The purpose of IR; 4. Important or critical 
moments in the development of IR; 4. Conflicts or problems; 5. How to overcome conflicts or 
problems? 
Atkins and Maroun (2015) interview investor, standard setter, 
analyst, consultant  
1. What are the drivers of IR? 2. What is the understanding of institutional investors of IR? 3. 
What is the response of institutional investors to IR? 4. What are the obstacles to the 
development of IR? 5. What are the recommendations for improving IR? 
James (2015) questionnaire accounting major 
students 
Benefits of IR 
Lodhia (2015) interview managers 1. What are the benefits and challenges of IR? 2. What is the organisation’s view on the future 
of IR? 3. What are the key success factors for the adoption of IR? 
Robertson and Samy (2015) interview senior manager 1. The limitations of current reporting practices; 2. How does IR provide a relative advantage 
over existing reporting practices? 







Author Method Recipients Main questions 
Strong (2015) interview IR interest groups  Can IR be the solution for addressing shortcomings in financial reporting and sustainability 
reporting? 
Burke and Clark (2016) interview speakers at Symposium The future of IR 
Lueg et al. (2016) interview manager How standards and guidelines for CSR can help a company step towards IR. 
Perego et al. (2016) interview academics 1. What aspects of IR are revealed in the academic literature? 2. How do experts understand 
the current strengths and weaknesses of IR from a management perspective? 
Wee et al. (2016) interview reports preparers 1. What is the status quo of the participant’s company’s integrated report? 2. Who are the users 
of the report? 3. Which people or sections are involved in preparing the report? 4. How to 
decide what is included in the report? 5. How to determine whether an item is material or not? 
6. How to achieve conciseness in the report? 7. In what ways do legal and regulatory 
requirements affect the preparation of the report? Do listing requirements affect the preparation 
of the report? 8. What challenges exist in preparing the report? 
Beck et al. (2017) interview report preparers How has the trend of non-financial reporting over the years led companies to publish IR? 
Camodeca and Almici (2017) interview managers 1. The reasons for the companies’ stepping towards IR; The main steps of this process; 3. The 
changes occurred in companies’ thinking after the transition to IR. 
Chaidali and Jones (2017) interview managers and consultants 1. The trustworthiness of IR; 2. The status of IR; 3.IR and sustainability; 4. The benefits of IR; 
5. The adequacy and clarity of the IR guidelines; 6. The cost of preparation of IR; 7. The format 
and length of IR 
Dumay and Dai (2017) interview senior managers How does integrated thinking operate as cultural control? 
Feng et al. (2017) interview managers 1. How do key stakeholders interpret integrated thinking? 2.To what extent do practitioners 








Author Method Recipients Main questions 
Gunarathne and Senaratne 
(2017) 
interview internal managers and external managers  1. What are the internal drivers to adopt IR? 2. What are the external drivers to adopt IR? 
3. What sort of support does top management provide when following IR? 4. What are 
the processes and systems in-house to prepare integrated reports? 5. What are the 
challenges in preparing integrated reports? 6. What is the participant’s impression of the 
current trend of IR in the country? 7. What factors really motivate companies to follow 
IR? 8. What are the weaknesses in the integrated reports? 
Guthrie et al. (2017) interview managers How do the internal mechanisms of change that can lead organisations to adopt IR impact 
integrated thinking internally? 
Lai et al. (2017) interview IR preparers How is the principle of materiality implemented in IR? 
Macias and Farfan-Lievano 
(2017) 
interview IR preparers 1. The reason for using the IR framework; 2. Challenges and difficulties of the 
implementation process; 3. Internal impact on stakeholders, organisational structure and 
decision-making; 4. Benefits of the application and future use of the IR framework 
Maroun (2017) interview auditor and report preparers The limitations of existing assurance standards and alternate approaches for assuring the 
integrated report. 
McNally et al. (2017) interview IR preparers 1. The reasons for preparing an integrated report; 2. How the IIRF is applied and 
challenges encountered. 
Silvestri et al. (2017) interview managers, employees and consultants How to evaluate the degree of accountability of IR? 
Adhariani and De Villiers 
(2018) 
questionnaire report preparers, auditors, investors, 
analysts, academics, consultant, regulator, 
civil servant 
1. What is the current level of IR knowledge in Indonesia? 2. What are the challenges and 
benefits faced by report preparers and stakeholders? 3. If IR is adopted in Indonesia, what 
form is it and what is needed to support widespread adoption? 
Al-Htaybat and Von Alberti-
Alhtaybat (2018)  
interview employees The link between integrated thinking and IR 
Argento et al. (2018) interview  managers The process of introducing the IR and the role played by crucial and key actors engaged 
in IR, particularly considering the changes achieved, the tensions that emerged in the 






Author Method Recipients Main questions 
Attanayake Mudiyanselage 
(2018) 
interview managers 1. Why do Sri Lankan companies adopt IR? 2. What challenges are faced by Sri Lankan 
companies during the implementation of IR? 3. Has the management of Sri Lankan 
companies achieved the expected benefits from adopting IR? 
Briem and Wald (2018) interview auditors 1. Why do companies assure their integrated reports voluntarily? 2. What role do auditors 
play in the IR assurance process? 
Engelbrecht et al. (2018) interview auditor 1. What is the role of the internal audit function in IR? 2. What are the potential challenges 
and barriers to internal audit’s involvement in IR? 
Hsiao and Kelly (2018) interview investors What is the relationship between investment considerations of Taiwanese investors and 
IIRF?                                                                                                                        
Lai et al. (2018) interview IR preparers How do IR preparers’ modes of cognition affect the patterns of accountability related to 
IR? 
Maroun (2018) interview audit experts and report preparers 1. The parts of the integrated reports currently being assured and the challenges of 
assuring the integrated report; 2. How preparers ensure the reliability of their integrated 
reports; 3. The need for assurance of the integrated report; 4. Recommendations on how 
to provide some level of assurance over an integrated report. 
McNally and Maroun (2018) interview managers and employees 1. The reasons for preparing an integrated report; 2. How the IIRF is applied and 
challenges encountered?  
Montecalvo et al. (2018) interview managers 1. Evolution of the content of sustainability disclosures; 2. Reasons for adopting reporting 
frameworks; 3. External assurance 
Slack and Tsalavoutas (2018) interview investor and analysts 1. The decision usefulness of IR; 2. What are the barriers when using IR? 
Stacchezzini et al. (2018) interview managers and employees  The process of IR preparation, the function that IR preparers assign to intellectual capital 
elements and the role of integrated thinking in this process. 
Stubbs and Higgins (2018) interview regulators, standard setters, auditor, 
investor 






Author Method Recipients Main questions 
Vesty et al. (2018) interview senior manager 1. The senior manager’s engagement with IR; 2. The impact of IR practice; 3. The 
challenge for IR. 
Abhayawansa et al. (2019) interview sell-side analysts How and why are integrated reports relevant to analysts? 
Badia et al. (2019) interview managers and external consultants 1. Adoption of IR; 2. Contribution of IR to a more effective system of governance and 
management; 3. Role of intellectual capital for the company and in the integrated report; 
4. Effects of IR and its role in the mobilization of intellectual capital. 
Bananuka et al. (2019) interview senior managers Why companies in developing countries are slow to adopt IR and what needs to be done 
to ensure such companies embrace IR. 
Corbella et al. (2019) interview managers and employees  The process of IR preparation and how intellectual capital elements are mobilized within 
this process. 
Doni et al. (2019) interview managers 1. IR within the company; 2. Key stakeholders and the competitive context; 3. Strengths 
and weaknesses of the IIRF; 4. Corporate reporting procedures; 5. The internal and 
external assurance system; 6. The company’s ability to improve corporate reporting; 7. 
Future challenges. 
Goicoechea et al. (2019) questionnaire auditors and users 1. The importance of assuring the content of IR; 2. The form and content of an audit report 
on IR; 3. The challenges of assuring IR. 
Maroun (2019b) interview preparers and assurance experts 1. The reasons for having select elements of an integrated report assured; 2. The type of 
assurance and the rationale for selecting specific assurance services; 3. The challenges 
encountered when seeking to have parts of an integrated report assured; 4. How these 
challenges were overcome and any recommendations for how to change current assurance 
practices; 5. Challenges encountered when preparing an integrated report; 6. Whether or 
not assurance was seen as adding value for organisations and their stakeholders; 7. 
Changes to professional standards; 8. The role of regulators/standard setters in driving IR 






Author Method Recipients Main questions 
Petcharat and Zaman (2019) interview senior managers 1. From IR perspectives, how do Thai- listed firms integrate all kinds of business information? 2. How does 
IR create communicative value for Thai- listed firms while satisfying information needs to stakeholders? 3. 
How is the SR of Thai companies related to the IR for value creation? 
Robertson and Samy (2019) interview senior managers 1. The company’s current SR practices; 2. The level of cross-functional activity in relation to the company’s 
reporting process; 3. The factors which may influence IR diffusion; 4. The drivers for voluntary adoption of 
SR; 5. Mandatory reporting. 
Cerbone and Maroun (2020) interview preparers 1. Reasons for preparing an integrated report; 2. The role of existing reporting guidelines; 3. How to approach 
disclosures in integrated reports; 4. Materiality in IR and how this differs from financial reporting; 5. How to 
adapt materiality to businesses; 6. The impact of stakeholders on the integrated report and materiality. 








Appendix B Instruments on mandatory disclosure 
Shanghai Stock Exchange: Notice of Doing a Better Job for Disclosing 2008 Annual Reports: 
Companies selected in the “Shanghai Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Index”, companies that have shares 
listed overseas and companies in the financial sector should disclose the internal control report and CSR report 
when releasing 2008 annual report. 
All listed companies are required to explain the status of the company’s internal control system in the following 
areas: (1) the status of the establishment of the company’s internal control, (2) the operation of the company’s 
internal control inspection and supervision mechanism, (3) the guidance gained from the company’s board of 
directors and its audit committee on the company’s internal control work, (4) the company’s plan for implementing 
the Basic Standards for Enterprise Internal Control  
Shanghai Stock Exchange: Guidelines for Environmental Information Disclosure of Listed Companies: 
Companies selected in the “Shanghai Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Index”, companies that have shares 
listed overseas and companies in the financial sector must disclose:  
(1) The company’s work in promoting social sustainable development, such as the protection of employees’ 
health and safety, the protection and support of their communities, and the quality control of products. 
(2) The company’s work in promoting environmental and ecological sustainable development, such as how 
to prevent and reduce environmental pollution, how to protect water resources and energy, how to ensure the 
livability of the region, and how to protect and improve the biodiversity of the region.  
(3) The company’s work in promoting sustainable economic development, such as how to create value for 
customers through its products and services, how to create better job opportunities and future development for 
employees, and how to bring high economic returns to its shareholders.  
(4) Environmental information: company environmental protection policy, annual environmental protection 
objective and effect; annual total energy consumption; environmental protection investment and environmental 
technology development status; emission/pollutant types, quantity, concentration and destination; construction of 
environmental protection equipment and operational status; production waste treatment, disposal and recycling 
status; the environmental improvement agreement (signed voluntarily by the company) that the company has 
entered into with the Ministry of Environmental Protection; awards the company has received from the Ministry 
of Environmental Protection; other information disclosed at the discretion of the company. 
China Securities Regulatory Commission: Regulations on Information Disclosure of Listed Companies: 
Ten parts must be contained in an annual report, namely (1) basic information of the company, (2) major 
accounting figures and financial indexes, (3) company stock and bond issuance and changes, (4) the number of 
shares, the number of bonds, the number of shareholders, top 10 shareholders (at the end of the reporting period); 
(5)  shareholders who have stakes of 5% or above, controlling shareholders and actual controllers, (6) positions, 
stock holding changes and annual remunerations (directors, supervisors and senior managers), (7) board of 
directors’ report, (8) management discussion and analyses, (9) major incidents and their influence on the company 









Shenzhen Stock Exchange: Notice of Doing a Better Job for Disclosing 2008 Annual Reports: 
Companies selected in the “Shenzhen 100 index” should follow “corporate social responsibility guidelines” referring to 
Annex 3—CSR disclosure requirements to disclose CSR report. The CSR reports should include: 
(1) Overview 
Briefly explain the company’s purpose and philosophy on CSR; Explain the system construction and organisational 
arrangement for ensuring social responsibility performance; the company’s ideas and plans for fulfilling social 
responsibilities; explain the important activities, work and achievements of the company in fulfilling its social 
responsibilities; the company was rewarded by the relevant departments and won the honorary title (in terms of social 
responsibility). 
(2) Implementation of social responsibility 
I. Protection of the interests of shareholders and creditors 
II. Protection of workers’ rights. 
It should clearly state whether the employment system complies with the requirements of laws and regulations such as 
the Labour Law and the Labour Contract Law, and whether the company strictly enforces national regulations and 
standards in terms of labour safety and health systems and social security; explain the company’s specific measures and 
improvements in employee benefits, safety production, vocational training, and employee benefits. 
III. Protection of suppliers, customers and consumers. 
It should clearly state measures for the company’s anti-bribery and explain the specific measures taken by the company 
in terms of product quality and safety control. 
IV. Environmental protection and sustainable development  
Explain the company’s specific measures in environmental protection investment and technology development, 
construction of environmental protection facilities, and reduction of energy consumption, pollutant emissions, waste 
recycling and comprehensive utilization; compare with national standards, industry standards, and past indicators; use 
specific numerical indicators to illustrate current conditions and the effects of improvements. 
V. Public relations and social welfare services 
State the work done by the company in disaster relief, donation, post-disaster reconstruction, etc. 
(3) Problems and rectification plans of the company in fulfilling its social responsibilities 
All listed companies are required to issue the internal control assessment report which should include: 
(1) Overview: explain the organizsational structure of the company’s internal control, the establishment of the internal 
control system, the establishment of the internal audit department that is responsible for supervision and inspection, the 
staff of the department and their duties, the important activities and work in order to establish and improve internal 
control and the corresponding results, and an overall assessment of the company’s internal control. 
(2) Key control activities 
Provide the chart which shows the subsidiaries of listed companies (including the corresponding share ratios); inspect 
the internal control on six aspects, including subsidiaries, related transactions, external guarantees, use of raised funds, 
major investments and information disclosure, by referring to the specific requirements of the “Guidelines for Internal 
Control of Listed Companies”. 








Notice of the China Securities Regulatory Commission on Promulgating the Standards Concerning the Contents and Formats 
of Information Disclosure by Companies Offering Securities to the Public No.2—Contents and Formats of Annual Reports 
(2017 Revision): 
(1) Basic Information on the Company 
(2) Summary of Accounting Data and Financial Indicators 
…the main accounting data and financial indicators of the company for the past three years, including but not limited to: total assets, 
operating income, net profit attributable to shareholders of listed companies, net profit attributable to shareholders of listed companies 
that deducts non-recurring gains and losses, net assets attributable to shareholders of listed companies, net cash flow from operating 
activities, ROE, Earnings per share… 
(3) Summary of Company’s Business 
…the company's main business, major products and their uses, business models, major performance drivers and other content. It should 
focus on the major changes that occurred during the reporting period…the development stage and cyclical characteristics of the 
company's industry and the competitive position of the company…Significant changes in the company's major assets…core 
competitiveness (including core management team, key technical staffs, patents, non-patented technology, franchise agreements, 
exploration rights, mining rights, unique business and profit models and so on)…Implementation and future plans about major 
investment projects, asset purchases, mergers and acquisitions, construction in progress, research and development projects, staff 
training and reserves… 
(4) Discussion and analysis on Company’s Business 
company’s external operating environment and internal capitals…company’s management policies…main business…non-primary 
business…status of assets and liabilities…investment status…the sale of major assets and equity…analysis on major 
subsidiaries…patterns and trends of the industry…company development strategies…future business plan…risks (e.g. policy risk, 
industry-specific risk, business model risk, operational risk, environmental risk, exchange rate risk, interest rate risk, technology risk, 
product price risk, raw material price and supply risk, financial risk and so on) 
(5) Important Matters 
…major lawsuits and arbitrations during the reporting period…For companies in polluting industries: pollutant discharge information; 
construction and operation of pollution prevention facilities; environmental impact assessment of construction projects and other 
environmental protection administrative licenses; emergency plan for sudden environmental incidents; environmental self-monitoring 
program.  
(6) Share Change and Information on Shareholders 
Changes in company shares; securities issuance and listing; the number of shareholders and shareholdings of the company; the situation 
of the controlling shareholder of the company; the actual controller of the company 
(7) Information on Preferred Shares 
(8) Information about Directors, Supervisors, Senior Executives and Employees  
Basic information on directors, supervisors and senior management…educational background, occupational experiences and duties of 
current directors, supervisors and senior management…decision-making procedures for the remuneration of directors, supervisors and 
senior executives; the basis for determination and actual payment of remuneration…Employees of the parent company and major 
subsidiaries, including the number of employees, professional composition, education level, employee compensation policy and training 
plan… 
(9) Corporate Governance 
Explain whether there is a significant difference between the actual situation of corporate governance and the regulatory documents 
issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission on the governance of listed companies; internal control report;  
(10) Information on Corporate Bond  
(11) Financial Report 







Hong Kong Stock Exchange: Corporate governance code (“Comply or explain” basis): 
 (1) corporate governance practices; (2) directors’ securities transactions; (3) board of directors; (4) chairman and chief 
executive; (5) non-executive directors; (6) board committees; (7) auditor’s remuneration; (8) company secretary; (9) 
shareholders’ rights; (10) investor relations; (11) risk management and internal control 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange: the revised guidelines for ESG reporting (“Comply or explain” basis): 
(1) Emissions: the policies and compliance with relevant laws and regulations that have a significant impact on the issuer 
relating to air and greenhouse gas emissions, discharges into water and land, and generation of hazardous and non-hazardous 
waste; The types of emissions and respective emissions data; Greenhouse gas emissions in total and, where appropriate, 
intensity; Total hazardous waste produced (in tonnes) and, where appropriate, intensity; Total non-hazardous waste produced 
(in tonnes) and, where appropriate, intensity; Description of measures to mitigate emissions and results achieved; Description 
of how hazardous and non-hazardous wastes are handled, reduction initiatives and results achieved. 
(2) Use of Resources: policies on the efficient use of resources, including energy, water and other raw materials; direct or/and 
indirect energy consumption by type in total and intensity; Water consumption in total and intensity; Description of energy use 
efficiency initiatives and results achieved; Description of whether there is any issue in sourcing water that is fit for purpose, 
water efficiency initiatives and results achieved; Total packaging material used for finished products (in tonnes) and, if 
applicable, with reference to per unit produced; 
(3) The Environment and Natural Resources: policies on minimising the issuer’s significant impact on the environment and 
natural resources; Description of the significant impacts of activities on the environment and natural resources and the actions 
taken to manage them;  
(4) Employment 
Information on: (a) the policies; and (b) compliance with relevant laws and regulations that have a significant impact on the 
issuer relating to compensation and dismissal, recruitment and promotion, working hours, rest periods, equal opportunity, 
diversity, anti-discrimination, and other benefits and welfare;  
(5) Health and Safety 
Information on: (a) the policies; and (b) compliance with relevant laws and regulations that have a significant impact on the 
issuer relating to providing a safe working environment and protecting employees from occupational hazards. 
(6) Development and Training 
Policies on improving employees’ knowledge and skills for discharging duties at work. Description of training activities. 
(7) Labour Standards 
Information on: (a) the policies; and (b) compliance with relevant laws and regulations that have a significant impact on the 
issuer relating to preventing child and forced labour. 
(8) Supply Chain Management: policies on managing environmental and social risks of the supply chain. 
(9) Product Responsibility  
Information on: (a) the policies; and (b) compliance with relevant laws and regulations that have a significant impact on the 
issuer relating to health and safety, advertising, labelling and privacy matters relating to products and services provided and 
methods of redress. 
(10) Anti-corruption 
Information on: (a) the policies; and (b) compliance with relevant laws and regulations that have a significant impact on the 
issuer relating to bribery, extortion, fraud and money laundering. 
(11) Community Investment: policies on community engagement to understand the needs of the communities where the issuer 
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TITLE OF THE PROJECT 
Towards an Integrated Reporting Framework for China 
 
AN INVITATION 
I would like to invite you to take part in a research study. Before you decide you need to 
understand why the research is being done and what it would involve for you. Please take 
time to read the following information carefully. Ask questions if anything you read is not 
clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not to take part. 
Your agreement to take part in this study would be greatly appreciated. 
 
WHO I AM? 
My name is Yanqi Sun and I am a PhD student in Accounting at the University of Waikato. 
 
WHO ARE MY SUPERVISORS? 
My chief supervisor’s name is Professor Howard Davey, a Professor in the department of 
accounting at the University of Waikato. My second supervisor is Dr. Murugesh 
Arunachalam, a senior lecturer in the department of accounting at the University of Waikato. 
 
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS PROJECT? 




for China and apply the framework to evaluate integrated reporting practices of Chinese listed 
companies. This research objective comprises of the following sub-objectives: 
⚫ Design a Chinese IR framework that includes a list of IR disclosure items, a weighting 
system and a scoring system for evaluating IR disclosure practices in China.  
⚫ Assess IR disclosure practices of Chinese listed companies using the above IR 
framework.   
⚫ Develop and test several hypotheses with respect to the determinants of IR disclosure 
practices and the effect of IR disclosure practices on agency costs. 
⚫ Make recommendations for the implementation of IR practices in China. 
 
WHAT YOU WILL BE ASKED TO DO IF YOU PARTICIPATE? 
The researcher will want to you complete three questionnaire surveys. In the first-round 
questionnaire survey, you will be inquired about a list of disclosure items of integrated 
reporting. In the second-round questionnaire survey, you will be inquired on the importance 
of each disclosure item. In the third questionnaire survey, you will be inquired on the 
recommendations for the implementation of integrated reporting in China. If you participate 
in the questionnaire surveys, the questionnaires will be sent to you by email. No parts will be 
taken longer than 45 minutes in most cases. 
 
DO YOU HAVE TO PARTICIPATE? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part, you will be 
able to keep a copy of this information sheet and you should indicate your agreement to the 
consent form. You can still withdraw at any time until 31 August 2020. You do not have to 
give a reason. 
 
WHY HAVE YOU BEEN INVITED TO TAKE PART? 
You have been chosen because you as a stakeholder of Chinese companies are important to 
construct Chinese integrated reporting framework and give recommendations for the 
implementation of integrated reporting in China. You are a Chinese resident, familiar with 






IF YOU PARTICIPATE, HOW WILL YOUR DATA BE MANAGED AND 
STORED? 
All the information that I collect about you during the course of the research will be kept 
strictly confidential. For the data collected from questionnaire surveys, it will only be used 
aggregately. Thus, you and your organisation will not be identified by name or by any other 
means. To protect your identities, any parts of questionnaire survey will not be directly 
quoted under all circumstances without your specific written consent. In addition, the 
researcher may give a code number (for example, A1, B1, C1) instead of your name and 
organisation in the thesis and any publications. Through this method, you and your 
organisation will not be identified by name as well. Merely the researcher and the researcher’ 
supervisors have access to the information/data collected from you. All the transcriptions of 
the responses/results of questionnaire surveys will be kept securely and will not be disclosed 
to any third party. And all the materials will be securely destroyed after the conclusion of the 
research. 
 
WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO THE RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT? 
Results of the research is expected to be published in the academic publication. 
 
WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE BENEFITS OF TAKING PART? 
Whilst there are no immediate benefits for those people participating in the project, it is hoped 
that this work will have a beneficial impact on the integrated reporting practices in China. 
When the project is concluded, an Executive Summary of the final report will be shared with 
you in order to inform your professional work. 
 
IF YOU PARTICIPATE, WHAT ARE THE RISKS OF BEING INVOLVED? 
There is no risk to you resulting from this research since you will be fully informed all the 
time during the research. The researcher was formerly an accounting major student and 
subsequently a financial manager in a state-owned company in China. The researcher may 
have a lot in common (e.g., academic background, language, and culture) while 
communicating with you. This may positively impact the investigation of the research. 
However, there is no way the researcher might influence the ethical appropriateness of 




researcher and you at the moment. No possible conflict is anticipated by this research. 
Nevertheless, the researcher will always adhere to professional ethical principles towards you 
through the process to maintain objectivity and protect your interests. 
 
WHAT IF SOMETHING GOES WRONG? 
If you have any complaints about the project in the first instance you can contact the 
researcher and the researchers’ supervisors. 
 
IF YOU PARTICIPATE, WHAT ARE YOUR RIGHTS? 
You are under no obligation to accept this invitation. If you decide to participate, you have 
the right to withdraw from the study at any point until 31 August 2020; ask any questions 
about the study at any time during participation; decline to answer any particular question 
(or reflect on any particular issue); provide information on the understanding that your name 
will not be used unless you give permission to the research team. When the project is 
concluded, you will receive an Executive Summary of the final report and will be given 
access to the full report upon request. 
 
WHO HAS ETHICALLY REVIEWED THE PROJECT? 
This project has been ethically approved by the Waikato Management School’s ethics review 
procedure. The Waikato Management School’s Research Ethics Committee monitors the 
application and delivery of the School’s Ethics Review Procedure across the Waikato 
Management School. 
 
WHO DO YOU CONTACT FOR MORE INFORMATION OR IF YOU HAVE 
CONCERNS? 
Please feel free to contact the researchers if you have any questions about this study. If you 
have concerns or complaints about the study at any stage, you can contact the researchers, 












Supervisor’s Name and contact information: 
Prof. Howard Davey 
Dept of Accounting 
Telephone: 0064-07-8384441 
Email: howard.davey@waikato.ac.nz 
Dr. Murugesh Arunachalam 































Appendix F Questionnaire for the first-round survey 
 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
 
This questionnaire is designed by Mr. Yanqi Sun, a Ph.D. student at Waikato Management 
School (University of Waikato, New Zealand), for data collection for his Ph.D. thesis 
“Towards an Integrated Reporting Framework for China”. It is the first stage of data 
collection for this research project.  
 
Thank you very much for your participation in this research. The purpose of this email is to 
have your comments on the appropriateness of a list of integrated reporting disclosure items 
(see Attachment I), which were obtained primarily from prior literature relating to 
information disclosure of integrated reporting. These integrated reporting disclosure items 
need to be scrutinized by you in order to be adaptive to the Chinese context and meet your 
expectations. Please note that all comments provided will be treated as confidential, and you 
have the right to: 
 
⚫ Refuse to provide any comments, and to withdraw from the study at any time until 31 
August 2020. 
⚫ Ask any further questions about the study which occur during your participation. 
⚫ Request a summary of findings from the study when it is concluded. 
 













A brief introduction to integrated reporting 
According to the definition by the International Integrated Reporting Council, an integrated 
report is a concise communication about how an organisation’s strategy, governance, 
performance and prospects, in the context of its external environment, lead to the creation of 
value over the short, medium and long term. Integrated reporting is a new corporate reporting 
form in order to enhance overall transparency and to respond the growing information needs 
of stakeholders by highlighting the connectivity between the material financial information 




Your name:       
   
Your gender: Female  Male  
 
Your email address: 
 
Name of the organisation you work for: 
 
Your job title: 
 
Are you a Chinese (mainland) resident? Yes  No  
 
Are you familiar with corporate reporting (financial reporting; sustainability 











Do you fully agree with all the disclosure items? Yes  No   
(If you choose “No”, please answer the questions in the list) 
 
In addition to the disclosure items presented in the list, are there any additional 
disclosure items that are ought to be disclosed? If so, why do you think these disclosure 







Attachment for Appendix F List of integrated reporting disclosure items 
Theme Item Description Which one do you think 
is not necessary and can 
be deleted? Why? 
Which one needs to be 
adjusted and how to modify 








Mission and vision Mission and vision of the company   
Culture, ethics and value Culture, ethics and values of the company   
Operating context The impacts of various external contexts on company’s business, including economic context, 
industrial context, political context, environmental context, legal context, social context and so on. 
  
Business and market Product or service differentiation, sales volume and sales revenue of each product or service in each 
market (region or country) 
  
Ownership structure Shareholders’ backgrounds and proportion of shareholding; the actual controller of the company; the 
history of shareholder equity changes 
  




Strategy Strategy statements, strategic profile, strategic summary and how does it intend to get there?   
Core Competitiveness  Competitive advantages owned by the company, such as talent, technology, natural resource, business 
model and etc. 
  







Management processes The processes related to the management of a company, such as cost management, marketing 
management and etc. 
  
Brand Brand ranking, brand value, brand image, brand reputation and etc.    
Technology  Application of various technologies (e.g. ERP, database, internet, e-commerce for internal 
administrative management, marketing management, customer relationship management, supplier 
management, employee management, etc. 
  
Research and development Research and development activities for new products and services creation, products and service 
upgradation, and etc.  
  
Intellectual property Patents, copyrights, trademarks, etc. owned by the company   
Marketing marketing activities such as advertising, commercial sponsorship, promotions, social media presence, 
roadshows, relationship with the media and etc. 
  
Entrepreneurial spirit The spirits of innovativeness, proactive and reactive abilities, changeability, empowerment, 
responsibility taking, risk taking, employee engagement, creativity, knowledge sharing; initiatives to 









Shareholder relation  Relationship between the company and shareholders   
Creditor relation Relationship between the company and creditors (e.g. Bank)   
Competitor relation Relationship between the company and its competitors, such as anti-competitive initiatives   
Customer relation Relationship between the company and the customers, such as initiatives to increase customer 
satisfaction, customer loyalty and etc. 
  
Business collaboration Business activities with other companies or non-governmental organisations, such as joint ventures, 
mergers or acquisitions, marketing, strategic alliances, R&D and etc. 
  
Supplier or distributor 
relation 
Relationship between the company and its suppliers or distributors, such as policies for suppliers or 
distributors, support for suppliers or distributors, identification of qualified suppliers and distributors 
  
Government relation Relationship between the company and governments, such as strategic cooperation    
Society & community 
support 
Various types of voluntary services provided by the company to the society and community   
Product or service quality Initiatives to ensure consumer safety, health and privacy   






Theme Item Description Which one do you think is 
not necessary and can be 
deleted? Why? 
Which one needs to be 
adjusted and how to 









Recruitment Recruitment activities   
Employee remuneration Employee remuneration policy and implementation (e.g. the comparison with the average wage of 
companies in the same industry or in the same region) 
  
Employee equality The equality for disabilities, females and ethnic minorities in recruitment, remuneration and etc.   
Employee care Employee care activities, such as providing counselling for employees who have personal crisis, holding 
sports competitions for employees and etc. 
  
Resignation, layoffs and 
dismissal 
The employee turnover and the impact of employee turnover on the company   
Employee career 
development 
Initiatives that support career development amongst employees   
Employee health and safety Initiatives to ensure the occupational health and safety   
Employee training and 
education 
Various training or education programs provided by the company to employees   
Employee qualifications The information on academic and vocational qualifications held by employees   
CCP building Chinese communist party building activities such as conferences, seminars, lessons, visiting and etc.    
Natural capital Pollution and pollution 
reduction 
Various pollution caused by the company and initiatives to reduce pollution   
Resource consumption and 
resource saving 
Various resources consumed by the company and initiatives to reduce resources consumption   
Extra environmental 
protection 
Voluntary environmental protection activities   
Financial capital Fund from financing The pool of fund that is available to a company obtained through financing   
Fund from operations or 
investments 
The pool of fund that is available to a company generated through operations or investments   
Present financial KPIs Important financial indicators and its analysis on the comparison with its target   
The linkage between past 
and present financial KPIs 
Analysis on the changes of important financial indicators   
Manufactured 
capital  
8.1 Buildings  Important buildings (e.g. factories and plants) used within the company   
8.2 Equipment Important equipment (e.g. machines and tools) used within the company   
8.3 Infrastructure  Important infrastructure (e.g. roads, ports, bridges) used within the company   
Governance Leadership structure Leadership hierarchy within a company related to board of directors, board of supervisors, senior 
managers; the duties of the company’s senior management 
  
Management remuneration Management remuneration policy and implementation (e.g. the stock options plan and how does the 




Senior Management’s background on education, career experience and occupational qualification   
Risk and 
opportunity 
Risk Internal and external risks that companies identify and initiatives to mitigate risk, such as internal audit, 
internal control, risk management and so on. 
  
Opportunity Internal and external opportunities that companies identify and initiatives to seize the opportunity   
Outlook Business plans Future business plans for marketing, financing, recruitment, M&A, R&D and etc.     
Business objectives Various business objectives set by the company and initiatives to achieve the objectives    
Challenges 
& uncertainties 
Challenges and uncertainties regarding pursuing its business objectives and potential respond to the 





Appendix G Questionnaire for the second-round survey 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
 
This questionnaire is designed by Mr. Yanqi Sun, a Ph.D. student at Waikato Management 
School (University of Waikato, New Zealand), for data collection for his Ph.D. thesis 
“Towards an Integrated Reporting Framework for China”. It is the second stage of data 
collection for this research project.  
 
Thank you very much for your participation in this research. In the following questionnaire, 
68 disclosure items identified in the previous stage of the research are provided (see 
Attachment I). Please indicate the importance of each disclosure and assign a score using the 
rating scale provided below (1-5).  
 
















Please note that all comments provided will be treated as confidential, and you have the right 
to: 
 
⚫ Refuse to provide any comments, and to withdraw from the study at any time until 31 
August 2020. 
⚫ Ask any further questions about the study which occur during your participation. 
⚫ Request a summary of findings from the study when it is concluded. 
 






Note: This is a translation for the original e-mail in Chinese. 
 
 
Attachment I for Appendix G The importance of integrated reporting disclosure item 











Basic information of the 
company 
Basic information of the company (e.g., industry type, registered capital). 1 2 3 4 5 
Mission and vision Mission and vision of the company 1 2 3 4 5 
Culture, ethics and value Culture, ethics and values of the company 1 2 3 4 5 
Operating context The impacts of various external contexts on company’s business, including economic context, 
industrial context, political context, environmental context, legal context, social context and so on. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Business and market Product or service differentiation, sales volume and sales revenue of each product or service in each 
market (region or country) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Company history The history of the company 1 2 3 4 5 






Strategy Strategy statements, strategic profile, strategic summary and how does it intend to get there? 1 2 3 4 5 
Core competitiveness  Competitive advantages owned by the company, such as talent, technology, natural resource, business 
model and etc. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Competitive landscape Market share and ranking of each product or service in each market (region or country) 1 2 3 4 5 
Business model The company’s business model to depict its value creation process and the impact of business models 
on the company  








Ownership structure Shareholders’ backgrounds and proportion of shareholding; the actual controller of the company; the 
history of shareholder equity changes 
1 2 3 4 5 
Leadership structure 
 
Leadership hierarchy within a company related to board of directors, board of supervisors, senior 
managers; the duties of the company’s senior management 
1 2 3 4 5 
Management 
remuneration 
Management remuneration policy and implementation (e.g., the stock options plan and how does the 
company use stock options plan to motivate management). 
1 2 3 4 5 
Management experience 
and capability 
Senior Management’s background on education, career experience and occupational qualification 1 2 3 4 5 
Warnings and penalties Warnings or penalties for companies (or senior management) (e.g., violation of the Labour Protection 
Act, the Environmental Protection Act or the Consumer Protection Act) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Chinese communist 
party building 






Theme Item Description Your rating (1-5) 
Risk and 
opportunity 
Risk Internal and external risks that companies identify and initiatives to mitigate risk, such as internal 
audit, internal control, risk management and so on. 
1 2 3 4 5 




Business plans Future business plans for marketing, financing, recruitment, M&A, R&D and etc.   1 2 3 4 5 
Business objectives Various business objectives set by the company and initiatives to achieve the objectives  1 2 3 4 5 
Challenges & uncertainties Challenges and uncertainties regarding pursuing its business objectives and potential respond to 
the critical challenges and uncertainties 











Fund from financing The pool of fund that is available to a company obtained through financing 1 2 3 4 5 
Fund from operations or 
investments 
The pool of fund that is available to a company generated through operations or investments 1 2 3 4 5 
Present financial KPIs Important financial indicators and its analysis on the comparison with its target  1 2 3 4 5 
The linkage between past and 
present financial KPIs 
Analysis on the changes of important financial indicators 1 2 3 4 5 
Shareholder relation  Relationship between the company and shareholders 1 2 3 4 5 
Creditor relation Relationship between the company and creditors (e.g. Bank) 1 2 3 4 5 
Debtor relation Relationship between the company and debtors (e.g. the collection of accounts receivable) 1 2 3 4 5 
Other financial relations Relationship between the company and other financial stakeholders (e.g. financial analyst, credit 
ratings agency) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Taxation The company’s information on taxation (e.g. tax incentives, tax rates for overseas subsidiaries or 
branches, company’s tax credit rating, tax contribution rate) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Insurance The purpose, coverage, amount, claims, etc. of the insurance bought by the company 1 2 3 4 5 
Manufacturing 
capital 
Buildings  Important buildings (e.g. factories and plants) used within the company 1 2 3 4 5 
Equipment Important equipment (e.g. machines and tools) used within the company 1 2 3 4 5 





Pollution and pollution reduction Various pollution caused by the company and initiatives to reduce pollution 1 2 3 4 5 
Resource consumption and 
resource saving 
Various resources consumed by the company and initiatives to reduce resources consumption 1 2 3 4 5 
Extra environmental protection Voluntary environmental protection activities 1 2 3 4 5 
Overseas CSR (environmental 
aspect) 
















The processes related to the management of a company, such as cost management, marketing management 
and etc.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Brand Brand ranking, brand value, brand image, brand reputation and etc.  1 2 3 4 5 
Technology  Application of various technologies (e.g. ERP, database, internet, e-commerce for internal administrative 
management, marketing management, customer relationship management, supplier management, employee 
management, etc. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Research and 
development 
Research and development activities for new products and services creation, products and service 
upgradation, and etc.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Intellectual property Patents, copyrights, trademarks, etc. owned by the company 1 2 3 4 5 
Marketing Marketing activities such as advertising, commercial sponsorship, promotions, social media presence, 
roadshows, relationship with the media and etc. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Entrepreneurial spirit The spirits of innovativeness, proactive and reactive abilities, changeability, empowerment, responsibility 
taking, risk taking, employee engagement, creativity, knowledge sharing; initiatives to spur and cultivate 
these spirits.                                 












Recruitment Recruitment activities 1 2 3 4 5 
Employee 
remuneration 
Employee remuneration policy and implementation (e.g. the comparison with the average wage of companies 
in the same industry or in the same region) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Employee equality The equality for disabilities, females and ethnic minorities in recruitment, remuneration and etc. 1 2 3 4 5 
Employee care Employee care activities, such as providing counselling for employees who have personal crisis, holding 
sports competitions for employees and etc. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Resignation, layoffs 
and dismissal 
The employee turnover and the impact of important employees’ turnover on the company 1 2 3 4 5 
Employee career 
development 
Initiatives that support career development amongst employees 1 2 3 4 5 
Employee health and 
safety 
Initiatives to ensure the occupational health and safety 1 2 3 4 5 
Employee training 
and education 
Various training or education programs provided by the company to employees 1 2 3 4 5 
Employee 
qualifications 
The information on academic and vocational qualifications held by employees 1 2 3 4 5 




















Competitor relation Relationship between the company and its competitors, such as anti-competitive initiatives 1 2 3 4 5 
Customer relation Relationship between the company and the customers, such as initiatives to increase customer 
satisfaction, customer loyalty and etc.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Business 
collaboration 
Business activities with other companies or non-governmental organisations, such as joint ventures, 
mergers or acquisitions, marketing, strategic alliances, R&D and etc. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Supplier or 
distributor relation 
Relationship between the company and its suppliers or distributors, such as policies for suppliers or 
distributors, support for suppliers or distributors, identification of qualified suppliers and 
distributors 
1 2 3 4 5 
Government relation Relationship between the company and governments, such as strategic cooperation  1 2 3 4 5 
Society & 
community support 
Various types of voluntary services provided by the company to the society and community 1 2 3 4 5 
Product or service 
quality 
Initiatives to ensure consumer safety, health and privacy 1 2 3 4 5 
NGO relation  Relationship between the company and Non-profit organisations (e.g.  environmental NGO) 1 2 3 4 5 
Media relation             Relationship between the company and the media 1 2 3 4 5 
Industry association 
relation 
Relationship between the company and industry association relation 1 2 3 4 5 
Anti-corruption The initiatives to prevent corruption  1 2 3 4 5 
Overseas CSR 
(social aspect) 









Appendix H Questionnaire for the third-round survey 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
 
This questionnaire is designed by Mr. Yanqi Sun, a Ph.D. student at Waikato Management 
School (University of Waikato, New Zealand), for data collection for his Ph.D. thesis 
“Towards an Integrated Reporting Framework for China”. It is the last stage of data collection 
for this research project.  
 
Thank you very much for your participation in this research. The purpose of this email is to 
have your comments on the recommendations for the implementation of integrated reporting 
in China (see Attachment I). Please note that all comments provided will be treated as 
confidential, and you have the right to: 
 
⚫ Refuse to provide any comments, and to withdraw from the study at any time until 31 
August 2020. 
⚫ Ask any further questions about the study which occur during your participation. 
⚫ Request a summary of findings from the study when it is concluded. 
 

















Attachment I for Appendix H 
1. Do you have any comments? Yes  No   
(If you choose “Yes”, please answer the following questions) 
 




































1. Participants:  
P1-P8 Scholars in accounting 
P9-P10 Editors in financial media 
P11-P17 Financial managers 
P18-P25 Financial analysts in banks 
P26-P31 Auditors 
P32-P36 Officials in government agencies in charge of supervising Chinese companies  
P37-P42 Industry analysts in consultant companies  
P43-P51 Financial analysts in investment companies  
 
2. Ratings:  
1 Unimportant to disclose  
2 Little importance  
3 Moderately important  
4 Very important  
5 Extremely important 
 
3. Disclosure items: 
1.1 Basic information of the company; 1.2 Mission and vision; 1.3 Culture, ethics and value; 1.4 Operating context; 1.5 Business and market; 1.6 Company history; 1.7 Operational structure; 2.1 Strategy; 2.2 Core 
competitiveness; 2.3 Competitive landscape; 2.4 Business model; 3.1 Ownership structure; 3.2 Leadership structure; 3.3 Management remuneration; 3.4 Management experience and capability; 3.5 Warnings and 
penalties; 3.6 Chinese communist party building; 4.1 Risk; 4.2 Opportunity; 5.1 Business plans; 5.2 Business objectives; 5.3 Challenges & uncertainties; 6.1 Fund from financing; 6.2 Fund from operations or 
investments; 6.3 Present financial KPIs; 6.4 The linkage between past and present financial KPIs; 6.5 Shareholder relation; 6.6 Creditor relation; 6.7 Debtor relation; 6.8 Other financial relations; 6.9 Taxation; 6.10 
Insurance; 7.1 Buildings; 7.2 Equipment; 7.3 Infrastructure; 8.1 Pollution and pollution reduction; 8.2 Resource consumption and resource saving; 8.3 Extra environmental protection; 8.4 Overseas CSR 
(environmental aspect); 9.1 Management processes; 9.2 Brand; 9.3 Technology; 9.4 Research and development; 9.5 Intellectual property; 9.6 Marketing; 9.7 Entrepreneurial spirit; 10.1 Recruitment; 10.2 Employee 
remuneration; 10.3 Employee equality; 10.4 Employee care; 10.5 Resignation, layoffs and dismissal; 10.6 Employee career development; 10.7 Employee health and safety; 10.8 Employee training and education; 10.9 
Employee qualifications; 10.10 Employee allocation; 11.1 Competitor relation; 11.2 Customer relation; 11.3 Business collaboration; 11.4 Supplier or distributor relation; 11.5 Government relation; 11.6 Society & 








Appendix J The measurement of the extent and quality of IR disclosures 
 The extent of IR disclosures  
Type Measurement Description 
One item(i) of a 
firm(j) in one 
year 
𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗 = 0 𝑜𝑟 1 If one item(i) appears in the corporate report 
of a firm(j), this item(i) is assigned a score of 
1, and 0 otherwise. 
One item(i) of all 







“m” is the number of total firms. 
One theme(p) of a 







“q” is the number of items in the theme(p). 
One theme(p) of 
all firms in one 
year 







“m” is the number of total firms; “q” is the 
number of items in the theme(p). 







 “m” is the number of total firms; “n” is the 
number of total disclosure items 
All firms in one 
year 







“m” is the number of total firms; “n” is the 
number of total disclosure items 
The quality of IR disclosures 
One item(i) of a 





Actual Score(i) is the actual quality score of 
one item(i) gained from content analysis for 
corporate reports of a firm(j); Maximum 
Score(i) is the possible maximum quality 
score of one item(i). 
One item(i) of all 








“m” is the number of total firms. 
One theme(p) of a 
firm(j) in one 
year 
∑ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗 × 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=1




“q” is the number of items in the theme(p). 
One theme(p) of 
all firms in one 
year 
∑
∑ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗 × 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖
𝑞
𝑖=1







“m” is the number of total firms; “q” is the 
number of items in the theme(p). 
A firm in one 
year 
∑ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗 × 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1





“n” is the number of total disclosure items. 
All firms in one 
year 
∑
∑ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗 × 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1







“m” is the number of total firms; “n” is the 











Name  Security 
Code 
Name 
1 000001 Ping An Bank Co., Ltd. 51 600376 Beijing Capital Development Co.,Ltd. 
2 000002 China Vanke Co.,Ltd. 52 600383 Gemdale Corporation 
3 000039 China International Marine Containers (Group) Co.,Ltd. 53 600585 Anhui Conch Cement Company Limited 
4 000046 Oceanwide Holdings Co., Ltd. 54 600663 Shanghai Lujiazui Finance & Trade Zone Development Co.,Ltd. 
5 000069 Shenzhen Overseas Chinese Town Co.,Ltd. 55 600690 Haier Smart Home Co.,Ltd. 
6 000100 Tcl Corporation 56 600705 Avic Capital Co.,ltd. 
7 000333 Midea Group Co., Ltd 57 600741 Huayu Automotive Systems Company Limited 
8 000338 Weichai Power Co.,Ltd. 58 600795 GD Power Development Co.,Ltd 
9 000402 Financial Street Holdings Co., Ltd. 59 600837 Haitong Securities Co.,Ltd. 
10 000625 Chongqing Changan Automobile Company Limited 60 600886 SDIC Power Holdings Co., Ltd. 
11 000651 Gree Electric Appliances,Inc.of Zhuhai 61 600893 AECC Aviation Power Co,Ltd 
12 000709 Hbis Company Limited 62 600900 China Yangtze Power Co.,Ltd. 
13 000725 Boe Technology Group Co.,Ltd. 63 600999 China Merchants Securities Co.,Ltd. 
14 000728 Guoyuan Securities Company Limited 64 601006 Daqin Railway Co., Ltd. 
15 000776 GF Securities Co.,Ltd. 65 601009 Bank Of Nanjing Co., Ltd 
16 000783 Changjiang Securities Company Limited 66 601088 China Shenhua Energy Company Limited 
17 000858 Wuliangye Yibin Co.,Ltd. 67 601111 Air China Limited 
18 000895 Henan Shuanghui Investment & Development Co.,Ltd. 68 601117 China National Chemical Engineering Co., Ltd. 
19 002024 Suning.com Co.,LTD. 69 601166 Industrial Bank Co., Ltd. 
20 002142 Bank Of Ningbo Co.,Ltd. 70 601169 Bank Of Beijing Co., Ltd. 
21 002146 Risesun Real Estate Development Co.,Ltd 71 601186 China Railway Construction Corporation Limited 
22 002304 Jiangsu Yanghe Brewery Joint-Stock Co., Ltd. 72 601238 Guangzhou Automobile Group Co., Ltd. 
23 002415 Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Co.,Ltd. 73 601288 Agricultural Bank Of China Limited 
24 002594 BYD Company Limited 74 601318 Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China,Ltd. 
25 002736 Guosen Securities Co.,Ltd 75 601328 Bank Of Communications Co., Ltd. 
26 600000 Shanghai Pudong Development Bank Co.,Ltd. 76 601336 New China Life Insurance Company Ltd. 
27 600011 Huaneng Power International,Inc. 77 601377 Industrial Securities Co., Ltd. 
28 600015 Hua Xia Bank Co.,Limited 78 601390 China Railway Group Limited 
29 600016 China Minsheng Banking Corp.,Ltd. 79 601398 Industrial And Commercial Bank Of China Limited 
30 600018 Shanghai International Port (Group) Co.,Ltd. 80 601555 Soochow Securities Co.,Ltd. 
31 600019 Baoshan Iron & Steel Co.,Ltd. 81 601601 China Pacific Insurance (Group) Co., Ltd. 
32 600026 COSCO Shipping Energy Transportation Co., Ltd. 82 601618 Metallurgical Corporation of China Ltd. 
33 600027 Huadian Power International Corporation Limited 83 601628 China Life Insurance Company Limited 
34 600028 China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation 84 601633 Great Wall Motor Company Limited 
35 600029 China Southern Airlines Co.,Ltd. 85 601668 China State Construction Engineering Corporation Limited 
36 600030 CITIC Securities Company Limited 86 601669 Power Construction Corporation of China,Ltd 
37 600036 China Merchants Bank Co., Ltd. 87 601688 Huatai Securities Co., Ltd. 
38 600048 Poly Development Holding Group Co.,Ltd. 88 601727 Shanghai Electric Group Company Limited 
39 600050 China United Network Communications Limited 89 601766 CRRC Corporation Limited 
40 600068 China Gezhouba Group Co.,Ltd. 90 601788 Everbright Securities Company Limited 
41 600089 TBEA Co., Ltd. 91 601800 China Communications Construction Company Limited 
42 600104 SAIC Motor Corporation Limited 92 601818 China Everbright Bank Company Limited 
43 600115 China Eastern Airlines Corporation Limited 93 601857 Petrochina Company Limited 
44 600153 Xiamen C&D Inc. 94 601899 Zijin Mining Group Company Limited 
45 600170 Shanghai Construction Group Co., Ltd. 95 601901 Founder Securities Co., Ltd. 
46 600188 Yanzhou Coal Mining Company Limited 96 601939 China Construction Bank Corporation 
47 600208 Xinhu Zhongbao Co.,Ltd. 97 601988 Bank Of China Limited 
48 600309 Wanhua Chemical Group Co.,Ltd. 98 601991 Datang International Power Generation Co., Ltd. 
49 600362 Jiangxi Copper Company Limited 99 601992 BBMG Corporation 




Appendix L Extent and quality of disclosures of all IR items 
Items 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Importance 
Extent Quality Extent Quality Extent Quality Extent Quality Extent Quality 
Basic information of the company 99.00% 0.5900 99.00% 0.5800 99.00% 0.5800 99.00% 0.5900 99.00% 0.4950 Extremely important 
Company history 44.00% 0.3500 34.00% 0.2850 33.00% 0.2750 34.00% 0.3000 57.00% 0.4800 Very important 
Mission and vision 62.00% 0.5000 65.00% 0.5450 64.00% 0.5350 68.00% 0.5650 83.00% 0.6700 Very important 
Culture, ethics and value 72.00% 0.6250 69.00% 0.5850 72.00% 0.5850 76.00% 0.6200 79.00% 0.6800 Very important 
Operating context 75.00% 0.5775 90.00% 0.7200 94.00% 0.7700 92.00% 0.7800 100.00% 0.8175 Very important 
Business and market 100.00% 0.9725 100.00% 0.9775 100.00% 0.9850 100.00% 0.9900 100.00% 0.9625 Extremely important 
Operational structure 100.00% 0.9100 100.00% 0.9125 100.00% 0.9075 100.00% 0.9000 100.00% 0.8225 Very important 
Business model  52.00% 0.1950 95.00% 0.5175 94.00% 0.5350 94.00% 0.5600 98.00% 0.5850 Very important 
Strategy  86.00% 0.4225 89.00% 0.4475 89.00% 0.4350 92.00% 0.4625 98.00% 0.4725 Very important 
Core competitiveness 88.00% 0.5850 91.00% 0.6025 91.00% 0.6200 91.00% 0.6400 98.00% 0.6250 Very important 
Competitive landscape 84.00% 0.5150 85.00% 0.5350 87.00% 0.5775 89.00% 0.5725 91.00% 0.5875 Very important 
Management processes 53.00% 0.2575 53.00% 0.2500 58.00% 0.2625 61.00% 0.2925 89.00% 0.4325 Very important 
Brand 96.00% 0.6150 96.00% 0.5975 93.00% 0.6075 93.00% 0.6175 98.00% 0.6500 Very important 
Technology  83.00% 0.5650 90.00% 0.6400 90.00% 0.6500 95.00% 0.7075 99.00% 0.7350 Very important 
Intellectual property  68.00% 0.4375 71.00% 0.4700 77.00% 0.4875 78.00% 0.5150 75.00% 0.5000 Very important 
Research and development 85.00% 0.6375 84.00% 0.7175 83.00% 0.7150 85.00% 0.7425 90.00% 0.7525 Very important 
Marketing 55.00% 0.3400 60.00% 0.3600 59.00% 0.3725 63.00% 0.3850 78.00% 0.5200 Moderately important 
Entrepreneurial spirit 54.00% 0.1950 61.00% 0.2300 64.00% 0.2375 64.00% 0.2350 86.00% 0.3575 Moderately important 
Buildings  17.00% 0.1125 22.00% 0.1975 23.00% 0.2000 24.00% 0.2075 32.00% 0.2450 Very important 
Equipment 11.00% 0.0750 11.00% 0.0775 12.00% 0.0850 13.00% 0.0900 21.00% 0.1400 Very important 
Infrastructure 12.00% 0.0875 15.00% 0.1100 16.00% 0.1150 17.00% 0.1275 16.00% 0.1250 Very important 










Items 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Importance 
Extent Quality Extent Quality Extent Quality Extent Quality Extent Quality 
Recruitment  54.00% 0.3225 58.00% 0.3300 53.00% 0.3125 52.00% 0.3025 63.00% 0.3600 Moderately important 
Employee qualifications  100.00% 0.7133 100.00% 0.7167 100.00% 0.7033 100.00% 0.7167 100.00% 0.6933 Moderately important 
Employee remuneration  94.00% 0.4775 97.00% 0.5050 95.00% 0.5200 96.00% 0.5250 98.00% 0.5975 Very important 
Employee care  91.00% 0.6375 93.00% 0.6625 92.00% 0.6600 97.00% 0.6800 97.00% 0.7150 Moderately important 
Employee equality 61.00% 0.3450 65.00% 0.3900 67.00% 0.3975 67.00% 0.4150 72.00% 0.4150 Moderately important 
Resignation, layoffs and dismissal  17.00% 0.0850 19.00% 0.0975 20.00% 0.1100 29.00% 0.1675 31.00% 0.1675 Moderately important 
Employee career development  79.00% 0.4100 79.00% 0.4425 78.00% 0.4500 76.00% 0.4150 87.00% 0.4500 Moderately important 
Employee health and safety  89.00% 0.5625 89.00% 0.5650 90.00% 0.5800 90.00% 0.6325 97.00% 0.6675 Moderately important 
Employee training and education  97.00% 0.7425 98.00% 0.7425 99.00% 0.8025 99.00% 0.7550 100.00% 0.7825 Moderately important 
Pollution and pollution reduction 73.00% 0.4850 76.00% 0.5025 81.00% 0.5925 87.00% 0.6125 88.00% 0.6400 Very important 
Resource consumption and resource saving 96.00% 0.7025 95.00% 0.7000 95.00% 0.7025 94.00% 0.7175 96.00% 0.7325 Very important 
Extra environmental protection 56.00% 0.2850 56.00% 0.2950 58.00% 0.3000 55.00% 0.2950 65.00% 0.4225 Moderately important 
Overseas CSR (environmental aspect) 6.00% 0.0225 6.00% 0.0275 7.00% 0.0375 10.00% 0.0425 6.00% 0.0300 Moderately important 
Fund from financing 99.00% 0.8200 99.00% 0.8900 99.00% 0.8975 99.00% 0.8975 98.00% 0.9050 Very important 
Fund from operations or investments 97.00% 0.7225 99.00% 0.7325 99.00% 0.7225 99.00% 0.7300 94.00% 0.6775 Very important 
Present financial KPIs 100.00% 0.5775 100.00% 0.5550 100.00% 0.5550 100.00% 0.5525 100.00% 0.5375 Extremely important 
The linkage between past and present financial KPIs 100.00% 0.9500 100.00% 0.9625 100.00% 0.9650 100.00% 0.9650 100.00% 0.9575 Extremely important 
Shareholder relation  100.00% 0.7725 100.00% 0.8025 100.00% 0.8100 100.00% 0.8100 100.00% 0.8550 Extremely important 
Creditor elation 27.00% 0.1350 60.00% 0.3650 61.00% 0.3975 62.00% 0.4000 66.00% 0.4300 Very important 












Items 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Importance 
Extent Quality Extent Quality Extent Quality Extent Quality Extent Quality 
Other financial relations 96.00% 0.5850 95.00% 0.6225 95.00% 0.6225 97.00% 0.6475 97.00% 0.6075 Very important 
Taxation 78.00% 0.4575 75.00% 0.4500 79.00% 0.4750 76.00% 0.4350 71.00% 0.4225 Very important 
Business collaboration  73.00% 0.4725 80.00% 0.5100 76.00% 0.5050 79.00% 0.5450 88.00% 0.5250 Very important 
Customer relation 84.00% 0.5675 82.00% 0.5525 88.00% 0.5975 87.00% 0.6075 92.00% 0.6500 Very important 
Competitor relation 23.00% 0.1150 21.00% 0.1000 25.00% 0.1325 26.00% 0.1225 34.00% 0.1475 Very important 
Supplier or distributor relation 82.00% 0.6025 80.00% 0.5950 84.00% 0.6325 89.00% 0.6900 90.00% 0.7125 Very important 
Government relation 81.00% 0.3050 83.00% 0.3425 84.00% 0.3475 87.00% 0.3525 94.00% 0.4725 Very important 
Society & community support 98.00% 0.8275 99.00% 0.8300 100.00% 0.9225 100.00% 0.9275 100.00% 0.9575 Moderately important 
Product or service quality 95.00% 0.6725 92.00% 0.6400 96.00% 0.6675 99.00% 0.6800 100.00% 0.7125 Very important 
Overseas CSR (social aspect)  25.00% 0.1425 28.00% 0.1700 30.00% 0.1850 31.00% 0.1975 27.00% 0.1825 Moderately important 
Anti-corruption              64.00% 0.3925 61.00% 0.3600 74.00% 0.4275 81.00% 0.4700 84.00% 0.5275 Moderately important 
Industry association relation 75.00% 0.2650 71.00% 0.2700 76.00% 0.2900 74.00% 0.2825 68.00% 0.2575 Moderately important 
Media relation 71.00% 0.1950 73.00% 0.2125 74.00% 0.2100 75.00% 0.2225 79.00% 0.3275 Moderately important 
NGO relation 48.00% 0.2200 43.00% 0.2275 49.00% 0.2425 58.00% 0.2700 51.00% 0.3000 Moderately important 
Ownership structure 100.00% 0.8825 100.00% 0.8350 100.00% 0.8350 100.00% 0.8375 100.00% 0.7625 Very important 
Leadership structure 98.00% 0.6000 100.00% 0.6100 100.00% 0.6200 100.00% 0.6200 100.00% 0.6750 Very important 
Management experience and capability  100.00% 0.8750 100.00% 0.8950 100.00% 0.9050 100.00% 0.9100 100.00% 0.9750 Very important 
Management remuneration 100.00% 0.7425 100.00% 0.7425 100.00% 0.7400 100.00% 0.7500 100.00% 0.7725 Very important 
Chinese communist party building  10.00% 0.0350 13.00% 0.0700 20.00% 0.1050 43.00% 0.2500 67.00% 0.3650 Moderately important 
Warnings and penalties 78.00% 0.2700 57.00% 0.2400 56.00% 0.2500 52.00% 0.2275 62.00% 0.2600 Very important 
Insurance 11.00% 0.0675 12.00% 0.0675 11.00% 0.0675 14.00% 0.0825 10.00% 0.0650 Moderately important 
Risk 96.00% 0.6525 96.00% 0.6500 97.00% 0.6600 97.00% 0.6575 100.00% 0.6900 Very important 
Opportunity 80.00% 0.4500 83.00% 0.4650 86.00% 0.5025 87.00% 0.5150 90.00% 0.5025 Very important 
Business plans 100.00% 0.6250 100.00% 0.6225 100.00% 0.6375 100.00% 0.6500 100.00% 0.6225 Very important 
Business objectives 99.00% 0.6275 99.00% 0.6350 100.00% 0.6375 100.00% 0.6625 98.00% 0.6225 Very important 




























No. Quality No. Quality No. Score No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality 
1 4 0.4185 3 0.5043 7 0.8246 1 0.0830 7 0.4724 2 0.3154 7 0.4886 10 0.4937 6 0.7003 2 0.6282 2 0.3381 51 0.5057 
2 7 0.7029 3 0.4363 6 0.5846 1 0.2519 9 0.6095 3 0.6532 7 0.5387 10 0.5685 5 0.5918 1 0.2564 3 0.6690 55 0.5601 
3 7 0.8019 4 0.6236 7 0.6220 2 0.5010 9 0.5918 3 0.6005 9 0.6982 10 0.4961 5 0.7009 2 0.8782 3 0.5810 61 0.6312 
4 7 0.7061 3 0.3776 5 0.3207 1 0.3359 7 0.3763 1 0.1348 8 0.5644 9 0.4246 5 0.5365 2 0.5064 3 0.6690 51 0.4545 
5 6 0.8065 4 0.4379 5 0.3946 1 0.3359 9 0.5197 3 0.5253 8 0.5874 10 0.4770 6 0.6269 2 0.3782 3 0.4190 57 0.5205 
6 7 0.7485 4 0.6236 6 0.6955 0 0.0000 9 0.6760 3 0.6005 8 0.6426 11 0.6074 4 0.4332 2 0.5000 3 0.4190 57 0.5913 
7 6 0.6005 4 0.7503 7 0.7918 0 0.0000 8 0.4787 2 0.4161 6 0.3836 10 0.4742 5 0.5897 2 0.3782 3 0.5000 53 0.5069 
8 6 0.6564 4 0.4991 7 0.6166 0 0.0000 10 0.6596 2 0.4835 6 0.4927 9 0.5021 6 0.5737 2 0.5000 3 0.5881 55 0.5323 
9 6 0.7123 3 0.3140 6 0.2455 1 0.3359 6 0.3537 2 0.1387 8 0.6124 7 0.3522 5 0.5979 2 0.3782 3 0.5876 49 0.4326 
10 7 0.8402 4 0.6860 7 0.6511 1 0.2490 9 0.5797 3 0.5253 7 0.5126 10 0.4950 6 0.6108 2 0.5000 3 0.5847 59 0.5732 
11 5 0.7619 3 0.5618 7 0.7851 0 0.0000 7 0.5400 2 0.4161 5 0.3559 9 0.5513 5 0.5365 2 0.7436 2 0.3381 47 0.5224 
12 6 0.6581 4 0.6267 4 0.4183 0 0.0000 6 0.3708 3 0.3378 8 0.6175 4 0.1783 6 0.5737 2 0.5000 3 0.5843 46 0.4407 
13 6 0.7068 4 0.6236 6 0.5895 1 0.2490 9 0.6508 3 0.7190 7 0.5926 10 0.5185 5 0.5918 2 0.8718 3 0.5038 56 0.5955 
14 6 0.7530 4 0.6860 7 0.5638 0 0.0000 7 0.3445 2 0.2480 7 0.6181 7 0.3348 6 0.7039 2 0.7500 3 0.5810 51 0.5053 
15 7 0.9456 4 0.6848 7 0.6879 1 0.1679 10 0.6885 2 0.3448 7 0.5866 11 0.4428 6 0.7695 2 0.5000 3 0.5000 60 0.5985 
16 7 0.8985 3 0.4370 5 0.4033 0 0.0000 9 0.4823 0 0.0000 7 0.5696 7 0.3278 6 0.8595 2 0.7564 3 0.5810 49 0.4887 
17 7 0.8969 3 0.4403 7 0.6918 0 0.0000 8 0.5565 3 0.6532 7 0.5666 10 0.5557 6 0.7039 2 0.5000 2 0.5071 55 0.5824 
18 6 0.6142 4 0.5000 5 0.4018 0 0.0000 9 0.6874 3 0.6679 8 0.5898 8 0.3478 6 0.6122 2 0.5000 3 0.5843 54 0.5129 
19 6 0.7586 3 0.3798 7 0.7542 0 0.0000 9 0.6128 3 0.5819 6 0.4670 10 0.6150 6 0.7199 2 0.5000 3 0.4190 55 0.5661 
20 7 0.7509 4 0.5000 5 0.5260 1 0.1679 8 0.4541 2 0.3448 8 0.5906 9 0.4698 6 0.7194 2 0.6346 3 0.5038 55 0.5272 
21 6 0.7100 4 0.5593 5 0.3522 1 0.3359 8 0.5598 3 0.5184 8 0.6175 9 0.6293 6 0.7943 2 0.6282 3 0.6686 55 0.5853 
22 6 0.6974 4 0.5637 7 0.6916 0 0.0000 7 0.5017 2 0.5547 7 0.4653 10 0.4964 6 0.7033 2 0.3782 3 0.5847 54 0.5333 
23 6 0.7068 4 0.6255 6 0.5183 0 0.0000 8 0.4761 3 0.4432 6 0.4908 10 0.4477 5 0.5365 2 0.6218 3 0.5000 53 0.4960 
24 6 0.6069 4 0.4388 6 0.5187 0 0.0000 8 0.5801 2 0.4161 7 0.5650 12 0.6270 5 0.5365 2 0.5000 3 0.5000 55 0.5259 
25 7 0.8043 4 0.6224 7 0.6463 1 0.0840 7 0.5372 3 0.4324 8 0.6175 9 0.5516 6 0.7483 2 0.7564 3 0.5000 57 0.5901 
26 7 0.8506 4 0.4969 6 0.6304 1 0.0840 9 0.5853 1 0.1348 7 0.6108 8 0.3968 6 0.8568 2 0.6346 3 0.5885 54 0.5538 





























No. Quality No. Quality No. Score No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality 
28 6 0.7100 4 0.5000 5 0.4623 0 0.0000 9 0.5545 2 0.3154 7 0.5932 8 0.5386 6 0.6981 2 0.7564 3 0.5000 52 0.5345 
29 7 0.8961 4 0.5612 6 0.5913 1 0.1679 9 0.5757 3 0.4541 7 0.5628 10 0.6816 6 0.7535 1 0.3846 3 0.5847 57 0.6028 
30 7 0.8961 4 0.4991 6 0.5897 2 0.4151 10 0.7930 3 0.5966 8 0.6733 11 0.5459 6 0.7535 1 0.5128 3 0.6690 61 0.6495 
31 6 0.8050 4 0.6236 7 0.7641 0 0.0000 7 0.5103 3 0.7245 8 0.6390 10 0.4989 6 0.6269 2 0.3782 3 0.8347 56 0.6023 
32 6 0.7626 4 0.6879 6 0.3811 1 0.3321 9 0.7340 3 0.5966 7 0.6536 11 0.5396 4 0.5396 2 0.8718 3 0.8381 56 0.6149 
33 7 0.8050 4 0.5031 6 0.4015 1 0.2490 10 0.5619 3 0.7245 7 0.5175 6 0.3264 6 0.7241 2 0.6218 3 0.6686 55 0.5282 
34 4 0.7060 4 0.5633 7 0.7598 1 0.2490 9 0.5296 3 0.7245 7 0.5148 10 0.5748 6 0.5706 1 0.3846 3 0.7533 55 0.5857 
35 7 0.8961 4 0.6236 7 0.7849 2 0.4151 10 0.6592 3 0.5966 7 0.5410 12 0.6917 5 0.5979 2 0.8782 3 0.9153 62 0.6754 
36 6 0.8001 4 0.8758 7 0.4672 0 0.0000 9 0.5839 3 0.6424 8 0.6160 10 0.5735 6 0.7324 2 0.6282 3 0.5810 58 0.6041 
37 7 0.9001 4 0.7509 7 0.7058 0 0.0000 10 0.6444 3 0.5711 9 0.6641 11 0.7517 6 0.6791 2 0.6282 3 0.5000 62 0.6645 
38 5 0.5717 4 0.6860 6 0.4583 1 0.2519 8 0.4671 3 0.5184 8 0.6684 8 0.4733 4 0.5396 2 0.5000 3 0.6686 52 0.5364 
39 7 0.6318 4 0.6870 7 0.8572 1 0.1660 10 0.7366 4 0.6348 8 0.5175 11 0.7898 5 0.5979 2 0.5000 3 0.5000 62 0.6471 
40 5 0.7155 4 0.6879 7 0.6866 1 0.3359 9 0.6613 2 0.4873 8 0.5892 8 0.4800 5 0.5607 2 0.7500 3 0.6690 54 0.5975 
41 5 0.7603 4 0.6248 7 0.5833 2 0.6641 8 0.4300 2 0.5547 7 0.5920 8 0.4823 4 0.5396 2 0.7436 3 0.5847 52 0.5696 
42 7 0.7539 4 0.5612 7 0.6469 1 0.2519 9 0.6566 3 0.5858 7 0.5158 9 0.6324 5 0.6532 2 0.6218 3 0.6695 57 0.6055 
43 6 0.6157 4 0.5031 6 0.5996 2 0.4981 8 0.5471 2 0.4161 7 0.5048 10 0.5554 5 0.5075 2 0.6282 3 0.6686 55 0.5451 
44 4 0.6707 4 0.5000 5 0.4341 1 0.3359 7 0.4089 3 0.4091 8 0.5914 6 0.3121 4 0.4332 2 0.8782 3 0.6690 47 0.4817 
45 6 0.8058 4 0.5624 6 0.4834 0 0.0000 8 0.5668 1 0.1425 8 0.5659 5 0.2972 5 0.5979 2 0.6218 3 0.6657 48 0.4904 
46 6 0.5168 4 0.5022 6 0.6252 1 0.2490 9 0.6960 3 0.7810 8 0.6159 8 0.4379 6 0.7324 2 0.6346 3 0.5881 56 0.5823 
47 4 0.5239 3 0.3776 4 0.1733 1 0.3359 7 0.3291 2 0.1387 7 0.5180 5 0.2380 4 0.5396 2 0.5000 3 0.5000 42 0.3689 
48 5 0.6622 4 0.5000 7 0.5534 1 0.2490 7 0.4322 2 0.5547 5 0.3959 5 0.2230 4 0.4864 2 0.6218 3 0.5004 45 0.4403 
49 6 0.7580 4 0.5643 6 0.5189 0 0.0000 6 0.4015 2 0.4199 8 0.6622 10 0.3210 4 0.4864 2 0.5000 3 0.6690 51 0.4939 
50 6 0.8089 4 0.5000 3 0.2504 0 0.0000 8 0.4030 1 0.1348 8 0.6383 4 0.2170 5 0.5866 2 0.7564 3 0.5000 44 0.4337 
51 6 0.7626 4 0.4388 5 0.3088 1 0.3359 5 0.2739 2 0.1387 8 0.6175 6 0.2799 5 0.5365 1 0.2564 3 0.7533 46 0.4302 
52 6 0.8058 4 0.5624 6 0.5504 1 0.3359 7 0.4032 2 0.1387 7 0.5411 7 0.4276 4 0.5976 2 0.3782 3 0.5843 49 0.4980 
53 5 0.5222 3 0.3798 6 0.4989 0 0.0000 10 0.8190 3 0.6424 8 0.5398 8 0.4890 6 0.6108 2 0.5000 3 0.7496 54 0.5459 































No. Quality No. Quality No. Score No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality 
55 6 0.7571 4 0.6236 7 0.7215 0 0.0000 6 0.4180 2 0.4161 7 0.5165 10 0.4929 4 0.4864 2 0.3782 3 0.5000 51 0.5141 
56 6 0.7556 3 0.3776 3 0.2120 0 0.0000 8 0.4638 1 0.1132 8 0.5613 9 0.5033 5 0.5979 2 0.5000 3 0.5000 48 0.4511 
57 5 0.6622 3 0.4400 6 0.5542 0 0.0000 9 0.5264 2 0.4835 8 0.6144 9 0.3984 4 0.4898 2 0.6282 3 0.5847 51 0.5057 
58 6 0.8515 4 0.5637 7 0.7186 1 0.1660 9 0.6571 3 0.5858 8 0.5890 10 0.5185 5 0.5979 2 0.5000 3 0.5038 58 0.5952 
59 7 0.9456 4 0.6248 7 0.5457 0 0.0000 9 0.7084 2 0.4161 9 0.6903 10 0.5522 6 0.8036 2 0.6282 3 0.5000 59 0.6214 
60 6 0.7626 4 0.5624 2 0.1772 1 0.2490 9 0.4985 3 0.7245 8 0.6175 4 0.2417 4 0.4864 2 0.7500 3 0.6724 46 0.4842 
61 7 0.7972 4 0.5000 5 0.4832 1 0.1660 9 0.6562 2 0.4873 6 0.4996 6 0.2840 4 0.5422 2 0.5000 3 0.7538 49 0.5062 
62 7 0.7028 4 0.6236 7 0.6467 2 0.3340 10 0.7023 3 0.5858 8 0.6149 10 0.6232 6 0.5025 2 0.6282 3 0.6695 62 0.6189 
63 7 0.8985 4 0.4991 7 0.5384 0 0.0000 9 0.6551 1 0.1348 6 0.5160 8 0.3082 6 0.7664 2 0.7564 3 0.5000 53 0.5136 
64 6 0.7626 4 0.5643 6 0.3868 0 0.0000 7 0.4082 3 0.6571 7 0.5437 7 0.3481 5 0.5767 2 0.6218 3 0.7533 50 0.4933 
65 7 0.7452 4 0.8752 6 0.5264 1 0.2519 8 0.5052 2 0.3154 8 0.5653 10 0.5913 6 0.6981 1 0.3846 2 0.5919 55 0.5723 
66 5 0.6181 4 0.6879 6 0.6212 3 0.7500 10 0.7077 4 0.8358 9 0.6677 11 0.6139 5 0.5607 2 0.6282 3 0.7538 62 0.6634 
67 7 0.8035 4 0.4982 7 0.6742 2 0.4981 10 0.6851 3 0.6679 8 0.5129 11 0.5863 5 0.4364 2 0.7564 3 0.5847 62 0.6021 
68 6 0.7602 4 0.5612 7 0.5893 0 0.0000 10 0.6465 3 0.4726 7 0.4902 9 0.5083 5 0.5979 2 0.8718 3 0.5847 56 0.5543 
69 7 0.7563 4 0.6298 6 0.6733 0 0.0000 6 0.4244 3 0.4998 8 0.5397 10 0.6339 6 0.6849 2 0.6282 3 0.8381 55 0.5829 
70 6 0.7602 4 0.5012 5 0.5019 1 0.0840 7 0.3951 3 0.4471 5 0.3701 10 0.5521 6 0.6238 1 0.3846 3 0.5000 51 0.4799 
71 6 0.6583 4 0.6255 6 0.6252 1 0.3359 8 0.5495 4 0.6953 8 0.6175 10 0.5538 5 0.5789 2 0.5000 2 0.4228 56 0.5787 
72 6 0.7076 3 0.5664 6 0.6914 1 0.3359 9 0.6088 3 0.7098 8 0.5888 10 0.5260 5 0.5979 2 0.7500 3 0.7504 56 0.6099 
73 7 0.9456 4 0.7528 6 0.6308 0 0.0000 9 0.6059 3 0.5145 8 0.6157 9 0.5861 6 0.7535 2 0.6346 3 0.5876 57 0.6256 
74 7 0.7005 4 0.5661 7 0.7893 1 0.2519 9 0.6545 3 0.5292 7 0.4928 10 0.6171 5 0.6952 2 0.7564 3 0.6690 58 0.6144 
75 6 0.8089 4 0.7534 6 0.6349 0 0.0000 9 0.7895 3 0.5292 8 0.6867 10 0.6638 6 0.8254 2 0.7564 3 0.5000 57 0.6698 
76 7 0.7587 3 0.3715 5 0.3413 1 0.0840 9 0.5629 3 0.5292 8 0.4759 9 0.4534 6 0.5687 2 0.6282 3 0.5000 56 0.4840 
77 7 0.9456 4 0.6224 7 0.6822 0 0.0000 10 0.7138 3 0.5711 8 0.5378 9 0.4480 6 0.5706 2 0.7564 3 0.4190 59 0.5831 
78 7 0.9001 4 0.6879 6 0.5893 3 0.8340 10 0.6560 3 0.5966 8 0.6426 8 0.4893 5 0.5979 2 0.7436 2 0.4148 58 0.6317 
79 7 0.9001 4 0.6264 7 0.7893 0 0.0000 7 0.3858 3 0.5711 9 0.6820 12 0.7149 5 0.6420 2 0.7564 3 0.5000 59 0.6301 
80 7 0.9456 4 0.5612 6 0.4250 0 0.0000 7 0.3529 1 0.0674 8 0.6154 9 0.3867 6 0.7142 2 0.6282 3 0.5000 53 0.4897 
































No. Quality No. Quality No. Score No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality 
82 7 0.8513 4 0.5000 7 0.6538 2 0.6679 9 0.5533 3 0.5858 8 0.6916 11 0.5727 4 0.4858 2 0.6218 3 0.4157 60 0.6107 
83 7 0.6981 4 0.4969 7 0.6424 0 0.0000 9 0.5800 2 0.4161 8 0.5892 10 0.5197 6 0.6207 2 0.5000 2 0.3305 57 0.5359 
84 5 0.7109 4 0.5000 6 0.4435 1 0.2490 9 0.4791 3 0.4726 8 0.6116 7 0.3570 4 0.4864 2 0.5000 3 0.7500 52 0.5022 
85 6 0.8545 4 0.5000 7 0.6889 1 0.1679 10 0.7368 3 0.6571 7 0.5696 11 0.6159 6 0.7012 2 0.5000 3 0.5847 60 0.6275 
86 6 0.7617 4 0.6236 7 0.6152 0 0.0000 9 0.6514 3 0.3378 8 0.5659 8 0.4411 5 0.5979 2 0.7436 3 0.4153 55 0.5440 
87 7 0.9456 4 0.6224 7 0.5775 1 0.2519 10 0.7865 3 0.5292 8 0.6622 10 0.4823 6 0.8036 2 0.7564 3 0.5000 61 0.6397 
88 5 0.5709 4 0.5612 7 0.6565 1 0.1660 9 0.6369 2 0.4161 8 0.5613 11 0.5948 4 0.4864 2 0.6218 3 0.5000 56 0.5549 
89 4 0.6220 4 0.5000 7 0.6218 0 0.0000 8 0.4518 2 0.4835 7 0.5390 11 0.5564 6 0.5737 2 0.7436 3 0.4190 54 0.5207 
90 6 0.8545 4 0.6224 5 0.5684 0 0.0000 10 0.6372 3 0.5858 8 0.5914 9 0.4070 4 0.4864 2 0.6282 3 0.5000 54 0.5494 
91 6 0.7563 4 0.7503 6 0.5542 2 0.5811 8 0.5528 3 0.7245 9 0.6837 11 0.6668 5 0.5607 2 0.6282 3 0.6661 59 0.6460 
92 6 0.6644 4 0.6285 7 0.6064 0 0.0000 9 0.6073 3 0.5292 10 0.6547 10 0.6395 6 0.7561 1 0.5128 3 0.5847 59 0.6036 
93 7 0.8065 4 0.4397 7 0.7219 1 0.2490 8 0.5004 4 0.7665 9 0.6838 12 0.6136 6 0.6791 2 0.7436 3 0.6686 63 0.6324 
94 6 0.8545 4 0.6236 6 0.6323 1 0.2490 9 0.6640 3 0.7098 8 0.6138 10 0.5078 5 0.5447 1 0.2564 3 0.6686 56 0.6003 
95 6 0.8515 4 0.5612 6 0.4594 0 0.0000 6 0.3799 0 0.0000 8 0.5898 8 0.3172 6 0.6078 2 0.6346 3 0.5000 49 0.4604 
96 7 0.9001 4 0.7509 7 0.6428 0 0.0000 8 0.5662 2 0.4161 8 0.6399 11 0.6395 5 0.6420 2 0.7564 3 0.5000 57 0.6162 
97 7 0.7995 4 0.4957 7 0.7058 0 0.0000 9 0.6378 4 0.7061 8 0.6628 12 0.7312 6 0.6791 2 0.7564 3 0.4996 62 0.6455 
98 5 0.6637 3 0.4351 5 0.5154 1 0.1660 8 0.5556 3 0.6571 7 0.5175 8 0.4359 5 0.5075 1 0.2564 3 0.5000 49 0.4974 
99 6 0.7587 4 0.7503 7 0.8290 1 0.3359 9 0.5514 3 0.6113 6 0.4416 10 0.4880 5 0.4833 2 0.3782 3 0.5847 56 0.5680 
100 7 0.9001 4 0.5612 7 0.6382 0 0.0000 9 0.5750 2 0.4161 9 0.7267 10 0.5839 6 0.8094 2 0.7564 3 0.5004 59 0.6228 
Mean 6.18 0.7589 3.85 0.5676 6.15 0.5688 0.69 0.1703 8.45 0.5613 2.55 0.4822 7.56 0.5763 9.07 0.4945 5.29 0.6171 1.90 0.5987 2.93 0.5739 54.62 0.5548 
Median 6 0.7587 4 0.5624 6 0.5896 1 0.1660 9 0.5646 3 0.5219 8 0.5891 10 0.5005 5 0.5979 2 0.6282 3 0.5843 55 0.5575 
Std. D 0.83 0.1105 0.36 0.1091 1.02 0.1492 0.72 0.1936 1.19 0.1203 0.78 0.1895 0.89 0.0739 1.90 0.1307 0.74 0.1013 0.30 0.1537 0.26 0.1163 4.60 0.0644 
Minimum 4 0.4185 3 0.3140 2 0.1733 0 0.0000 5 0.2739 0 0.0000 5 0.3559 4 0.1783 4 0.4332 1 0.2564 2 0.3305 42 0.3689 



































No. Quality No. Quality No. Score No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality 
1 6 0.5591 3 0.3776 7 0.5707 0 0.0000 6 0.3926 2 0.3828 5 0.3424 8 0.5001 5 0.5888 2 0.7564 2 0.3381 46 0.4415 
2 6 0.6598 2 0.1897 7 0.5779 1 0.2519 9 0.5366 3 0.5858 8 0.6150 10 0.5187 6 0.7194 2 0.5064 3 0.6690 57 0.5484 
3 7 0.7987 4 0.6285 6 0.5609 0 0.0000 8 0.4294 2 0.5547 9 0.6511 9 0.4600 5 0.7009 2 0.7564 3 0.6653 55 0.5647 
4 7 0.7996 4 0.3767 2 0.1768 1 0.3359 6 0.2727 2 0.2061 7 0.5395 6 0.2797 6 0.6269 2 0.3782 3 0.5843 46 0.4074 
5 7 0.8026 4 0.5000 6 0.4705 1 0.3359 9 0.6514 3 0.5107 7 0.5665 10 0.4991 5 0.5979 2 0.3718 3 0.5000 57 0.5502 
6 5 0.6566 4 0.5593 7 0.6920 0 0.0000 9 0.6760 3 0.5439 8 0.6129 11 0.6032 4 0.4864 2 0.3718 3 0.4190 56 0.5697 
7 6 0.8058 4 0.8115 7 0.8574 0 0.0000 6 0.3840 3 0.3339 6 0.4908 9 0.4321 5 0.5378 2 0.6218 2 0.3381 50 0.5264 
8 6 0.8545 4 0.5633 6 0.4817 0 0.0000 9 0.6338 3 0.6532 6 0.4682 10 0.4358 6 0.5737 2 0.6218 3 0.5881 55 0.5336 
9 6 0.8097 2 0.3170 3 0.2735 1 0.3359 6 0.3303 2 0.1387 8 0.6899 6 0.3053 5 0.7070 1 0.2564 3 0.5876 43 0.4516 
10 7 0.8961 4 0.7482 7 0.6243 0 0.0000 8 0.5827 3 0.4765 7 0.5387 11 0.5200 6 0.6108 2 0.6218 3 0.5847 58 0.5784 
11 5 0.5615 4 0.6267 7 0.5862 0 0.0000 7 0.5609 2 0.5547 8 0.5591 7 0.3863 5 0.5897 2 0.5000 2 0.3381 49 0.5026 
12 6 0.7076 4 0.5655 5 0.4795 1 0.1660 6 0.3743 3 0.3378 10 0.6859 6 0.2971 5 0.5392 2 0.5000 3 0.5843 51 0.4847 
13 6 0.6150 4 0.6236 6 0.5542 0 0.0000 10 0.7550 2 0.5547 7 0.5672 11 0.6317 5 0.5365 2 0.7500 3 0.4190 56 0.5789 
14 6 0.8067 4 0.8103 6 0.4645 0 0.0000 7 0.5093 2 0.2735 8 0.6129 7 0.3464 6 0.6981 2 0.7500 3 0.5000 51 0.5267 
15 7 0.9456 4 0.6848 6 0.5821 0 0.0000 9 0.6368 2 0.4161 8 0.5868 10 0.3792 5 0.6921 2 0.5000 3 0.5000 56 0.5599 
16 6 0.8515 4 0.6848 5 0.5105 1 0.2519 7 0.3316 2 0.1240 8 0.6175 9 0.3756 5 0.6425 2 0.6282 3 0.5000 52 0.5043 
17 7 0.8065 3 0.4382 7 0.7241 0 0.0000 8 0.5768 3 0.7245 7 0.5666 11 0.4636 6 0.6295 1 0.2564 3 0.6728 56 0.5634 
18 6 0.6142 3 0.3776 4 0.4049 0 0.0000 8 0.5301 2 0.4873 8 0.6137 7 0.2816 5 0.5378 2 0.5000 3 0.5843 48 0.4612 
19 7 0.9008 4 0.5000 7 0.7219 1 0.2519 8 0.6003 2 0.3409 7 0.5670 10 0.6082 5 0.6456 2 0.5000 2 0.3381 55 0.5850 
20 6 0.7085 3 0.3103 5 0.3589 0 0.0000 8 0.4294 3 0.3867 8 0.6640 9 0.4564 5 0.6425 1 0.5128 3 0.5000 51 0.4842 
21 5 0.7116 4 0.7472 5 0.3444 1 0.3359 8 0.5003 3 0.3339 8 0.6707 10 0.5668 6 0.6507 2 0.2500 3 0.7571 55 0.5588 
22 6 0.7077 3 0.4400 7 0.7168 0 0.0000 7 0.4769 2 0.5547 8 0.5898 8 0.3720 6 0.6295 2 0.6218 3 0.5847 52 0.5276 
23 6 0.6574 4 0.6879 6 0.5858 1 0.2519 6 0.3870 3 0.3283 6 0.4908 7 0.3020 5 0.5897 2 0.5000 3 0.5000 49 0.4723 
24 6 0.7563 3 0.4994 6 0.5513 0 0.0000 8 0.5207 2 0.4161 7 0.5670 11 0.4718 5 0.5897 2 0.3718 2 0.3381 52 0.5051 
25 5 0.7619 4 0.6224 6 0.5435 0 0.0000 7 0.4827 2 0.3611 8 0.6644 9 0.4730 6 0.7168 2 0.7564 3 0.5000 52 0.5527 
26 6 0.8050 4 0.4357 3 0.3479 0 0.0000 8 0.5235 1 0.1348 8 0.6640 10 0.4414 6 0.8595 1 0.5128 3 0.6695 50 0.5201 































No. Quality No. Quality No. Score No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality 
28 6 0.7100 4 0.5000 4 0.3834 0 0.0000 8 0.5467 1 0.1348 8 0.6389 9 0.4449 6 0.7039 2 0.6346 3 0.4190 51 0.4990 
29 6 0.7085 3 0.3721 7 0.4985 0 0.0000 7 0.4183 2 0.3262 9 0.6330 10 0.5396 6 0.7540 2 0.5000 3 0.5000 55 0.5163 
30 7 0.7587 4 0.6242 6 0.6278 1 0.0830 9 0.6708 3 0.5292 8 0.6963 10 0.5612 5 0.6572 2 0.5000 3 0.6695 58 0.6151 
31 6 0.8545 4 0.6860 7 0.6939 0 0.0000 8 0.5930 3 0.6113 8 0.6941 10 0.5336 4 0.5396 1 0.3846 3 0.8381 54 0.6159 
32 6 0.8074 4 0.5624 5 0.3739 1 0.3321 10 0.7558 3 0.5400 7 0.6276 11 0.5818 4 0.4864 2 0.7436 3 0.8381 56 0.6030 
33 6 0.7571 4 0.5034 6 0.5480 2 0.4151 8 0.4355 3 0.6679 6 0.4698 5 0.2863 4 0.4864 2 0.6218 2 0.5071 48 0.4865 
34 4 0.6612 3 0.3727 4 0.4894 1 0.3321 9 0.5753 4 0.8887 7 0.4919 11 0.5849 5 0.5075 1 0.2564 2 0.5067 51 0.5346 
35 4 0.6757 4 0.6879 7 0.6399 2 0.4981 7 0.4790 3 0.5292 7 0.5410 11 0.6514 5 0.7091 2 0.8782 3 0.9153 55 0.6240 
36 6 0.8089 4 0.7472 5 0.4032 0 0.0000 10 0.5821 3 0.3193 8 0.5898 10 0.4425 5 0.6979 2 0.7564 3 0.6653 56 0.5481 
37 5 0.5694 4 0.4357 5 0.6079 0 0.0000 10 0.6455 3 0.3867 8 0.6128 11 0.6271 5 0.6979 1 0.5128 3 0.6690 55 0.5688 
38 4 0.6764 4 0.7534 2 0.1764 1 0.3359 8 0.3757 2 0.2480 9 0.6093 6 0.3987 4 0.4345 1 0.3654 3 0.7533 44 0.4635 
39 5 0.6623 4 0.6267 7 0.7872 1 0.1660 10 0.7094 3 0.6679 9 0.5838 11 0.7071 5 0.6005 2 0.5064 3 0.4190 60 0.6302 
40 5 0.7660 4 0.6255 3 0.3836 1 0.1679 9 0.6530 4 0.5986 8 0.5938 10 0.5573 5 0.5088 2 0.6282 3 0.6690 54 0.5679 
41 5 0.7603 4 0.6248 7 0.5511 2 0.6641 8 0.5074 2 0.5547 7 0.5393 9 0.4520 5 0.6398 2 0.7436 3 0.5847 54 0.5695 
42 6 0.7659 4 0.6255 6 0.6810 1 0.3359 8 0.6189 3 0.4726 8 0.5627 11 0.6199 5 0.5481 2 0.6218 3 0.6695 57 0.6048 
43 6 0.7675 4 0.6888 6 0.4591 2 0.3321 10 0.7168 2 0.4161 8 0.5888 12 0.6261 5 0.5447 2 0.6282 3 0.6686 60 0.5993 
44 4 0.6707 4 0.5643 5 0.3926 1 0.3359 7 0.4370 1 0.0713 8 0.5914 7 0.2722 4 0.3813 2 0.6218 2 0.5071 45 0.4386 
45 6 0.7610 4 0.7522 4 0.4140 0 0.0000 5 0.3801 2 0.1387 7 0.5160 5 0.2265 4 0.5436 2 0.7436 3 0.7467 42 0.4508 
46 3 0.5273 3 0.5025 5 0.5596 1 0.3321 9 0.6593 3 0.7245 8 0.5888 9 0.5459 5 0.6398 1 0.2564 2 0.5071 49 0.5621 
47 5 0.7155 3 0.5043 2 0.1933 1 0.3359 7 0.3022 2 0.1387 8 0.5383 4 0.2079 4 0.4345 2 0.5000 2 0.6762 40 0.3913 
48 6 0.7092 4 0.5000 6 0.5571 1 0.2490 6 0.3816 2 0.5547 6 0.4166 6 0.2259 4 0.4864 2 0.6218 2 0.3385 45 0.4346 
49 5 0.7603 4 0.5624 5 0.4536 1 0.2490 6 0.3718 2 0.3448 7 0.5665 9 0.3187 4 0.4332 2 0.6282 3 0.6653 48 0.4721 
50 5 0.7619 4 0.5612 4 0.3203 0 0.0000 6 0.3474 2 0.1387 8 0.6383 5 0.2776 5 0.6368 2 0.5000 2 0.3381 43 0.4334 
51 5 0.7178 3 0.4400 3 0.2764 1 0.3359 6 0.3034 0 0.0000 8 0.5914 5 0.2144 4 0.4864 2 0.5000 3 0.7538 40 0.4065 
52 6 0.8545 4 0.7534 6 0.6230 1 0.3359 7 0.3776 2 0.4161 7 0.5665 9 0.4035 4 0.4864 2 0.3782 3 0.5847 51 0.5278 
53 4 0.5726 2 0.3177 1 0.1421 0 0.0000 9 0.5877 3 0.7810 7 0.5435 7 0.5051 5 0.6456 2 0.6282 2 0.5067 42 0.4837 
































No. Quality No. Quality No. Score No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality 
55 6 0.7580 4 0.6879 6 0.6860 0 0.0000 5 0.3064 2 0.4835 7 0.5261 10 0.5081 4 0.5396 2 0.5000 3 0.5810 49 0.5207 
56 6 0.7491 3 0.3776 3 0.2120 0 0.0000 8 0.4628 0 0.0000 8 0.5602 7 0.2760 4 0.4864 2 0.8718 3 0.5000 44 0.4077 
57 5 0.6622 3 0.4400 7 0.6216 0 0.0000 9 0.5264 2 0.4835 8 0.6144 9 0.3984 4 0.4898 2 0.6282 3 0.5847 52 0.5132 
58 5 0.7109 4 0.6267 6 0.6243 1 0.2490 8 0.5370 3 0.5858 8 0.6144 6 0.3319 5 0.5460 2 0.5064 3 0.6653 51 0.5421 
59 5 0.7619 4 0.6848 7 0.6538 0 0.0000 8 0.5815 2 0.3448 8 0.5888 9 0.4180 6 0.7324 2 0.6346 3 0.4190 54 0.5516 
60 6 0.8545 4 0.6267 4 0.1704 0 0.0000 9 0.5753 3 0.6679 8 0.5914 5 0.2108 4 0.4898 2 0.6218 3 0.6724 48 0.4775 
61 7 0.8467 4 0.5000 5 0.4478 1 0.1660 9 0.6584 2 0.5547 6 0.4996 7 0.3088 4 0.5422 2 0.5000 3 0.7538 50 0.5149 
62 7 0.9505 4 0.7503 5 0.5141 2 0.3321 9 0.6322 3 0.4471 8 0.6128 9 0.5386 5 0.5075 2 0.7500 2 0.5071 56 0.5986 
63 5 0.7619 4 0.7472 7 0.5069 0 0.0000 9 0.5327 2 0.2774 8 0.6144 10 0.4656 5 0.6447 2 0.6282 3 0.5000 55 0.5389 
64 4 0.6707 4 0.6255 4 0.3113 0 0.0000 7 0.4825 3 0.6532 7 0.5455 7 0.3448 5 0.5607 2 0.8718 3 0.8381 46 0.5011 
65 5 0.6118 4 0.5000 2 0.2475 0 0.0000 6 0.3741 0 0.0000 8 0.6379 7 0.3276 6 0.6667 2 0.3782 3 0.5885 43 0.4227 
66 5 0.6629 4 0.6267 5 0.5245 2 0.5811 9 0.6750 3 0.7810 7 0.5126 9 0.4350 5 0.5607 2 0.7500 3 0.7500 54 0.5834 
67 7 0.9001 4 0.6248 7 0.7128 2 0.4981 10 0.7360 3 0.6679 8 0.5888 9 0.5318 5 0.5979 2 0.7564 3 0.6690 60 0.6508 
68 7 0.9065 4 0.6910 5 0.4540 0 0.0000 9 0.6313 2 0.3448 6 0.4192 9 0.4703 4 0.4345 2 0.7436 3 0.5004 51 0.5114 
69 6 0.8099 4 0.5000 7 0.6411 0 0.0000 7 0.4486 2 0.3720 8 0.6367 10 0.6409 5 0.5893 2 0.6282 3 0.5847 54 0.5689 
70 6 0.7602 4 0.5000 6 0.5025 0 0.0000 7 0.3165 2 0.2774 7 0.5417 10 0.5101 5 0.5365 2 0.6346 3 0.5000 52 0.4801 
71 4 0.5681 4 0.6276 5 0.4864 1 0.3359 9 0.6487 3 0.6679 9 0.6629 11 0.5701 4 0.4332 2 0.6282 2 0.5914 54 0.5781 
72 6 0.7076 4 0.6888 6 0.7592 1 0.3359 9 0.6088 3 0.5858 8 0.5888 9 0.4970 5 0.5235 2 0.6282 3 0.7504 56 0.6039 
73 6 0.9089 1 0.1224 5 0.4808 0 0.0000 9 0.6293 3 0.5145 7 0.5129 12 0.5974 6 0.7350 1 0.5128 2 0.5076 52 0.5398 
74 6 0.8146 3 0.5037 6 0.6993 0 0.0000 8 0.5853 2 0.3486 8 0.5979 10 0.6612 5 0.6952 2 0.7564 3 0.8381 53 0.6134 
75 6 0.9104 4 0.5627 6 0.4603 0 0.0000 9 0.7328 3 0.5966 8 0.6367 12 0.7194 6 0.8072 2 0.7564 3 0.5847 59 0.6459 
76 5 0.6118 3 0.2512 6 0.5231 0 0.0000 8 0.5583 3 0.5253 7 0.5261 8 0.4106 5 0.6979 2 0.5000 3 0.4190 50 0.4826 
77 6 0.8067 4 0.6224 6 0.5079 0 0.0000 8 0.4614 2 0.1387 8 0.5623 8 0.3429 6 0.6207 2 0.8782 3 0.4190 53 0.4890 
78 6 0.8154 4 0.7491 5 0.4154 2 0.5840 9 0.6045 3 0.4579 8 0.6662 9 0.5018 4 0.4345 2 0.8718 3 0.6690 55 0.5933 
79 6 0.8097 1 0.1224 7 0.6129 0 0.0000 7 0.3871 3 0.5145 9 0.6547 11 0.6023 5 0.6979 2 0.7564 3 0.5000 54 0.5452 
80 7 0.9008 4 0.6224 6 0.4322 0 0.0000 7 0.3529 0 0.0000 8 0.6409 9 0.4106 5 0.6160 2 0.5000 3 0.5000 51 0.4836 
































No. Quality No. Quality No. Score No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality 
82 5 0.7706 4 0.4988 5 0.4864 2 0.5840 9 0.6322 4 0.7100 8 0.6423 8 0.5179 4 0.4864 2 0.7436 3 0.7500 54 0.6007 
83 5 0.6095 4 0.6218 7 0.7456 0 0.0000 9 0.5762 2 0.4161 7 0.5380 10 0.5434 5 0.5866 2 0.5000 3 0.4153 54 0.5444 
84 6 0.8050 4 0.6876 6 0.5857 1 0.2519 9 0.4197 3 0.4726 7 0.5126 6 0.4266 4 0.3813 1 0.3654 3 0.6657 50 0.5094 
85 6 0.7029 4 0.6845 6 0.6955 1 0.1679 9 0.6330 3 0.6532 8 0.5888 11 0.6149 5 0.6511 2 0.8718 3 0.7533 58 0.6339 
86 6 0.7571 4 0.7503 5 0.4509 2 0.3340 9 0.6003 4 0.6278 8 0.6217 8 0.4924 5 0.5460 2 0.7436 3 0.7500 56 0.5900 
87 7 0.8537 4 0.6848 6 0.5025 0 0.0000 10 0.7542 2 0.4161 8 0.6128 9 0.5343 5 0.7480 2 0.7564 3 0.5000 56 0.6019 
88 4 0.6213 4 0.5000 5 0.5245 0 0.0000 9 0.6638 2 0.4873 8 0.6128 12 0.6007 5 0.5979 2 0.7500 3 0.4190 54 0.5597 
89 4 0.5726 4 0.6248 6 0.6913 0 0.0000 9 0.6321 2 0.4161 7 0.5390 9 0.3718 4 0.4864 2 0.7436 3 0.5000 50 0.5172 
90 7 0.8985 4 0.6848 7 0.6130 0 0.0000 8 0.5265 3 0.4726 8 0.5399 10 0.4031 4 0.4372 2 0.6282 3 0.5000 56 0.5281 
91 5 0.7634 4 0.6239 5 0.5220 0 0.0000 8 0.5337 4 0.7792 8 0.6132 11 0.6919 6 0.6821 2 0.7564 3 0.8381 56 0.6232 
92 4 0.5718 3 0.3715 7 0.5779 0 0.0000 9 0.5547 3 0.4726 10 0.7044 10 0.5448 6 0.7003 1 0.3846 2 0.4228 55 0.5410 
93 6 0.6652 3 0.4385 5 0.4890 1 0.2490 7 0.4770 4 0.7608 9 0.6563 11 0.5780 5 0.5866 2 0.3782 3 0.5876 56 0.5576 
94 7 0.9001 4 0.5000 5 0.5220 1 0.3321 10 0.6670 4 0.7518 8 0.5659 11 0.6383 5 0.5075 2 0.6218 2 0.5067 59 0.6047 
95 7 0.8985 4 0.6867 5 0.4391 0 0.0000 7 0.5584 0 0.0000 8 0.6154 9 0.4046 6 0.6766 2 0.7564 3 0.5000 51 0.5223 
96 6 0.8097 2 0.2466 5 0.4714 0 0.0000 8 0.5640 3 0.4708 8 0.5669 8 0.4291 5 0.7511 2 0.7564 3 0.5000 50 0.5175 
97 6 0.8603 2 0.2466 5 0.5377 0 0.0000 9 0.6031 4 0.5948 8 0.6128 12 0.7006 5 0.6420 1 0.5128 2 0.4228 54 0.5755 
98 6 0.8065 4 0.6248 6 0.5480 0 0.0000 8 0.5310 3 0.5858 7 0.5435 7 0.4095 5 0.5634 1 0.2564 3 0.5000 50 0.5162 
99 6 0.7580 4 0.7503 5 0.5216 1 0.3359 9 0.5980 2 0.5547 8 0.6279 7 0.3186 4 0.4864 2 0.5000 3 0.5847 51 0.5444 
100 6 0.9089 4 0.4982 6 0.6520 0 0.0000 9 0.6566 3 0.4014 8 0.6128 10 0.5376 6 0.8094 2 0.7564 3 0.5847 57 0.6063 
Mean 5.69 0.7514 3.66 0.5588 5.39 0.5080 0.54 0.1419 8.06 0.5338 2.46 0.4442 7.67 0.5832 8.86 0.4606 4.95 0.5927 1.84 0.5881 2.81 0.5749 51.93 0.5330 
Median 6 0.7603 4 0.5937 6 0.5218 0 0.0000 8 0.5565 3 0.4726 8 0.5893 9 0.4646 5 0.5897 2 0.6218 3 0.5843 53 0.5394 
Std. D 0.92 0.1004 0.67 0.1513 1.42 0.1505 0.67 0.1800 1.25 0.1231 0.88 0.2004 0.83 0.0638 2.05 0.1316 0.70 0.1053 0.37 0.1619 0.39 0.1341 4.82 0.0606 
Minimum 3 0.5273 1 0.1224 1 0.1421 0 0.0000 5 0.2727 0 0.0000 5 0.3424 3 0.1765 4 0.3813 1 0.2500 2 0.3381 39 0.3913 



































No. Quality No. Quality No. Score No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality 
1 5 0.5622 3 0.3133 4 0.3573 0 0.0000 6 0.3692 2 0.3828 6 0.4176 8 0.4189 5 0.5888 2 0.6218 3 0.5000 44 0.4135 
2 7 0.7539 3 0.2497 6 0.5486 1 0.2519 9 0.6050 3 0.5858 7 0.5642 10 0.5115 5 0.6451 2 0.8718 3 0.6690 56 0.5615 
3 7 0.7492 4 0.5612 6 0.5964 0 0.0000 8 0.4543 2 0.5547 9 0.6511 9 0.5223 5 0.7009 2 0.8782 3 0.6653 55 0.5774 
4 6 0.7525 3 0.3155 3 0.2094 1 0.3359 6 0.3796 3 0.4346 7 0.5670 8 0.2668 5 0.5897 2 0.5000 3 0.6690 47 0.4373 
5 7 0.8513 4 0.4982 6 0.5085 1 0.3359 8 0.6366 3 0.7245 7 0.5665 9 0.4808 5 0.5235 2 0.2500 3 0.4190 55 0.5521 
6 6 0.7477 4 0.5593 7 0.6210 0 0.0000 9 0.7315 4 0.7792 8 0.6129 11 0.6316 5 0.5365 2 0.5064 3 0.4190 59 0.6034 
7 5 0.7162 4 0.7503 7 0.7248 1 0.2519 6 0.4099 3 0.3339 6 0.4654 11 0.4689 5 0.5378 2 0.7436 2 0.3381 52 0.5200 
8 6 0.8545 3 0.5012 6 0.6315 0 0.0000 9 0.6328 3 0.7245 6 0.4403 8 0.4300 6 0.5737 2 0.6218 3 0.5881 52 0.5439 
9 6 0.8097 1 0.1928 4 0.3880 1 0.3359 6 0.3451 2 0.1387 8 0.6638 6 0.3284 4 0.5422 1 0.2564 2 0.3381 41 0.4318 
10 7 0.8506 4 0.7482 6 0.5216 0 0.0000 9 0.6381 2 0.4873 8 0.6707 9 0.4575 6 0.6108 2 0.6218 3 0.6690 56 0.5874 
11 5 0.7044 4 0.6882 7 0.5815 0 0.0000 7 0.5344 2 0.5547 7 0.4839 9 0.4459 5 0.5897 2 0.3718 2 0.3381 50 0.5080 
12 6 0.7076 4 0.5655 5 0.4799 1 0.1660 6 0.3474 3 0.5439 8 0.6404 6 0.2494 5 0.5392 2 0.5000 3 0.5033 49 0.4733 
13 6 0.5655 4 0.5615 6 0.5187 0 0.0000 10 0.7847 3 0.6679 7 0.5926 10 0.5553 5 0.5365 2 0.5064 2 0.3381 55 0.5566 
14 6 0.8067 4 0.6212 5 0.3855 0 0.0000 9 0.6009 2 0.1387 8 0.6129 8 0.3608 6 0.6480 2 0.6282 3 0.5000 53 0.5032 
15 7 0.9456 3 0.4994 6 0.5466 0 0.0000 9 0.6136 2 0.2774 8 0.5868 8 0.3135 5 0.6921 2 0.5000 3 0.5843 53 0.5249 
16 6 0.8515 4 0.7494 6 0.5458 0 0.0000 7 0.4104 2 0.2588 8 0.6404 9 0.3168 5 0.6425 2 0.7564 3 0.5000 52 0.5174 
17 7 0.9001 4 0.5637 7 0.7274 0 0.0000 8 0.5589 2 0.5547 7 0.5666 11 0.5352 5 0.6456 2 0.6282 3 0.5038 56 0.5855 
18 6 0.6142 3 0.3776 4 0.4049 0 0.0000 8 0.5207 2 0.4873 8 0.6137 6 0.3142 5 0.5378 2 0.5000 3 0.5843 47 0.4656 
19 5 0.7649 4 0.3745 7 0.7525 0 0.0000 8 0.5295 3 0.5966 7 0.5670 10 0.6507 5 0.6456 2 0.5000 3 0.5000 54 0.5779 
20 6 0.7085 4 0.5612 4 0.3506 0 0.0000 8 0.4294 2 0.2735 8 0.6411 8 0.3723 5 0.6425 1 0.5128 3 0.5000 49 0.4757 
21 5 0.7116 4 0.6236 4 0.3150 1 0.3359 9 0.5541 3 0.5439 8 0.6707 9 0.4550 6 0.6135 2 0.2500 3 0.7571 54 0.5439 
22 6 0.6583 3 0.4400 7 0.6461 0 0.0000 7 0.4979 3 0.6113 8 0.5898 8 0.3473 5 0.5924 2 0.5000 3 0.5847 52 0.5105 
23 6 0.5655 3 0.4400 7 0.6887 1 0.0840 6 0.3802 3 0.4618 6 0.4908 8 0.3898 5 0.5897 2 0.5000 3 0.5000 50 0.4731 
24 5 0.6622 3 0.4994 6 0.5160 0 0.0000 8 0.5232 3 0.6571 7 0.5670 11 0.4644 5 0.5897 2 0.4936 2 0.3381 52 0.5102 
25 5 0.7619 4 0.6224 6 0.5435 0 0.0000 7 0.4827 2 0.3611 8 0.6644 9 0.4909 6 0.8171 2 0.7564 3 0.5000 52 0.5637 
26 4 0.6213 4 0.4357 3 0.3479 0 0.0000 8 0.5183 1 0.2022 8 0.6640 10 0.4835 6 0.7561 1 0.5128 3 0.6695 48 0.5067 
































No. Quality No. Quality No. Score No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality 
28 4 0.5718 4 0.5000 4 0.3156 0 0.0000 8 0.5198 2 0.1914 8 0.6389 9 0.4559 5 0.5924 2 0.6346 3 0.4190 49 0.4726 
29 5 0.6189 3 0.3721 6 0.4591 0 0.0000 7 0.4430 2 0.3262 9 0.6330 10 0.5342 5 0.6425 2 0.5000 3 0.5000 52 0.4976 
30 7 0.7587 4 0.6242 6 0.6278 1 0.0830 9 0.7176 3 0.5292 8 0.7202 10 0.6090 5 0.6572 2 0.5000 3 0.6695 58 0.6334 
31 6 0.8545 4 0.6860 6 0.6252 0 0.0000 8 0.5930 2 0.5547 8 0.6686 10 0.5089 4 0.5396 1 0.3846 3 0.8381 52 0.5964 
32 6 0.8050 4 0.5624 6 0.3811 1 0.3321 10 0.7311 2 0.4161 7 0.5738 10 0.5389 4 0.4864 2 0.6218 3 0.9190 55 0.5765 
33 6 0.7108 4 0.5034 1 0.0703 2 0.4151 7 0.4279 2 0.4161 7 0.4928 3 0.1703 4 0.4864 2 0.3782 2 0.5071 40 0.3906 
34 4 0.7060 3 0.3727 5 0.4850 1 0.2490 6 0.3988 3 0.6005 7 0.4919 10 0.5431 4 0.4332 1 0.2564 2 0.5067 46 0.4820 
35 6 0.8594 4 0.7500 6 0.6098 1 0.2490 8 0.6029 2 0.4161 8 0.6128 10 0.6058 5 0.7091 2 0.8782 3 0.8343 55 0.6396 
36 6 0.8089 4 0.6851 6 0.4387 0 0.0000 8 0.4766 1 0.2022 8 0.5898 11 0.4833 5 0.6979 2 0.8782 3 0.5843 54 0.5345 
37 5 0.6189 4 0.4357 5 0.6007 0 0.0000 10 0.6008 3 0.3867 8 0.6128 10 0.6105 5 0.6979 1 0.5128 3 0.6690 54 0.5637 
38 4 0.6764 4 0.5661 2 0.1768 1 0.3359 8 0.4767 3 0.3193 8 0.6128 6 0.3176 4 0.4345 1 0.2436 3 0.8343 44 0.4543 
39 3 0.5273 4 0.5643 7 0.7513 1 0.1660 10 0.7328 3 0.5966 9 0.5838 11 0.7224 5 0.5447 2 0.3782 3 0.4190 58 0.6034 
40 5 0.7660 4 0.6255 3 0.4191 1 0.2519 9 0.6273 3 0.5439 8 0.5938 10 0.5826 4 0.4345 2 0.8718 3 0.6690 52 0.5752 
41 5 0.7155 4 0.5627 7 0.5511 2 0.6641 7 0.4579 2 0.4161 7 0.4910 9 0.4330 5 0.6900 2 0.7436 3 0.5000 53 0.5352 
42 6 0.7659 4 0.5633 6 0.6413 1 0.3359 8 0.5594 3 0.3301 8 0.5867 12 0.6781 5 0.5481 2 0.6218 3 0.5885 58 0.5905 
43 7 0.8043 4 0.6888 7 0.5710 2 0.3321 9 0.6677 3 0.4014 8 0.5888 10 0.5473 5 0.4703 2 0.6282 3 0.6686 60 0.5883 
44 4 0.6707 4 0.5643 3 0.1735 1 0.3359 7 0.4101 2 0.1387 7 0.4667 8 0.2953 4 0.3813 2 0.5000 2 0.5071 44 0.3932 
45 5 0.6668 4 0.7522 4 0.3391 0 0.0000 6 0.4279 2 0.2812 7 0.4928 3 0.1335 4 0.5436 2 0.7436 3 0.7467 40 0.4289 
46 3 0.5273 3 0.4400 7 0.7214 1 0.2490 9 0.7137 3 0.7245 9 0.6644 9 0.5690 5 0.6398 1 0.3846 2 0.5071 52 0.6001 
47 5 0.7155 3 0.5043 3 0.2636 1 0.3359 7 0.3022 2 0.1387 8 0.5659 4 0.1520 4 0.4345 2 0.5000 2 0.3381 41 0.3781 
48 6 0.7563 4 0.5612 7 0.6540 1 0.2490 6 0.3547 2 0.4873 5 0.3683 6 0.2748 5 0.5235 2 0.5000 2 0.4228 46 0.4493 
49 6 0.8074 4 0.5624 5 0.4933 1 0.2490 6 0.3215 1 0.2022 7 0.5665 9 0.3137 4 0.4332 2 0.6282 3 0.5033 48 0.4572 
50 5 0.7619 4 0.5612 4 0.2851 0 0.0000 6 0.3216 2 0.2774 8 0.6383 4 0.2447 4 0.4864 2 0.5000 3 0.4190 42 0.4205 
51 4 0.6707 3 0.5043 3 0.2058 1 0.3359 6 0.2774 0 0.0000 8 0.5914 5 0.2190 4 0.4864 2 0.5000 3 0.7538 39 0.3967 
52 6 0.8545 4 0.6891 5 0.4337 1 0.3359 8 0.4236 2 0.4161 7 0.5665 8 0.3908 4 0.4864 1 0.2564 3 0.5847 49 0.5022 
53 4 0.5726 2 0.3177 2 0.1462 0 0.0000 8 0.4569 3 0.5439 7 0.5435 7 0.4002 5 0.6456 2 0.5064 3 0.5029 43 0.4318 
































No. Quality No. Quality No. Score No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality 
55 6 0.7587 4 0.6236 7 0.8215 0 0.0000 4 0.2830 2 0.5547 6 0.4573 8 0.3747 4 0.5396 2 0.7436 2 0.3381 45 0.4937 
56 6 0.6502 3 0.3776 2 0.1413 0 0.0000 8 0.4515 0 0.0000 7 0.4851 8 0.2519 5 0.6368 2 0.5000 3 0.5810 44 0.3769 
57 5 0.6127 4 0.5012 7 0.6187 0 0.0000 9 0.5534 2 0.4835 8 0.6383 9 0.4232 4 0.4898 2 0.5064 3 0.5847 53 0.5209 
58 5 0.7109 3 0.5043 6 0.5889 1 0.2490 8 0.5123 3 0.6532 8 0.6144 7 0.4046 5 0.5088 2 0.7500 3 0.6653 51 0.5476 
59 5 0.7060 4 0.7472 5 0.5108 0 0.0000 9 0.5274 1 0.2022 8 0.6124 8 0.3386 5 0.6420 2 0.6346 3 0.4190 50 0.5036 
60 6 0.8050 4 0.6267 5 0.2498 0 0.0000 9 0.5484 3 0.6679 8 0.5914 6 0.2288 4 0.4366 2 0.7500 3 0.8343 50 0.4893 
61 7 0.8019 4 0.5000 4 0.4125 1 0.1660 9 0.6045 2 0.5547 6 0.4996 6 0.2840 4 0.5422 2 0.5000 3 0.7538 48 0.4961 
62 6 0.8146 4 0.8115 6 0.5147 2 0.3321 8 0.5076 3 0.5292 8 0.6168 10 0.5744 5 0.5075 1 0.2564 3 0.7500 56 0.5832 
63 6 0.8515 4 0.7472 7 0.5424 0 0.0000 9 0.5779 3 0.3867 8 0.6128 9 0.4183 5 0.6447 2 0.6282 3 0.5000 56 0.5542 
64 4 0.6707 4 0.6255 3 0.2547 0 0.0000 7 0.5342 3 0.7245 7 0.5946 7 0.4141 5 0.5607 2 0.8718 3 0.8381 45 0.5260 
65 6 0.6613 4 0.5000 2 0.2120 0 0.0000 7 0.4430 1 0.1348 8 0.6125 8 0.4102 5 0.5405 2 0.5000 3 0.6695 46 0.4469 
66 4 0.5733 4 0.6267 5 0.5642 2 0.5811 8 0.6840 3 0.7810 7 0.5126 11 0.5733 4 0.4864 2 0.7500 3 0.7500 53 0.5990 
67 7 0.9001 4 0.5000 7 0.6409 2 0.4981 10 0.7928 3 0.5966 8 0.5888 10 0.5497 5 0.5365 2 0.5000 3 0.6690 61 0.6273 
68 7 0.7605 3 0.4400 5 0.3801 0 0.0000 10 0.6608 3 0.4765 6 0.3913 8 0.5140 5 0.4717 2 0.7436 3 0.5847 52 0.4944 
69 6 0.7556 4 0.5643 7 0.6409 0 0.0000 6 0.3758 2 0.2480 8 0.6138 10 0.6539 5 0.5392 2 0.6282 3 0.5847 53 0.5465 
70 6 0.7602 4 0.5612 5 0.4381 0 0.0000 7 0.3165 2 0.2061 7 0.5647 9 0.5038 5 0.5365 2 0.6346 3 0.5000 50 0.4760 
71 4 0.5681 4 0.5633 5 0.4443 1 0.3359 9 0.6487 3 0.6679 9 0.6629 10 0.5277 4 0.4332 2 0.6282 3 0.6690 54 0.5655 
72 6 0.7076 4 0.7500 6 0.6914 1 0.3359 8 0.5736 3 0.5858 8 0.5888 11 0.5269 4 0.4864 2 0.6282 3 0.7504 56 0.5983 
73 5 0.8163 1 0.1224 5 0.4808 0 0.0000 8 0.5508 2 0.3154 7 0.5129 11 0.5674 5 0.6979 1 0.5128 2 0.3381 47 0.4942 
74 6 0.8146 3 0.5037 5 0.4938 0 0.0000 8 0.5853 3 0.4510 8 0.5979 11 0.5933 5 0.6952 2 0.7564 3 0.5000 54 0.5688 
75 5 0.8193 4 0.5003 7 0.4955 0 0.0000 9 0.7328 3 0.4014 8 0.6367 12 0.6791 5 0.6957 2 0.7564 3 0.5847 58 0.6106 
76 6 0.6054 3 0.2512 6 0.5981 0 0.0000 7 0.3503 2 0.1806 8 0.5501 6 0.2911 5 0.6979 2 0.3782 2 0.3381 47 0.4199 
77 7 0.9456 4 0.6224 5 0.4369 0 0.0000 7 0.3763 2 0.1240 8 0.5898 4 0.2280 5 0.6337 2 0.7564 3 0.5000 47 0.4676 
78 6 0.8154 4 0.7491 5 0.4154 2 0.5840 9 0.6045 3 0.3867 8 0.6662 9 0.5265 4 0.4345 2 0.8718 3 0.6690 55 0.5934 
79 6 0.8097 1 0.1224 6 0.6158 0 0.0000 8 0.4139 3 0.4579 9 0.6808 11 0.5126 5 0.6979 2 0.7564 3 0.5000 54 0.5349 
80 6 0.8515 4 0.6224 5 0.5137 0 0.0000 6 0.4209 1 0.0674 8 0.6409 9 0.3824 6 0.6791 2 0.5000 3 0.5000 50 0.5013 
































No. Quality No. Quality No. Score No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality 
82 5 0.7706 4 0.4988 4 0.3807 2 0.5840 8 0.5595 4 0.7627 8 0.6423 7 0.3565 4 0.4864 2 0.7436 3 0.7500 51 0.5553 
83 5 0.6095 3 0.4975 7 0.7101 0 0.0000 9 0.5478 2 0.3262 7 0.5380 9 0.4958 5 0.6368 2 0.5000 3 0.4153 52 0.5189 
84 6 0.8545 4 0.6233 6 0.5108 1 0.3359 9 0.4431 2 0.4161 7 0.5605 6 0.3771 5 0.4816 1 0.2436 3 0.6657 50 0.5084 
85 4 0.5670 4 0.6845 6 0.6629 1 0.1679 10 0.7072 3 0.5966 8 0.5888 11 0.6775 5 0.6511 2 0.7500 3 0.6690 57 0.6277 
86 6 0.8058 4 0.6879 6 0.4437 2 0.3340 8 0.4961 2 0.4328 8 0.5938 7 0.4086 4 0.4345 2 0.8718 3 0.6690 52 0.5364 
87 7 0.8537 4 0.7472 6 0.5112 0 0.0000 8 0.4535 2 0.1387 8 0.6128 7 0.2866 5 0.7981 2 0.7564 3 0.5000 52 0.5145 
88 4 0.6213 4 0.5612 5 0.5245 0 0.0000 9 0.5903 2 0.4873 8 0.6128 11 0.6007 4 0.4864 2 0.7500 3 0.4190 52 0.5457 
89 6 0.7610 4 0.5624 5 0.5133 0 0.0000 9 0.5843 3 0.5292 7 0.5160 10 0.4653 4 0.4332 2 0.7436 2 0.5067 52 0.5177 
90 7 0.8985 4 0.6224 5 0.3174 0 0.0000 8 0.5295 2 0.2774 8 0.5878 9 0.3750 4 0.4372 2 0.6282 3 0.5000 52 0.4837 
91 6 0.8082 4 0.6851 5 0.5220 0 0.0000 8 0.5841 4 0.7079 8 0.6132 10 0.6453 5 0.5334 2 0.8782 2 0.4228 54 0.5976 
92 4 0.5718 3 0.3715 7 0.6105 0 0.0000 9 0.5163 3 0.4014 9 0.6537 9 0.4830 5 0.5888 1 0.5128 2 0.4228 52 0.5113 
93 6 0.6652 3 0.4385 5 0.5600 1 0.2490 7 0.4770 4 0.7627 9 0.6563 11 0.5586 5 0.5866 2 0.3782 3 0.5876 56 0.5622 
94 7 0.8513 4 0.5643 5 0.4470 1 0.3321 8 0.5095 4 0.7518 8 0.5914 8 0.5064 4 0.4332 2 0.5000 3 0.6686 54 0.5566 
95 7 0.8985 4 0.6867 5 0.3996 0 0.0000 8 0.5309 0 0.0000 8 0.6154 8 0.3360 5 0.6394 2 0.6282 3 0.5000 50 0.4957 
96 6 0.8097 2 0.2466 5 0.4714 0 0.0000 8 0.6108 2 0.4161 8 0.5669 10 0.4469 5 0.7511 2 0.7564 3 0.5000 51 0.5233 
97 7 0.9074 2 0.1845 4 0.4583 0 0.0000 8 0.5249 3 0.6532 8 0.6389 10 0.5720 5 0.6420 1 0.5128 2 0.4228 50 0.5425 
98 6 0.7595 4 0.6860 6 0.5123 0 0.0000 8 0.5569 3 0.6571 7 0.5181 7 0.3717 4 0.4890 1 0.2564 3 0.5000 49 0.5031 
99 6 0.8074 4 0.7503 5 0.5216 1 0.3359 9 0.6002 2 0.4873 8 0.6279 5 0.2623 4 0.4864 2 0.5000 3 0.5847 49 0.5353 
100 7 0.9050 4 0.5606 6 0.6842 0 0.0000 9 0.6282 2 0.3448 8 0.6128 10 0.5725 6 0.8094 2 0.7564 3 0.5000 57 0.6089 
Mean 5.62 0.7404 3.61 0.5418 5.24 0.4842 0.51 0.1336 7.94 0.5237 2.41 0.4345 7.63 0.5823 8.56 0.4423 4.76 0.5724 1.83 0.5833 2.82 0.5646 50.93 0.5205 
Median 6 0.7575 4 0.5620 5 0.5110 0 0.0000 8 0.5285 2 0.4337 8 0.5914 9 0.4555 5 0.5464 2 0.5128 3 0.5071 52 0.5205 
Std. D 1.00 0.1038 0.69 0.1470 1.46 0.1570 0.66 0.1767 1.23 0.1230 0.81 0.1945 0.77 0.0675 2.13 0.1358 0.59 0.1003 0.38 0.1736 0.39 0.1377 4.95 0.0634 
Minimum 3 0.5273 1 0.1224 1 0.0703 0 0.0000 4 0.2774 0 0.0000 5 0.3683 2 0.1292 4 0.3813 1 0.2436 2 0.3381 36 0.3769 



































No. Quality No. Quality No. Score No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality 
1 5 0.4584 4 0.6224 4 0.4119 1 0.1679 8 0.4960 2 0.3154 5 0.3676 9 0.4624 5 0.5888 2 0.5000 3 0.3343 48 0.4388 
2 7 0.6574 3 0.3155 6 0.4821 1 0.2519 9 0.5744 3 0.5858 7 0.5639 9 0.4758 5 0.5897 2 0.8718 3 0.7500 55 0.5399 
3 7 0.7492 4 0.5612 7 0.6212 0 0.0000 8 0.4543 2 0.5547 9 0.6763 9 0.5222 4 0.6508 2 0.7500 3 0.6653 55 0.5765 
4 7 0.7996 4 0.5000 3 0.3076 1 0.3359 8 0.4478 3 0.5253 8 0.6149 7 0.2873 5 0.5897 2 0.5000 3 0.6690 51 0.4908 
5 7 0.9001 4 0.4357 6 0.5466 1 0.3359 9 0.7344 3 0.4432 6 0.4899 9 0.3793 4 0.4864 2 0.3718 2 0.3381 53 0.5184 
6 6 0.7022 4 0.5593 6 0.5922 0 0.0000 9 0.6269 2 0.5547 9 0.6814 10 0.4355 5 0.5897 2 0.3718 3 0.3347 56 0.5445 
7 6 0.7587 4 0.8115 7 0.7604 0 0.0000 7 0.4109 2 0.2774 6 0.4657 9 0.4129 5 0.5378 2 0.6218 3 0.5810 51 0.5157 
8 6 0.8545 3 0.5012 7 0.6904 1 0.3359 8 0.5514 2 0.5547 6 0.4682 8 0.4762 5 0.5365 2 0.3782 3 0.6690 51 0.5511 
9 6 0.8545 2 0.2549 4 0.2880 1 0.3359 5 0.2439 2 0.1387 8 0.6644 6 0.3100 4 0.5955 1 0.2564 2 0.4224 41 0.4212 
10 5 0.6662 4 0.7460 7 0.6567 0 0.0000 9 0.5269 2 0.4835 8 0.6447 9 0.5269 6 0.6108 2 0.6218 3 0.7538 55 0.5835 
11 5 0.7044 3 0.5025 7 0.5788 0 0.0000 8 0.5025 2 0.4122 7 0.5090 7 0.3913 5 0.5365 2 0.5000 2 0.3381 48 0.4774 
12 6 0.7563 4 0.5655 5 0.4443 1 0.1660 6 0.3474 3 0.5439 8 0.6404 6 0.2482 4 0.4890 2 0.3782 2 0.3339 47 0.4573 
13 6 0.8050 4 0.6236 6 0.5187 0 0.0000 9 0.7305 3 0.6679 7 0.5926 9 0.4790 5 0.5365 2 0.5064 3 0.4190 54 0.5652 
14 5 0.7619 4 0.5590 5 0.3855 0 0.0000 6 0.3975 2 0.1387 7 0.5650 7 0.2818 5 0.5365 2 0.6282 3 0.5000 46 0.4385 
15 7 0.9456 3 0.5606 5 0.4033 0 0.0000 7 0.4072 2 0.2061 8 0.5868 5 0.2523 5 0.5861 2 0.6218 3 0.5000 47 0.4638 
16 6 0.8020 4 0.8115 5 0.5460 0 0.0000 8 0.5045 2 0.2480 7 0.5696 8 0.3416 5 0.6425 2 0.6282 3 0.5000 50 0.5166 
17 7 0.8506 4 0.6248 7 0.6960 0 0.0000 8 0.5617 3 0.6532 6 0.5187 11 0.5740 5 0.6456 2 0.5000 3 0.5847 56 0.5862 
18 6 0.5655 3 0.3776 5 0.4371 0 0.0000 8 0.5481 2 0.4873 8 0.6137 7 0.3104 5 0.5378 2 0.6218 3 0.5843 49 0.4717 
19 7 0.8961 4 0.4388 7 0.7496 0 0.0000 9 0.6375 3 0.5107 8 0.6149 9 0.6044 5 0.6456 2 0.6218 2 0.3381 56 0.5985 
20 6 0.7085 4 0.4388 5 0.3946 0 0.0000 9 0.3993 3 0.3867 8 0.6411 9 0.4350 5 0.6425 1 0.5128 3 0.5000 53 0.4856 
21 5 0.7116 3 0.4400 5 0.2766 1 0.3359 9 0.5894 2 0.2100 7 0.5950 9 0.4037 6 0.6507 1 0.2436 3 0.7571 51 0.4927 
22 5 0.5687 3 0.4400 6 0.5809 0 0.0000 7 0.4720 3 0.6113 8 0.5637 7 0.3319 5 0.5924 2 0.5000 3 0.5847 49 0.4852 
23 6 0.6644 4 0.5624 6 0.5828 0 0.0000 6 0.3271 2 0.2100 7 0.5419 8 0.3229 6 0.6269 2 0.5000 3 0.5000 50 0.4536 
24 7 0.8474 3 0.3770 7 0.7174 0 0.0000 7 0.4235 2 0.2735 7 0.5180 8 0.4625 5 0.5897 2 0.4936 3 0.4190 51 0.4996 
25 5 0.7619 4 0.6224 6 0.5040 0 0.0000 7 0.4827 2 0.3611 8 0.6644 9 0.4909 6 0.7540 2 0.8718 3 0.5810 52 0.5619 
26 4 0.5718 4 0.4357 3 0.3479 0 0.0000 10 0.6839 2 0.3154 8 0.6619 10 0.6012 5 0.6948 2 0.7564 3 0.6695 51 0.5527 
































No. Quality No. Quality No. Score No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality 
28 4 0.5718 4 0.5000 5 0.3593 0 0.0000 8 0.4623 2 0.4285 8 0.5908 8 0.4638 5 0.6425 2 0.6346 3 0.4190 49 0.4809 
29 4 0.5718 3 0.3721 4 0.3239 0 0.0000 7 0.4430 1 0.2697 9 0.6330 9 0.4934 5 0.6425 2 0.6282 3 0.5000 47 0.4725 
30 7 0.7587 4 0.6242 6 0.6278 1 0.0830 9 0.7176 3 0.5253 8 0.6963 10 0.5364 6 0.7575 2 0.5000 3 0.6695 59 0.6246 
31 6 0.8545 4 0.6248 6 0.5897 0 0.0000 8 0.6402 2 0.4873 8 0.6407 11 0.6219 5 0.5897 1 0.3846 3 0.9190 54 0.6126 
32 4 0.6213 4 0.3745 5 0.3167 1 0.3321 9 0.6774 3 0.4726 7 0.5738 10 0.4460 4 0.4864 1 0.3846 3 0.9190 51 0.5138 
33 5 0.6118 4 0.5655 2 0.1413 2 0.4151 7 0.3776 2 0.4161 7 0.4928 3 0.1150 4 0.4864 2 0.5000 2 0.5071 40 0.3824 
34 4 0.7060 3 0.3727 7 0.5540 1 0.3321 7 0.5234 4 0.7226 6 0.4899 9 0.4271 4 0.4332 1 0.2564 2 0.5067 48 0.4961 
35 6 0.7605 4 0.6264 5 0.4626 1 0.2490 9 0.6049 3 0.5966 8 0.5888 12 0.6360 4 0.6508 2 0.8782 3 0.5843 57 0.6014 
36 6 0.8089 4 0.7472 5 0.4032 0 0.0000 7 0.3992 2 0.1240 8 0.5898 6 0.2557 5 0.6979 1 0.5128 3 0.5810 47 0.4699 
37 5 0.6189 4 0.4357 5 0.5684 0 0.0000 10 0.5715 3 0.4998 8 0.6379 11 0.6432 5 0.6979 2 0.7564 3 0.6690 56 0.5807 
38 4 0.6764 4 0.7534 2 0.1768 1 0.3359 8 0.4284 2 0.2480 9 0.6332 5 0.2529 4 0.4345 1 0.3654 3 0.7533 43 0.4496 
39 3 0.5273 3 0.3776 7 0.7893 1 0.1660 9 0.6786 3 0.5400 7 0.4416 11 0.6643 4 0.4332 2 0.3782 3 0.4190 53 0.5407 
40 5 0.7660 4 0.6255 4 0.4894 1 0.2519 10 0.6949 2 0.4873 5 0.4499 10 0.5848 4 0.4345 2 0.8718 3 0.6690 50 0.5634 
41 6 0.8074 3 0.3779 5 0.4835 2 0.6641 8 0.4744 2 0.4161 7 0.5138 8 0.3788 4 0.5396 2 0.7436 3 0.5847 50 0.5116 
42 6 0.8107 4 0.6255 6 0.6058 1 0.3359 8 0.5594 2 0.4873 8 0.5615 12 0.6403 5 0.5110 2 0.6218 3 0.6695 57 0.5939 
43 6 0.7675 4 0.6888 7 0.6069 2 0.3321 10 0.7378 3 0.5400 8 0.5888 11 0.5600 4 0.4864 2 0.6282 3 0.6686 60 0.6095 
44 4 0.5718 4 0.5643 2 0.1380 1 0.3359 7 0.4101 2 0.1387 8 0.5914 7 0.2722 4 0.3813 2 0.6218 2 0.5071 43 0.4026 
45 5 0.6668 4 0.7522 3 0.2953 0 0.0000 5 0.3504 1 0.0547 6 0.4194 3 0.1335 4 0.4372 2 0.7436 3 0.7467 36 0.3797 
46 3 0.5273 3 0.4400 7 0.7215 1 0.2490 9 0.6890 3 0.7810 9 0.6389 9 0.5091 5 0.6398 1 0.3846 2 0.5071 52 0.5856 
47 4 0.6213 3 0.5043 3 0.2636 1 0.3359 7 0.3022 2 0.1387 8 0.5659 3 0.1422 4 0.4345 2 0.5000 2 0.6762 39 0.3846 
48 5 0.5608 3 0.3776 7 0.4830 1 0.1660 6 0.2774 1 0.2138 5 0.3959 6 0.2140 4 0.4864 2 0.5000 3 0.5038 43 0.3670 
49 6 0.8074 4 0.5624 5 0.4181 1 0.2490 6 0.3225 3 0.5400 7 0.5435 8 0.3865 4 0.4332 2 0.5064 3 0.6653 49 0.4810 
50 5 0.7619 4 0.6224 4 0.2851 0 0.0000 7 0.3711 2 0.2774 8 0.6383 5 0.2695 5 0.5866 2 0.5000 3 0.5000 45 0.4472 
51 6 0.8545 3 0.5043 3 0.2768 1 0.3359 7 0.3281 0 0.0000 8 0.5914 6 0.2357 4 0.4864 2 0.5064 3 0.6728 43 0.4257 
52 6 0.8050 3 0.4419 6 0.5011 1 0.3359 8 0.4470 3 0.5858 7 0.5665 9 0.3770 4 0.4864 2 0.3782 3 0.5000 52 0.4986 
53 4 0.5726 2 0.2540 1 0.1066 0 0.0000 8 0.4597 2 0.4835 8 0.6144 6 0.3061 5 0.6456 2 0.5064 3 0.5029 41 0.4162 































No. Quality No. Quality No. Score No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality 
55 6 0.7580 4 0.6236 6 0.7186 0 0.0000 4 0.2830 2 0.4835 5 0.3959 8 0.3445 4 0.5396 2 0.5000 3 0.5000 44 0.4622 
56 6 0.6526 3 0.3776 1 0.0703 0 0.0000 8 0.3293 0 0.0000 7 0.4851 4 0.1738 5 0.5348 2 0.5000 3 0.5810 39 0.3323 
57 5 0.6667 3 0.3776 7 0.6187 0 0.0000 9 0.5534 2 0.4122 8 0.6383 8 0.4034 4 0.4898 1 0.3846 3 0.5847 50 0.5055 
58 5 0.7109 4 0.5624 5 0.3753 1 0.2490 9 0.5830 3 0.5858 8 0.6144 7 0.3118 5 0.4717 2 0.7500 3 0.6657 52 0.5143 
59 5 0.7060 4 0.6848 5 0.4714 0 0.0000 7 0.3529 1 0.2022 8 0.6124 4 0.2481 5 0.7453 2 0.6346 3 0.4190 44 0.4655 
60 6 0.7556 3 0.4400 6 0.3928 0 0.0000 9 0.5753 3 0.6679 8 0.5659 5 0.1452 4 0.4366 2 0.6282 3 0.7533 49 0.4648 
61 7 0.8513 4 0.5624 6 0.5586 1 0.1660 9 0.5794 2 0.5547 7 0.5685 7 0.3037 4 0.5422 2 0.7436 3 0.8381 52 0.5448 
62 6 0.8050 4 0.6236 5 0.5517 2 0.4151 9 0.5294 3 0.7098 8 0.6447 10 0.5496 5 0.5115 1 0.2564 3 0.7500 56 0.5913 
63 7 0.9456 4 0.5624 7 0.5424 0 0.0000 10 0.6835 3 0.3867 8 0.6128 9 0.3998 6 0.7509 2 0.6282 3 0.5000 59 0.5680 
64 4 0.6707 4 0.6879 4 0.2475 0 0.0000 7 0.5045 3 0.7245 7 0.5946 6 0.2103 5 0.5979 2 0.7500 3 0.9190 45 0.4940 
65 5 0.6118 4 0.5000 3 0.2768 0 0.0000 6 0.3741 1 0.2022 8 0.5896 9 0.3860 5 0.5405 2 0.3782 3 0.6695 46 0.4330 
66 6 0.7571 4 0.6267 6 0.5897 2 0.5811 9 0.7582 4 0.8905 7 0.5126 11 0.5911 5 0.5866 2 0.6282 3 0.7500 59 0.6404 
67 7 0.9001 4 0.5624 6 0.5260 0 0.0000 10 0.7657 3 0.5966 8 0.5659 9 0.5335 5 0.5365 2 0.5000 3 0.5847 57 0.5825 
68 4 0.5697 4 0.5646 5 0.4185 0 0.0000 10 0.7114 3 0.3339 6 0.3913 8 0.4690 4 0.4345 2 0.6218 3 0.4157 49 0.4666 
69 6 0.7556 4 0.5643 7 0.6058 0 0.0000 7 0.4252 2 0.2480 8 0.6389 10 0.4522 5 0.5392 1 0.5128 3 0.5847 53 0.5152 
70 6 0.7108 4 0.5000 5 0.4736 0 0.0000 4 0.2141 2 0.2061 8 0.6056 9 0.5260 5 0.5866 2 0.6346 3 0.6690 48 0.4815 
71 5 0.6671 4 0.5633 4 0.3799 1 0.3359 9 0.6204 3 0.6679 9 0.6102 10 0.5206 4 0.4332 2 0.7564 2 0.5071 53 0.5490 
72 7 0.7987 3 0.5040 6 0.6596 1 0.3359 7 0.4724 3 0.7245 8 0.5888 10 0.5744 4 0.4864 2 0.5064 3 0.7504 54 0.5849 
73 5 0.7603 2 0.1867 5 0.5203 0 0.0000 9 0.6785 2 0.2588 7 0.5129 10 0.5014 5 0.6477 1 0.5128 2 0.3381 48 0.4959 
74 6 0.8617 3 0.5037 4 0.4471 0 0.0000 8 0.6087 3 0.3378 8 0.5979 9 0.5266 5 0.7453 2 0.7564 3 0.5000 51 0.5566 
75 6 0.8648 4 0.5003 6 0.5395 0 0.0000 9 0.6553 3 0.5711 8 0.6367 11 0.6473 5 0.6957 2 0.7564 3 0.5847 57 0.6139 
76 6 0.6054 4 0.3736 6 0.5587 0 0.0000 8 0.3215 2 0.1806 8 0.5501 8 0.3358 5 0.6979 2 0.3782 3 0.4190 52 0.4319 
77 5 0.7619 4 0.5581 5 0.4369 0 0.0000 4 0.2530 1 0.0674 8 0.5852 3 0.1691 5 0.5334 2 0.7564 3 0.5000 40 0.4097 
78 5 0.6117 4 0.6848 5 0.4154 2 0.5000 9 0.6045 3 0.3193 8 0.6407 8 0.5068 4 0.4345 2 0.8718 3 0.6690 53 0.5562 
79 7 0.9008 1 0.1224 5 0.5118 0 0.0000 9 0.5407 2 0.3828 9 0.6547 10 0.5046 5 0.6979 2 0.7564 3 0.5000 53 0.5370 
80 6 0.8020 4 0.6224 4 0.4051 0 0.0000 9 0.5205 1 0.1348 8 0.6638 8 0.3384 6 0.6290 2 0.5000 3 0.5000 51 0.4941 































No. Quality No. Quality No. Score No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality 
82 5 0.7211 4 0.6233 5 0.4835 2 0.5840 10 0.6066 4 0.5948 8 0.5938 7 0.3461 4 0.4864 2 0.5000 3 0.6695 54 0.5455 
83 4 0.5625 3 0.4975 6 0.5981 0 0.0000 8 0.5045 1 0.2022 7 0.5380 10 0.4761 5 0.5866 1 0.2564 3 0.4153 48 0.4747 
84 6 0.8545 4 0.6233 6 0.4799 1 0.3359 8 0.3757 3 0.2665 7 0.5605 5 0.2863 5 0.4816 1 0.2436 3 0.6657 49 0.4721 
85 5 0.6118 4 0.6202 6 0.6629 1 0.1679 10 0.6765 3 0.5400 8 0.5888 11 0.6577 4 0.5396 2 0.8718 3 0.5847 57 0.6073 
86 6 0.8058 4 0.6879 6 0.5174 1 0.1660 9 0.5768 4 0.6896 8 0.5892 8 0.4074 4 0.4345 2 0.6218 3 0.6690 55 0.5534 
87 6 0.8067 4 0.7472 6 0.5435 0 0.0000 9 0.5301 2 0.1387 8 0.6128 7 0.2635 5 0.7480 2 0.6282 3 0.5000 52 0.5118 
88 5 0.7154 4 0.5000 5 0.4811 0 0.0000 6 0.3746 3 0.4726 8 0.6138 9 0.3728 4 0.4864 2 0.6218 3 0.4190 49 0.4735 
89 6 0.6620 4 0.5624 4 0.4480 0 0.0000 8 0.5358 3 0.5400 7 0.5160 9 0.4256 5 0.4833 2 0.7436 3 0.5000 51 0.4935 
90 7 0.8537 4 0.5581 5 0.2822 0 0.0000 8 0.5051 2 0.1387 8 0.5878 8 0.4104 4 0.4372 2 0.6282 3 0.4190 51 0.4626 
91 6 0.8082 4 0.5615 6 0.5509 0 0.0000 10 0.6868 3 0.4688 8 0.6132 9 0.6236 4 0.4332 2 0.7564 2 0.2538 54 0.5676 
92 4 0.5718 3 0.3715 5 0.5062 0 0.0000 7 0.3934 2 0.1914 10 0.6792 9 0.4773 5 0.5888 1 0.3846 3 0.4190 49 0.4712 
93 6 0.6652 3 0.4385 5 0.5245 1 0.2490 7 0.4770 4 0.7608 9 0.6323 12 0.5940 5 0.5866 2 0.3782 3 0.5876 57 0.5600 
94 5 0.6676 4 0.4982 4 0.4499 1 0.3321 8 0.4838 3 0.6424 8 0.5914 8 0.4042 4 0.4332 2 0.6282 3 0.6686 50 0.5137 
95 7 0.8985 4 0.6867 5 0.3996 0 0.0000 8 0.5309 0 0.0000 7 0.5136 6 0.2514 5 0.5893 2 0.6282 3 0.5000 47 0.4594 
96 6 0.8097 2 0.2466 5 0.4714 0 0.0000 8 0.6342 2 0.4161 8 0.5669 9 0.4432 5 0.7511 2 0.7564 3 0.5000 50 0.5256 
97 6 0.8155 2 0.1845 5 0.5025 0 0.0000 9 0.5703 2 0.1914 8 0.6128 9 0.4653 5 0.5888 1 0.5128 2 0.4228 49 0.4914 
98 6 0.8065 4 0.5637 5 0.4478 0 0.0000 8 0.5296 3 0.4618 7 0.5180 7 0.3480 4 0.4890 1 0.2564 3 0.6690 48 0.4807 
99 6 0.8074 4 0.7503 5 0.5613 1 0.3359 7 0.5017 2 0.4873 8 0.5542 7 0.4241 5 0.5235 2 0.5000 3 0.5847 50 0.5449 
100 7 0.9544 4 0.4357 5 0.4306 0 0.0000 9 0.6282 2 0.3448 8 0.6379 10 0.6204 6 0.8094 2 0.7564 2 0.2533 55 0.5772 
Mean 5.57 0.7317 3.60 0.5256 5.15 0.4746 0.48 0.1286 7.98 0.5138 2.33 0.4048 7.58 0.5752 8.13 0.4138 4.70 0.5636 1.79 0.5599 2.84 0.5644 50.15 0.5068 
Median 6 0.7560 4 0.5592 5 0.4833 0 0.0000 8 0.5220 2 0.4161 8 0.5894 9 0.4185 5 0.5401 2 0.5128 3 0.5810 51 0.4991 
Std. D 1.00 0.1104 0.64 0.1366 1.40 0.1511 0.63 0.1725 1.39 0.1352 0.83 0.1995 0.92 0.0694 2.14 0.1396 0.61 0.0995 0.43 0.1737 0.37 0.1470 5.08 0.0648 
Minimum 3 0.4584 1 0.1224 1 0.0703 0 0.0000 4 0.2141 0 0.0000 5 0.3676 3 0.1150 4 0.3813 0 0.0000 2 0.2533 36 0.3323 



































No. Quality No. Quality No. Score No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality 
1 5 0.4584 4 0.6897 5 0.4587 1 0.0840 7 0.4781 2 0.2588 6 0.3905 9 0.5301 5 0.5888 2 0.5000 3 0.4153 49 0.4588 
2 6 0.6118 2 0.1910 6 0.4742 1 0.2519 8 0.5229 3 0.5858 7 0.5893 6 0.3521 4 0.5949 2 0.5000 2 0.5071 47 0.4803 
3 7 0.8474 4 0.5000 6 0.5567 0 0.0000 8 0.4812 2 0.5547 9 0.6511 9 0.4975 5 0.7009 2 0.7564 3 0.6653 55 0.5724 
4 7 0.7996 3 0.3133 5 0.4391 0 0.0000 7 0.4242 3 0.5107 7 0.5378 6 0.2922 5 0.5897 2 0.6282 3 0.5843 48 0.4609 
5 7 0.6957 3 0.3115 4 0.3248 1 0.1679 9 0.6035 3 0.4541 6 0.4648 10 0.4227 4 0.4890 2 0.3718 3 0.5000 52 0.4555 
6 6 0.7477 4 0.5000 7 0.6241 0 0.0000 9 0.5741 2 0.5547 8 0.5284 9 0.4361 5 0.6456 2 0.5000 2 0.5076 54 0.5311 
7 6 0.8058 3 0.4951 7 0.7924 1 0.0840 7 0.4109 2 0.3448 7 0.5126 9 0.5096 5 0.4846 2 0.6218 3 0.4190 52 0.5216 
8 6 0.8545 2 0.3084 5 0.4715 0 0.0000 8 0.6327 2 0.4835 7 0.4621 6 0.4057 6 0.6295 2 0.7436 3 0.5881 47 0.5068 
9 7 0.8552 1 0.1285 3 0.1380 1 0.2519 6 0.2934 2 0.1387 8 0.5876 7 0.3843 4 0.5436 2 0.6346 3 0.5033 44 0.4095 
10 6 0.7022 4 0.6215 7 0.6534 0 0.0000 7 0.4469 2 0.4122 7 0.5685 9 0.4642 6 0.6295 2 0.6218 3 0.7538 53 0.5407 
11 6 0.7028 3 0.4339 7 0.7215 1 0.2490 8 0.5025 3 0.7245 6 0.4098 7 0.3568 5 0.5183 2 0.6218 2 0.3381 50 0.4966 
12 5 0.5608 3 0.3727 4 0.2906 1 0.1660 6 0.3718 3 0.6113 8 0.6153 4 0.1751 5 0.4873 1 0.2436 2 0.3305 42 0.3959 
13 6 0.8050 4 0.6236 6 0.4790 0 0.0000 9 0.6778 3 0.5966 6 0.4648 10 0.5143 5 0.5365 1 0.3846 3 0.4190 53 0.5298 
14 7 0.8537 4 0.4978 5 0.3855 0 0.0000 8 0.5075 2 0.1387 7 0.5134 6 0.2598 5 0.5365 2 0.7436 3 0.5000 49 0.4468 
15 7 0.9456 4 0.6860 6 0.5351 0 0.0000 10 0.6328 1 0.2697 7 0.5158 9 0.4237 4 0.5814 2 0.6282 3 0.5000 53 0.5361 
16 7 0.8491 4 0.5581 5 0.5105 0 0.0000 7 0.4678 2 0.1914 8 0.5914 8 0.3399 6 0.6295 2 0.6282 3 0.4190 52 0.4897 
17 7 0.8011 4 0.4994 6 0.6179 0 0.0000 8 0.4747 3 0.6532 6 0.4648 11 0.5244 6 0.7571 2 0.5000 3 0.5000 56 0.5405 
18 5 0.5694 3 0.3133 5 0.3621 0 0.0000 6 0.3744 2 0.5547 8 0.6155 7 0.2873 5 0.5937 2 0.6218 3 0.6690 46 0.4460 
19 5 0.7603 3 0.4339 7 0.7107 0 0.0000 9 0.5557 3 0.5253 8 0.5992 9 0.5212 5 0.6456 2 0.5000 3 0.4190 54 0.5558 
20 6 0.6590 3 0.3715 5 0.4295 0 0.0000 8 0.4044 3 0.3867 8 0.5898 9 0.3470 5 0.6425 1 0.5128 3 0.5000 51 0.4572 
21 5 0.7603 2 0.3115 6 0.3205 1 0.3359 9 0.5980 2 0.2812 7 0.5126 9 0.4121 5 0.6456 1 0.3654 3 0.8381 50 0.4923 
22 5 0.5679 2 0.3115 6 0.5414 0 0.0000 7 0.4279 2 0.4873 8 0.5637 8 0.3493 4 0.5422 2 0.3782 3 0.5000 47 0.4500 
23 4 0.5138 3 0.3727 7 0.5784 0 0.0000 6 0.4108 2 0.2812 8 0.5637 6 0.3354 5 0.6456 2 0.5000 3 0.5000 46 0.4494 
24 5 0.6536 2 0.2472 6 0.4426 0 0.0000 7 0.3838 3 0.4363 7 0.4897 6 0.3326 5 0.4833 2 0.3718 3 0.4190 46 0.4087 
25 5 0.7619 4 0.5581 5 0.3996 0 0.0000 7 0.4359 1 0.1348 8 0.5924 8 0.3838 5 0.6425 2 0.5000 3 0.5000 48 0.4712 
26 4 0.5177 4 0.4357 3 0.2826 0 0.0000 10 0.6529 1 0.2022 8 0.6365 9 0.4627 5 0.6447 2 0.7564 3 0.5000 49 0.4901 
































No. Quality No. Quality No. Score No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality 
28 4 0.5625 3 0.4963 4 0.3239 0 0.0000 8 0.4730 2 0.2588 8 0.5908 10 0.5096 5 0.5924 1 0.5128 3 0.5000 48 0.4712 
29 4 0.5718 3 0.3721 6 0.5093 0 0.0000 8 0.4969 1 0.2022 8 0.6125 9 0.4681 5 0.5365 2 0.5064 3 0.4190 49 0.4718 
30 6 0.6103 4 0.5600 6 0.5835 1 0.0830 10 0.7684 3 0.5400 7 0.5427 10 0.5491 6 0.6330 2 0.5000 3 0.6695 58 0.5753 
31 6 0.8074 3 0.4351 7 0.7575 0 0.0000 9 0.6242 2 0.5547 8 0.6696 10 0.6019 5 0.6456 1 0.2564 3 0.9190 54 0.6178 
32 5 0.7163 4 0.3745 5 0.3167 1 0.3321 9 0.7043 3 0.5966 5 0.4769 10 0.4652 4 0.5422 1 0.2564 3 0.8381 50 0.5153 
33 6 0.7108 3 0.3727 1 0.0703 1 0.2490 7 0.3529 2 0.4161 7 0.5486 3 0.0904 4 0.4864 2 0.5000 2 0.5071 38 0.3646 
34 5 0.7553 3 0.3115 3 0.3078 1 0.2490 7 0.4987 3 0.6005 7 0.5378 10 0.4861 4 0.4332 1 0.2564 2 0.5067 46 0.4733 
35 5 0.7110 3 0.3715 4 0.2909 1 0.2490 9 0.6211 3 0.4579 6 0.4418 11 0.5972 5 0.7511 1 0.3846 2 0.4224 50 0.5067 
36 5 0.7619 4 0.6224 5 0.4354 0 0.0000 6 0.3722 1 0.1697 7 0.5661 6 0.2553 5 0.6979 1 0.5128 3 0.5000 43 0.4519 
37 4 0.5199 4 0.4357 5 0.4938 0 0.0000 9 0.4465 2 0.2588 8 0.6379 10 0.4821 5 0.6979 2 0.7564 3 0.6690 52 0.5066 
38 5 0.8147 3 0.5037 4 0.3440 1 0.3359 9 0.5025 2 0.2735 7 0.4852 5 0.2548 5 0.4846 1 0.2436 3 0.8343 45 0.4517 
39 5 0.6678 2 0.3115 6 0.7592 1 0.1660 9 0.6491 3 0.5382 8 0.4620 11 0.7318 4 0.4890 2 0.3782 3 0.4190 54 0.5604 
40 5 0.5736 3 0.4951 4 0.4183 1 0.1679 8 0.5037 3 0.4726 5 0.4750 8 0.4230 5 0.4846 2 0.5000 3 0.6690 47 0.4703 
41 7 0.7046 4 0.4370 5 0.5191 0 0.0000 7 0.5047 3 0.5184 8 0.5656 9 0.4283 5 0.5378 2 0.7436 3 0.5847 53 0.5086 
42 5 0.6725 3 0.3705 6 0.6810 0 0.0000 8 0.5594 4 0.5948 8 0.5934 12 0.6408 5 0.4868 2 0.6218 3 0.5885 56 0.5639 
43 6 0.6694 3 0.4960 7 0.5351 2 0.4981 10 0.7886 3 0.6113 7 0.5366 11 0.5995 5 0.5897 2 0.6282 3 0.6686 59 0.6037 
44 4 0.5718 3 0.3715 3 0.1735 0 0.0000 7 0.4101 3 0.1953 7 0.4946 8 0.2901 5 0.4873 2 0.5000 2 0.5071 44 0.3722 
45 4 0.6220 3 0.4951 2 0.1141 0 0.0000 6 0.4043 0 0.0000 6 0.4194 4 0.1877 4 0.4904 2 0.7436 3 0.8310 34 0.3592 
46 4 0.6184 3 0.2491 7 0.6889 0 0.0000 9 0.7147 3 0.7810 8 0.5661 9 0.4917 5 0.6425 1 0.2564 2 0.5071 51 0.5490 
47 4 0.5184 2 0.3115 3 0.2241 1 0.3359 7 0.3022 2 0.1387 6 0.3913 4 0.1647 5 0.4846 2 0.5000 3 0.8381 39 0.3432 
48 6 0.6519 4 0.3745 7 0.5538 1 0.1660 6 0.3816 2 0.4873 6 0.4422 8 0.3229 4 0.4864 1 0.3846 3 0.5847 48 0.4384 
49 6 0.8074 4 0.4982 5 0.3786 1 0.2490 6 0.2955 2 0.5547 7 0.4929 9 0.3238 5 0.4833 2 0.6282 3 0.6653 50 0.4579 
50 6 0.8067 3 0.4938 4 0.3326 0 0.0000 6 0.3474 2 0.1387 7 0.5388 5 0.3282 5 0.5866 2 0.5000 3 0.5000 43 0.4288 
51 6 0.8545 2 0.3739 3 0.2471 1 0.3359 10 0.4531 1 0.1348 8 0.6144 4 0.2809 5 0.5405 2 0.6346 3 0.6728 45 0.4572 
52 6 0.8050 2 0.2491 6 0.4978 1 0.3359 7 0.3774 2 0.1387 6 0.4648 7 0.2983 4 0.4864 2 0.3782 3 0.5000 46 0.4187 
53 4 0.5726 1 0.1224 2 0.1768 0 0.0000 8 0.4300 2 0.3486 6 0.4418 8 0.3558 4 0.5955 2 0.5064 3 0.5029 40 0.3774 
































No. Quality No. Quality No. Score No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality 
55 7 0.7476 3 0.4951 6 0.7186 0 0.0000 5 0.3497 2 0.5547 6 0.4372 10 0.4300 5 0.5897 2 0.5000 3 0.5000 49 0.4909 
56 6 0.7020 2 0.2491 1 0.0703 0 0.0000 8 0.3293 0 0.0000 7 0.4851 7 0.2272 5 0.5906 2 0.5000 3 0.5000 41 0.3372 
57 5 0.6094 3 0.3133 4 0.3788 0 0.0000 9 0.4710 2 0.4122 7 0.5617 9 0.3984 5 0.5918 2 0.6282 3 0.5004 49 0.4568 
58 6 0.7564 2 0.3115 5 0.4142 1 0.2490 8 0.5128 3 0.6424 7 0.5936 7 0.3104 5 0.5405 2 0.7500 3 0.6690 49 0.5012 
59 5 0.6135 4 0.6205 5 0.3963 0 0.0000 5 0.3025 1 0.2022 8 0.5888 5 0.2645 5 0.5918 2 0.6346 3 0.4190 43 0.4250 
60 6 0.8050 2 0.3115 5 0.2966 0 0.0000 8 0.4808 3 0.6679 8 0.5683 2 0.1025 4 0.4925 2 0.6282 3 0.7533 43 0.4350 
61 6 0.6470 3 0.4339 5 0.5191 1 0.1660 9 0.5237 2 0.5547 8 0.4926 6 0.2789 4 0.5422 1 0.2564 3 0.7538 48 0.4701 
62 6 0.8050 3 0.4951 5 0.5191 1 0.2490 7 0.4958 3 0.6424 7 0.5617 9 0.5101 5 0.5115 2 0.6218 2 0.4224 50 0.5378 
63 7 0.9456 4 0.6205 7 0.5424 0 0.0000 9 0.6320 3 0.3867 7 0.5617 9 0.4004 5 0.5374 2 0.6282 3 0.5000 56 0.5396 
64 4 0.6707 4 0.4969 3 0.2182 0 0.0000 7 0.4563 3 0.5858 7 0.5946 8 0.3835 6 0.5737 2 0.8718 3 0.7571 47 0.4870 
65 5 0.5631 4 0.5000 2 0.2123 0 0.0000 6 0.3493 1 0.2697 8 0.5393 8 0.3871 5 0.5405 2 0.3782 3 0.6695 44 0.4139 
66 6 0.7571 3 0.4339 6 0.6294 2 0.4151 10 0.7865 4 0.8905 7 0.5378 10 0.5811 5 0.6425 2 0.6282 3 0.7500 58 0.6348 
67 7 0.6478 3 0.3727 7 0.6012 2 0.4981 8 0.6083 3 0.6532 8 0.5183 12 0.5655 5 0.5918 2 0.6282 3 0.6619 60 0.5710 
68 5 0.6686 3 0.3718 4 0.3834 0 0.0000 8 0.5415 2 0.2061 6 0.4192 8 0.3916 5 0.4846 2 0.6218 3 0.6657 46 0.4363 
69 4 0.6169 3 0.3715 6 0.4699 0 0.0000 7 0.4486 2 0.2588 8 0.6389 11 0.6313 5 0.5392 1 0.5128 3 0.5847 50 0.5092 
70 6 0.8097 4 0.5000 5 0.3876 0 0.0000 8 0.3906 2 0.2061 8 0.6009 10 0.5297 5 0.5866 1 0.5128 3 0.5000 52 0.4907 
71 5 0.6623 4 0.4360 4 0.3799 1 0.1679 9 0.5956 4 0.7081 8 0.5591 8 0.3960 6 0.6078 2 1.0000 2 0.5071 53 0.5229 
72 7 0.7987 3 0.4419 6 0.5846 0 0.0000 6 0.4237 3 0.6571 7 0.5126 10 0.5146 4 0.5955 2 0.7500 3 0.6657 51 0.5361 
73 5 0.7603 2 0.2478 5 0.5203 0 0.0000 8 0.5437 2 0.1914 7 0.5129 12 0.6770 5 0.6477 1 0.5128 2 0.3381 49 0.5091 
74 6 0.9104 3 0.5037 4 0.4148 0 0.0000 7 0.5826 3 0.3944 8 0.5979 9 0.4793 5 0.6451 2 0.7564 3 0.5000 50 0.5411 
75 6 0.8648 3 0.2488 5 0.3884 0 0.0000 9 0.6268 2 0.3720 8 0.6367 11 0.6174 5 0.6456 2 0.6346 3 0.4190 54 0.5436 
76 5 0.6079 3 0.4951 6 0.5192 0 0.0000 9 0.3632 2 0.2480 7 0.5776 9 0.4809 5 0.5918 2 0.6282 3 0.4157 51 0.4743 
77 6 0.8515 4 0.5581 5 0.4369 0 0.0000 5 0.3232 1 0.0674 7 0.5617 5 0.2334 5 0.5334 2 0.8782 3 0.5000 43 0.4369 
78 5 0.7235 3 0.5563 5 0.4154 2 0.5000 9 0.6653 3 0.5292 7 0.5896 8 0.4147 4 0.3813 2 0.8718 3 0.6690 51 0.5477 
79 6 0.8097 1 0.1224 6 0.6085 0 0.0000 9 0.5971 2 0.3154 8 0.6138 10 0.5287 5 0.6979 2 0.7564 3 0.6695 52 0.5482 
80 6 0.8020 4 0.5581 4 0.2496 0 0.0000 9 0.4503 2 0.1914 8 0.5878 6 0.2540 6 0.7350 2 0.5000 3 0.5000 50 0.4476 
































No. Quality No. Quality No. Score No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality No. Quality 
82 6 0.7139 4 0.5624 4 0.3404 1 0.3321 8 0.4019 4 0.4561 8 0.5683 10 0.4725 5 0.5365 1 0.2564 2 0.4228 53 0.4811 
83 4 0.5625 3 0.5587 6 0.5981 0 0.0000 8 0.5513 1 0.1348 7 0.5380 10 0.4582 5 0.5365 1 0.2564 3 0.4153 48 0.4739 
84 6 0.7556 4 0.4348 3 0.2214 1 0.1679 8 0.3757 3 0.1953 7 0.5605 7 0.3274 5 0.4873 2 0.6218 3 0.5810 49 0.4259 
85 5 0.6118 4 0.5606 6 0.6560 1 0.1679 10 0.6589 3 0.5400 8 0.6168 11 0.6594 5 0.5897 2 0.7500 3 0.5847 58 0.6055 
86 7 0.6478 4 0.7491 5 0.4509 0 0.0000 8 0.5254 3 0.4579 6 0.4441 7 0.2975 4 0.4345 2 0.7436 3 0.6690 49 0.4692 
87 6 0.8067 4 0.6830 6 0.4362 0 0.0000 8 0.5031 2 0.2061 7 0.5112 7 0.3106 5 0.7428 2 0.6282 3 0.5000 50 0.4858 
88 4 0.5610 3 0.3715 6 0.5800 0 0.0000 6 0.3305 2 0.4161 6 0.4372 11 0.4530 5 0.5365 2 0.6218 3 0.4190 48 0.4403 
89 5 0.6623 3 0.5575 6 0.6212 0 0.0000 6 0.4996 2 0.4161 8 0.5382 8 0.4603 5 0.5897 2 0.6218 3 0.5843 48 0.5189 
90 7 0.8491 4 0.5581 5 0.2822 0 0.0000 8 0.5051 2 0.1387 7 0.4883 7 0.2635 5 0.5374 2 0.7564 3 0.5000 50 0.4356 
91 6 0.7540 3 0.4951 6 0.5864 0 0.0000 10 0.6375 3 0.5107 7 0.5382 7 0.4295 4 0.4332 2 0.5064 3 0.5000 51 0.5161 
92 4 0.5718 2 0.1264 4 0.4015 0 0.0000 7 0.3231 2 0.1914 9 0.6635 10 0.4843 5 0.5888 1 0.3846 3 0.4190 47 0.4321 
93 6 0.6652 3 0.4385 3 0.2681 1 0.2490 7 0.4770 4 0.5948 8 0.5306 10 0.5190 5 0.5866 2 0.3782 3 0.5033 52 0.4874 
94 4 0.6764 3 0.3715 3 0.3480 1 0.2490 8 0.5323 3 0.7136 8 0.5898 10 0.5541 4 0.4332 1 0.3846 3 0.6686 48 0.5187 
95 7 0.8985 3 0.4339 5 0.3996 0 0.0000 7 0.3834 0 0.0000 7 0.5136 4 0.1613 5 0.5392 2 0.7564 3 0.5000 43 0.4077 
96 6 0.8097 2 0.2466 5 0.5110 0 0.0000 8 0.5803 2 0.2588 8 0.5669 9 0.3955 5 0.7511 2 0.7564 3 0.5000 50 0.5058 
97 6 0.8155 2 0.1845 4 0.4626 0 0.0000 8 0.5497 2 0.3154 8 0.6128 9 0.5148 5 0.5888 1 0.5128 2 0.4228 47 0.5001 
98 4 0.5640 2 0.3109 5 0.4437 0 0.0000 8 0.6038 3 0.5184 6 0.4165 6 0.3071 4 0.4890 2 0.5000 3 0.7533 43 0.4418 
99 6 0.6598 3 0.4963 5 0.5216 1 0.2519 7 0.5017 2 0.5547 8 0.5542 6 0.3485 5 0.5924 2 0.5000 3 0.5847 48 0.5031 
100 6 0.7659 4 0.4360 5 0.3911 0 0.0000 9 0.6035 3 0.4688 8 0.6128 10 0.5844 5 0.6979 2 0.7564 3 0.5847 55 0.5573 
Mean 5.52 0.7082 3.10 0.4272 4.94 0.4425 0.40 0.0917 7.82 0.4988 2.31 0.3971 7.25 0.5385 8.19 0.4112 4.86 0.5718 1.76 0.5538 2.86 0.5611 49.01 0.4839 
Median 6 0.7109 3 0.4354 5 0.4380 0 0.0000 8 0.4978 2 0.4161 7 0.5457 9 0.4187 5 0.5866 2 0.5128 3 0.5033 49 0.4835 
Std. D 0.99 0.1117 0.78 0.1325 1.41 0.1585 0.57 0.1389 1.27 0.1216 0.84 0.1956 0.83 0.0668 2.20 0.1321 0.53 0.0818 0.45 0.1724 0.35 0.1305 4.81 0.0609 
Minimum 3 0.4584 1 0.1224 1 0.0703 0 0.0000 5 0.2934 0 0.0000 5 0.3905 2 0.0904 4 0.3813 0 0.0000 2 0.3305 34 0.3372 
Maximum 7 0.9456 4 0.7491 7 0.7924 2 0.5000 10 0.8189 4 0.8905 9 0.6696 12 0.7318 6 0.7571 2 1.0000 3 0.9190 60 0.6348 
